

James Longstreet

James Longstreet

I. Soldier

By Donald Bridgman Sanger

II. Politician, Officeholder, and Writer

By Thomas Robson Hay



LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Baton Rouge

COPYRIGHT 1952
BY LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC., BINGHAMTON, N. Y.

Publisher's Preface

Colonel D. B. Sanger's study of General Longstreet's military career was submitted for publication by the author's brother, Alan B. Sanger, shortly after Colonel Sanger's death in California, February 10, 1947. Because of poor health and the intervention of World War II, with its unusual demands upon his time and energy, he was never able to carry his account beyond the surrender of Appomattox Courthouse, except for a brief addendum.

Since Longstreet's postwar career was not only a lengthy one but eventful and controversial as well, it seemed essential that the biography should be completed if it was to be published. Thomas Robson Hay, author of *Hood's Tennessee Campaign* and other studies on the Civil War period, was asked to write Part II, covering the later years of the General's life. He was also requested to edit Colonel Sanger's portion of the biography and prepare a bibliography for it, and to compile an index for the entire volume.

Thus, the biography appears in two parts, the first written by a United States Army officer who, during his lifetime of service, had studied the military career of Longstreet, and the second prepared by a specialist in the field of Civil War history. Instead of having suffered because of Colonel Sanger's inability to complete it, the biography has actually been strengthened by having had Mr. Hay's valuable assistance in its preparation.

Contents

Publisher's Preface	v
List of Illustrations	ix
List of Maps	xi

I. SOLDIER

Introduction	3
I Preparation	5
II Blackburn's Ford	21
III First Manassas and After	28
IV Off to the Peninsula	38
V Seven Pines	50
VI From Fair Oaks to Malvern Hill	62
VII Second Manassas	77
VIII The First Northern Invasion	91
IX Fredericksburg	105
X The Spring of 1863	118
XI Operations Around Suffolk	137
XII On to Gettysburg	156
XIII The First Corps at Gettysburg	173
XIV The Return to Virginia	189
XV Chickamauga	200
XVI Knoxville	217
XVII Winter in East Tennessee	235
XVIII The Wilderness	256
XIX With Lee's Left Wing	277
XX The Last March	292
XXI Appomattox	305
Critical Essay on Authorities	311

II. POLITICIAN, OFFICEHOLDER, AND WRITER

Introduction	315
I A Soldier Turns to Peaceful Ways	317
II Louisiana Radical	345

III	Diplomat and Georgia Politician	376
IV	Marking Time	397
V	The Soldier's Story	410
VI	The End of the Road	437
	Epilogue	444
	Critical Essay on Authorities	448
	Index	453

List of Illustrations

	<i>facing page</i>
Mrs. James Longstreet and Children	14
General James Longstreet, C.S.A.	124
Letter of Recommendation for Longstreet from Lee	342
James Longstreet, about 1872	362
James Longstreet, 1895	432

List of Maps

	<i>facing page</i>
Second Battle of Manassas (from Johnson and Buel, eds., <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	88
Suffolk and Vicinity	140
Battle of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863, about 3:30 P.M. (from <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	170
Battle of Gettysburg, July 2, about 7:15 P.M. (from <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	178
Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, about 3:15 P.M. (from <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	184
Battlefield of Chickamauga (from <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	210
Knoxville and East Tennessee	236
Battle of the Wilderness	270
Last Campaign and Surrender (from <i>Battles and Leaders</i>)	300

I. Soldier

Introduction

WHEN THE DRAMATIC MOMENT CAME THAT THE FATE OF THE UNION WAS AT stake, James Longstreet cast his lot with the Confederacy and served her faithfully in all grades from brigadier to lieutenant general. He participated in almost every campaign against the Army of the Potomac, as well as in the battle of Chickamauga and in East Tennessee. He was Lee's mainstay in the important tactical movements from Seven Days to the final surrender at Appomattox. The summer of 1864, when he was recuperating from wounds received at the Wilderness, marks his only extended absence from the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. No other corps commander of the South had so wide an experience.

In this book I have tried, in a detailed account of his colorful life and campaigns, to give a true estimate of his ability as a general and his value to the South. Without possessing the strategic brilliancy of either Lee or Jackson, he was, I believe, superior to both in battle leadership and in an appreciation of tactical values. He knew instinctively the exact moment for the counter-stroke. Defensively, he was, as Grant said, Lee's best general, and the crushing effect of his well-timed assaults at Second Manassas, Chickamauga Creek, and the Wilderness, are eloquent testimonials of his skill on the offensive. He was the best fighting general in the armies of the Confederacy and the best corps commander, North or South.

Since this is the first extended critical study of General Longstreet, I have taken the liberty of giving frequent references to authorities cited. A list of references will be found at the end of Part I.

This study was completed in 1933 and put aside. At the suggestion of Thomas Robson Hay, it was revived and completely revised in the light of new sources of material and professional studies appearing since that date. In this revision, the writer cannot escape the debt he owes to Mr. Hay for a patience and gentle criticism far outreaching that usually to be found among kindred scholars. It was only with the greatest reluctance that I disregarded any part of his helpful and understanding criticism. Needless to say, the conclusions herein are directly chargeable to me, as well as any errors which may have been overlooked.

I am also indebted to my former teacher and friend, Professor William

E. Dodd, of the University of Chicago, for helpful guidance in selecting the material and in the preliminary work of preparing the manuscript; to my good friend and colleague, Colonel Robert E. Wyllie, formerly of the General Staff Corps, for his invaluable criticism and many suggestions; to Brigadier General Evan H. Humphrey, Cavalry, for an authoritative criticism of the cavalry operations described in the text; to Katherine Hall, of the libraries of the University of Chicago, for her enthusiastic response to my many requests; and to the highly efficient personnel of the Old Records Section of the War Department, particularly Louis A. Rosafy, for courtesies too numerous to mention. I am greatly in debt to Colonel Robert Lee Longstreet for the information regarding the incidents surrounding the early life of his distinguished father. To my wife, Margaret Burrell Sanger, I am indeed grateful for her ever-painstaking criticism and constant support.

New York, 1939

DONALD BRIDGMAN SANGER

Preparation

JAMES LONGSTREET WAS BORN ON JANUARY 8, 1821; HE DIED JANUARY 2, 1904. The eighty-three years between these dates were richer and more varied in human experience than are most lifetimes. Born amid modest circumstances, James Longstreet tasted from boyhood all the sweet and the bitter of life. Destined for the career of a soldier, he was fortunate in his early training and environment—and doubly so in the opportunities which later came to him.

According to the best information, Longstreet's ancestors were from the Netherlands, probably from the neighborhood of Utrecht. In 1657, Dirck Stoffels Langestraet came to the New Netherlands, then under Dutch control but soon to be New York. He settled in Amersfort (Flatlands), about three miles from the village of Breuckelen (Brooklyn). Sometime between 1698 and 1700, Dirck Stoffels Langestraet moved with his family to Monmouth County, New Jersey. His son, Stoffel Dircksen Langestraet, born in Flatlands about 1666 and married about 1695, was living in 1726 in Shrewsbury in East Jersey. His son Stoffel, the first to spell the name "Longstreet," was born on July 14, 1712, married Abigail Wooley on December 16, 1743, and lived most of his life on a farm near Allentown, Upper Freehold Township, New Jersey, where he died on August 31, 1782.¹

Stoffel Longstreet's son, William, was born on the family farm near Allentown, New Jersey, on October 6, 1759, and in his youth showed a marked mechanical skill. About 1780, he became interested in the steam engine, probably as a result of the experiments of John Fitch and Oliver Evans, which were then being carried on in the neighborhood. About 1784 or 1785, after his marriage to Hannah Randolph, William Longstreet moved to Augusta, Georgia, where he established his home and resumed his steam engine experiments. In 1787, he first applied steam as motive power to a small boat in the Savannah River. He received little encouragement in the conduct of his experiments and less in the way of financial aid. He persevered, however, and appealed to Governor Edward Telfair of Georgia for aid. The letter, dated September 26, 1790, was published in Savannah and Augusta newspapers, but without avail. In the meantime, young Longstreet experimented with steam-operated cotton gins, portable sawmills, and other power-driven

¹ Edward Mayes, *Genealogy of the Family of Longstreet* (Jackson, Miss., 1893 [?]), 16-25.

machines used in the local economy. Handicapped by lack of funds and public indifference, he produced but a small output and did not live to see any wide application of his steam engine. About 1800, he moved his family to a small plantation near Edgefield, South Carolina, some twenty-five miles north of Augusta; but he apparently spent much time thereafter in travel between the two towns.²

James Longstreet, the oldest child of William and Hannah Longstreet and the father of the future Confederate general, was born about 1784, before the family removed to Georgia. His brother, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, was afterwards famous as a jurist, educator, and writer and was the author of *Georgia Scenes*, a type of American literature later exemplified in the Uncle Remus stories and *Huckleberry Finn*. James Longstreet became a cotton planter and in 1814 married Mary Anne Dent, the daughter of Marshall and Ann (Magruder) Dent, who had but recently moved to Augusta, Georgia, from Charles County, Maryland. Their fifth child, James, was born in Edgefield, South Carolina, on January 8, 1821, while his mother was visiting her husband's parents. The future soldier later became related to his future friend, schoolmate, and military opponent Ulysses Simpson Grant, whose wife and Longstreet were descended from two brothers, George and Peter Dent of Charles County, Maryland, in the fifth generation. The kinship was not very close, perhaps, but still it was a bond that in future years asserted itself on important occasions. Through his grandfather Marshall Dent, Longstreet was also related to John Marshall, the famous chief justice of the United States Supreme Court.³

Tradition remains today the sole source of information concerning James Longstreet's boyhood, which was spent on a plantation near Gainesville, Georgia. He formed an early kinship with the creatures of the great woods, which reached to the very borders of the cotton fields surrounding his home. The love of the woods and the chase and the lure of the stream took early hold on this rough-and-tumble boy, and his chief delight was to uncover some of the mysteries which the dark woods withheld from less skillful eyes. He was often afield with his only living brother William, one or two of the brighter Negro lads, and Sarah, one of his younger sisters. When his tasks were done, there was the call to hunt and fish; trapping vied with tramping along fresh trails, and the silent tutoring of the forest and glen combined with the lessons learned at his mother's knee in shaping this stripling for his place in the world.

² Sketch of William Longstreet, in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), *Dictionary of American Biography* (22 vols.; New York, 1928-37), XI, 393.

³ Mayes, *Genealogy*, 24-25; John Donald Wade, *Augustus Baldwin Longstreet; A Study of the Development of Culture in the South* (New York, 1924), 3-5.

The foundation of James Longstreet's character was laid in those earlier years on the plantation. Often alone with his thoughts, he became reserved in speech; accustomed to decide for himself, he could little brook opposition. His daily wanderings over the forested country quickened his appreciation of topography. The wholesome and simple life developed his splendid physique, his simple, rugged honesty, and his devotion to the soil from which he sprang.

When James reached the age of nine, he was removed from the temptations of the forest and brought under the control of his Uncle Augustus, who thenceforth assumed the role of tutor and guide. The pleasures of the out-of-doors were now overshadowed by the confinement and discipline of the local academy in Augusta, where his road was rough because of a distaste for books and formal schooling. Indeed, his dislike for school was such that it was only through the prestige of his uncle's name and standing that he was able to get along at all.

When Longstreet was twelve, his whole life was changed by the death of his father, who fell victim to the cholera epidemic which swept Georgia in 1833. Already the subject of his uncle's care, Longstreet now became the instrument of his ambitions. The two brothers had long planned to have James enter West Point; in fact, his education had been arranged definitely to this end. So when the father died, the uncle took full charge of the boy's future and searched for an opportunity to send him to the Military Academy. As there was no vacancy from Georgia, Augustus Longstreet moved to the Huntsville district of Alabama in order to satisfy the residential requirements in anticipation of an early appointment through the good offices of a kinsman, Reuben Chapman, who represented that district in Congress.⁴

James Longstreet was appointed to the Military Academy from the Huntsville district of Alabama and entered as a plebe in the early summer of 1838.

It was a time when men of promise were seeking careers in the army. Departing as Longstreet entered were P.G.T. Beauregard and Irvin McDowell, who twenty-three years later were opposing commanders at Bull Run, and William J. Hardee, one of the most dependable fighters in the western armies of the Confederacy. Braxton Bragg had gone the year before, and Henry W. Halleck, later general in chief of the Union armies, followed the year after.

In the class of 1840 were William T. Sherman, R. S. Ewell, and George H. Thomas—all destined to distinguish themselves when war gave them their opportunities. The next class, that of 1841, sent many of its number to death

⁴ Colonel D. B. Sanger was informed by Colonel Richard Coke Burleson, United States Army, in 1939 that this appointment properly belonged to Burleson's grandfather, since Longstreet could hardly have been considered a resident of Alabama. Had Congressman Chapman followed a former plan and appointed young Burleson, Longstreet might never have become a soldier.

on the field of battle. J. F. Irons, G. W. Ayers, R. F. Ernst, Levi Gantt, C. F. Morris, and J. G. Burbank were killed in the Mexican War; Nathaniel Lyon, J. F. Reynolds, the Garnetts (R. S. and R. B.), A. W. Whipple, J. M. Jones, I. B. Richardson, and J. P. Garesché fell in the conflict between the states.

Longstreet's class was that of 1842. A list of its members reads like the muster of the opposing armies in 1861. Here were John Newton, H. L. Eustis, M. L. Smith, G. W. Smith, Mansfield Lovell, Earl Van Dorn, R. H. Anderson, Lafayette McLaws, D. H. Hill, A. P. Stewart, B. S. Alexander, N. J. T. Dana, and many others of lesser fame. Although the class graduated but fifty-six, the majority of these reached enviable heights of fame.⁵

The real Longstreet began to emerge at the academy. His scholastic aptitude improved but little. He still detested the compelling routine of study; and, as he later admitted, he never got down to real work until he was faced with the probability of failure. It was probably his unwillingness to accept defeat which alone pulled him through, for he was third from the bottom of his class when he graduated.

On the drill ground things were different. His swordsmanship was excellent; his horsemanship, superb. Even in sports, his great physical strength and endurance more than offset a certain lack of spring and dexterity. In spite of his low standing in his studies, he received consistent promotion as a cadet, chiefly because he was soon known as a natural leader.

Socially, too, he was a great success. He was voted the handsomest cadet—a reputation which may have had something to do with his unwillingness or inability to study. He roomed with W. S. Rosecrans—"Point Rosey," they called him—and developed a lasting affection for this studious and brilliant soldier. "Old Pete" was Longstreet's own nickname. What more could be said to establish the affection of the corps for him?

With his graduation in June, 1842, Longstreet received the coveted commission as a brevet second lieutenant and was assigned to the Fourth Infantry—which was commanded by Colonel John Garland, a splendid soldier of the old school, and stationed at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis. After the customary graduation leave of absence, he reported for duty and entered at once upon the garrison life, which had its contact with the upper circles of St. Louis society. A year later, to Longstreet's delight, Ulysses S. Grant survived the course of instruction at West Point, was assigned to the Fourth Infantry, and reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks. The two soon became constant companions. Of this period, Longstreet later wrote:

⁵ See G. W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy* (3 vols.; New York, 1891), II, *passim*.

My kinsman, Mr Frederick Dent, whose son had graduated from West Point in the same class with Grant, was a substantial farmer living near Jefferson Barracks, and was much interested in young army officers. One day I received an invitation to visit his house in order to meet his son Fred, just arrived at home from West Point. I asked Grant to go with me. This he did, and of course was introduced to the family, the last one to come in being Miss Julia Dent, the charming daughter of our host. It is needless to say that we saw little of Grant during the rest of our visit. He paid court with such assiduity as to give rise to the hope that he had forever gotten over his diffidence. Five years later, in 1848, after the usual uncertainties of a soldier's courtship, Grant returned and claimed Miss Dent as his bride. I had been married [nearly] six months, and my wife and I were among the guests at the wedding [which took place in St. Louis on August 22, 1848].⁶

Romance came to James Longstreet also, in the person of Maria Louisa Garland, a daughter of the colonel of the regiment, John Garland. She and her sister, Elizabeth, were in much demand on a post of which young Lieutenant Richard S. Ewell wrote as follows to his brother, Benjamin, at William and Mary College: "This is the worst Country for single ladies I ever saw in my life. They are hardly allowed to come of age before they are engaged to be married however ugly they may be. Except the Miss Garlands I have not seen a pretty girl or interesting one since I have been here." Ewell thought the post most disagreeable and one well calculated to cure an officer of matrimonial disposition, though he felt he "must except the Miss Garlands . . . as they are so devilish pretty they have rather a tendency the other way. . . ." The report was that Miss Elizabeth Garland was to marry Lieutenant George Deas of the Fifth Infantry in September, 1844, and that her sister, Louisa, was expected to marry Lieutenant James Longstreet as soon as she was old enough.⁷

It was this lack of age as well as young Longstreet's rank—he was still only a brevet second lieutenant—that prevented marriage before the young officer went off to war. Colonel Garland was said to have insisted that his daughter could not marry any officer below the grade of captain; but this was probably only a good story, as Elizabeth Garland had just married George Deas, a second lieutenant. In any case, Longstreet contemplated his own lack of rank with impatience. As promotion in the army at that time was slow and uncertain, he could not contemplate delay with much equanimity. But Texas and the Mexicans soon made a silver lining for his cloud of frustration. Early

⁶ "Longstreet's Reminiscences," in *New York Times*, July 24, 1885; James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (2d ed.; Philadelphia, 1908), 8; U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York, 1885-86), I, 50, 193. Grant did not mention Longstreet either as having first introduced him to his future wife or as being present at his wedding.

⁷ R. S. Ewell to Benjamin S. Ewell, August 1, 1844, P. G. Hamlin (ed.), *The Making of a Soldier: Letters of General R. S. Ewell* (Richmond, 1935), 53.

in May, 1844, orders came sending the Fourth Infantry to frontier duty at Natchitoches (Camp Salubrity), Louisiana; the ladies and sweethearts remained behind pending developments.

On March 4, 1845, Longstreet received his promotion to the full rank of second lieutenant and was assigned to duty with the Eighth Infantry, stationed in Florida. Longstreet's company was at Fort Marion, St. Augustine, where he reported about the first of April. This promotion removed him from the Fourth Infantry and his prospective father-in-law, but not for long, as the Texas situation soon brought about the concentration of American troops along the Rio Grande. The Eighth Infantry left Florida in mid-August, arriving at Corpus Christi early in September, where with twelve companies of artillery it constituted the first brigade of General Zachary Taylor's Army of Occupation. Longstreet's old regiment, the Fourth Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel John Garland, was there too, brigaded with the Third Infantry as the Third Brigade under the command of Colonel William Whistler, who had recently been promoted.

Although the American troops were fit and eager for battle, there were weary months of watchful waiting for them. It was not until March 8, 1846, that the army moved forward. All was excitement on the ten-day march to Arroyo Colorado, where the United States troops met the enemy. Mexican cavalry manned the far side of the salt-water inlet; and notice was sent to General David E. Twiggs, the American column commander, that any further movement would be resisted.

Still no fighting occurred. Lacking artillery, the Mexicans were too weak to make a stand; and after a bombastic announcement that should Twiggs advance it would be an act of war, they retired. The Americans crossed without incident and arrived opposite Matamoras on March 24. Here the forces divided. One column, under General William J. Worth (Lieutenant Longstreet's commander), moved directly on Matamoras while the remainder of the forces marched toward Point Isabel to guard the line of communications.

Another period of uncertainty followed. Although war was inevitable, the Mexicans made no effort to begin it, and the Americans were equally loath to stir up active hostilities. In the meantime, raids continued; and from these and incidental killings larger affairs developed, until on April 10 a sizable skirmish took place between patrols near Carricitos. This was enough of an overt act to suit General Taylor. He called for volunteers to fill the ranks and made ready to invade Old Mexico.

The concentration against General Mariano Arista was ordered on May 1. From this initial movement the troops soon came into contact; and on May 8 and 9, the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma were fought, with the

American troops everywhere victorious. The way was now open to cross the Rio Grande, and on May 18 Old Mexico was occupied. The army swarmed around Matamoras and prepared to march on the city of Monterrey.

In all this skirmishing Lieutenant Longstreet was actively engaged—so much so that on June 10 he was selected for the office of company commander. For a junior officer so young in years to be so honored shows the high regard in which he must have been held by his superiors. Thenceforth he was never deprived of a position of responsibility.

From Matamoras to Monterrey, Longstreet's company was out on the flank, probably on the service of security. On July 9 he was at Camargo, and on August 25 he reached Cerralvo. On September 21 he was present at the opening assault on the works at Monterrey, which were captured after three days of ragged fighting.

Though there is little in the records to testify as to the work done by Lieutenant Longstreet, we may surmise that it was well done. He had his share of fighting and undoubtedly acquitted himself as a West Pointer should. Before long he was again promoted—this time to the much-coveted berth of regimental adjutant, an office of power in those days. He was in and about Monterrey for some months; but about Christmas he was ordered to Saltillo, Mexico, and remained in independent command until February 5, 1847. On that day he left in haste with his command to rejoin his regiment at Lobos Island, where another army was being gathered under General Winfield Scott. Scott's mission was to move on the port of Vera Cruz by sea, reduce that place, and then penetrate the interior over the old Spanish trail which led to the capital.

It was a curious collection of vessels that sailed out upon the blue waters of the Gulf. Days passed, and not until March 9 were the sharp outlines of the famed castle of San Juan de Ulloa silhouetted against the darker background of hills which encircled the city of Vera Cruz. Shortly after dawn the troops disembarked, and Longstreet's regiment was marched to its place in the first line of advance that formed to invest the city.

It is unfortunate that the records are so blunt. We should be glad to know how James Longstreet conducted himself in the siege of Vera Cruz and later. He was with a veteran organization, one which had tasted more than once the thrill of battle—which had been "blooded," as Kipling would have said—and these veterans were looked up to with awe by the less experienced volunteer units. But there is nothing that tells of Longstreet's personal goings and comings, not even a letter. He had with him the faded daguerreotype of Maria Louisa; so we may at least conclude that if he flirted, he did not flirt outrageously. He widened his circle of friends; he learned to know many of the

older officers who had come down on Scott's staff. Grant was his companion, and their friendship was by now so ripened and bound with bonds so firm that the passage of years and the vicissitudes of war could not weaken it.

From his arrival before Vera Cruz on March 9 to the storming of Chapultepec Castle on the thirteenth of the following September, James Longstreet was on continuous and arduous field service. Of battle and skirmish he had his fill. The first of the series of engagements were those at Cerro Gordo and at San Antonio. These were soon followed by the two-days-running fight at Churubusco and Contreras. Promotion came to him. By General Orders dated August 20, 1847, he was breveted captain for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles of Churubusco and Contreras. On September 8 he was similarly honored and breveted major for gallantry at the battle of Molino del Rey. Not content with such recognition, he rushed up the heights of Chapultepec with the regimental colors in his arms—only to fall, his thigh shattered by a ball, before he could plant the staff on the parapet. It was George E. Pickett who seized the flag from his failing arms and carried it to the top of the hill and thence to the castle wall—the same Pickett, it need hardly be added, who endeared himself to the world for his gallant charge against the Federal center at Gettysburg.

After the tide of battle had swept onward, Longstreet was picked up from the ground and removed to a private dwelling which served as a hospital; he lay prostrate in Mexico City until December 10. Fortunately he regained full use of his limb. Invalided home about the middle of December, he reached his Alabama hills while the dogwood was in bloom and the slopes were pink with redbud.

The virtue of his patience was now amply vindicated. His splendid record as a soldier had been more than gratifying in the eyes of his colonel. Under the greatest of tutors—experience—he had mastered the technique of battle leadership; and it was his further good fortune that this schooling had come while Louisa Garland's father looked on. There was now no objection to the marriage. Still limping from his wounds, Major Longstreet crossed the hills into Virginia; and on March 8, 1848, in the little Episcopal chapel at Lynchburg, Maria Louisa became his bride in the presence of smiling General Garland and a gathering of friends and relatives.⁸

Longstreet's bride had been born at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, on March 6, 1827, and was one of five children who lived to maturity. Her maternal grandfather Jacob Smith was a trapper and fur trader (operating from Detroit) who lived much of his life among the Chippewa Indians in southeastern Michigan. Her grandmother was at least a half- if not a full-blooded Chippewa

⁸ Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide* (Gainesville, Ga., 1905), 160, 216.

Indian. Her mother, Harriet Smith, met her father, then a captain of infantry, in Detroit, where he was stationed for a number of years. John Garland invested in Detroit real estate and in the American Fur Company. In 1833, he escorted Black Hawk on his trip to Washington, D.C., after the Indian had surrendered to the American troops commanded by General Winfield Scott. For his services in the Mexican War, in which he was wounded, General Garland was awarded a sword by his native state of Virginia. At the conclusion of the war he remained with his regiment, the Fourth Infantry, on duty in the Southwest. At the death of General William J. Worth, General Garland was promoted to be colonel of the Eighth Infantry and took station at San Antonio, Texas.⁹

After a brief honeymoon, which probably included a visit to New York City and possibly to West Point, the couple went to Poughkeepsie, New York, where Longstreet served a brief tour on recruiting duty, and then was stationed at the instruction camp at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It was here that their first child, John Garland Longstreet, was born on December 26, 1848. Before this event, and probably while escorting recruits to Jefferson Barracks, Longstreet and his bride attended the wedding of his friend U. S. Grant and Julia Dent, in St. Louis, Missouri, on August 22, 1848. Whether Longstreet served as best man for his friend is uncertain; if he did, neither of the two men mentioned it in his memoirs. In any case, Longstreet was soon back in Carlisle Barracks. After several months there he returned to Jefferson Barracks with more recruits and from there went on to his station at San Antonio, Texas, traveling in an army ambulance (the early counterpart of the present-day station wagon) that rattled its tedious way over the rough roads of the prairie or over no road at all. On May 1, 1849, Longstreet reported for duty in San Antonio and briefly resumed his duties as adjutant of the Eighth Infantry, which he had relinquished when he was wounded in the storming of Chapultepec in Mexico, nearly two years previous. He was relieved of this assignment on July 1, 1849, and spent the remainder of the summer on duty at Fort Lincoln, some fifty miles west of San Antonio. The next two years he spent pleasantly as commissary of the Department of Texas; and on December 15, 1850, his second son, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, was born at San Antonio.

In the next eight years Longstreet's service in the frontier West against Indians and renegade whites duplicated that of many other officers stationed

⁹ The date of Mrs. Longstreet's birth is based on information obtained from F. R. Longstreet of Gainesville, Georgia, and Mary L. Garland of Richmond, Virginia. For information concerning Jacob Smith, the grandfather of Mrs. Longstreet, see Franklin Ellis, *History of Genesee County, Michigan* (Philadelphia, 1879), 12-13; *Collections Michigan Historical Society* (Lansing), VII (1886), 140-44; and *ibid.*, XXXV (1907), 364-65.

on the frontier. We have only fleeting glimpses of this life of routine scouting and exploring in the wild sections of the Big Bend country in West Texas and occasional brief visits to his wife and children, who remained in San Antonio. There, on April 19, 1853, Longstreet's third child, another son, William Dent, was born.

Longstreet was now a captain of the Eighth Infantry, having been promoted to that rank on December 7, 1852. In the spring of 1854 he went east by boat, taking his wife and children with him. Arrived in New York late in March, he put up at the Astor Hotel; but soon afterwards he went on to Washington. Possibly he had been sent east as a carrier of dispatches from his father-in-law, General Garland, who was then commanding the Ninth Military District, to the authorities in Washington. During the Longstreets' brief stay in Washington their youngest child, William Dent, died on July 19, 1854. Shortly afterwards the grieving young couple turned their faces southward again, and early in August they were at Longstreet's new station at Fort Bliss, Texas.¹⁰ At this post Longstreet assumed command of the detachments of the Eighth Infantry stationed in that area. Early in the following year, Major Longstreet and his command, who were operating against hostile Indians in the Guadalupe Mountains, about one hundred miles east of Fort Bliss, were joined by several troops of the Second Dragoons, among whose officers were a young lieutenant, J. E. B. Stuart, and Captain R. S. Ewell, both of them to be closely associated with Longstreet in the threatening intersectional strife even then beginning to take form. After several months of field operations against the Comanche Indians, Longstreet returned with his command to Fort Bliss. The ensuing two or three years were routine in character, involving both garrison and field duty. On July 8, 1857, while on a visit to her father at Santa Fe, New Mexico, Mrs. Longstreet gave birth to her fifth child, a son, named James Longstreet for his father.¹¹

In January, 1858, Longstreet was briefly on detached service at Santa Fe, the headquarters of the Ninth Military District, and here his wife and children spent much time visiting with her parents, General and Mrs. Garland. Longstreet renewed many old friendships, among them that with his wife's brother-

¹⁰ Listing of Longstreet among "Arrivals" at Astor House, N.Y., on March 24, 1854, in *New York Herald*, March 25, 1854; notice of the death in Washington, D.C., on July 19, 1854, of William Dent, infant son of Major James Longstreet, in *Washington Sentinel*, July 18, 1854; James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, August 8, 1854, in The National Archives, Washington, D.C. Longstreet's children were: John Garland, 1848-1918; Augustus Baldwin, 1850-62; William Dent, 1853-54; Harriet Margaret, born and died 1856; James, 1857-62; Mary Anne, 1860-62; Robert Lee, 1863-1940; James (second of the name), 1865-1922; Fitz Randolph, 1869-; and Maria Louisa, 1872-.

¹¹ H. B. McClellan, *The Life and Campaigns of Major General J. E. B. Stuart* (Boston, 1855), 14-15.



MRS. JAMES LONGSTREET WITH AUGUSTUS BALDWIN LONGSTREET AND JAMES LONGSTREET, ABOUT 1860

Both of these children and a daughter, Mary Anne, died of scarlet fever early in 1862. (From a daguerreotype in possession of F. R. Longstreet.)

in-law, Captain (later General) William A. Nichols, who was on General Garland's staff. In the latter part of May, 1858, Longstreet, on a six-months leave (his first since his sick leave for convalescence after his wound in the Mexican War), departed for the East with his growing family to be gone until the late summer. Where they went—whether to his wife's home in Lynchburg, Virginia, to his own home in Georgia, or to both—is uncertain. In any case, as the result of a vacancy Longstreet received a long-sought appointment to the Paymaster Corps and promotion to the permanent rank of major, effective July 19, 1858. The ensuing year was spent at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the performance of routine duties incident to this new assignment. He was frequently in St. Louis, where he occasionally met his old friend, U. S. Grant, now out of the army. Years later Longstreet told a story of one of their meetings as follows:

In the long days of our stay in Louisiana and Texas, we frequently engaged in the game of brag and five cent ante and similar diversions. We instructed Grant in the mysteries of these games, but he made a poor player. The man who lost 75 cents in one day was esteemed in those times a peculiarly unfortunate person. The games often lasted an entire day. Years later, in 1858, I happened to be in St. Louis, and there met Capt. [E. B.] Holloway and other army chums. We went into the Planters' Hotel to talk over old times, and it was soon proposed to have an old-time game of brag, but it was found we were one short of making up a full hand. "Wait a few minutes," said Holloway, "and I will find some one." In a few minutes he returned with a man poorly dressed in citizen's clothes and in whom I recognized our old friend Grant. Going into civil life Grant had been unfortunate, and he was really in needy circumstances. The next day I was walking in front of the Planters', when I found myself face to face again with Grant who, placing in the palm of my hand a five-dollar gold piece, insisted that I should take it in payment of a debt of honor over 15 years old. I peremptorily declined to take it, alleging that he was out of the service and more in need of it than I. "You must take it," said he, "I cannot live with anything in my possession which is not mine." Seeing the determination in the man's face, and in order to save him mortification, I took the money, and shaking hands we parted. The next time we met was at Appomattox.¹²

After a stay of a year at Fort Leavenworth, Longstreet was ordered to Albuquerque, New Mexico, where Colonel Garland was in command. He reported for duty on October 29, 1859, but ten days later he set out to pay his district before the worst of the winter set in.¹³ This assignment occupied Longstreet until the spring of 1861.

Apparently it was during this trip that Longstreet purchased a part of the site of Fort Mason, Texas, which had been established in July, 1851, but

¹² "Longstreet's Reminiscences," in *New York Times*, July 24, 1885.

¹³ Longstreet to Captain G. W. Cullum, October 29, 1859, in Association of Graduates Manuscript File, United States Military Academy, West Point. (Hereinafter cited as West Point Graduates Manuscript File.)

which by 1860 was only occasionally garrisoned. The post was located some one hundred miles north of San Antonio. On May 26, 1860, Longstreet purchased "an undivided one sixth ($1/6$) interest . . . to . . . tract . . . , known as Survey No. 75, containing 320 acres, and the western half of Survey 87, containing 160 acres. . . ." It is not known what was paid for this acreage or why Longstreet purchased it. In June, 1860, the ground on which Fort Mason was located and of which Longstreet's tract was a part was leased to the Federal government for \$50 a month. The post was abandoned by the Northern troops on March 19, 1861, and the lease was ended. So far as is known, Longstreet did not sell his land during his lifetime, but he may have done so in January, 1891, when he was in San Antonio.¹⁴

During this period gathering clouds, portending sectional conflict, forced Longstreet to consider what his future course should be. In the midst of this period of uncertainty a daughter, Mary Anne, was born to the Longstreets at Albuquerque, on December 31, 1860. This was just four months after the death of Mrs. Longstreet's mother on August 31, 1860, at Saratoga Springs, New York, where she had gone in search of health. General Garland, who was with her, buried her in Oak Hill Cemetery in Georgetown, Maryland. He did not return to his station in the West but, himself in poor health, went to New York City to be near his ailing son, Hudson, an officer in the United States Navy stationed at Brooklyn Navy Yard. Hudson died on February 27, 1861. General Garland, still on leave, remained on in New York at the New York Hotel, failing in health until his death on June 5, 1861. His sons, David and John Spotswood Garland, accompanied his remains to Georgetown, where the old veteran was buried beside his recently deceased wife.¹⁵

Just when Major Longstreet made his decision to cast his lot with the South is not known. Undoubtedly he was urged by his father-in-law to consider carefully before making his decision. For himself, General Garland, long in the service of his country and in poor health, had decided to take no part in the conflict. Of these times, Longstreet later wrote:

The violent political and sectional controversy which disturbed the States was watched with intense anxiety by officers of the army, who naturally felt the deepest interest in the result. While there were, doubtless, many officers, es-

¹⁴ Margaret Bierschwale, "Mason County, Texas, 1845-1870," in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* (Austin), LII (April, 1949), 381-82, 389. See also *West Texas Historical Association Year Book* (Abilene), VII (January, 1931), 128; Longstreet to T. J. Goree, January 22, 1891, in Goree Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

¹⁵ The deaths of Mrs. Garland, Hudson Garland, and General Garland are noted in the *Washington National Intelligencer* on September 22, 1860, March 6, 1861, and June 10, 1861, respectively, and in the *New York Herald* on June 8, 1861. See also General Orders No. 8, Headquarters, United States Army, announcing General Garland's death and funeral, published in the *Washington National Intelligencer*, June 8, 1861.

pecially those whose tastes had led them to read much of the political history of the Government, who believed in the right of a State, as a last resort, for the redress of grievances, to secede, there were probably none in the Summer and Autumn of 1860 who were known as secessionists, and there were many who went with their seceding States who did not believe there was sufficient cause for violent action, nor were there, perhaps, more than a dozen, if so many, officers in the army who were Abolitionists. All felt more or less sympathy with their respective sections. All were in sympathy with the South. . . .

During the Winter of 1860 and 1861, we on the frontier were in the most painful suspense. Our mails came in at long intervals and so irregularly that we were often without information of the progress of events for weeks at a time. We often assembled on the top of the Quartermaster's office, the most elevated perch at the post, and watched for hours together for the column of dust which at that season rose as the mail coach rolled over the arid roads, and could be seen miles away. Every mail brought the same dark, troublous signs, yet the feeling was hopeful, and the remark was often made: "The man for the occasion, will yet show himself and all will be well."

.
A number of officers, Northerners, knowing that I was about to offer my resignation, came and tried to persuade me to retain my commission in the Union army. Capt. Alfred Gibbs of the Rifles did most of the talking on the occasion. After a long talk I asked Gibbs what he would do if his State should leave the Union and call him home? Would he hold his commission in the army and draw his sword against his own State? He confessed that he would return to his State.¹⁶

Whatever his feelings, it is certain that Longstreet's sympathies were with his section and that if there was war he would follow his adopted state of Alabama. Lincoln was elected in November, 1860, and Alabama seceded on January 11, 1861. Longstreet, in anticipation of the possibility of armed conflict, wrote his friend J. L. M. Curry of Talladega, Alabama, that he was ready to follow his state in whatever course she should take and would serve her in any capacity to which he should be assigned. Curry later wrote: "After the election of Mr. Lincoln, Major Longstreet, then stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, wrote to me expressing the opinion that Alabama would resist, and authorizing me to tender to Governor [A. B.] Moore whatever services he might render. . . ." Even more decided was Longstreet's letter to Governor Moore of February 15, 1861. After outlining his personal views, he made a definite offer of service to the state of Alabama. He wrote: "I desire, therefore, to tender through you my services to [Alabama], should she need a soldier who has seen hard service. I am the senior officer of the Army, from Alabama, and should be the first to offer her such assistance in my profession as I may be able to render. . . ." This letter was forwarded to Confederate Secretary of War L. P. Walker on March 31, 1861, with the request that he

¹⁶ From Longstreet's account, "How They Left the Old Army," in *New York Times*, August 19, 1894.

lay it before the President of the newly formed Southern Confederacy.¹⁷

When news of the firing on Fort Sumter was received at Albuquerque, Longstreet acted. His decision had already been made. He only awaited word of an overt act. On May 9, 1861, he tendered his resignation as a Major and Paymaster in the Army of the United States. Going through military channels, it was received at the Federal War Department and accepted by Simon Cameron, the secretary of war, on June 1, 1861. Endorsements on this letter of resignation with circular attached indicate that all except transit accounts had been properly settled. The only exception was an item of \$116.60, which apparently was a hold-over item of indebtedness incurred in the fourth quarter of 1857; this presumably was in negotiation and was later satisfactorily settled.¹⁸

Of this period a young officer on duty in the district later wrote:

General Longstreet was exceedingly punctilious. Just before I left the service [in April, 1861] I rode with him from Albuquerque to Santa Fe, the department Headquarters. There were or had been three paymasters in New Mexico, Majors Longstreet, [T. G.] Rhett and [A. W.] Reynolds. Rhett was from South Carolina and was so fired with enthusiasm, when his state left the Union that he pulled right out without making any settlement with the Government; he didn't resign, just quit. [General Thomas may have been mistaken in this assertion, as the records show that Rhett resigned on April 1, 1861.] Reynolds of Tennessee [Virginia] was so overjoyed that he got on a spree [Reynolds had been in San Antonio, where he was compelled to give his funds to the Texas state forces. He reported the fact and was ordered to Washington, but he failed to report and was dropped from Army rolls on October 4, 1861; in the meantime he had joined the Southern Confederacy] and the result was that Longstreet was directed by Col [W. W.] Loring to take charge of the whole business of winding up. . . . When I bid Major Longstreet good-bye he said please explain his situation to Mr. [Jefferson] Davis and tell him "I would rather have my right hand cut off than to leave the service owing it one cent". . . .¹⁹

By the middle of June, 1861, Longstreet had put his affairs in shape; and when news of the acceptance of his resignation arrived, he was ready to start for Richmond, Virginia, to which point the capital of the Southern Confederacy had been removed. Of his trip east, Longstreet later wrote:

¹⁷ J. L. M. Curry, *Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States with Personal Reminiscences* (Richmond, 1901), 161; Longstreet to A. B. Moore, February 15, 1861, in *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. IV, I, 182. (Hereinafter cited as *Official Records*. All references are to Series I unless otherwise noted.) On June 25, 1861, Curry wrote Secretary of War L. P. Walker at Richmond, requesting the Secretary to authorize Longstreet to raise an Alabama regiment. Walker replied on July 4, 1861, that Longstreet had already been appointed a brigadier general. *Ibid.*, 420.

¹⁸ Longstreet's letter of resignation of May 9, 1861, with Secretary of War Cameron's endorsement of acceptance, dated June 1, 1861, and circular, dated May 31, 1861, in The National Archives.

¹⁹ Bryan M. Thomas to Captain W. R. Smith (Secretary, Association of Graduates, West Point), February 2, 1904, in West Point Graduates Manuscript File.

It was a sad day when we took leave of lifetime comrades and gave up a service of twenty years. Neither Union officers nor their families made efforts to conceal feelings of deepest regret. When we drove out from the post, a number of officers rode with us, which only made the last farewell more trying.

Speaking of the impending struggle, I was asked as to the length of the war, and said, "At least three years, and if it holds for five you may begin to look for a dictator," at which Lieutenant [George] Ryan, of the Seventh Infantry, said, "If we are to have a dictator, I hope that you may be the man."

Friends in El Paso persuaded me to leave my family with them and go by a train that was to start in a few days for San Antonio, and to take the faster route by stage for myself. . . .

At Galveston we took a small inland sailing-craft, but were a little apprehensive, as United States ships were reported cruising outside in search of all vessels not flying the Stars and Stripes. Our vessel, however, was only boarded once, and that by a large Spanish mackerel that made a misleap, fell amidships, and served our little company with a pleasant dinner. Aboard this little vessel I first met T. J. Goree, an intelligent, clever Texan, who afterwards joined me at Richmond, Va., and served in faithful duty as my aide-de-camp from Bull Run to Appomattox Court House.

At New Orleans, my companions found safe-conduct to the Northern lines, and I journeyed on to Richmond. Relatives along the route, who heard of my approach, met me at the stations, though none suggested a stop over-night, or for the next train, but after affectionate salutations waved me on to join "Jeff Davis, for Dixie and for Southern rights."

On the 29th of June, 1861, I reported at the War Department at Richmond, and I asked to be assigned for service in the pay department, in which I had recently served (for when I left the line service, under appointment as paymaster, I had given up all aspirations of military honor, and thought to settle down into more peaceful pursuits.) On the 1st of July I received notice of my appointment as brigadier general, with orders to report at Manassas Junction, to General [P. G. T.] Beauregard.²⁰

The circumstances of Longstreet's decision, his journey to Richmond, and his application for service form, in their sequence, positive indexes of his character. One would expect him to join the South. It was consistent with his early training and environment. J. H. Stine said in his *History of the Army of the Potomac* that it was reported that Longstreet's mother begged him to remain in the United States service, but if this is true, no evidence of her request has been found. Longstreet did not mention such a request in his memoirs. But his courage in making the decision will pass unnoticed unless the complete picture is reproduced. James Longstreet the paymaster was a man who had quit the serious and uncomfortable side of soldiering to rechart his life under the more pleasant conditions surrounding the life of a staff officer.

²⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 30-32.

He was secure and probably much better satisfied than at any time in his career. He was almost a king, beholden only to an impersonal bureau in far-off Washington. His duties were never so light, and the hardships of the frontier can be said to have been left behind.²¹

And what sort of a man was he when, at the age of forty, he enlisted under the banner of the South? He was capable and sincere; he was experienced as a soldier. In personal appearance he looked much younger than his years; a soldier every inch of him, he was strong and active, a superb horseman with an unsurpassed bearing in and out of the saddle. His eyes were cold blue—glinting steel blue—deep, and piercing; his head was well shaped, but his face lacked nobility because of the brown beard which covered a mouth somewhat coarse and brutal. He had the set of an eagle in the thrust of his body; he carried not an ounce of excess fat, yet he was a huge hulk of a man. His strength changed to gentleness when he was dealing with children and subordinates. He was kind and a favorite among the soldiers. Although he was fond of his glass, his liquor never overwhelmed him; and his one fault, an over-fondness for poker, may be forgiven him because of the real pleasure he had when seated with a few cronies after the day's work was done. This was his recreation. He was in no sense a gambler; and in his dealings with the world, no man could have been more honorable and scrupulous in affairs both large and small. He was likable; he was to be trusted.²²

What would this man do in the war? With his splendid experience, he could be expected to know something of the science and technique of war; and he had already demonstrated a high degree of force and personal courage, the basic attributes of true battle leadership. In spite of his huge frame, he had dash. He had a peculiar brand of sympathy which drew men to him and inspired them to follow him faithfully even to the very vale of death. He had tasted war; he had passed through skirmish after skirmish. Although he had been struck down, he had no fear of personal injury. How much of this experience could he translate into effective battle leadership under new and changed conditions, new leaders, and new policies?

²¹ J. H. Stine, *History of the Army of the Potomac* (Philadelphia, 1892), 531.

²² For description and characterization of Longstreet, see G. Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (New York, 1905), 23, 25, 115. See also Gamaliel Bradford, *Confederate Portraits* (Boston, 1914), 65-92.

Blackburn's Ford

HIS APPOINTMENT RECEIVED, GENERAL LONGSTREET LOST LITTLE TIME IN JOINING the Fourth Brigade, which had its headquarters at Manassas Junction. Here also were the headquarters of the three regiments composing the unit—the First, the Eleventh, and the Seventeenth Virginia Volunteers, commanded, in the order named, by Colonels P. T. Moore, Samuel Garland, Jr., and M. D. Corse. Longstreet's first problem when he assumed command on July 2, 1861, was to organize his command.

As the period of active operations opened, two rival armies, both composed of raw and undisciplined troops, were facing each other with but a narrow strip of northern Virginia between.¹ General Irvin McDowell, leading a force of thirty-five thousand men and forty-nine guns, had crossed the Potomac on the night of May 23–24 and was preparing actively for an offensive in response to the overwhelming popular clamor of "On to Richmond." A large part of McDowell's army were the three months' volunteers who had answered the President's call to suppress combinations against the Government and who would fulfill their term of service by July 24. There were also about eight thousand regulars, but many of these were recruits. In spite of several weeks of training, McDowell's organization was still in the formative state.

Opposing McDowell was a force of twenty-three thousand men and twenty-seven guns under General Beauregard, who had lately come up from South Carolina after the capture of Fort Sumter. The aim of the Confederates was purely negative; it contemplated little more than an attempt to block the Union advance. On the date when Longstreet first assumed command of his brigade, plans for the Federal advance had been perfected; the movement was ordered to start on July 8; and the stage was thus set for a rapid and crushing defeat of

¹ The most critical and complete account of this First Bull Run campaign will be found in R. M. Johnston, *Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics* (Boston, 1913). For contemporary dispatches, the printed *Official Records* offer the best collection. Not included in the printed records are many unpublished letters and dispatches on file in the War Department Records, The National Archives. Included in these unpublished records are two volumes of the correspondence of Longstreet which deal with this engagement and the period of reorganization of the Confederate Army in Virginia during July, August, and September of 1863. These unpublished letters will be cited hereinafter as Unpublished Longstreet Letters. See also E. P. Alexander, *The Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York, 1907), 21 ff., for a good account of a limited part of the engagement of Blackburn's Ford.

the "rebel" forces in northern Virginia. The problem facing the Confederate commanders was, therefore, urgent. Although hundreds—nay, thousands—had rushed to the recruiting offices and sought early opportunity to strike a blow in defense of their native land, these sons of the South knew little of the technique of battle movement and still less about subordination and discipline. Only the accepted former social leadership of many of the higher officers, combined with an ardent patriotism, enabled the unit commanders to hold these volunteers in some kind of order. There was no nucleus of a regular army or other trained and organized force around which to build. Staff organization was lacking, supply systems were still on paper, and the vital business of munitions was further complicated by the absence of any uniform standard in weapons. The South had to build from the ground up—even to the creation of the needed administrative bureaus.

General Longstreet brought to this task the sum of his military experience. For a first staff he had his loyal aide, Captain Thomas J. Goree, who, it will be recalled, had accompanied him to New Orleans. For tools with which to fashion a fighting force, he had firmness and patience, an understanding of men, and the will to lead them. He found his command scattered about on every conceivable kind of duty. He could not even get his troops together for the first lessons in discipline. Baffled at first, he was forced to appeal to higher authority. "I respectfully request," he wrote on July 13, "that all men of my brigade now on special detached service be returned to duty with their respective companies."² He saw the danger; he knew from experience that orderly duty was no fit training for battle discipline. James Longstreet voiced the cry of all distressed regimental commanders when he asked to have his soldiers brought back under the leadership of those who would direct them in battle.

A scant week after this appeal the Fourth Brigade received its baptism of fire. Beauregard had learned on July 10 that McDowell was ready to march. On July 16 definite advices came that the movement would commence the next day. Having already decided to remain on the defensive, as his troops were raw and unbroken to battle, Beauregard had selected a line along the tricky stream known as Bull Run, which coursed southeasterly from the hills about six miles west of Centreville, passing about three miles to the south of that place, and thence to the Potomac, which it entered about forty miles below Alexandria. Because of the backwash of the tides, which reached inland as far as Union Mills, this stream served admirably as a general defensive line and, it may be added, was the only suitable place to make a stand between Washington and the valley of the Rappahannock.

² Unpublished Longstreet Letters, II.

Tactically the terrain had many defects. The stream itself was fordable at will except during freshets, and the approaches from the north leading to the well-used fords came through a thick screen of cover terminating at the edge of the bluffs, which rose above the water to a height of fifteen feet in most places. The south bank, which was skirted by a narrow belt of timber, was under observation almost at will. South of the run the country was broken and rolling, dotted with many small woods, and cut up into pastures or cultivated fields. Beyond the fields was a fringe of low hills covered with second-growth pine and scrub oak.

Beauregard selected the line of the run between Union Mills Ford on the right and Mitchell's Ford on the left as the scene of his defense. This was further divided into sectors, with General Richard S. Ewell on the right, Colonel Philip St. George Cocke's brigade as left flank guard near Ball's Ford, General D. R. Jones next to Ewell, then Longstreet, and on his left, M. L. Bonham. Jubal A. Early's brigade was held in general reserve a scant quarter of a mile behind Longstreet. On the extreme left, the Fourth South Carolina Infantry, with Major Roberdeau Wheat's Louisiana battalion, took position near the Stone Bridge. This gave a front of about three miles for the main body, with both flanks well secured.

Longstreet's sector ran behind what was known as Blackburn's Ford, a long curved bend in the river which rounded into the north bank. It was undoubtedly the most dangerous part of the line in event of an attack on the center, as Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford were the logical points of crossing should a successful assault be launched. Further, it had the weakness of having both flanks exposed to enfilade fire from the opposite bank. The sector covered about one half of a mile in front—too long a distance for the available fourteen hundred men—and extended from a point about eight hundred yards east of Mitchell's Ford to within one hundred yards of McLean's Ford. The risk of an enfilade fire had to be taken, as to correct this would have put both flanks in the air and separated them from the main body by a difficult stream. On the left, Longstreet had Bonham's brigade, some two thousand strong, covering the approaches to Mitchell's Ford; on the right, a force of nearly four thousand was ready to dispute the passage of McLean's Ford. No other troops were close enough to assist Longstreet except by indirect pressure.

As the orders outlining the defense were published on July 8, opportunity was given for needful reconnaissances of routes and an inspection of the positions to be occupied. All troops were ordered to stand firm; and in case of inability to hold at Bull Run, the plans provided for a movement by echelon to the line of the Rappahannock—probably near the Wilderness—where the final effort would be made.

Well in advance of the arrival of his brigade, Longstreet went over the ground thoroughly. His first instructions from the army commander caused him to open the front on the north bank, which he organized in part, camouflaging the emplacements. Before this work was completed, however, his earlier orders were revoked, and he was directed to organize for defense on the south bank. With but two weeks for preparation—hardly time, it may be added, for a commander to sense the quality of his troops—Longstreet had been forced to suspend his work of organization and training and move out to meet the enemy. It was an anxious moment for both commander and men. Would these half-disciplined soldiers, raw and totally uninstructed in tactical maneuver, be able to stand the test of battle? Doubtless, the men in the ranks were just as skeptical of the reputed ability of General Longstreet. Much depended on his leadership—on whether he could inspire his men to stand and meet the enemy.

On the night of July 17, the Fourth Brigade bivouacked astride the trail leading to Blackburn's Ford under cover of a line of pickets which patrolled the water's edge. Scouts sent across Bull Run penetrated the wooded area to a depth sufficient for ample warning. Under the circumstances, the disposition of the command was excellent. A close line of skirmishers formed a cordon along the south bank, while the remainder of the brigade was disposed in depth in a line of masses as a general reserve. The main body occupied positions from which any threatened point could be reached quickly. It was contemplated that free use would be made of the bayonet should the enemy penetrate the position. Two of Major J. B. Walton's guns were emplaced so as to bring flanking fire on the front of the position. In rear, and not far away, was the general reserve under Early.

The first night was uneventful. There were staff conferences and visits of inspection to the picket line, and Longstreet made several reconnaissances. At eleven-thirty the next morning, word was passed back from the pickets that the enemy was approaching in force. At noon the pickets retired in good order without bringing on a general engagement. The two guns had been pushed well forward on the north bank to a position in a small copse of wood, with orders to cover the front until the last possible moment and to retire only when well within range of the Union artillery. The gunners were sent scampering to the rear by the first hostile shot.³

The Federal advance was preceded by an artillery preparation which lasted half an hour. Following this came the infantry attack—some three to four

³ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, II, 461-62; [P.] G. T. Beauregard, "The First Battle of Bull Run," in Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* . . . (New York, 1887-88), I, 201; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 22.

thousand strong—which was repelled. General E. Porter Alexander, an eyewitness, recorded many details of this first engagement, about which General Longstreet had very little to say. According to Alexander, General I. B. Richardson's Union brigade "found itself on a low bluff overlooking Bull Run, scarcely fifty yards away, a thin fringe of woods intervening. Just across the creek was Longstreet's brigade, about 1400 strong, occupying the low opposite bank of the stream. Immediately both sides opened fire, and a portion of Longstreet's men, finding themselves in the lower position and on open ground, broke to the rear badly. Longstreet rode among them and rallied them, and soon led them back."⁴

A second advance followed which was even more determined. Again the Confederate skirmishers were successful, and, with the arrival of one of the reserve companies, broke up the attack. The reserves charged with vigor and used the bayonet. Sensing the nature of the attempt to force a crossing, Longstreet sent a staff officer to call up part of the general reserve (Early's brigade), and the Seventh Louisiana was hurried forward.

After the repulse of the second attack, Longstreet commenced crossing a few of his men in an attempt to build up a firing line on the north bank. It was while this movement was taking place that the third Federal assault was launched. Longstreet was on the north bank with a small detachment; other troops were engaged in fording the stream, which was waist-deep; the Seventh Louisiana was advancing at the double-quick and was still about two hundred yards to the rear of the river; a strong enemy attack was coming head on.

Despite the fact that Longstreet had crossed the run and was thus between it and the enemy, the Louisiana regiment opened fire over the heads of the troops on the south bank. In a moment bullets were flying among the men who had crossed, and several casualties resulted. There was instant confusion. Longstreet was forced to withdraw to the south bank under a severe fire, which was now coming from friend as well as foe.

This was a favorable opportunity for the Federal commander, Richardson, to push his attack, for Longstreet's brigade, because of its disorganized state, would have been powerless to stop a vigorous assault. But for some unaccountable reason the Union fire slackened; and during the lull a detachment of the Seventeenth Virginia, under Captain M. Marye, crossed the stream again and fell on the Union front and flank with excellent result. The advance was checked and repulsed. A score of Yankee prisoners with many more muskets was Captain Marye's reward.

Although this skirmish at Blackburn's Ford can hardly claim the dignity of being termed a battle, it gives one the first picture of Longstreet and his troops

⁴ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 23.

as they appeared under fire.⁵ They were outnumbered—by as much, perhaps, as two and one half to one; also, there is no question but that the enemy had the advantage in equipment, length of training, organization, artillery support, and, above all, tactical position. With the exception of the third assault, the offensive was pushed with vigor and in good order. Longstreet's troops broke, as all green troops are apt to do when they come under fire for the first time; but the extraordinary aspect of the situation was the leadership of the brigade commander, who, after a scant two weeks of training, was able to rally his men and bring them up to the line of battle.

The losses in this brief engagement were small. Longstreet admitted that sixty-three Confederate soldiers were killed or wounded, but his estimate of the Federal losses was undoubtedly exaggerated. He asserted that the Union losses included from nine hundred to two thousand men, but he conceded that these figures came from the unverified statements of prisoners. The Federal losses were perhaps twice those of Longstreet, exclusive of prisoners taken.

No other troops of Beauregard's command were engaged that day. Strong demonstrations were made against Bonham in the late afternoon when the affair at Blackburn's Ford was at its height, but a few well-placed shots relieved the pressure before contact was made. As the day closed, Longstreet was directed to withdraw his First and Seventeenth Virginia into the general reserve, and Colonel Garland, with the added support of Early's brigade, occupied the position.

The drawing of first blood brought forth commendatory words from the army commander. According to Beauregard's report, the Fourth Brigade met the enemy with "characteristic vigor and intrepidity." "Brigadier General Longstreet," continued Beauregard, "who commanded the troops engaged at Blackburn's ford, on the 18th, equaled my confident expectations, and I may fitly say that by his presence at the right place at the right moment among his men, by the exhibition of characteristic coolness, he infused a confidence and spirit that contributed largely to the success of our arms on that day."⁶

Beauregard indicated elsewhere in the report his desire "to place on record that on the 18th of July not one yard of entrenchments nor one rifle pit sheltered the men at Blackburn's ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, were on that day for the first time under fire, and who, taking and maintaining every position ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly behavior."⁷

From his experience in Mexico, Longstreet should have known better than

⁵ For an account of the skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, see *ibid.*, 23-25.

⁶ Beauregard's report, in *Official Records*, II, 442.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 443-44.

to put green troops on the defensive without some artificial protection. There had been ample time for the construction of simple trenches. He learned better as time went on. Also, for a soldier of experience, Longstreet ran great risk in attempting to cross raw troops under fire and build up a firing line on the north bank of Bull Run. That the engagement did not turn out badly may be attributed to good luck rather than to any skill on his part.

On the Union side, Richardson was at fault in that he failed to grasp his opportunity when it came. The redeeming features of the Confederate action were, of course, the splendid battle leadership exhibited by Longstreet and the excellence of the attack made by Captain Marye.

First Manassas and After

TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION THAT NOW DEVELOPED IT IS NECESSARY TO REVIEW the plans of the Federal commander.¹ General McDowell had first had the idea of turning Beauregard's right by way of Union Mills in order to strike across the Confederate line of communications. General Daniel Tyler, who had been in command of the reconnoitering force, was given the mission of ascertaining whether the route was feasible and the terrain such as to facilitate a quick advance. He was also charged with locating the center of gravity of the Confederate forces. Tyler discovered all that was required. In his zeal, however, he went beyond orders and sent Richardson, heavily reinforced with artillery and some cavalry, in an unwise attempt to force a crossing over the fords held by Longstreet.

Finding the way to the left unsuited, McDowell next considered the center. The reconnaissance of July 18 had demonstrated that the Confederates were on the alert and disposed to make any attempt on the center a costly affair. There was also the question whether McDowell's green troops were sufficiently skilled to employ in a frontal attack. The alternative was a wide swing around the Confederate left center near the Stone Bridge.

Tyler was ordered to stage a demonstration while the remainder of McDowell's army, less a reserve at Centreville, marched around the Southern left. The flank movement was to be made in a column of divisions, starting promptly at 2 A.M., July 21, which would put both of the leading units across Bull Run before sunrise and well in rear of the Confederate left by the time the holding attack was launched.

While McDowell was inactive at Centreville on July 19 and 20, Beauregard put the time to good use. Realizing a certain superiority in the fighting quality of the troops on his right, he now changed from the defensive and organized an attack which would use all his forces as well as General Joseph E. Johnston's troops, who were then hastening to him from Harper's Ferry. The Confederate plan was similar to the movement devised by McDowell. Using the force at Mitchell's Ford as a pivot, Beauregard planned a wide envelopment of the Union left. Longstreet was selected to make the frontal attack, with Colonel T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson, General M. L. Bonham, and Colonel Francis S.

¹ Johnston, *Bull Run*, is the best general account containing an authoritative critical discussion of the military tactics employed by both sides.

Bartow in close support. On the right, Ewell, with General T. H. Holmes, was to make the main or enveloping attack, while General D. R. Jones followed closely in echelon to the left, with Early in general reserve. Near the Stone Bridge, Cocke was to drive straight to the front with his Virginia Volunteers and pin the Union troops to the ground. The movement was ordered for 4:30 A.M., on July 21.²

McDowell, therefore, had the initiative, but his plans did not work out. Tyler was late in starting his march; and since he put his troops on the road in advance of those of General S. P. Heintzelman, who was to lead the flanking column, Heintzelman was delayed nearly three hours before he reached the point of divergence to the right. Instead of crossing Bull Run at Sudley Springs at 7 A.M. as planned, the enveloping force did not arrive at the first attack position until 9:30 A.M. By this time the men were tired and thirsty, and their presence had been betrayed by the clouds of dust which rose from the miserable roads and trails.³

In the center, Tyler started his attack—at sunrise, or about 5:30 A.M.—but it was so feeble and lacking in offensive spirit that its nature was interpreted correctly. The Confederate commander at the Stone Bridge (N. G. Evans) was satisfied that it was only a feint; and with true soldier's instinct, he located and determined the extent of the flanking movement. He left four companies to care for Tyler and moved with the remainder of his force to the high ground north of the Warrenton Pike astride the path of the oncoming Union army. His new line was somewhat at right angles to that which he had abandoned. Evans' interposition of his small force between Beauregard's left flank and the Union envelopment completely spoiled the surprise of the attack and gave the Confederate army its chance of success in the coming battle.

Before the time set for the Confederate attack, General Johnston arrived on the field. He approved the plans; and although he was the senior officer present, he permitted Beauregard to direct the operations, since that officer had made all the preparations. Accordingly, at the hour set, Longstreet crossed to the north bank of Bull Run, where he soon came under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. In the front line, Longstreet put Garland with the Eleventh Virginia on the left and the Fifth North Carolina on the right. As a reserve, and to fill the gap between the right and Ewell's brigade, the Seventeenth Virginia was disposed in depth. The First Virginia provided for left flank security, and the Twenty-fourth Virginia was massed well in the rear as a general reserve. Before entering the woods, Longstreet threw out a line of skirmishers

² Johnston's report, in *Official Records*, II, 470-79; McDowell's report, *ibid.*, 316-29; Beauregard's report, *ibid.*, 484, 504 ff.; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 45.

³ McDowell's report, in *Official Records*, II, 316-29; *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War* (Washington, 1863), Pt. II, 35 ff.

with instructions to feel their way forward, locate the enemy batteries, and keep up a constant and heavy fire to cover the crossing of the river and the movement into position.

No criticism can be made of this formation. It was rectangular—somewhat similar to that used by many of the divisions during the Meuse-Argonne offensive in World War I—and admirably conceived for prolonged effort and penetration in great depth. The covering was well done; and while the brigade was awaiting orders to continue the advance, two officers of Longstreet's staff, Colonels B. F. Terry and F. R. Lubbock, were kept well out in front in observation. It was from these officers that Longstreet learned of the serious block of troops on the road which Tyler's delay had caused. This information, rushed to General Johnston's headquarters, was soon followed by the more complete intelligence from Evans that McDowell was striking at the Confederate left. The Confederate offensive was halted; and in preparation for what the Union attack might develop, Longstreet's brigade was ordered to return to the south side of Bull Run.

Though the fighting increased on the left, Longstreet remained idle. He did not fire a shot. Since he wished to learn more of what was happening elsewhere, he again called on Colonels Terry and Lubbock and, at about 2 P.M., sent them on a deep reconnaissance within the Federal lines. They were completely successful. Not only did they locate the hostile batteries which were concentrating their fire on the Confederate troops near the Henry house, but they prepared an excellent sketch of the positions and terrain occupied by the Union left under Richardson. This information, together with the report that the Federal flank was carelessly guarded, was so promising that Longstreet requested authority to cross the run and attack the batteries and the hostile left as a diversion in favor of the main battle. Approval was not long in coming, and Longstreet's brigade commenced to cross the stream for the second time that day and assemble in position for an advance against the unprotected Union flank and artillery.

As some delay ensued in crossing the reserve, Longstreet halted the leading units until all his troops were on the north bank and in readiness. It was while the rear elements were closing up that information came from headquarters that the Union attack on the left had been stopped and strong counterassaults were driving the enemy from the field. McDowell's flanking movement had failed. By 6 P.M. there was hardly a Federal soldier south of Bull Run.

Shortly after 5 P.M., Longstreet had received orders to push forward and cut off the retreat of the Union army by way of the Warrenton Pike. Bonham received similar instructions. Hastily crossing with the remainder of his force, General Longstreet struck out through the woods toward Centreville. Captain

Edgar Whitehead's troop of cavalry was sent forward to gain contact with the flank of the retreating columns, with orders to hang on and harass them. Whitehead was followed by the First Virginia Infantry as advance guard, with Lieutenant J. J. Garnett's battery; and then, well closed up, came the main body—the Eleventh, the Seventeenth, and the Twenty-fourth Virginia, in the order named. The Fifth North Carolina was left behind to protect the crossings at Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords.

When the advance started, Bonham had crossed the run and was on Longstreet's left. Finding cross-country marching tedious, he moved to the right and soon mixed his troops with those of Longstreet, who had found a narrow dirt road. The Fourth Brigade was halted to permit Bonham's troops to pass through the column, gain distance, and take up the advance. During this delay, the routed Union soldiers, who had swarmed back across Bull Run at the Stone Bridge and to the north of it, were passing by the left front of Longstreet and Bonham in a confused attempt to rally on Centreville. Before the pursuit could be taken up again, the Union troops had had time to re-form and effect some semblance of order. The opportunity was lost.⁴ After an hour of vain attempt to close in on the Union regiments, darkness halted further movement. Bonham's insistence on his prerogatives had cost the Confederates what chance they may have had to clinch the victory.

That night the troops bivouacked astride the Warrenton Pike, Bonham on the left and Longstreet on the right. Pickets were sent out along Cub Run to guard against surprise. Although the men had not participated in any of the day's fighting, they were sadly in need of rest, as, according to Longstreet's caustic remark, they had crossed and recrossed the run six times during the day and night. Before dawn, orders were received from General Johnston stopping further pursuit, and all troops were directed to return at once to the south side of Bull Run.

In his account of the day's happenings, Longstreet has given several illustrations of the looseness of command which characterized this first battle of the war. One has just been cited. Another was equally costly. As the Union soldiers streamed along the Warrenton Pike, they came within range of both Bonham's and Longstreet's artillery. Garnett, of Longstreet's command, was about to open fire when Major W. H. C. Whiting of Johnston's staff came up and ordered the battery to cease firing. Questioned by what authority this order was given and whether the commanding general had sent any such order, Whiting stated that he alone was the authority.⁵ Longstreet then asserted that since

⁴ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 46-47; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 51.

⁵ The only connected account of this incident is given in Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 52.

Garnett's battery was under his command, he had the right to decide. He had just repeated his order to Garnett when Bonham, by virtue of his seniority, countermanded Longstreet's orders and silenced the guns. The military student can find no shadow of excuse for such a travesty of command. The situation called for an increasing pressure on the defeated Federal army. Had a few well-directed shots landed among the excited Union soldiers, not even the steadiness of the regular units could have prevented a disorderly retreat. But Longstreet's common sense was not proof against the officiousness of Whiting and the stupidity of Bonham.

Many attacks have been made on President Davis on the assumption that *he* halted the pursuit and the Confederate counteroffensive. These attacks are unjust. Full responsibility rested with General Johnston, who recalled the troops from north of the run in order to meet what was first thought to be a Union envelopment by way of Union Mills. That the supposed Union force was Jones's Confederate brigade, returning from its position north of Bull Run, was not discovered until too late to rescind the order of withdrawal. Johnston failed to pursue beyond Centreville for a very commendable reason. As he himself stated, "The apparent firmness of the U.S. Troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit, the strong forces occupying works near Georgetown, Arlington and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General [Robert] Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of thirty thousand men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital." ⁶ Thus spoke the soldier who knew the fallacy of attempting to march twenty miles and then attack a fortified position with troops who were green and demoralized by victory. Furthermore, it rained that night—a perfect torrent—and by morning the roads had become rivers of mud, and the troops were thoroughly soaked.

Finally, Johnston and Beauregard had accomplished all that they had originally intended: they had stopped the Union army which had started its march to Richmond. It was a tremendous shock to official Washington to see the flower of the Union army racing across the Potomac, utterly demoralized and incapable of making a stand. Nearly three thousand of the Federal soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing; and there was further humiliation in that the Union troops had been driven from the field by the much-despised Southern volunteers. On the Confederate side, about two thousand were killed,

⁶ Johnston's report, in *Official Records*, II, 478; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 46-47; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 51; Beauregard, "The First Battle of Bull Run," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, I, 216.

wounded, or missing. General Longstreet played but a small part in the engagement. In his effort to make this part conform to the spirit of Johnston's orders, however, he displayed considerable tactical ability and the same quality of leadership which he had shown at Blackburn's Ford. Amid the confusion attending the victory, he sought to gather its fruits.

After the battle, the Confederate army followed slowly on McDowell's heels until he was within the fortifications of Washington. Longstreet's brigade, reinforced by a regiment of cavalry under Colonel J. E. B. Stuart and a battery of light artillery, was assigned to outpost duty; and by the morning of July 23 his pickets ranged north of Fairfax Courthouse. A few days later his patrols had eased their way to the line of Fall's Church and Munson's Hill—less than six miles from Washington.

Meanwhile the main body of Johnston's army was concentrated in the vicinity of Fairfax Courthouse, busily engaged in reorganization, drills, and attempts to untangle the vexing snarl of field transportation. In place of the unworkable system of independent brigades, the semblance of a corps organization was adopted on July 25.⁷ This consisted of eight brigades and Wheat's separate battalion of Louisianians. General Beauregard became its commander. In addition, there was one independent command (the Eighth Virginia Infantry and the Hampton Legion) under Colonel Eppa Hunton which garrisoned Leesburg and patrolled the Potomac. Longstreet was continued in command of the Fourth Brigade, which was reorganized and composed of the First, the Seventh, the Eleventh and the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry and Captain J. C. Shields' battery of horse artillery.

A change of greater importance came about on August 11. Prior to this date General Johnston had been unable to secure from President Davis the authority for forming divisions. Permission having now been granted, he took this more practical means of placing his troops because he believed that a more efficient tactical grouping of units would result. The bulk of Longstreet's brigade was ordered back to Fairfax Courthouse, Jones to Germantown, Bonham to Fall's Church, Cocke to Centreville, Ewell to Sangster's Crossroads, Early and Wade Hampton to the Wolf Run Shoals Road, and Evans to Leesburg to command the independent volunteers. Only a small force of cavalry was left in observation near Vienna, and Wheat's Louisianians were returned to Mitchell's Ford. This gave a better defensive line and indicated the proposed divisional grouping.⁸

In tactical matters, Longstreet seemed far ahead of his associates. On August

⁷ Beauregard's Order No. 169 (organizing his army into eight brigades), July 25, 1861, in *Official Records*, II, 1000.

⁸ Beauregard to Johnston, August 11, 1861, *ibid.*, V, 778-79.

13 he wrote to Johnston and suggested the appointment of a single commander for all of the outpost. The number of men on security duty under a system of detached units proved too heavy a drain on the regiments. On August 27, therefore, this service was reorganized, and Longstreet was given the command of the entire line of outposts in addition to the duty of leading the Fourth Brigade. A fifty-mile front presented a task. One has new respect for the leader of, and the men in, the Fourth Brigade when he discovers that by the end of August the positions had been thoroughly reconnoitered and the routes to the rear had all been plotted and marked in preparation for a forced retirement.

Longstreet's many letters and the records covering this period⁹ do not reflect the James Longstreet who loved his glass and the music of the dance. Rather, from the yellowing pages there seems to emerge—in contrast with the Major Longstreet of Albuquerque—a serious man who had commenced to write long letters to his superiors on tedious subjects. Such a Longstreet must be anything but interesting, so it is indeed fortunate for us that his good friend and associate Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel has told the rest of the story.

From Sorrel we learn that the old Longstreet was not lost; he was still as full of fun and as able to play a skillful hand of poker. Before the autumn winds had whirled the leaves about the camp grounds, his busy headquarters had taken on the aspect of a club. When the day was ended, General Earl Van Dorn would ride over, and General G. W. Smith and Major T. G. Rhett; sometimes, too, others of lesser fame would clear the table and make a night of it. The glass was filled with the rare old toddy which only the Virginia gentlemen knew how to brew, and voices reached high as the old army songs burst out to gladden the listening soldiers. "So much for wine," said Colonel Sorrel.¹⁰

On August 31, the First Corps had 27,716 men available for duty. This was too large a body to be handled through eight separate brigade commanders because it put too great an administrative burden on army headquarters. The organization could be justified only for training purposes; it was entirely unsuited to battle and maneuver. With the troops properly disposed on the ground, it was easier to convince the President of the desirability of a divisional organization. On September 5, Davis authorized Johnston to consider such a scheme and added that it might have increased value if there were available junior brigadiers of merit to replace senior brigadiers unfit for command. Apparently Davis was ready to cut off a few heads.¹¹

This was the opportunity for which Johnston had been waiting. He lost

⁹ See Unpublished Longstreet Letters. These are the letters particularly referred to here, although many of the Longstreet letters in *Official Records*, V, have the same characteristics.

¹⁰ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 37, 57.

¹¹ Davis to Johnston, September 5, 1861, in *Official Records*, V, 829; J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* (New York, 1874), 73-74.

little time. A letter of joint recommendations from Johnston and Beauregard went forward to Richmond on September 28, and within a few days these recommendations were approved.¹² An organization of four divisions of four or five brigades each was ordered; Van Dorn, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, and Edmund Kirby-Smith were promoted to the rank of major general and assigned as division commanders. The roster of the First Corps of the Confederate Army of the Potomac now had two full generals (Johnston and Beauregard), five major generals, and thirteen brigadiers. (Jackson was soon sent to the Shenandoah Valley.) An additional corps had been created by October 12, and Johnston made an effort to have Longstreet and Jackson promoted to the command of the First and Second Corps respectively. But his recommendations were of no avail. Beauregard was still in command of the First Corps by order of President Davis; and the same authority sent G. W. Smith—who ranked Jackson—to the Second Corps, where he was the senior major general.¹³

Full divisional organization was not as yet possible. As a logical preliminary to such organization, General Johnston had grouped brigades into divisions. Longstreet was first assigned to Beauregard's First Corps on October 12. Two days later he was assigned to command "a division" consisting of the Fourth and Fifth Brigades. It was not until October 22 that divisional organization was fully recognized and, by General Orders of the War Department, Longstreet received his permanent assignment to command the Third Division of the First Corps.¹⁴

On the last day of November a carefully planned retirement and concentration behind the defensive line of Bull Run was ordered. Although Johnston has been subjected to severe criticism for this retrograde movement, the situation made it imperative. There was no doubt that the Northern government was building a powerful army, and the indications were that it would advance over the route taken by McDowell. The position near Fairfax Courthouse was too far forward for safety. Although the Confederate forces in northern Virginia numbered nearly eighty thousand men, they were scattered and not in sufficient strength to oppose the large Union army, now commanded by Gen-

¹² P. G. T. Beauregard to Judah P. Benjamin (requesting that divisions be organized for the promotion of efficiency), September 28, 1861, in *Official Records*, V, 882-83; Benjamin to J. E. Johnston, October 7, 1861, *ibid.*, 892; General Orders No. 15, October 22, 1861, *ibid.*, 913.

¹³ General Orders No. 31 (forming the Second Corps under the command of General G. W. Smith), September 25, 1861, *ibid.*, 881. See also the reference to the newly formed divisions in Benjamin to Beauregard, September 24, 1861, *ibid.*, 877; and Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction* (New York, 1879), 26, 31.

¹⁴ Special Orders No. 442, October 14, 1861, in *Official Records*, V, 897; General Order No. 15 (organizing the army into divisions and brigades and constituting certain areas as departments), October 22, 1861, *ibid.*, 913; Special Orders No. 419, October 12, 1861, *ibid.*, 896; Special Orders No. 442, October 14, 1861, *ibid.*, 897.

eral George B. McClellan. During the period of waiting, Johnston had wisely prepared a second and stronger line of defense; and when it was ready, he moved his army into it. Longstreet covered the withdrawal and then went into the army reserve with his division. This gave his men a well-deserved rest after their long weeks of outpost duty.

The winter had hardly begun when there arose differences with the War Department which subsequently kept many of the generals in hot water. Beauregard was the first to fall into disfavor with the administration. On January 26, 1862, he was ordered away from Virginia and the army which he had done so much to train and make fit for battle, and sent to Tennessee as a subordinate to General Albert Sidney Johnston. Even General Joseph E. Johnston also commenced to feel the touch of presidential irritation, and his relations with Davis cooled considerably as the months passed.¹⁵

Through this period of changes and charges, Longstreet seems to have kept his head and devoted himself to perfecting his organization. The *Official Records* are full of his letters, which contained many a valuable suggestion. They were silent as to unreasonable complaints. It seems that Longstreet went about his business without worrying over the squabbles of his military superiors. No doubt he had much sympathy with General Johnston when matters grew tense, but he had the good sense to prevent his dislikes and sympathies from creeping into his official correspondence—a trait that might well have been copied by his associates and later by himself. He advanced the cause of his subordinates only when they had shown some capacity for the office sought. He never let his feeling of friendship govern him to the extent of asking favors for his friends on the basis of friendship only. He never sought promotion for himself; his rank came as a reward for superior ability.¹⁶ And these promotions earned him the increasing respect of his soldiers.

Longstreet's joy in his promotion was, however, soon hushed by the tragic touch of death. His wife and children had long since come east from Texas, and were living comfortably with friends in Richmond. Early in 1862 an epidemic of scarlet fever took the lives of three of the four Longstreet children within a single week.¹⁷ The blow was almost too much for Longstreet. He hurriedly went to Richmond, and it was some days before he could leave his wife, who was prostrated by the tragedy. Longstreet was a changed man. Al-

¹⁵ See Johnston to Benjamin, January 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 1028; *id.* to *id.*, March 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 1086; Jefferson Davis to Beauregard, November 10, 1861, and *id.* to Johnston, November 10, 1861, *ibid.*, 945-47.

¹⁶ For example, see Longstreet to William Porcher Miles, December 19, 1861, *ibid.*, 1001.

¹⁷ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 37. The legends on the tombstones give the dates as follows: Mary Anne, died January 25, 1862; James, died January 26, 1862; Augustus Baldwin, died February 1, 1862.

though he made little effort to avoid the company of his friends, the glass enticed him less, and the poker game went on without his presence. It was long before he became again the lively person who had won his way into the hearts of army garrisons, where the coming of the paymaster's ambulance had been an event of prime importance.

As early as February, 1862, the events of spring cast their shadows before them—rather gloomy shadows for the South. Quarrels and jealousies marked the intercourse between military commanders, and the attitude of the civilian population was anything but inspiring. Instead of wholeheartedly preparing for war, the citizens of the South showed an alarming disposition to defer military preparation and to rely on the success of "King Cotton diplomacy" and the active intervention of Europe before the summer of 1862. Something was needed to shake the South into action, and that something was the threat of McClellan's army as it prepared to march on the Confederate capital.

Alive to this menace and seeing the necessity for bringing the armies into closer supporting distance, General Johnston now planned a further withdrawal. President Davis' view also was that it was "needful that the armies on the north, the east, and the approximate south of this capital should be so disposed as to support each other. . . . Threatened as we are by a large force on the southeast [the Federals had taken Roanoke Island on February 8] you must see the hazard of your position, by its liability to isolation and attack in rear, should we be beaten on the lines south and east of Richmond. . . ." ¹⁸ Wisely, Johnston chose to draw nearer to the Confederate capital.

Longstreet was selected to command an expeditionary force—the first to go into action on another front. Joining his command to that of G. W. Smith, and reinforced on March 5 by additional light artillery, he first moved along the Warrenton Pike to Centreville, prepared to go to the south of the Rappahannock when needed. On March 9 his division crossed Broad Run, where D. H. Hill's brigade was stationed, Stuart's cavalry taking position in his front to cover the march. The next day they reached the north fork of the Rappahannock. In spite of the months of training, the discipline was poor, and the wagons got into a hopeless muddle. Longstreet was lucky that his march was not made to the tune of hostile fire.¹⁹

¹⁸ Davis to Johnston, February 28, 1862, in *Official Records*, V, 1083; *id.* to *id.*, March 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 1102. Lee was assigned to duty at Richmond on March 13, 1862. *Ibid.*, 1099. See also Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography* (New York, 1934-35), II, 4-7, for a discussion of the internal situation which practically dictated the withdrawal.

¹⁹ Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, February 28, 1862, in *Official Records*, V, 1085; G. W. Smith to D. H. Hill, March 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 1095-96; Johnston to Whiting, March 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 1098. For the artillery assignment, see Special Orders No. 270, March 5, 1862, *ibid.*, 1091.

Off to the Peninsula

GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, WHO HAD SUCCEEDED McDOWELL AFTER the battle of Manassas, was now ready to test the machine which he had been building. Under his skilled hands the Union organization had been shaped into a formidable military force. McClellan was able; he had come to his task with the prestige of having won the mountain country of western Virginia for the Union. His personality and exactness had so impressed his troops that the effect could be seen for years. McClellan was to be feared, and none knew it better than Joseph E. Johnston and his trusted lieutenant, James Longstreet.

During the exciting autumn and winter of 1861-1862, the Northern political situation had demanded, yet blocked, any forward movement. The growing seriousness of the *Trent* affair had seemed to portend war with England. Scott and McClellan had quarreled, and the old general had been retired. The administration had urged an advance in the fall, but McClellan, after first agreeing, had demurred; he wanted more time to raise and train troops. The public, however, was becoming increasingly impatient.

The winter was unusually severe, and the gathering snow and ice were sufficient to prevent the advance of large troop bodies. Nevertheless, Lincoln—urged on by public opinion and his own feeling that something should be done—ordered a general advance on Washington's Birthday. McClellan's objections caused Lincoln to abandon this movement, but the handwriting was on the wall: McClellan must make a move.

The first plan considered by General McClellan was an overland advance from Urbanna; but either through accident or by strategic design, Johnston's withdrawal to the Rappahannock so puzzled McClellan and his advisers that this plan was rejected in favor of an all-water movement. Pending definite tidings of what the Federal move would be, Johnston had directed Longstreet, who, with G. W. Smith, formed the inner council for Johnston, to build roads to the rear and to reconnoiter a defensive line along the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Longstreet's reconnaissance was soon made; and early in March, before the snow had quit the ground, the troops were withdrawn to this position.¹ They were now strategically well located to move either to the

¹ See the statement which the Rev. J. K. Stuart made on April 5, 1862, to Captain B. B. Douglas, Ninth Virginia Cavalry, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 428; A. S. Webb, *The Peninsula* (New York, 1881), 31 ff.

Peninsula or to the Shenandoah Valley. It was on March 17 that Johnston learned that Fortress Monroe, and not Urbanna, was the Federal objective.

In spite of the havoc played by disease—especially measles, mumps, and dysentery—the Confederate army in Virginia was fast hardening into shape. Its strength on March 1 totaled some 47,000 men and about 175 guns. The eighteen brigades which formed the bulk of the forces averaged two thousand men each. This total included Jackson's command, which, after the Bull Run campaign was over, had been sent to the Shenandoah, and now less than one fourth that number faced General N. P. Banks's twenty thousand men. The Union army—the Army of the Potomac—was organized into five corps, but the divisions were much smaller than those in the Southern army, there being only three brigades to the division. On March 1 the effective strength of all McClellan's forces, including Banks's and McDowell's, was about 185,000 men and 450 guns. In addition to the advantage which came from organization into corps, the Union army had the advantage of being provided with a staff; it had established the office of chief of staff and was well along with its system of supply and transport. To guard the rear, the area about Washington had been strongly fortified and was immune to successful attack except through siege operations.²

On April 5, a mixed union force of infantry, artillery, and some cavalry appeared before Yorktown, Virginia, and collided with a force of two thousand men led by General John B. Magruder. From the earliest indications of an advance by way of the Peninsula, Magruder had studied the defensive value of the Warwick River, which crossed the Peninsula from Yorktown to the southeast, and had set his troops to constructing dams which caused the river to break up into a chain of small lakes. At critical points of passage between these artificial lakes, he arranged a series of forts connected by trenches. Thus, in a short time, he had developed a very formidable obstacle to any hostile movement up the Peninsula.

Not content with earthworks, Magruder, when McClellan's advance guard appeared, led the same troops in and out of the forts with such rapidity as to create in McClellan's mind the belief that he was opposed by a powerful defensive army. This stratagem was largely responsible for the delay of the Union

² Throughout this study the term "effective strength" has been used to mean the numbers who were present for duty and able to participate in any engagement. There seems to be a wide difference of interpretation as to the number of men who could be used effectively in any battle. Because of straggling, not all the company and regimental returns give the true picture. Where possible, the statements as to the strength of commands are taken from the *Official Records*. For comparative strengths at this period (each month from December, 1861, to March, 1862, inclusive), see the figures given in McClellan's report, August 4, 1863, in *Official Records*, V, 12 and 18 ff.; Report, General W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery (Army of the Potomac), September 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 67; and Webb, *Peninsula*, 7.

leader. McClellan pressed hard against this handful of Southerners—averaging less than a thousand muskets per mile.

Although the enemy's main effort appeared to be coming from the sea, there was a formidable force north of the Rappahannock. Official Richmond was in a quandary. General Robert E. Lee, who had returned from South Carolina early in March, 1862, and was now established in Richmond as military adviser to President Davis, could not determine whether the great attack would be delivered against Johnston's lines or against Magruder's—or against both.³ Johnston was busy up and down the Rappahannock, prodding and driving, while Stuart, with his cavalry reached far into the territory north of that river, seeking the answer to this perplexing riddle. G. W. Smith—second in command after Beauregard left for the West—was detached on March 23 and sent to command the Acquia District, and Longstreet took over this responsibility.⁴

Stuart's driving curiosity brought results. He was at Bealeton on the night of March 27 and for the first time was of the opinion that the Union pressure on Johnston was but a feint to cover major operations elsewhere.⁵ That night he drove deep to the enemy's rear and discovered the real situation. The fog of war was now partially lifted; Johnston could decide more wisely.

Generals Johnston and Longstreet had a long conference. The War Department had already commenced to draw on Johnston's strength to reinforce Magruder, by taking two brigades with some artillery from the Acquia District,⁶ and on March 25 Lee had notified Johnston that some twenty to thirty thousand troops might soon be needed on the Peninsula.⁷ The next day, before Stuart's report on conditions had been received, Johnston advised Lee that he would reduce his force to mere outposts and bring some twenty-five thousand of his troops to Richmond. There was no question of demurring; Johnston could see even then that Magruder was in the greater danger.⁸ No doubt these problems were discussed in great detail between Johnston and his second in command during their conference on March 27. Johnston had been invited to come to Richmond for a conference over the general situation;⁹ there were

³ See Freeman, *Lee*, II, chap. i, for a full discussion of the situation in Richmond.

⁴ Special Orders No. 83, March 23, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 392. In this connection, it is of interest to note that Beauregard, shortly after the first battle of Manassas, had requested particularly that Longstreet be officially designated as second in command, even though Longstreet was then a brigadier general and junior in rank to many others. See Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, August 13, 1861, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 229.

⁵ Stuart to Johnston, March 27, 1862, *ibid.*, XI, Pt. III, 406-407.

⁶ Davis to *id.*, March 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 397.

⁷ Lee to *id.*, March 25, 1862, *ibid.*

⁸ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 16-17. Freeman interprets the correspondence in a manner which is prejudicial to Johnston and which the text does not support. See also in this connection Johnston to Lee, March 27, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 405; and Lee to Johnston, March 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 408-409.

⁹ Lee to Johnston, March 28, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 408-409.

problems to be met near Fredericksburg—all of which meant that active command would fall to Longstreet.

Johnston left his headquarters at Rapidan on March 28, directing Longstreet to start the advance troops toward Richmond.¹⁰ Although there is no mention of this in the records, to Longstreet also was delegated the greater task of evaluating the information from Stuart and from Jackson in the Valley.¹¹ There were problems of supply and of command—petty problems that always intrude upon an active commander. It became Longstreet's job to disengage some seventy-five hundred men from his lines and get them moving.¹² Column after column had to clear the defensive area without crossing each other and without exposing any part of the front to successful surprise attack. The task was well done. The change in command status was accepted without apparent disturbance, and Longstreet's redistribution of the troops received the full approval of Johnston's staff.¹³

There is nothing spectacular in the logistics of military movements. This may be called the drudgery of campaigns; yet to prepare and execute troop movements skillfully on a large scale is a high military accomplishment. War is not all glamor and dashing men on speeding horses. That is but the outer picture. Behind the scene there is the close study of maps, the anxious pondering over what the enemy may be up to, and the prosaic business of feeding and clothing thousands of human beings who march at the orders of their leaders, little knowing where they are going and often caring less.

That Longstreet handled the task well is not surprising—he had the requisite training and driving temperament for such work—but that he assumed easily and with so little confusion the office of second in command speaks well for his reputation among his fellows and the confidence which they had in him.

Shortly after his return to the Rapidan on April 6, Johnston again went to Richmond to confer with President Davis and General Lee. He had written to Lee on April 6 that only those who knew conditions on all fronts could decide where troops were needed.¹⁴ Conference was imperative.¹⁵ He had offered Lee all of the troops he needed, and Lee had countered with a request for a mere ten thousand men—too few to help Magruder if he were attacked, and too many to lose if Johnston's front were the objective. Johnston thought that

¹⁰ Johnston to Lee, March 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 405; A. P. Mason to Jubal A. Early, March 30, 1862, *ibid.*, 412. See also Johnston to Lee, April 6, 1862, *ibid.*, 423.

¹¹ Stuart to Longstreet, April 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 415-16.

¹² Johnston to Lee, March 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 405; Longstreet's instructions, April 3-5, 1862, to Early and D. H. Hill for troop transfers from the Rapidan to Richmond, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 527-30.

¹³ Mason to Early, March 30, 1862, *ibid.*, XI, Pt. III, 412; Johnston to Lee, April 4, 1862, *ibid.*, 419.

¹⁴ Johnston to Lee, April 6, 1862, *ibid.*, 423.

¹⁵ Lee to Johnston, March 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 408. See Freeman, *Lee*, II, 16-17, for a discussion of the situation.

Magruder, and not he, was the Union objective; and he reiterated his suggestion that large reinforcements be sent to the Peninsula.¹⁶ As it was necessary to clear up any misunderstandings, Johnston went to Richmond while Longstreet led the movement of troops toward Richmond. Longstreet established his headquarters in the hotel at Louisa Courthouse late on April 9 and remained there until he was summoned to the war conference held in Richmond on April 14.¹⁷

At the conference Longstreet had nothing to say until called on. When he did advance an opinion, it was to the effect that he knew McClellan and his methods—that he would move his army by the careful and detailed measurements of a military engineer and would not be ready before May 1.¹⁸ At this point Longstreet was interrupted by President Davis, who injected the comment that McClellan was a man of high military attainments. Longstreet has attributed to Davis an unwillingness to have his former favorite, McClellan, criticized.¹⁹

The span of years and the subsequent personal differences between Longstreet and Jefferson Davis may have clouded the former's memory. It may be that the exchange of words did go somewhat as Longstreet stated. The entire matter is of little consequence unless one assumes that at this time and place the slow-growing antipathy of Longstreet to Davis had its beginning. What is really important is Longstreet's statement: "My intention was to suggest that we leave Magruder to look after McClellan, and march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before, through the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Washington, and call McClellan to his own capital."²⁰ His idea was evolved, one may suppose, from a comprehension of the feeling in Washington that the capital must be saved at all hazard. Knowing of Jackson's vigorous work in the Valley, Longstreet saw that the quickest way to paralyze McClellan was to bring about political interference to disperse his army. Although the cry had been raised after Bull Run for a movement on Washington, it would have been a novel recommendation at the time of this conference. It is a great pity that Longstreet remained silent. One speculates on the attitude the others

¹⁶ Lee to Johnston, March 25, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 397; Johnston to Lee, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 400-401; *id.* to *id.*, March 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 405; Lee to Johnston, March 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 408-409.

¹⁷ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 21-22; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 66. Somewhat earlier—probably on April 1—Johnson had held a conference on these matters with Generals G. W. Smith and Longstreet.

¹⁸ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 66; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 21.

¹⁹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 66.

²⁰ *Ibid.* See also the remarks of Colonel Charles Marshall in Sir Frederick Maurice, *An Aide-de-camp to Lee* (Boston, 1927), 48. Marshall attributed the idea of operating in the Valley to President Davis. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 21. See also Johnston, *Narrative*, 112; Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, 2 vols. (New York, 1881), II, 87; G. W. Smith, *Confederate War Papers* (New York, 1884), 41.

would have taken—particularly Lee, who, by just such strategy, twice enticed the Union army out of Virginia in subsequent campaigns.²¹

The decision of the council was to reinforce Magruder and stake all on blocking McClellan on the lower Peninsula, while all forces would be so disposed as to operate on interior lines should the pressure grow too heavy on the line of the Rappahannock. The details were to be arranged between Lee and Johnston. During his visit of inspection to the Peninsula on April 13 and 14, Johnston had become doubtful of the chances of any real success on the lower Peninsula.²² On April 12 he had assumed the additional duties of commanding the Department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, and it behooved him to translate the decision of the Richmond conference into effective action just as quickly as possible. Longstreet was sent back to hurry the troops forward, and G. W. Smith was directed to take over other important duties near Yorktown in command of the army reserve.²³

One significant phrase appears in the Special Orders issued by the War Department on April 12, 1862, which assigned General Johnston to command of the Department of the Peninsula: this was the reference to Johnston's forces as "the Army of Northern Virginia." Thus the old Confederate Army of the Potomac disappeared, and the new name was born. The eastern army with its glories and its humiliations was known by this name until that fateful day in April, 1865, when it stacked its arms and returned to the ways of peace.²⁴

By April 18 sufficient troops had arrived on the lower Peninsula for the defense to be organized.²⁵ The basic plan called for three wings or groups—D. H. Hill to cover Yorktown, Magruder to take the right beginning at Dam 1, and Longstreet to take the center astride the main road to Williamsburg.²⁶

Anxious letters passed between army headquarters and the War Office in Richmond. Indeed, those were critical days. The location of army headquarters was the Lee farm—somewhat in rear of the river where the road crosses at Lee's Mill and in close proximity to the headquarters established earlier by Magruder. Longstreet's post of command was some distance away—near Jones's Field on the lateral road running south from Yorktown on the west

²¹ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 21, gives a good account of what probably did take place at this conference.

²² Richard Taylor to Benjamin Huger, April 13, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 439; Lee to Johnston, April 21, 1862, *ibid.*, 452; Johnston to Lee, April 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 456.

²³ Special Orders No. 6, April 12, 1862, *ibid.*, 438; General Orders No. 1 (Headquarters, Department of Northern Virginia), April 18, 1862, *ibid.*, 448.

²⁴ For the designation of the army as the "Army of Northern Virginia," see Lee to Johnston, March 25, 1862, *ibid.*, 397; General Orders No. 35, March 25, 1862, *ibid.*, 683; Davis to Johnston, March 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 392; Special Orders No. 6, April 12, 1862, *ibid.*, 438; Special Orders No. 22, *ibid.*, 569.

²⁵ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 25.

²⁶ General Orders No. 1, April 18, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 448.

side of the Warwick River.²⁷ Johnston had fully decided to withdraw from the vicinity of Yorktown when McClellan's preparations were completed,²⁸ and no great strengthening of the trenches was in order. Rather, the forces held themselves poised for rear-guard action while efforts were made to have the supplies moved out of the danger zone and plans were perfected for an orderly withdrawal.²⁹ The Confederate army was so weak that it is surprising that McClellan did not crash through the thin lines. The Union leader's uncertainty brought forth caustic comment from Johnston, who seemed more fully alive to the situation than his opponent. "No one but McClellan," he wrote, "could have hesitated to attack."³⁰

Things looked dark for the Richmond government. A force of unknown strength, led by McDowell, was ready to pounce on the capital from the north when the time seemed opportune. On the east, the masses mobilized by McClellan were in themselves sufficient to crush and overwhelm the Southern army of less than half the strength which opposed them. Johnston's previous solution³¹ had been to concentrate all available troops in front of Richmond and then to fight each hostile force separately before the enemy had a chance to combine against him. Now, with the situation growing in seriousness, Johnston suggested that the Peninsula be abandoned and that all troops—east and west—launch an offensive to the North to relieve the tightening pressure.³²

On May 1 Johnston was due to lose either Longstreet or G. W. Smith, for President Davis had demanded that one of the two be released to command the forces along the Rappahannock.³³ Johnston ignored this message as long as he could, replying to it only when Lee's insistence forced him to do so.³⁴ Johnston was about to move his army, and it was unthinkable that he should give up one of his best tactical leaders. He refused, and in so doing he paid Longstreet a generous tribute: ". . . the two officers named are necessary to the preservation of anything like organization in this Army. This Army cannot be commanded without these two officers; indeed, several more major generals like them are required to make this an Army."³⁵ Johnston needed Longstreet

²⁷ G. Moxley Sorrel to A. P. Hill, April 20, 1862, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 543. Mention is made here of Longstreet's troops repairing the trenches "near Jones' field." See also Webb, *Peninsula*, 67, which gives an excellent map.

²⁸ Johnston to Lee, April 24, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 461. See also *id.* to *id.*, April 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 473; and the discussion in Freeman, *Lee*, II, 21 ff.

²⁹ Johnston to Huger, April 27, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 469; Huger to Lee, April 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 474-75.

³⁰ Johnston to Lee, April 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 456.

³¹ See the discussion in Freeman, *Lee*, II, 19 ff.

³² Johnston to Lee, April 30, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 477. See also Lee to Johnston, May 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 485.

³³ Davis to Johnston, May 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 484-85.

³⁴ Lee to *id.*, May 5, 1862, *ibid.*, 493; Johnston to Lee, May 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 503.

³⁵ Johnston to Lee, May 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 503.

to co-ordinate the action of his rear—to stand between the Confederate main body and the enemy as the scant fifty thousand Confederates slogged along the mirelike roads seeking a place near Richmond and the supporting troops. Had Longstreet been absent during this withdrawal, one may well question whether the Southern army could have been extricated without heavy loss.

The generals met in Longstreet's tent on the night of April 30 to discuss the plans of withdrawal. It was time to move. All that remained undone was the proper lining up of the divisions. President Davis was notified that the withdrawal was on. The news brought consternation to official Richmond. Could not Johnston wait a little longer? Hasty preparations were made to move the seat of the government elsewhere.³⁶

The first line of the Confederate defense had paralleled the Warwick River southeasterly from Yorktown. A second and much stronger line—to which Johnston now planned to withdraw—had been constructed by Magruder from Queen's Creek to College Creek, to the east of Williamsburg. The key to the main part of this line was a bastion at the series of earthworks which stretched in both directions from Williamsburg to the York and the James. At this point the width of the Peninsula narrowed to some eight miles, and all approaches had been covered except that from College Creek—a small stream running northeasterly into the York. This line was strong, but Johnston planned to hold it only long enough for his main body to get clear and for his trains to have a safe start on their march to Richmond.³⁷

Stuart was assigned to mask the movement by skillful use of his cavalry. To Longstreet came the more important task of co-ordinating the movement of the elements nearest the enemy and assuming command of the rear guard. The plan called for a concentration of the command near Williamsburg during the night of May 2-3 and for all to be ready to set out from that place at 8 A.M. on May 3.³⁸

The first movement to the rear was completed during the night of May 3-4. The troops at Yorktown retired on the Williamsburg Road, while the two outer wings moved by the Hampton and Lee's Mill roads. Longstreet's men crept through the woods in human chains with links of clasped hands until they felt the soft road underfoot. The withdrawal was a complete success. So quietly did the troops move back across the fields or feel their way through the matted underbrush that the enemy made no attempt to penetrate Stuart's

³⁶ *Id.* to D. H. Hill, May 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 486; Davis to Johnston, May 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 484-85. See also instructions to the provost marshal at Petersburg (regarding preparation for the possible evacuation of Richmond), May 6, 1862, *ibid.*, 495; and instructions to all sections of the War Department, May 10, 1862, *ibid.*, 504.

³⁷ Richmond was some fifty miles distant over roads that were little better than rivers of mud.

³⁸ Johnston's withdrawal orders, May 2, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 489-90.

defensive screen. A deathlike silence seemed to grip the command; not even the bray of a mule broke the stillness. The quiet withdrawal spoke well for the state of discipline of troops that were green and unused to war.

When McClellan learned on the morning of May 4 that his foe had stolen away during the night, he sent General George Stoneman's cavalry in swift pursuit. Stuart threw out a strong screen; and Longstreet took over the service of security and assumed personal leadership of the rear guard. Stoneman soon came into contact with Stuart, and a running fight resulted, with the Confederate tactics proving much the better of the two. Stoneman made little progress; and General Joseph Hooker, who commanded the main Union pursuing column, got lost in the woods. It seemed as if the whole Union army was one confused mass. But in spite of these delays, the pursuit came up with Longstreet just as he was about to enter the defensive works east of Williamsburg. His line of skirmishers fell back, disputing every inch, while his massed reserves moved from position to position. The sudden Union drive, however, prevented a complete deployment of all of Longstreet's troops. The left, consisting of the earthworks near College Creek, was not covered; and General W. S. Hancock was able to move up a brigade to threaten the Confederate left rear.

While Longstreet was holding off the repeated attempts of the enemy, the withdrawing Confederate columns were plowing through knee-deep mud. The rate of march, according to General Alexander, was less than one mile per hour. This was a certain indication to Longstreet that he must plan to hold back the enemy at least all of the following day—May 5—and probably through the night. He decided to give battle with all his strength and to attempt to defeat and break up the Federal pursuit before the arrival of reinforcements to the Union advanced elements. He might have to sacrifice his entire command. His mission demanded it. There was some reserve in D. H. Hill's division, which had been delayed at Williamsburg, but this was about all the aid Longstreet could count on to bolster his already-fatigued battalions. In his favor, however, was the certainty that his opponent would not expect him to pass from the defensive to the offensive.

On the morning of May 5, the Union troops assaulted all along his front. Fighting desperately, the Confederate pickets were slowly driven back. Johnston was asked for aid, and General A. P. Hill's brigade was sent back. As these fresh troops came up, Longstreet decided to counterattack. His dispositions were excellent. The troops of General R. H. Anderson, with the brigades of Generals C. M. Wilcox and A. P. Hill in immediate support, were astride the main highway in a column of masses. Behind them came General George E. Pickett in a similar formation, with large detachments out on both flanks to

guard against surprise. Longstreet rode to the head of the assaulting columns and prepared to lead the attack in person.

Shortly after 10 A.M. Longstreet attacked. The Union advance was checked; now it was to be thrown back. Longstreet's drive gained momentum. It commenced to slow only when it met the Union reserves echeloned in the rear. The Federal offensive was broken up into flying groups of men, each pursued by the charging Confederates. The suddenness of Longstreet's thrust had broken down the attacks of a much larger force. Because the drive came as a complete surprise to the enemy, it was completely successful.

Attacking in columns of masses as he did, Longstreet could not prevent open places in his line after the advance had penetrated the Union first positions. Some Union skirmishers passed through these gaps and opened fire on Longstreet's rear units. Sensing the danger, Longstreet called on D. H. Hill to send a brigade and then ordered his own reserve (General R. E. Colston's brigade) to fill the gaps in the battle line and to round up the Union troops in his rear. When D. H. Hill's men came up, they were sent against the forming Union reserves. A sharp drive sent these Northern supports scampering to the rear. With quickened instinct, Longstreet then sent Stuart forward to change the hostile retreat into a rout.³⁹ Stuart soon ran head on against the main body of McClellan's forces and was just able to hold them off with his advance guard while he moved his main column off to the flank.

Toward the middle of the afternoon of May 5 the ammunition ran short. As the entire reserve supply was in the trains which were struggling through the mud some three miles back, fresh troops were called in. The remainder of D. H. Hill's division came up, and Early's brigade went into the fight at once to support A. P. Hill, who was having a hard time of it on the right. Colston, who had penetrated the woods to the front, was then able to lend some aid to Hill by flanking the stubborn Union force which had re-formed and counterattacked. With the Confederate line so stiffened, no further progress was made by McClellan during the balance of the day.

General Johnston heard the roll of musketry and joined Longstreet at about 3:30 P.M. He stated in his report that things were going to his entire satisfaction and that he "was compelled to be a mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference."⁴⁰ Longstreet's version was quite modest. He stated that Johnston, "with his usual magnanimity, declined to take command."⁴¹

³⁹ Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 565.

⁴⁰ Johnston's report, *ibid.*, 275.

⁴¹ Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, 565. In this report Longstreet also wrote, "My part in the battle was comparatively simple and easy, that of placing troops in the proper positions at the proper time." *Ibid.*, 566. Actually, of course, the proper placement of troops for battle constitutes a good measure of any commanding officer's ability.

What was really remarkable about the fight was the high morale and the excellent battle discipline of Longstreet's command. These revealed the confidence which the soldiers had in their leader. Brigade and lesser commanders accepted without question the tactical dispositions devised by Longstreet; and the records allow no inference that there existed any dissatisfaction with the actions of either the commander or his staff.⁴² To choose the proper moment for a counterattack is extremely difficult. It may have been a matter of luck that Longstreet judged the situation so accurately in this case. His success may also have been attributable entirely to his fund of battle sense or judgment. He appeared well as a troop leader. His tactical ability thus far in the war seems without question to have been excellent.

Longstreet forfeited part of the reputation as a leader which the earlier events of the day had earned him, however, when in the afternoon he gave in weakly, as Alexander has said, and permitted D. H. Hill to divert himself in a useless and risky attack. At about 5 P.M., D. H. Hill came to Longstreet's headquarters and asked for authority to launch an attack on a large Union force which had come up on the left. A Federal general, Hancock, had moved in close on Longstreet's left rear with about a corps and had occupied some fieldworks which had been either overlooked by the Confederates or evacuated too soon. Hill had discovered this situation; and having part of his division in hand, he told Longstreet's staff that he had caged Hancock and wished to capture him or drive him off. Longstreet at first refused. Not accepting the decision, Hill made a second impetuous appeal in person. This time Longstreet consented.

Hancock had much the better situation on the ground, and it appears that Hill rushed his troops into an assault without any attempt to reconnoiter and find out just what the Union dispositions were. The result was disastrous. Hill suffered a severe repulse and the practical annihilation of the Fifth North Carolina Infantry. The most that would have been permissible under the circumstances would have been a holding attack or a mere blocking of Hancock. This seems to have been Longstreet's first tactical blunder of any importance—at least, the first of which there is any record.

The affair between Hill and Hancock ended the action at Williamsburg. Although firing was kept up during the night along Longstreet's right front, the Confederates experienced no difficulty in holding back the Union front line. By his sound judgment and willingness to close with his enemy, Longstreet undoubtedly saved the Confederate army from serious defeat. Through the judicious combination of Johnston's wisdom in withdrawing from Yorktown before he was pinned to the ground by an overwhelming attack, and the tactical skill of his rear-guard commander, the army was saved. It had cost

⁴² *Ibid.*

Longstreet some 102 officers and 1,458 men—about one ninth of his force—to carry out his mission, but the damage which he had inflicted was much greater. His captures included many guns (every piece but four being carried off the field), numerous regimental standards, and many prisoners. This was the payment which McClellan made for the rashness of his pursuit commander. But McClellan's greater loss was the complete disruption of his plan to intercept and destroy Johnston's army. And for this upset he had only James Longstreet and his rear-guard soldiers to blame.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Johnston's report, *ibid.*, 276.

Seven Pines

THANKS TO LONGSTREET'S SKILL,¹ JOHNSTON HAD BEEN ABLE TO EXTRICATE his army from the grasp of McClellan's advance and to move back to positions behind the Chickahominy and Beaver Dam Creek. He was pursued closely; and by May 17 the Union forces had swarmed around him and occupied a line from Beaver Dam Creek, on the north bank of the Chickahominy, along that stream for some three or four miles as far as New Bridge, and thence across the river in a southerly direction until the other flank rested on White Oak Swamp. General Fitz John Porter, with the V Corps, had the right of the Federal line from Mechanicsville to where it joined General William B. Franklin's VI Corps near New Bridge. General E. V. Sumner's II Corps was divided between the Grapevine (or Upper) Bridge and the Lower Bridge; the IV Corps, under General E. D. Keyes, was near Seven Pines, about seven miles from Richmond; and the III Corps, under Heintzelman, was about four miles to the east near Bottom's Bridge. General Joseph Hooker covered the left and the bridge over White Oak Creek. The Union line was about fifteen miles long and occupied a series of strong positions. It had but one serious weakness: it was astride an unfordable stream.

The Confederate army was encamped within sight of Richmond and was, actually, with its back to the wall. It could retire no further without abandoning the capital. Here it was prepared to stand and die rather than give another inch. Without establishing definite sectors of defense, Johnston disposed his troops somewhat as follows: Magruder, with A. P. Hill's weak division, faced Porter; G. W. Smith was astride the New Bridge Road, just west of Old Tavern; D. H. Hill opposed Keyes near Seven Pines; Longstreet was massed well back on the Nine Mile Road; and General Benjamin Huger's small force covered the right on the Charles City Road. Although numerically much weaker than McClellan's army, the Confederate army was well located; and its morale was so high that when McClellan wired Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton on May 10 that it would be unwise to count on anything but a stubborn

¹ This is a strong assertion. However, a careful study of the Confederate situation at the time of the rear-guard action at Williamsburg leads one to the conclusion that if it had not been for Longstreet's tactical skill, his tenacity, and his timing, the Confederate rear would have been forced and the Southern army overwhelmed by the eager pursuers. An unco-ordinated action, no matter how vicious the fighting, could not have averted a catastrophe.

and desperate defense, he made no mistake. His one error was that he estimated Johnston's forces at least double the numbers available.

But not only was the Army of Northern Virginia facing the swelling numbers that McClellan had marched up the Peninsula; it had McDowell with some thirty-seven thousand men as a direct threat against the left. McDowell was at Fredericksburg, and opposed to him were the two brigades of Generals R. H. Anderson and L. O'B. Branch. Should McClellan pin Johnston down, there was nothing to prevent McDowell from moving in to roll up the Confederate flank and destroy Johnston's army. Johnston's hope lay in taking the offensive against one force before the pressure exerted by the other could intervene to defeat him. This was the situation as the month of May drew to a close.

On May 26, General James Shields joined forces with McDowell, and together they moved southward toward McClellan and the Southern capital. Johnston learned of the advance on May 27. This might be his last and most favorable opportunity. Should McDowell join McClellan, it might be the end. Accordingly, Johnston laid his plans to drive in the Federal right while Longstreet launched a strong holding attack south of the Chickahominy. Johnston had the opportunity to prevent the junction of the two Union armies; he might even defeat McClellan.

This attack was set for dawn on May 29; but later during the night of May 27,² when Johnston was in conference with his generals, word was received that McDowell had turned tail suddenly and returned to the vicinity of Washington.³ The explanation is simple. Ever since Stonewall Jackson's fierce assault on Kernstown on March 23, the Northern War Department had kept anxious eyes on him. The uncertainty where this extraordinary man would next appear had official Washington almost in a panic. When Shields had been withdrawn from the Valley to reinforce McDowell and news of this action reached Jackson, he struck hard at Banks at Strasburg on May 23 and at Winchester on May 25; and a defeated Banks rushed back to the Potomac with Jackson close on his heels. Hurried councils were called; McClellan was forgotten, and McDowell was ordered to halt his march and to move toward the Valley.⁴ There was little thought of the grand movement against Johnston.

² Joseph E. Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 211-12. For orders as issued based on Johnston's information, see Walter H. Taylor to Huger, May 27, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 554; and A. P. Hill to L. O'B. Branch, May 7, 1862, *ibid.* McDowell was first reported to be moving south on the twenty-seventh, but later that same night Stuart reported that he was moving north.

³ Lee to Johnston, May 30, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 560.

⁴ McClellan's report, quoting Edwin M. Stanton to Irvin McDowell, May 17, 1862, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 28-29; memo by President Lincoln, May 17, 1862, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 176-77; Webb, *Peninsula*, 36-37; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 85-86.

Lincoln wanted to use McDowell and the Union forces already in the Valley to trap Jackson.

The danger to Richmond had indeed been great. President Davis had been made aware of the probable necessity for evacuating the capital. This shifting of McDowell to the West kept from McClellan a large reinforcement that might have enabled him to take Richmond.⁵ Secretary of War George W. Randolph had issued to the department chiefs a confidential circular in which he directed that the archives be secretly put aboard a special train and that all preparations be made to quit Richmond.⁶

With McDowell out of the way, Johnston called off the attack which was scheduled for May 29. Since the troops had been moved into position, Longstreet urged that the battle be carried on as planned.⁷ But Johnston demurred and changed his scheme to an attack from the south. A close study of the situation and the relative positions of the rival forces seems to indicate that Longstreet was sound in his recommendation. McClellan's right was still in its dangerous position of isolation, and the task would have been just so much easier with McDowell no longer a threat. However, the troops were withdrawn from the north flank, and all preparations were made for a strong attack on the Federal left center.

The plans for this battle were made by Johnston and Longstreet during the afternoon of May 30. The details of what happened are not known. General Alexander has given a detailed description of the conference; but since it is uncertain whether he was present, the facts which he cited may not have been firsthand.⁸ The position of the Federal army was precarious. The Chickahominy was swollen from recent rains, and Porter's only way of crossing the river would be over the few bridges which were located further down the stream and which could be kept under fire at all times. The situation, therefore, gave much promise of success.

Johnston's plan seems to have been to make a deep penetration between General Silas Casey's right and the Chickahominy.⁹ Casey commanded the right elements of Keyes's IV Corps and occupied a strong position in the vicinity of Seven Pines. By forcing the head of his attack between Casey and the river,

⁵ See report of B. B. Douglas, June 1, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 567.

⁶ Memo by secretary of war to chiefs of bureaus, May 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 557.

⁷ Longstreet charged that a definite unwillingness on the part of G. W. Smith to attack near Beaver Dam Creek induced Johnston to abandon his original plan of battle. Smith, on the other hand, stated that it was Longstreet who wanted to abandon Johnston's plan, proposing instead an attack south of the Chickahominy. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 85-86; Gustavus W. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 222, 224.

⁸ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 74 ff. Cf. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 224 ff.

⁹ Johnston to G. W. Smith, May 30, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 563-64.

Johnston could dislocate the Union left from the river and throw it back against White Oak Swamp. This would isolate Sumner and Porter and bring about a situation whereby he might defeat McClellan in detail before the widely scattered elements of the Union army could come to each other's support.

The disposition of the Confederate army was such as to facilitate this scheme of maneuver. Since D. H. Hill faced Casey at Seven Pines, he was directed to advance against him. Similarly, orders were presumed to have been given Longstreet to move down the Nine Mile Road, preceding G. W. Smith's division, and, assisted by Whiting of G. W. Smith's division, to uncover Casey's right flank, turn on him, and co-operate with Hill in destroying him. In support of this attack, Magruder was given the mission of holding the Union right in place; G. W. Smith was directed to prevent any reinforcements from coming to Casey from across the Chickahominy; and Huger, already in position on the Williamsburg Road, was directed to march to relieve General R. E. Rodes, who was picketed well down on the Charles City Road, and to drive on Casey's left from that position.¹⁰

It was a good plan; it ought to have been successful. But in the absence of definite written orders, something went wrong. It seems that the conference between Johnston and Longstreet was protracted—it lasted all afternoon—and several plans were discussed. As no minutes were taken, nothing can be stated with certainty about this preliminary meeting. It is said that Johnston was considerably disturbed by a thunderstorm which came up suddenly in the middle of the afternoon.¹¹ It is hard to picture this soldier as being so upset by a storm as to fail to give definite instructions to his principal subordinate. At all events, either Johnston failed to make his plan clear to Longstreet and to inform him as to all details, or else Longstreet utterly failed to appreciate the essential features of Johnston's tactical plans. The two did not reach a complete understanding. For while Johnston seems to have planned for Longstreet to move directly east on the Nine Mile Road, astride which his troops were already in position, and to lead the main thrust against Casey's right near Fair Oaks Station, Longstreet's idea of his mission was to march over to the Williamsburg Road and support D. H. Hill with part of his division while the remainder attacked on Hill's right. Longstreet later claimed that he was instructed to close in on Casey's left rather than on his right. He also seems to have understood that G. W. Smith was to take over his front on the Nine Mile Road when he vacated that spot.

But assuming that Longstreet was sincere in his misunderstanding of John-

¹⁰ Note the orders given to G. W. Smith and Whiting, *ibid.* Cf. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 224.

¹¹ See Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 227.

ston's tactics, there is still not much to be said for his own conception of the plan. Certainly it did not have the prospect of such complete success as the scheme of attack said to have been prepared by General Johnston. Johnston's plan was the more simple; and it had the larger merit of anticipating a more destructive effect on the Union army. Nevertheless, there was still opportunity to deal McClellan a decisive blow if the several elements in the attack could have been well timed and the effort co-ordinated. But whatever the merits of General Longstreet's conception of the maneuver, the advantages of an attack on Casey's left were lost because the other commanders had a different idea of what was expected. This lack of a well-understood plan led to much confusion. In his march across country from the Nine Mile Road, Longstreet ran counter to Huger, who was moving up to relieve Rodes. According to General Alexander, who was caustic in his criticism, Longstreet and Huger lost much valuable time in crossing a small stream, and this resulted in a disjointed attack. Alexander stated bluntly that Longstreet came up to Huger and demanded the right to cross his division first because he was first at the stream, but, once across and learning that Huger was the senior, Longstreet halted his column and permitted Huger to march past and take the lead.¹²

The *Official Records* are silent as to the cause of the delay; there are the bare statements that Huger failed to get up with his command, that Longstreet waited as long as he could before launching the assault in order to have Huger close at hand, and that the attack failed because of Huger's delay. This being true, it does not seem probable that Longstreet had delayed at the stream as Alexander charged.¹³ Johnston blamed Huger and did not criticize Longstreet, so all may have been much different from the version recited by Alexander.

The incident of Longstreet's reported collision with Huger is not a trivial affair to be dismissed as one of the many incidents resulting from the lack of training and faulty staff work of the Confederate army. It seems to be a positive index of one of Longstreet's traits which in later years made him a target for criticism. He may have proposed to Johnston that the attack be made against Casey's left and, with this idea fixed in his mind, have failed to note that Johnston had finally decided on a drive against Casey's right. His collision with Huger may have brought home to him the realization that he was not operating in his proper area. But once committed to the attack on Casey's left, he was forced to see it through. Longstreet's misunderstanding, if it was one, offers a plausible explanation for the confusion that occurred along the Charles City Road.

The battle did not start until about 2 P.M. on May 31. With true instinct,

¹² Alexander, *Memoirs*, 78 ff.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 78.

Rodes, without waiting for Huger, who was delayed at the stream, launched a furious flank attack on Casey in time to bring effective pressure in support of the main assault. For some unknown reason, G. W. Smith did not cooperate. It has been said that the sound of Hill's musketry was the agreed signal for the troops on the Confederate left to participate, and that because this was not heard, Smith held fast and did not advance until much later, when the main attack had reached its maximum intensity. But the thought occurs: Was Smith waiting for Longstreet to come up on his right as the Johnston plan had provided? ¹⁴

The flank attack on Casey's left resulted in the early capture of several sections of the Union trenches and some of the more important fieldworks. As the main assault moved up to the Federal lines, the Northern pickets abandoned their posts and fell back even before contact was gained. D. H. Hill pushed Casey for about a mile; and later, after he had been reinforced, he drove him back another mile. The Confederate troops fought like veterans; and when darkness fell, Hill's battalions had been everywhere successful. That the victory was not more complete was due to the lack of concert in the whole attack. Had all parts of the line worked together, Casey probably would have been destroyed and McClellan's army split in twain. As it was, a great moral victory was gained for the green Confederate troops who saw the superior numbers of the enemy fall back before their vigorous assaults. It was the beginning of the moral supremacy of the Army of Northern Virginia which was to excite the admiration of the world. Brigades which had never before experienced real battle became seasoned in their first big engagement.

Though D. H. Hill and Longstreet had gained considerable success on the Southern right, affairs had gone less favorably on the other flank. Johnston had been with the left all day, and much of the action had taken place under his personal direction. Basing his orders on the assumption that the Chickahominy could not be forded, he had sent Whiting against a mass of Federal artillery which was supported by a part of Sumner's corps that had crossed to the aid of Casey. Whiting suffered severe loss. General Robert Hatton reinforced him; and, with Wade Hampton and J. Johnston Pettigrew in close support, the advance was started again. In a short time all four commands had been badly cut up. Later G. W. Smith's division was formed for another assault on Casey's right; but hardly had this attack been well launched when Johnston, who rode with the advance, was so badly wounded by a bursting shell that his removal to the rear was necessary. It was just before dark on the

¹⁴ Cf. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 240-45; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," *ibid.*, 211 ff.

afternoon of May 31 when Johnston fell. The command then devolved upon G. W. Smith, who soon stopped the fighting but prepared to carry it on the next day.

The Army of Northern Virginia was now well in hand. G. W. Smith's division, facing east, its right resting on Fair Oaks Station, was lined somewhat at right angles with the York River Railroad. Magruder, on Smith's left, had a reserve of some ten thousand fresh troops. Longstreet occupied the center (or left of the right wing), with his left near Smith's right, one brigade in rear of D. H. Hill, and the others scattered in a line of masses. Hill's division, in close contact with the Union third line of defense, paralleled the railroad for nearly a mile and covered the front beyond the railroad to White Oak Swamp. On the left of the Confederate front, the terrain was open and well adapted for maneuver; on the right, however, the ground was swampy, the roads were in a terrible state from recent rains, and the enemy positions were blanketed by a thick grove of small pines, which afforded excellent cover. This terrain made maneuver difficult and severely restricted the use of artillery.

On the Union side, John Sedgwick faced G. W. Smith; I. B. Richardson, in a column of masses, was close up on Longstreet's left; and D. B. Birney, with his brigade in line, covered the remainder of Longstreet's front from the third line of the Union trenches and the excellent protection afforded by the railroad embankment. The III Corps adjoined Birney; then came all of the IV Corps. With the exception of Porter's V Corps, the troops north of the Chickahominy were closed up near the bridges and ready to cross and take their positions in the line should it become necessary.

Learning of Johnston's wound, Longstreet first saw to the comfort of his men and then sought out G. W. Smith to ascertain the plans for the next day, June 1.¹⁵ He stumbled around in the darkness and did not reach Smith's headquarters until well after midnight. After reporting the situation on the right, Longstreet asked for reinforcements in order to continue the attack with increasing vigor the next morning. Smith was much disturbed by reports of newly constructed bridges across the Chickahominy and betrayed anxiety that the enemy might steal a march on him and swing around his left rear toward Richmond.¹⁶ There was a prolonged discussion. In the end Smith directed that the attack continue, but he stipulated that a brigade should be sent to his division, which, under General W. H. C. Whiting's command, was to become the pivot on which the main Confederate attack would swing when it attacked

¹⁵ Smith charged that he had to send for Longstreet. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 251-52.

¹⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 103.

the Union left and attempted to drive it into the swampy bed of the Chickahominy.¹⁷

General Smith thus abandoned Johnston's plan and devised a complicated close-in envelopment of the Federal left. In view of the situation, this was a dangerous maneuver. Should Longstreet drive forward rapidly and then attempt to converge on either Sedgwick or Richardson, his right would be exposed to heavy flanking fire from the entire Union IV Corps. The one chance for Smith's plan to succeed seemed to be for Smith to make a quick plunge against the Union right, dislocate it from the river, and hold it fast while Magruder penetrated the gap thus formed and swung hard against the Union left center or rear. The terrain favored this kind of an attack, provided Longstreet could keep his front engaged and prevent any movement of Federal troops to the right in support of Sedgwick. It would be gratifying to be able to record that Longstreet protested against the risky plan advocated by Smith and offered some more workable alternative. Perhaps he did; the records of this conference are far from complete.

At the opening of the battle of June 1, Pickett moved in on Richardson's outguards; and General John B. Hood's brigade, which was on G. W. Smith's right, was so well sprinkled with fire that it was ordered back. The Union defense had stiffened perceptibly. With Hood's withdrawal, the Southern pivot commenced to retire. This movement to the rear occurred just as Longstreet moved to the attack. Such tactics could not possibly gain any advantage. As Longstreet forged ahead, his left became more and more exposed to heavy fire—so much so that he believed the enemy had launched a strong counter-attack. He called for reinforcements. In his message to General Smith, he mentioned hard going because of the thick woods and the swampy nature of the ground. Lafayette McLaws was rushed to his aid; he reported that Longstreet was holding hard on the same ground that the enemy had held the day before and that five thousand men were needed to maintain the position and ten thousand to attack with any chance of success. The truth of the matter was that Longstreet was not being attacked—he had run into a very strong defense.

The real failure of the second day's battle was caused by the retirement of the pivot. When a pivot was needed to protect Longstreet's left and thus allow him to swing his right around, there was none, and the Federal musketry had full play on Longstreet's unprotected left flank. G. W. Smith, in his postwar explanation, said that he directed Whiting to make a diversion in favor of Longstreet, but that Whiting was later ordered to make no advance until the

¹⁷ Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 253.

fighting on the right was well developed. Whiting was not engaged that day because, according to Smith's version, "nothing was observed from the Nine Miles' Road that indicated . . . a real and determined attack . . . by the right wing." Although G. W. Smith did not admit that Hood of Whiting's division was called back,¹⁸ he did say that there was heavy firing and that Hood was slightly engaged. Smith also seemed to complain that Longstreet allowed D. H. Hill to do all of the fighting and that he did not use all of Huger's force on the first day.¹⁹

The personal recollections of both Longstreet and G. W. Smith are tinged with so much bitterness and so many repeated accusations that it is difficult to separate fact from fiction. Smith charged that Longstreet made no attempt to obey orders—without, however, stating which orders. Since all the charges seem to hinge on the nonemployment of D. H. Hill's division—which was in general reserve—the order referred to may be that in which Longstreet was directed to continue the fight with the rest of his command after deducting the brigade which was to assist either McLaws or Whiting.²⁰ Smith seems to have forgotten that Hill was in reserve and thus no longer subject to Longstreet's orders. He also appears to have ignored the fact that all of Longstreet's messages indicated that he was heavily engaged.

Longstreet fought back at Smith and accused him of doing nothing to aid him. He further charged that when Whiting, who had sensed the situation, requested of Smith the authority to make a diversion in favor of Longstreet's attack on the right, Smith not only refused this request but directed Whiting to withdraw to the vicinity of the New Bridge Road fork on the Nine Mile Road; and that Whiting's retirement then resulted in a further retirement of the pivot and exposed him (Longstreet) to a still more devastating fire. In support of this criticism, Longstreet cited one of Smith's letters, which says that Whiting had been ordered to take close defensive relations with Magruder. This, when Smith's division, of which Whiting was the advance, was presumed to be engaged in an attack!²¹

In regard to all of this quarreling, little can be said now. It is evident that Smith ordered an attack, and that instead of putting his whole force into the offensive, he put part of it on the defensive.²² The evidence seems to support

¹⁸ G. W. Smith's report, *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 993. Cf. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 253.

¹⁹ See Johnston to Huger, May 31, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 938.

²⁰ Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 243, 252; Smith's report, June 24, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 989-94; D. H. Hill's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 944.

²¹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 105-107.

²² No other inference can be drawn from his own statements in his report, *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 989-94 (particularly p. 993); or from his postwar account and explanations, "Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 251-63.

Longstreet, though one of the best historians of the war has commented that "Longstreet's performance of his orders on this morning of June 1st was singularly lacking in energy and dash."²³ Longstreet, however, later became one of Lee's corps commanders; G. W. Smith soon left the army on account of illness, was later assigned to duty elsewhere, and subsequently resigned his commission in the Confederate army.

The day following the battle of Seven Pines, Longstreet published a congratulatory order to the troops of D. H. Hill and his own divisions who had done well in the engagement. The names of both Williamsburg and Seven Pines were authorized to be inscribed on streamers to be carried on the battle flags. Not all of the regiments deserved this distinction, for some had quit the field under fire; and Longstreet was determined that none but the worthy should be given the battle award. He wrote to Hill:

I send you enough of the Seven Pines for your troops, but I think that neither of the regiments that left the battle field have [*sic*] the slightest claim to it nor the regiment that lost its colors. We must endeavor to have this thing select, or it will be of no service. Any regiment that goes through battle creditably I think entitled to the inscription; but I hold that no regiment goes through creditably when it leaves the field before the fight is over; particularly when repeated efforts have to be made to get it back on the field. I have spoken in strong terms about this, because I am entirely satisfied that it is just. No regiment of mine can ever have the name of a battle on its banner if it quits the field before the battle is ended.²⁴

It is a pity that this high regard for battle honor did not characterize more of the Confederate generals. Longstreet gave praise where praise was earned but held it strictly for those who had won it fairly. The bonds of affection that slowly but surely welded the First Corps to this man are the more easily understood from such exhibitions of his character. Young officers competed eagerly to gain his notice; and the soldiers soon learned to call him by his West Point name—Old Pete—with voices high-pitched with emotion and evident affection. Longstreet was behind no man in knowing the way to reach the heart of the man in the ranks.

But what of the battle? No lasting result was gained from the two days of bloody fighting. Briefly, it had been Johnston's plan for D. H. Hill and Longstreet to strike the Federal front, while Huger was to assist by a movement against the Federal left flank or by reinforcing Longstreet if necessary. G. W. Smith, commanding on Johnston's left, was to advance against the Federal right, both to relieve pressure against Longstreet and to drive back the

²³ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 89; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 77; John Codman Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War; A Concise Account of the War in the United States of America Between 1861 and 1865* (New York, 1894-1913), Pt. II, 149.

²⁴ Longstreet to D. H. Hill (re battle inscriptions on flags), June 12, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 595.

opposition. Longstreet has said that a signal gun from Huger announcing his readiness to attack was to have determined the time of his forward movement. Smith on the left was to have moved to the attack at the sound of Longstreet's guns. The heavy rain and wretched condition of the roads, poor staff work, lack of written orders, misunderstanding of verbal orders, and Longstreet's delay in attacking all acted to create confusion, delay, and lack of co-ordinated movement. The result was piecemeal attacks, ending in local success but not in any sustained, co-ordinated advance all along the line. D. H. Hill did not advance until 1 P.M., and by 6:30 P.M. the fighting in the Confederate center was over. The Federal center and left were driven back and separated from the right. About 4 P.M. the Confederate left finally began to move forward, but it was met by troops from the Federal right under Sumner and suffered heavy losses. About 7 P.M. Johnston was severely wounded, and the command devolved on G. W. Smith. This officer planned to renew the engagement on the next day and thought to use Longstreet's victorious troops to garner the fruits of their victory of May 31. We have seen that nothing of consequence was accomplished in the fighting on June 1. After dark the Confederate troops were withdrawn into their former positions in front of Richmond. Over ten thousand casualties was the aggregate toll suffered by both armies; and the net gain was but a stiffening of McClellan's defensive lines south of the Chickahominy, although he was forced to sacrifice a mile or so of front.²⁵

Johnston's plans should have worked out better. They were simple and bold, and they promised a more crushing defeat of the Union south wing. General McClellan might have paid dearly for his tactical faults. Two reasons stand out for the failure to achieve complete success. First, there was the confusion incident to Longstreet's apparent misunderstanding of the orders; and second, there was the misfortune of having General Johnston struck down at the end of the first day's fighting, when the earlier delays and confusion had well-nigh been corrected. Had Johnston been on the field to direct the second day's work, it is doubtful whether he would have done as badly as G. W. Smith seems to have done. Had the tactical maneuver on the second day been carefully co-ordinated—even if based on Smith's plan—it is not likely that even the strong Union line could have withstood the whipping assault from the Confederate right. Johnston would have seen the danger involved in Whiting's retirement and promptly maintained the pivot, so that the Federal reserves would have

²⁵ For varying accounts of the battle of Seven Pines other than those already cited, see G. W. Smith, *The Battle of Seven Pines* (New York, 1891), *passim* (especially chap. iii, re Huger's operations); Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. II, 139-53; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 68-74; and William Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac* (New York, 1882), 132-39. For a statement concerning the troops engaged and the losses, see Thomas L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-65* (Boston, 1901), 81.

had little chance of getting in on Longstreet's left and thus holding up the main attack. The lack of co-ordination was fatal to any continued success.

Longstreet has paid high tribute to his wounded chief. Although his words were written long after the event, they are of greater value because time had mellowed his judgment. He said that "General Johnston was skilled in the art and science of war, gifted in his quick, penetrating mind and soldierly bearing, genial and affectionate in nature, honorable and winning in person, and confiding in his love." Through the long months that followed Manassas, Longstreet found great satisfaction in serving close to a man of such superior attainments.²⁶

²⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 100.

From Fair Oaks to Malvern Hill

SHORTLY AFTER NOON ON JUNE 1, 1862, A QUIET, UNASSUMING, GRAY-HAIRED man rode out from Richmond to the field headquarters of the Army of Northern Virginia, accompanied by a number of officers, who followed at a respectful distance. He was Robert E. Lee, the President's military adviser, come by order of Jefferson Davis to assume command of the army.¹

General Longstreet was at first somewhat in doubt as to Lee's capacity for command. He later said that Lee's assignment "was far from reconciling the troops to the loss of our beloved chief, Joseph E. Johnston," and that General Lee's reputation seemed to rest on his services as an engineer under General Winfield Scott in Mexico, as his experience as a troop leader had been limited to an unsuccessful campaign against the Union forces in western Virginia and a doubtful mission in South Carolina. In this he expressed the prevailing opinion among military men. General Lee was comparatively unknown. Few had given him much thought, so quietly and unobtrusively had he worked at his post in the War Department.²

The appointment, however, was logical. No other leader of equal worth and experience was available. G. W. Smith was too new in the Confederacy, and there was some question as to his loyalty to the cause; ³ Beauregard was out of favor; Jackson had done well, but he was not even considered as a possible leader for the Confederate army; Longstreet was still untried as a strategist, although he had shown tactical ability of a high order. Subsequent events demonstrated that the selection was a happy one.

Lee's immediate problem was to reorganize the scattered forces and put them in condition for battle. There had been much wasted effort, much straggling, and much confusion due to faulty battle execution and the inexperience of both officers and men. First the troops were brought back to their original lines and the whole defensive system subjected to the critical eye of the trained engineer. Inspections were in order; and although General Lee found condi-

¹ Because of the revolutionary change in command marked by the battle of Fair Oaks and the battle of Seven Pines, they have herein been treated as two distinct battles, although some writers consider them successive parts of a single engagement. Seven Pines was Johnston's battle; Fair Oaks marked Lee's assumption of command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee held this office continuously until the final engagement at Appomattox Courthouse.

² Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 112; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 79.

³ John B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital* (Philadelphia, 1866), I, 89, 134, 158, 163, 166.

tions satisfactory on the right, where Longstreet was continued in command, he was far from pleased with what he discovered on the left. Fearing that this weakness would become known to General McClellan, he cautioned Longstreet to watch his front carefully, and should he see indications of a movement against the Confederate left to swing his wing in sharply toward the Federal left and engage.⁴

General Longstreet's earlier feeling that Lee lacked aggressiveness, as well as other qualifications for high command, soon changed into admiration.⁵ His first meeting with his new chief was at a conference of the division commanders at General Lee's headquarters during the first week of June. Longstreet approached this council in fear that secrecy could not be maintained with so many present, or at least that there would be misunderstandings and disagreements. He returned with the observation that all of the talking had been done by those who were called and that General Lee had proved to be a very good listener. He was aware that Lee had been sizing up his subordinates.⁶ He poked a bit of fun at General Robert Toombs for asking for a new line of defense where he could be more comfortable; he praised D. H. Hill's dry humor; he reflected philosophically on pessimistic Whiting.

Because of Longstreet's acknowledged common sense, General Lee soon asked him for suggestions.⁷ And from that time forth, the history of their close association gives ample testimony that these suggestions were frequently made and were, more often than not, welcome. Longstreet was the complement of Lee. They were spiritually cohesive; and the great leader found strength and an element of repose in the simple pragmatism and rather strong self-confidence that was the basis of General Longstreet's military philosophy. Lee's brilliance was of the consuming kind; it needed something stolid to rely upon for its effectiveness. The slower mental operation which characterized Longstreet's thinking acted as a brake on the more rapid and often intuitive reasoning of both Lee and Jackson. Longstreet was not brilliant; but, as will be seen later, he was often the soundest of the three leaders when dealing with the practical side of war.⁸

⁴ Lee to Longstreet, June 6, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 577. Longstreet's division was soon put in army reserve for rest and re-equipment. Longstreet wrote D. H. Hill on June 12, 1862, "It is not the place I ever expected my command to occupy." *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 596. His military judgment must have told him, however, that even the best of troops need rest before more strenuous tasks are taken up.

⁵ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 59; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 110; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 79-80.

⁶ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 88.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 81, 90. Cf. Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 78, which gives Colonel Charles Marshall's view that Longstreet was one of the few consulted by General Lee and one of the few who supported Lee in his policy of holding his lines preparatory to making an attack.

⁸ See also herein Longstreet's advice to Lee on the Harper's Ferry diversion, his tactics at Second Manassas and at Chickamauga, his remonstrances at Gettysburg, and his advice to Bragg after Chickamauga.

General Lee's letter of June 8 to Jackson, who was then in the Shenandoah Valley, gives the first indications of his strategy. Although this letter has been quoted widely, it bears reprinting in part: "Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the Valley so as to prevent your leaving it for a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond. Make your arrangements accordingly, but should an opportunity occur for striking the enemy a successful blow do not let it escape you."⁹

About the same time Longstreet also conceived the idea of using Jackson's force in operations designed to destroy McClellan. The press of logic had brought home to General Longstreet that the only way in which the Union army could be driven away from Richmond was to hit hard around its right while continuous pressure was applied all along the main line of battle. Pin him to the ground, reasoned Longstreet, hurl Jackson at his right, crumple his line, and then drive him into the river! But is Longstreet due the original credit for the strategy of throwing Jackson at McClellan's right? He has said that he favored a move against McClellan's right flank and that when he broached the idea, General Lee neither approved nor disapproved. Although according to General Longstreet a meeting with Lee did take place, the date is not fixed. Probably, it was on June 10. Two days before, Lee had written to Jackson and intimated that the Valley troops would be used with the main army, though he did not write down any of the details. Again, on June 11, Lee wrote: "Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's division and [General A. R.] Lawton's and Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks General McClellan in front."¹⁰

It is doubtful, therefore, whether the plan outlined by General Lee was the product of Longstreet's reasoning. The situation admitted of but one plan for the defeat of the Union army. The fact that Longstreet had come to the same strategic solution may have convinced Lee that it was sound. We know that Longstreet was honest; the only doubtful point is the accuracy of his memory after so many years.

On June 15 the South was electrified by Stuart's ride around the entire Federal army. He had been directed to make a deep reconnaissance into the Union

⁹ Lee to Jackson, June 8, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 582. See also Lee to Jackson, June 11, 1862, *ibid.*, 589. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 105-106 n.

¹⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 114, 120; Longstreet to Davis, June 7, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 580; Lee to Jackson, June 11, 1862, *ibid.*, 589.

right rear; when this task was accomplished and he found himself trapped, Stuart chose to complete the circuit rather than risk his command by fighting his way back. The harmful effect of the movement lay in the exposure to McClellan of the weakness on his right and right rear—the very place where Jackson was directed to strike. The stimulating effect, however, on the morale of the Army of Northern Virginia cannot be doubted; and a corresponding depression was created among the soldiers of the North.

Eight days later—on June 23—a “mysterious stranger” was closeted with Lee and some of the division commanders. The dusty visitor was none other than the famous Stonewall Jackson. He had arrived silently in response to Lee’s letter of June 11, and the conference had under discussion a plan for the employment of the combined Confederate forces against McClellan. The officers present—Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill—had opportunity to exchange views; and Jackson expressed the opinion that he could put his troops down at Ashland on June 25. General Lee urged that he take longer so as to guarantee a timely arrival, while Longstreet suggested that since Jackson had the longest march to make, the day of execution should be fixed by him. Jackson is reported by General D. H. Hill to have answered: “Daylight on the 25th.”¹¹

Having handled larger forces, Longstreet saw some of the difficulties which Jackson may have overlooked in his enthusiasm. He saw the distance that had to be marched and the obstacles that might be put in the way by an alert enemy. He saw the troubles surrounding a movement to be made part of the way by marching and part by rail. He saw also that Jackson’s movement was the pivot on which all else hinged; as already stated, it was Longstreet who suggested that Jackson should designate the hour of arrival at the rendezvous. And when Jackson insisted that he could arrive by the morning of June 25, Longstreet continued to urge him to take more time. On Longstreet’s advice, Jackson set the morning of June 26.¹²

This was the final understanding, and the officers separated pledged to the following plan: Jackson was to march from Ashland by way of the high ground between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, turning the Federal right and driving deep into its right rear; A. P. Hill, on the retirement of the Federal right, was to cross the upper Chickahominy and move on Mechanicsville,

¹¹ *Land We Love* (Charlotte), II (April, 1867), 465.

¹² Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 85. Longstreet stated: “Turning to Jackson I said, ‘as your move is the key of the campaign, you should appoint the hour at which the connection may be made cooperative.’ He responded promptly,—‘The morning of the 25th.’ I expressed doubt of his meeting at that hour, and suggested that it would be better to take a little more time, as the movements of our columns could be readily adjusted to those of his. He then appointed the morning of the 26th.” Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 121. See also Freeman, *Lee*, II, 105–106.

echeloned to Jackson's right rear; Longstreet, when the Mechanicsville Bridge was clear, was to cross with D. H. Hill; and Hill was then to move to the left and give support to A. P. Hill as far as Gaines's Mill. The remaining forces, under Magruder, were to hold the south bank of the river and be prepared to move forward in attack as soon as the Federal army showed signs of retreating.¹³

Jackson's prompt arrival at the time stated was the essential element. The critical nature of Jackson's movements was clear to Longstreet, who also seemed to visualize the difficulties confronting Jackson better than did Jackson himself. As it turned out, both Jackson and Longstreet underestimated the difficulties. Instead of appearing at Ashland on the morning of June 26, Jackson arrived late in the afternoon; and the delay was never brought to Lee's attention. At an early hour Lee, accompanied by Longstreet, followed D. H. Hill to a covered position just south of the Mechanicsville Bridge and there awaited developments. From about 10 A.M. in the morning until well on toward 4 P.M. there was no indication that Jackson had arrived or was in motion. Neither was there any movement from A. P. Hill, whose troops were massed a little farther up the stream. No one could account for the delay, Colonel Charles Marshall commented.¹⁴ The die cast, no postponement could be made, because once General McClellan became aware of Jackson's presence, the whole plan would be clear to him. Jackson, who had gained a well-deserved reputation for celerity of movement, was now the chief cause of the delay.

About 4 P.M., A. P. Hill's leading troops were noticed coming across the fields from Meadow Bridge, and soon thereafter they struck and dislodged the Union pickets from the entrenchments surrounding Mechanicsville and above Beaver Dam. A subsequent attack on the second line of Union trenches was repulsed, forcing a part of Hill's division to retire. Three converging lines of fire now focused on Hill's men. It was too much. Both Longstreet and D. H. Hill fretted like dogs in leash; and when they saw the men of A. P. Hill's division sweeping through the Federal defenses of Mechanicsville, they crowded across the bridge and set about their respective missions. There was still no news from Jackson.

A. P. Hill moved on, but the Federal position commanded by Fitz John Porter was formidable. Hill made repeated attempts to carry the works on Ellery Hill, but without success. About dark D. H. Hill went to his support, and through their joint efforts the assault was carried to the banks of Beaver Dam Creek in the face of a very destructive fire. It was impossible to cross; yet, still expecting that Jackson's pressure would make itself felt on the Union

¹³ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 108 ff., gives an excellent discussion of these plans.

¹⁴ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 90-91.

right, the two Hills continued the attacks, until about 9 P.M. the exhausted troops were withdrawn and given their first rest. The first part of Lee's plan had failed. Instead of McClellan's being pushed back against the Chickahominy with his right crushed in, the Confederate enveloping force was still in front of Beaver Dam Creek, and communication with Jackson was still lacking.

That night Lee, with Longstreet and the two Hills, went over the situation in detail. The conference did not end until nearly midnight. Afterwards Lee made a hurried inspection of the troops on the south side while the others returned to their broken forces. The Union loss had been slight—some four hundred—while the Confederates lost many times that number. Longstreet has given the figures at from two to three thousand.¹⁵

Acting under orders from General McClellan, Porter withdrew the Union right during the night; and when D. H. Hill moved to the attack soon after daybreak on June 27, he caught a section of the trenches being evacuated by the Federal rear elements. A heavy toll of prisoners resulted. From this first success, Hill marched on Huntley's Corners, took the road ahead of Jackson, who was just coming up, and pressed hard against the Federal right. Meanwhile, A. P. Hill had moved directly on Gaines's Mill, and Longstreet had followed the river to a point beyond the Gaines house.

The pursuit forced by D. H. Hill from Bethesda Church to Cold Harbor terminated in a desperate assault on the Union right, which had halted along Chickahominy Heights. Close behind Hill, echeloned to his right rear, came A. P. Hill. Longstreet, still in reserve, could do nothing but move in close and be ready when he received Lee's orders to attack. The skirmish developed into a battle which raged until midafternoon, with the Federal forces holding a very strong defensive position. Jackson, who at last entered the fight, and the two Hills bore the brunt of the battle, while Longstreet gathered his troops and held them in hand to use at the first favorable opportunity.

About 5 P.M. Lee directed Longstreet to go in. The Federal lines were probed unsuccessfully to find a weak spot. Later, at sunset, Lee sent word that the other attacks had failed, and that unless Longstreet's succeeded, the day was lost.¹⁶ Pickett, Hood, and Whiting, together with Anderson's brigade, dashed in at the first lull. They were fresh and with ranks unthinned; their charge could not be resisted, and the Union lines crumpled. Some five thousand prisoners

¹⁵ Webb, *Peninsula*, 127; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 121. The official reports do not segregate the losses for this engagement: see the casualty lists of the Army of Northern Virginia, July 1, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 502-10. No report of Longstreet's losses was received (see *ibid.*, 501), and they are not given separately in Livermore, *Numbers and Losses* (see pp. 85-86).

¹⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 127; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 154. See also Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 757.

were taken. In his account Longstreet was generous. He gave full credit for the success to A. P. Hill. It had been Hill's soldiers who had harried the Union line all day and thus paved the way for the inspiring victory when the fresh reserves were thrown in.

When on the evening of June 27 darkness crept over the battlefield, the Southern troops were in full possession of the area around Gaines's Mill, while the broken Federal army had fled to the cover of the Chickahominy's banks or had sought safety in the woods. It was a victory of which any general could boast. But instead of vain boasting, Lee, the audacious, wrote President Davis of his profound gratitude to God for the Confederate success. The enemy had been driven from his strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek to a point behind the Powhite Creek, and finally, by nightfall, entirely from the field. He was grieved, he wrote, that the Confederate loss in officers and men had been so great.¹⁷

Although the exposed Union right had not been cut off and destroyed as Lee's plans had contemplated, the Federal elements north of the Chickahominy had been dislocated from the main body. The right flank of the Union army was subject to hostile flanking movements. McClellan was, in fact, in great danger. When the fighting closed on the first day, Lee was still facing the strong position at Beaver Dam, with no news of Jackson. The Federal army had retreated during the night chiefly because McClellan's stand at that place was not to anticipate a counterattack but merely to give time for a change of the Union base from White House to the James. Lee had already struck deep enough on the Federal right to threaten McClellan's communications.

No pursuit was possible on June 28 because of the exhaustion of the men. By tacit consent, seemingly, both sides rested, cared for the wounded, and buried the dead. With dawn on June 29, the Confederate pursuit was begun and the advance brought sharply against the Union rear guard.

Because of McClellan's careful defensive screening, Lee could neither discover the real situation nor fathom the Union commander's intentions. Stuart was again called into service, and made a deep reconnaissance toward White House, driving in between the Federal cavalry and the main body of the Union army. He reached White House without interference, and his tired men and animals were soon feasting on the abandoned stores in the captured supply depots. Here he rested for some hours, while from his bivouac he watched the glow from a line of fires which disappeared into the distance—mute testimony to the destruction of supplies and hurried retirement of the Union army.

Not content merely to wait for the news that Stuart might bring, Longstreet sent two of his officers on a scout to see what the enemy was about. Major

¹⁷ Lee to Davis, June 27, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 622.

R. K. Meade and his companion penetrated the hostile front and, just after daybreak on June 29, arrived at the line of trenches beyond the Chickahominy. They found these works vacant. This news, coupled with the reports from Stuart about the fires he had seen the previous afternoon, confirmed Longstreet in his opinion that McClellan was in full retreat across the Peninsula. He rushed these reports to Lee, who was busy with his plan of pursuit. Lee concurred in Longstreet's opinion; and when the advance picked up after the momentary check on June 29, he was able to launch his main body directly at McClellan.

McClellan's decision to change his base from White House to the James had been announced to his corps commanders at a conference early on the evening of June 28. His orders put the IV Corps (Keyes's) in motion at once to secure the passage of White Oak Swamp. The V Corps (Porter's) and part of the VI Corps (Franklin's), were to follow Keyes that night; the II Corps (Sumner's) and the III Corps (Heintzelman's) were assigned the mission of covering the rear of the main body and thus securing an uninterrupted movement to the James River. Once clear of White Oak Swamp, the IV Corps was to continue as far as Turkey Bridge and take position there to block any hostile advance by way of the River Road. To the V Corps, McClellan gave the task of proceeding to Malvern Hill to prepare a defensive position covering the approaches from the Long Bridge and Charles City roads. These plans were laid with skill, and the initial movements were perfectly timed.¹⁸

As the news of McClellan's retirement moved along the lines, the eager Confederates took up the pursuit. Magruder, who had contained Franklin successfully south of the Chickahominy while the fighting at Gaines's Mill was going on, now pushed to the front along the old Williamsburg State Road. East of Seven Pines, he soon gained contact again with Franklin, who now was supported by almost all of the II Corps. Jackson and D. H. Hill turned south across the Grapevine Bridge in an endeavor to cut in on the Union right flank. Stuart, drawn off toward White House by some Union cavalry, was not available to intercept any of McClellan's hurrying divisions. Huger, detaching himself from Magruder, moved toward the Union left along the Charles City Road, while Longstreet, with A. P. Hill, recrossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge and doubled back to the Darbytown Road, passing in rear of Magruder. All pushed their marches so as to interpose between McClellan and the safety which he sought so anxiously.

Magruder hit first; but not having the promised support, he was unable to make any impression. Franklin retired slowly toward Savage's Station on the

¹⁸ McClellan's order to retire to the James River was issued on the evening of June 27, 1862. Cf. *Official Records*, XI, Pt. I, 160.

York River Railroad. Jackson, coming up on Magruder's left, soon found that McClellan had destroyed the bridges over the Chickahominy. He was delayed all day on June 28 and part of the following night in making needful repairs. As a consequence, he was not able to give Magruder any aid in his three futile attacks against Franklin, who withdrew through White Oak Swamp and abandoned the hospital center at Savage's Station.

Marching to the sound of the battle at Savage's Station, Longstreet forged ahead on the Darbytown Road in an effort to cut in between McClellan and the James. A. P. Hill led the pursuit down the Darbytown and Long Bridge roads while Holmes, off to the right, reached the outskirts of New Market with his small division.

During Porter's night march on June 29, some of his flankers went astray and encountered Longstreet's advance. A spirited brush took place, indicating that larger Union forces were near. This was Longstreet's opportunity, for in a few brief minutes he might have fastened his division to the flank of the main body of McClellan's retreating army. But Longstreet did nothing. It is strange that he neither sought battle nor even pushed a strong reconnaissance deep into the Federal flank.¹⁹ A possible explanation is that he did not know the ground to his front nor the strength and character of the hostile force. But he must have known that Magruder was worrying Franklin and that Jackson was coming up on the Union right rear. He knew that McClellan was striving desperately to reach the James!²⁰ Had he used that rare quality of tactical judgment which he had displayed during the skirmishing around Richmond and struck hard at McClellan, it is probable that the Union army could have been brought to bay and forced to fight at a serious disadvantage. Longstreet's lack of initiative here had much to do with the escape of the Union army.²¹

While the Federal retirement was prosecuted with skill, the Confederate pursuit grew apathetic and ragged. It was not until nearly noon on June 30 that it was picked up again with vigor. Though Jackson and D. H. Hill had come up with Franklin's corps, which was blocking the roads at White Oak Swamp Bridge, no serious attempt seems to have been made to force through the defile of the road crossing the swamp to the bridge. Longstreet, who by now had recovered his senses and some of his accustomed energy, put his troops in motion and launched a strong attack against Heintzelman and part of Sumner's corps, which had occupied the ground lately vacated by Porter

¹⁹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 133. See Fitz John Porter's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 228. Had Longstreet's leading troops pushed in to solid contact, they probably could have cut off McClellan's rear.

²⁰ See the discussion of McClellan's situation and plans in Freeman, *Lee*, II, 176 ff.

²¹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 133; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 176.

in the vicinity of Glendale. The divisions of G. A. McCall and Phil Kearny faced Longstreet. In order to meet both with equal pressure, Longstreet's troops were deployed astride the Long Bridge Road, with A. P. Hill's weaker division in massed reserve close behind the center. To hold off Hooker, who was bristling on the right front, Longstreet arranged for a strong detachment from Hill's force to move well to the right toward the Quaker Road. Between the lines the terrain was heavily wooded and choked with underbrush, which forced the Confederates to feel their way and prevented the forming of regular lines of battle on either side. The Union line of defense had General Henry W. Slocum north of the Charles City Road, facing Huger; then came Kearny, who occupied the ground between the Charles City and Darbytown roads; and on his left was McCall, who extended his left south so as to reach Hooker's division. Sedgwick, in reserve, was centrally located near the Charles City Crossroads.

In order to secure a decision, General Longstreet sent word to Jackson that he was ready to strike Franklin's left and rear and that, for co-ordinated effort, he would launch his assault just as soon as he heard the sound of Jackson's musketry. Longstreet, who was planning to cut off the tail of the Union army, was poised, ready and eager; but in the occasional bursts of artillery and scattered sound of musketry there was nothing definite enough to show that Jackson had started the fight. There was no word from Jackson—nothing to indicate that he had reached White Oak Swamp Bridge with enough men to chance battle.²²

Lee joined Longstreet about noon. At 2:30 P.M. Longstreet attacked almost simultaneously with Huger's movement against Slocum. About 4 P.M. the battle reached its height. McCall was forced back and all but broke; Huger reached for Slocum's flank, but Kearny interposed. Longstreet drove forward and, after a fierce bayonet fight along the center, his men crashed through McCall's thin right to engage his reserve. Darkness came before the assault was ended, and the enemy was thus able to free himself and retire under cover of the night. Before Longstreet could gather his scattered troops to secure his victory, the stubborn Union divisions were following Franklin across the wooded slopes leading to Malvern Hill. Once more McClellan was saved.²³

Neither Jackson nor D. H. Hill participated in the battle.²⁴ While Longstreet's battalions were engaged with four enemy divisions Franklin had little

²² Longstreet's report, July 29, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 758.

²³ Jackson's report, February 20, 1863, *ibid.*, 557; Wilcox's report, July 21, 1862, *ibid.*, 778. See also Daniel H. Hill, "McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill," in Johnson and Buell (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 388.

²⁴ Jackson's report, February 20, 1863, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 557; D. H. Hill's report, n.d., of Seven Days, transmitted to General Samuel Cooper, July 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 627; Longstreet's report, July 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 759-60.

if any pressure brought against him and was able to send support to Sumner, who was having a hard time of it against Longstreet's men. Attacked on three sides, the Union army was in great danger. Its rear was spread out on three distinct fronts in the shape of a huge mushroom. All that saved McClellan was the seeming inability of the Confederate leaders to co-ordinate their attacks. If all elements had struck together, a disaster would have overwhelmed the Federal force. As in the battle of Gaines's Mill, the Jackson of White Oak Swamp was not the Jackson of the Shenandoah Valley.²⁵ Although General Longstreet had pushed his assault repeatedly, the Union line held. Hooker counterattacked and all but drove in Longstreet's right, but the men rallied. Holmes could do nothing, and the main Confederate reserve was not thrown in to help Longstreet because General Lee's plans called for a reserve of fresh troops to be available to seize any opportunity afforded by a break in the Union lines. Almost in a fury, Longstreet finally called on A. P. Hill to throw in all his troops to relieve the pressure on his right while he made one last effort to crash down the Union resistance. But the Federal lines held long enough to allow McClellan to escape with his main body.

With the coming of the night of June 30, the field belonged to Longstreet's men. Although the ground was strewn with enemy dead and wounded, and some few cannon and spoils had been taken, the victory was a doubtful one. Nearly three thousand of Longstreet's best troops were down, and A. P. Hill had lost fully two thirds as many. "But for Jackson's delay at White Oak Swamp," wrote Colonel Marshall in his papers, "General Lee would have this day inflicted on General McClellan the signal defeat at which his plans aimed." Lee's comment on Longstreet's battle was to the effect that if the other commands had co-operated in this action, the result would have proved disastrous to the enemy.²⁶

Shortly before midnight, Magruder was called in to take over Longstreet's front.²⁷ He had not arrived in time for the battle—having taken the wrong road²⁸—and now, too late to be of much help, he came hurrying up with his tired but eager men. But he could provide security; and Longstreet's exhausted soldiers soon turned over to Magruder's men the arduous duty of covering the front and were able to get some much-needed rest.

The lessons to be gained from this second phase of the pursuit down the Peninsula are of peculiar interest to the military historian. For the first time Longstreet departed from his former tactical formations of columns in depth

²⁵ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 107–109, gives Colonel Marshall's able discussion of McClellan's predicament.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 109; Lee's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 495; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 155.

²⁷ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 202.

²⁸ Magruder insisted that he was on the right road. See Magruder's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 667.

—lines of masses—which he had used at Bull Run and Seven Pines. He engaged at Frayser's farm with his division in line and employed some of A. P. Hill's troops in massed support. Had his formation been in depth, it seems probable that he could have crashed through the thin Union front, penetrated between McCall and Kearny, and reached the hostile rear. Jackson was twice guilty of slowness, and Holmes turned away from his foe merely because he thought the enemy was too strong. None of the lesser commanders save A. P. Hill seemed to understand the situation; and all failed utterly in that quality of offensive spirit which would have ensured the success of Lee's plans. There was no doubt of McClellan's retreat; and had all plunged into the pursuit with enthusiasm and a willingness to sacrifice their commands—as they did in subsequent campaigns when replacements were not so easily obtained—McClellan would have been doomed. Their lack of initiative was one of those inexplicable lapses that befalls commanders from time to time and seems to defy explanation; lack of experience and poor staff work were probably the basic reasons for the failure to pursue.

The Union withdrawal continued unmolested; at no time was Lee able to fasten a grip on the flying columns and force his opponent into decisive battle. But though clearly disappointed, Lee was not the victim of vain regrets. He urged greater effort, and Jackson once more pressed forward on the Union rear while Magruder and Huger moved along the right seeking opportunity to attack. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were again put in general reserve, ready to be launched at any vulnerable place that could be found. But in spite of Lee's renewed urging, the pursuit gained no decisive results; and shortly thereafter, about daybreak on July 1, the Federal army was disposed for defense on the high plateau of Malvern Hill. General McClellan's masterful handling of his forces in this retreat has few parallels in history.

The fatigue of the march, the anxiety, and the long hours had all but broken Lee. Uncertain as to how long he could keep the saddle, he sent for Longstreet to join him as he rode near Jackson. A stronger body than his must make the reconnaissances; a mind unfretted by disappointments must interpret the fragmentary intelligence that the scouts brought in. Lee had confidence in Longstreet, and in this hour of fatigue he had great need of him.²⁹

Longstreet's first mission for Lee was to make a close reconnaissance of the attack positions in front of Malvern Hill and to dispose the troops on the ground. This could not be done from the maps, which had proved incorrect in essential details. Although Longstreet was informed of the difference between Lee's maps and the data furnished by Magruder's guides, he seemed to

²⁹ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 201; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 142. The *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, *passim*, show that many generals received orders from Longstreet without questioning his right to give them—as if he were the designated second in command.

see no necessity for entering the necessary corrections. He was limited in his authority—so he says—to reconnaissance, and posting of the divisions. He failed, however, to bring information of faulty troop positions to the attention of his chief. There seems to have been no haste that would have prevented his sending a messenger if he could not have gone to Lee in person.⁸⁰

Profound silence rested on the field as Longstreet disposed the troops for battle. He found a section of the front where a hundred guns could be emplaced so as to enfilade Porter's eighty reserve batteries and reported to Lee that the position was strong enough to justify assault, since the Union artillery could be brought under destructive fire. Lee then ordered the divisions into the positions which Longstreet had selected.⁸¹

Magruder, the first to reach the line of battle, objected to Longstreet's orders because the bearer was not of Lee's recognized staff. Longstreet thereupon turned over to Colonel R. H. Chilton—Lee's adjutant general—the work of posting Magruder's troops, while he turned his attention to locating the artillery. Only eight guns had come up; but Magruder promised to lend the thirty of his division until the remainder could arrive. Without verifying the arrival and emplacement of Magruder's artillery, Longstreet returned to Lee's side and reported that everything was ready. He then rejoined his division and awaited the signal for the attack.

Now it seems either that Magruder did not give up his guns or that something prevented the men from getting them into position. As a consequence, the attack started with but eight cannon against the Union eighty. The result was disastrous to the Confederates, as the eight were soon piled a heterogeneous mass of caissons, guns, limbers, and horses. Longstreet should have remained to witness the actual arrival and emplacement of Magruder's artillery before quitting his task.⁸²

The infantry attack fared no better. The initial movement was by the right, which advanced briskly to the assault on the false information that the Federals were retiring. The impact of the collision was heard along the lines. The left next made a strong attack, which soon ended in a repulse with the field a shambles of dead and wounded. Magruder called for help, and Longstreet sent him all of A. P. Hill's division under the mistaken idea that the Union pressure on the Confederate right was but a strong diversion to facilitate a safe withdrawal. He could not see that McClellan was forced to stand and fight. Longstreet's division was soon called in on the extreme right. Its advance was exposed to flanking fire from artillery as well as small arms. His men

⁸⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 142.

⁸¹ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 206.

⁸² Magruder's report, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. II, 669; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 143-44. Alexander stated that the reserve artillery was silent. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 158.

staggered under the impact of this terrific fire. Thousands of men gave their lives in a futile, piecemeal attempt to take the main Union defensive works on Malvern Hill. The result was a bloody repulse all along the line.

With the coming of darkness on July 1, McClellan began to withdraw his army to prepared positions at Harrison's Landing. As July 2 dawned and the last of the Federals disappeared, a heavy mist which hung over the battlefield and surrounding country turned into a cold rain. When Lee had had time to consider the reports of the Federal retreat, he determined to follow McClellan and, if possible, learn his intentions. Jackson was ordered to move against the retreating enemy, Longstreet and A. P. Hill to follow. The rain and mud delayed the start of the pursuit. Stuart and his cavalry went on ahead. The rain ceased on the morning of July 3, and the pursuit was taken up in earnest by both infantry and cavalry. Stuart reported that McClellan's army had reached Harrison's Landing, about eight miles south of Malvern Hill. In his eagerness, he opened fire on the enemy outposts before any supporting troops were up, thus warning the Union forces of their danger. Stuart thought he could have finished his business if the army had been up. When Lee arrived on the scene, it was too late to strike a damaging blow, and the pursuit was halted.³³

The next two or three days were spent in observation and in gathering the scattered Confederate divisions. It was only too evident that the Union army was safe from serious attack and that there was no further advantage in holding the army in the lower Peninsula, where the supply difficulties were seriously increased and the comfort of the troops adversely affected by the hot, sticky weather. With the approval of President Davis, Lee started his entire force back toward Richmond on July 8. The Peninsular campaign was over; and although McClellan's army had escaped Lee's efforts to destroy it, it had been driven far enough from the gates of Richmond that the capital could breathe freely once more.

This campaign is of interest in many ways quite apart from its strictly military features. It was Lee's first experience in commanding a large army; it was also the first opportunity his lieutenants had had to learn to work in harness in a series of offensive operations. It demonstrated the quickness of McClellan's defensive strategy; the lesson of his masterly handling of the Union forces was not lost on the lesser commanders of either side. In it, too, was first evidenced that brilliancy of strategic conception which made Lee so formidable an antagonist. On the other hand, it also revealed Lee's greatest fault: a too certain dependence on the ability of his subordinates to fulfill their respective parts in the greater mission without some co-ordinating control. The work of Lee's

³³ Stuart to his wife, July 5, 1862, quoted in J. W. Thomason, Jr., *Jeb Stuart* (New York, 1930), 206.

staff had been poor. Jackson had failed him twice—once at Gaines's Mill and again at the crossing of White Oak Swamp. Magruder had been slow in moving into combat, and his slowness had brought a just rebuke from Lee. Longstreet had shown a disposition to avoid clashing with Porter on June 29 and incompleteness in his tactical arrangements both at Frayser's farm and in his delicate mission before Malvern Hill. The campaign had been full of costly errors.

Second Manassas

ON JULY 8 LEE TURNED AWAY FROM HIS DEFEATED ENEMY. KNOWING McCLELLAN, Lee had little fear of another attack on Richmond unless heavy reinforcements were received by the Union army. The surprised and joyous South welcomed its soldiers in the Richmond entrenchments, where each returning son was pampered to the limit of available luxuries. Jackson's veterans moved to the northern exits of the capital and occupied both sides of the Mechanicsville Turnpike; Longstreet withdrew by the River Road to positions along Cornelius Creek between the Darbytown Road and the James. D. H. Hill's men filed back into their old sector on the Williamsburg Road, while McLaws went north of the York River Railroad and camped between it and the New Bridge Road. Stuart, as usual, covered the march and established the outpost when the defensive line was reached.

But the Army of Northern Virginia was not to be allowed to grow stale in the trenches. General John Pope, called from the West to assume command of the remnants of Banks's forces, McDowell's corps, and other troops, was now blustering along a line from the Blue Ridge to Fredericksburg. As an evidence of the slight respect which he had for the army that McClellan had learned to fear, he published a bombastic proclamation which defied his enemy and irritated his own troops. He then moved to the north bank of the Rapidan and sent an advance guard across that stream. He was now in a position to menace Gordonsville and possibly even Richmond.

Lee ordered Jackson to Gordonsville on July 13 as a threat against Pope, while he, with Longstreet, watched to see what McClellan would do. Until Lee could learn definitely of McClellan's plans, he could make no concerted move toward the north. The Federal army which was encamped about Harrison's Landing on the north bank of the James River, nearly ten miles south of Malvern Hill, numbered about one hundred thousand men, and Pope was known to have nearly half as many. It was no time to try risky experiments; but something had to be done, since inactivity would be fatal.

Lee's first move to clear the situation was to send D. H. Hill on a feint against McClellan to shell the Union transports on the James River in front of the encampment at Harrison's Landing. As a result of this demonstration, Lee be-

came fully convinced that the Peninsular army would make no further offensive movement—at least until it was strongly reinforced.

General Pope, however, was aggressive; his attitude finally became so threatening that it was necessary for Lee to advise Jackson that he wished Pope “suppressed.”¹ A. P. Hill was sent to reinforce Jackson, and the first page in Lee’s strategy was unfolded. He hoped that by starting these forces northward and creating the impression that Jackson was to continue on to the gates of Washington, he could hasten the withdrawal of McClellan to reinforce the troops defending the capital.

Jackson crossed the Rapidan on August 8 and met Pope’s advance guard under Banks at Cedar Run.² Some desperate fighting resulted, and Banks met a sharp defeat. Jackson had now regained his former ability to march far and with speed and to strike swiftly when once in contact. Pope rushed troops to rescue Banks from disaster while Jackson withdrew quietly behind the Rapidan. Though this was a small victory, its strategic results were far-reaching. Halleck, the Federal general in chief, was convinced that Washington was the objective; and orders were soon issued recalling McClellan. Burnside was directed to move in closer to support Pope, and there was every indication that the next great offensive would be launched across Virginia from behind the Rappahannock.

The second step in the Confederate plan was to consolidate all forces against Pope. On August 16, Lee sent Longstreet to Gordonsville to assume command of the troops facing Pope in that section.³ While Lee watched the general situation and kept a cautious eye on the lower James, his chief lieutenant had the problem of locating the troops in conformation with any tactical plan which Lee might decide on.⁴ Problems of supply, discipline, and morale were ever present and awaiting solution; and, because of inexperienced staffs, much of the burden fell squarely on Longstreet’s shoulders. The official letters give only a brief picture of the aid that Longstreet could give Lee at this time. Lee dreamed the picture; Longstreet arranged the details. Lee could view the situation as a whole because Longstreet and other able men could care for the small things—so troublesome but ever so necessary. Longstreet was in constant touch with Lee, reporting progress, making suggestions, and calling to

¹ Lee to Jackson, July 27, 1862, in *Official Records*, XII, Pt. III, 918–19.

² Sometimes referred to as Slaughter’s Mountain.

³ Lee to Longstreet, July 23, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 646–47. See also *id.* to *id.*, August 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 676, in which Lee gave Longstreet even broader powers. Certainly it seems true that a very close and sympathetic understanding had grown up between the two men. The tone of the correspondence indicates that Lee had substantial faith in Longstreet’s ability and that he regarded him as a trusted lieutenant and competent adviser. See also Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 158.

⁴ Lee to Longstreet, July 23, 1862, in *Official Records*, XI, Pt. III, 646–47; *id.* to *id.*, August 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 676.

Lee's attention the tactical necessities for bringing Lee's army to a high point of efficiency.

Lee's plan, in brief, was to interpose the Confederate army between Pope and his sources of supply and reinforcement. This involved a stroke at the Federal left rear. Longstreet had advised against this scheme of operations and had favored a move against Pope's right because of the tremendous advantage of the mountainous terrain, which would mask the movement.⁵ While recognizing the worth of Longstreet's suggestions, Lee adhered to his original idea. Operations were started on August 16.⁶ Longstreet advanced his wing to a position where he could cross the Rapidan at the lower fords in double columns while Jackson marched to the upper fords. The cavalry, however, had not arrived, and the crossing was postponed until the eighteenth.

Stuart came up with Lee on the seventeenth and received full instructions in person. He was also furnished a list showing the troop locations in detail. After reading them over, Stuart turned these papers over to his adjutant for safekeeping. He then started out on the Plank Road to rejoin his command, which had been left under Fitzhugh Lee with orders to camp near Raccoon Ford on the evening of August 17. Not appreciating the full situation, Fitzhugh Lee had gone wide of his route and had failed to reach Raccoon Ford as scheduled. As a result, when Stuart rode out, ignorant of what his lieutenant had done, he ran full tilt into the enemy. He managed to escape by jumping his horse over a fence and dashing off across the fields; but the less-lucky adjutant became a prisoner—and with him, Stuart's package of papers which recited Lee's plans.⁷ In a few hours Pope knew all. He withdrew at once behind the Rappahannock, so that when the morning of the eighteenth dawned and Lee's army commenced its advance, the bird had flown and the plan was nullified. Longstreet, less gentle than his contemporaries, has said that Stuart's carelessness was a tremendous blow that could not be overestimated.⁸

Fitzhugh Lee's failure to reach his destination brought Longstreet into prominence again. Finding Raccoon Ford unguarded, Longstreet had sent two regiments from Toombs's brigade to cover it. Toombs was absent from his

⁵ Longstreet's letter to Lee opposing Lee's movement seems to be missing, but his viewpoint and Lee's can be found in Lee's letter of August 14 just cited.

⁶ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 284, which gives the date as the nineteenth. Freeman did not consider Longstreet's movement into position, which was an essential element in Lee's tactical operations at the opening of the campaign.

⁷ Pope's report, in *Official Records*, XII, Pt. II, 29; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 287; Thomason, *Jeb Stuart*, 223.

⁸ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 285-87. Freeman disclaimed Longstreet's version and inclined toward giving full credence to the account of Fitzhugh Lee. At the time of their writing, Fitzhugh Lee and Longstreet had had many years of bitter controversy, so that statements made by either should be accepted with caution. In this case, however, Longstreet's comment was about Stuart and not about Fitzhugh Lee. Longstreet and Stuart never had serious prolonged quarrels or estrangements. After all, the fact remains that Stuart was careless.

headquarters when Longstreet's orders were received. When he returned and found his two regiments doing picket duty, without making inquiry as to the reason, Toombs ordered both regiments back in bivouac. A few moments later a Federal troop of cavalry crossed by the ford and moved, unnoticed, behind the Confederate lines. It was this troop that shortly afterwards ran into Stuart.

When Longstreet learned that a hostile force had penetrated his picket line, he investigated and soon learned where the two regiments were and how they had been relieved. His action was brief and to the point: Toombs was relieved of his command, placed in arrest, and sent to the rear. To place Robert Toombs of Georgia in disgrace was no inconsequential act, and it is to Longstreet's credit that possible political consequences—if he considered them at all—did not sway him. Whether matters would have been pushed to a court-martial will never be known, for Toombs lost little time in writing a complete and humble apology and begging for restoration to his command. Longstreet replied that since the act was due to lack of experience and not to an intentional breach of authority, he would rescind his orders and restore Toombs to the command of his brigade. It was a salutary lesson for all; there was no further interference with Longstreet's orders.⁹

The confusion caused by the loss of Stuart's book of orders forced a change of plan. There was now no hope of gaining Pope's left, but the advance was continued in order to maintain pressure on the Union rear elements.¹⁰ On August 20, Longstreet moved his divisions toward Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock, and Jackson went to the fords above. But before the troops were well started, word came from Jackson that the crossings were so heavily defended that a passage could not be forced. So Jackson turned upstream, with Longstreet following closely, in search of easier crossings. This stirring of the Confederate army did not go unchallenged. As Jackson reached out, so did Pope; and the picture comes of the rival armies stealing up the stream on opposite sides, each trying to beat the other in the race for a place to cross. The entire march was full of cat-and-dog fights; it finally came to a halt on August 23, when both armies stopped and faced each other.

Now came Stuart's revenge. On a deep reconnaissance in Pope's rear on the twenty-second, Stuart had swung wide around Warrenton and Catlett's Station and had driven through the pounding rain to the place where Pope had

⁹ See the letters of Robert Toombs covering this incident in Ulrich B. Phillips (ed.), "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb," in *American Historical Association, Annual Report*, II (1911 [Washington, 1913]), 903-904; and Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 166.

¹⁰ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 286, which states that Lee would have been forced to delay anyway because of faulty organization. Lee reported that the enemy had retreated on August 20 and stated that the Confederate army crossed the Rapidan at Somerville, Raccoon, and Morton's fords. Lee to Davis, August 21, 1862, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 609.

established his headquarters. A friendly Negro had pointed out the General's tent, and it had taken but a moment for Stuart to ride forth with Pope's hat and cloak. What was infinitely better, he had secured the file of Pope's letters and dispatches from Washington. After a series of narrow escapes, Stuart rejoined the Confederate lines near Jackson's bivouac and went at once to report to Lee.

The advantage was now Lee's. Pope's hopes and fears were known to him, and he acted. Jackson was sent across near the Warrenton Pike and, moving by Sulphur Springs, was firmly established on the north bank by the night of August 23. Further crossings were impossible because of the rising waters. In the meantime, Pope had planned a stroke at Lee's right (Longstreet's wing) but was, in turn, prevented from moving by the swelling river. He chose Jackson as an alternative and moved on him with vigor. Although Jackson was cut off from all support, he fought with great skill and managed to escape to the south bank of the Rappahannock with his corps intact. Pope was now flushed with victory.

The next day both armies lay idle, as the high waters still interfered. Pope received about seven thousand reinforcements and planned further attacks. Lee, however, lost little time in bringing new thought to bear on this problem. As his own plans had been exposed accidentally, he determined to move as Longstreet had suggested the previous month. He would send Jackson around Pope's right while Longstreet held the front.¹¹ The troops were in position for just such a maneuver, and as all of Lee's previous dispositions had contemplated a move around Pope's left, the element of surprise was present. A second phase of the plan called for Longstreet to free himself from contact with the Union army and follow Jackson, covering his right and rear, just as soon as Jackson had room for rapid maneuver. The route of the advance—or left turning movement—lay through the mountains, with a destination in Pope's rear somewhere along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

Jackson pushed on while Stuart scoured the country to his right flank. On the night of August 25, Jackson reached Salem; the next morning his eager soldiers made their way through Thoroughfare Gap unchallenged. Once clear of the Bull Run Mountains, Jackson advanced rapidly toward Gainesville and then to Bristoe Station, where he camped late on August 26. He was now behind Pope and between him and the Federal capital. No large forces had been encountered, and evidently Pope knew nothing of what had happened.

On reaching Bristoe Station Jackson's troops tore up the tracks and captured

¹¹ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 292 ff.; G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (2 vols.; New York, 1906), II, 125 ff.; William Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862* (Boston, 1892), 202.

two trains. Realizing the need for haste, Jackson sent a strong detachment to Manassas Junction—about seven miles distant—to destroy the Union supply depots. This force arrived late in the night and at once set about looting the rich stores. Munitions and prisoners were captured, but the largest haul lay in the enormous stocks of rations and other quartermaster's supplies. Empty stomachs were filled, and bare feet felt the touch of real leather. Potted meats, wines, white bread, pork products, and cereals were found by the thousands of pounds; and once again the men tasted Java coffee with sugar to sweeten it. There was enough and more for the hilarious members of Jackson's "foot cavalry."

The remainder of Jackson's force came up on the twenty-seventh and spent the entire day in feasting. All stores which they could not move they destroyed. When Pope learned of this he began to concentrate his forces. But Jackson was not to be caught napping. He gave one day to the men to enjoy their plunder; then he marched swiftly to a position near Groveton, where he could either unite with Longstreet, who was fast coming up, or retire by way of Aldie Gap should Pope press him too closely. It was a perfect position, with ample cover and open communications to both Lee and Longstreet.

Meanwhile, Longstreet was engaged in fending off Pope's dashes from behind the Rappahannock. Lee's plan, as unfolded to him, was to maneuver Pope out of Virginia. Lee had no serious intention of throwing his smaller army at Pope. The risk was too great. Jackson's move was to be followed closely by Longstreet; and after Pope had been forced to look away from Richmond, Lee intended to unite Longstreet and Jackson somewhere in the Valley, and bring further strategic pressure on Washington.

Longstreet was able to shake loose from Pope without much difficulty and soon followed slowly up the south bank of the Rappahannock, making a flank march in the face of an enemy who was eager to pin him down and defeat him. Fortune favored him, as each attack was parried before it could develop into a general engagement. On the morning of August 26, it was evident that the Union army was turning away from the river. Quite likely Pope had heard rumors of what Jackson was doing in his rear.¹² Leaving but a small force in observation, Longstreet now marched rapidly after Jackson, with R. H. Anderson maintaining communications to the rear and guarding the Confederate right flank.

Longstreet crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill Ford and reached Orleans by dark on the twenty-sixth after fighting off small Federal cavalry

¹² Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 206-12; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 320 ff.; Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 141-42; Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. II, 261, 267 ff.; John Codman Ropes, *The Army Under Pope* (New York, 1881), 51 ff.

patrols all afternoon. These were General John Buford's men, who had learned of the movement and were out for information. The next morning the march was pushed toward Salem, with the enemy cavalry thickening and becoming bolder. Toward noon these Union troopers very nearly captured Lee, his staff, and Longstreet. The two generals were riding at the head of the main body when a large Federal patrol cut in behind the flankers and made a swift dash at them. Longstreet, Lee's staff, and a few couriers were hard put to beat off the attack while Lee was rushed to safety under the guard of a handful of men.¹³

This was the last of the dangerous episodes during the march, and Salem was reached without further incident.¹⁴ While the columns were threading their way through this mountain village, Lee learned for the first time of Jackson's success at Manassas Junction on the night of August 26. It will be seen how the sequel to this engagement induced Lee to abandon his first idea of maneuvering Pope out of Virginia; he changed and, as if in preparation for the decision he was about to make, ordered that the two wings of his army should join in front of Pope. Perhaps this was to protect Jackson; possibly it was with the idea of giving battle to the Union army.¹⁵

It was after dark on the twenty-seventh when Longstreet reached the wooded slopes near White Plains, a small village about midway between Salem and Thoroughfare Gap. Further marching would have been unwise, as he was deficient in cavalry, and the enemy horse was in close and very active. Actually, Buford had garrisoned the gap with a strong brigade, which was supported closely by J. B. Ricketts' division from McDowell's corps. General Longstreet knew nothing of this, but his common sense warned him that a plunge in the dark would jeopardize his command. Furthermore, there was no call for undue haste, since Jackson had sent no word of needing reinforcements.¹⁶

Jackson, who had taken a position in readiness along a deep cut near Groveton, was in no mood to remain quiet. His patience was exhausted when a Union division under Rufus King came swinging along the turnpike late on August 28, moving east, utterly unaware of Jackson's nearness. The Federal flank was fully exposed and the troops tired from the long day's march. The

¹³ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 308. Although Freeman did not mention Longstreet's presence, the whole import of his language (see pp. 307-309) is that Longstreet dined with Lee the night before and then had breakfast with him and rode off with him on the morning of the incident in question. It was Lee's practice to ride with the commander of the column. Longstreet certainly was leading his First Corps on this march, and Lee undoubtedly was with him. See also Alexander, *Memoirs*, 196.

¹⁴ See B. Napier, *A Soldier's Story of the War* (New Orleans, 1874), 126.

¹⁵ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 319. See also Lee to Davis, August 30, 1862, in Douglas Southall Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches* (New York, 1915), 56. Freeman pictured Lee at this point as debating whether he should fight. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 318-19.

¹⁶ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 318, quotes Lee as saying: "We must hurry on and help [Jackson]."

bait was too tempting. Jackson abandoned his security and hit King in the flank all along the column; and this started a bloody battle which only darkness halted. The second battle of Manassas was thus precipitated, and any idea which Lee may still have had of avoiding heavy battle to escape losses was changed by force of circumstances. Every tactical consideration now demanded that the two Confederate wings be joined at once and that Pope be attacked before he could concentrate his scattered army.

Pope's situation was pitiful. Three times he had changed his mind, and with each change his situation had become more involved and more desperate. At first he had turned away from Longstreet in order to concentrate against Jackson; next, fearing that Longstreet might break down his weakened rear, he had changed front and planned a smashing attack against Longstreet's holding force. As the river was well up between banks, this second scheme of Pope's became impracticable because he could not secure concerted action; so he again turned his back on Longstreet to try his chances with Jackson once more. He had no conception of what his enemy was about. Jackson had fooled him completely, and Pope did not know where Jackson was until the dark heavens were reddened by the fires from the storehouses at Manassas Junction. Then—much too late—he realized what Jackson had done and turned with surprising speed and vigor to crush him before help could come or this daring leader could escape behind the mountains.

Sensing the situation, McDowell, on his own responsibility, had ordered Ricketts to interpose his division at Thoroughfare Gap, to prevent any reinforcements from reaching Jackson from that direction. This might have been McDowell's great contribution to the campaign had he but made Ricketts' orders specific and imperative. There is nothing in either McDowell's or Ricketts' report to indicate that they appreciated the importance, *at the time*, of using every means to prevent Longstreet's passage of the gap. With some trepidation, apparently, McDowell varied from Pope's orders to the extent of sending a detachment to close the gap on the morning of August 28. Calls for help were answered by the detachment of Ricketts' division. Ricketts arrived in the vicinity of the gap after 3 P.M. He attacked with some local success but later was repulsed and driven back. Apparently his orders were discretionary, and they do not seem to have been insistent that Ricketts, if necessary, should sacrifice his entire command. In any case, after sustaining some severe local fighting and satisfying himself that he was opposed by an overwhelming force and flanked by Confederate troops coming through Hopewell Gap, Ricketts withdrew, allowing Longstreet and Jackson to make their planned junction. Alone he could not do much, nor did he insist that he be reinforced.¹⁷

¹⁷ McDowell's report, in *Official Records*, XII, Pt. II, 336; Ricketts' report, *ibid.*, 383-84.

Longstreet has given the following account of the turn of events at Thoroughfare Gap:

The head of my column reached Thoroughfare Gap about 3 P.M. on the 28th. A small party of infantry was sent into the mountains to reconnoiter. Passing through the Gap, Colonel [Benjamin] Beck of the Ninth Georgia regiment, met the enemy, but was obliged to retire before a greatly superior force. The enemy held a strong position on the opposite gorge and succeeded in getting his sharpshooters in position on the mountain. Brigadier-General Hood, with his own and General Whiting's brigade, was ordered by a footpath over the mountain to turn the enemy's right, and Brigadier-General Wilcox, with his own and Brigadier-General [Winfield Scott] Featherston's and [General Roger A.] Pryor's brigades, was ordered through Hopewell Gap, 3 miles to our left, to turn to the right and attack the enemy in the rear. The enemy made his attack on [D. R.] Jones, however, before these troops could get into their positions, and after being repulsed with severe loss, commenced his retreat just before night.¹⁸

General Longstreet wrote a very modest report of what must have been a desperate piece of fighting, full of color and excitement, where soldier vied with soldier to carry out the wishes of his leader. Fortune smiled again on the Southern arms. Ricketts withdrew. Had Ricketts appreciated the importance of his mission—if he had not quit so soon—Longstreet would have been forced to fight his way through a difficult defile with delay, serious losses, and the exhaustion of his men the inevitable result.

The Union situation was rapidly becoming more desperate. There seemed to be no way in which the Confederate concentration could be stopped. With a clear road before him, Longstreet soon had his column swinging down the dusty pike to the tune of Jackson's artillery, which boomed its hollow note far in the east. A delay of an hour occurred when Stuart crossed his cavalry through the column; but Longstreet's troops were soon striding forward once more, and at 11 A.M. the quiet streets of Gainesville resounded to the tramp of his twenty-five thousand men as they passed through and took the turnpike.¹⁹ In a short while the leading files could gaze upon the Federal troops which Jackson had pinned to the ground by his furious attacks. The two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia had joined, and General Longstreet commenced to deploy his men facing the Union left rear.

Longstreet's action following his arrival at the scene of battle has been the object of much criticism. He has been accused of willful delay and failure to conform to Lee's wishes during the afternoon of August 29. Lee was anxious

¹⁸ Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, 564. Cf. R. M. Johnson, "Pope's Campaign in Virginia," in *Military Historian and Economist* (Cambridge, Mass.), III (1918), 186-87.

¹⁹ Longstreet's official report is contained in *Official Records*, XII, Pt. II, 564. But Colonel Marshall said that Lee ordered the move through Hopewell Gap. Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 135. Cf. James Longstreet, "Our March Against Pope," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 517.

that Longstreet should attack at once—before Pope's army could be concentrated. Longstreet argued against an immediate assault and succeeded in inducing Lee to modify his desires and consent to a reconnaissance in force while the troops were prepared for serious battle early on the morning of the thirtieth.

According to the information possessed by Longstreet *at the time*, there was, in addition to Ricketts' division, a Union corps somewhere near Manassas—that is, off his right flank.²⁰ When he took position on Jackson's right, Longstreet found his line enfilading that of the Federals who opposed Jackson. As he brought up the artillery and prepared to attack, this Federal force withdrew farther into the woods. Whether other Union troops were back in the woods neither Longstreet nor Lee could know. Pope had been maneuvering his divisions back and forth for a day or so and even then might have the bulk of his army near enough to launch a surprise attack on Longstreet's flank. Pope was known to be aggressive; and although he had been fooled twice, it was not to be expected that he could be fooled all the time.

It was the audacious Lee who urged the attack; Longstreet demurred. His practical battle sense warned him against throwing his troops at an unknown enemy force without some reconnaissance. With the situation as uncertain as it was, it would have been unwise for Longstreet to plunge forward. Jackson was in no immediate danger. Furthermore, there was no justification for becoming heavily engaged on the right until something more definite was known of the Federal corps which was reported coming up from the south. General Lee did not press the matter.²¹

A reconnaissance was made in the direction of Brewer's Spring and the Hampton Cole house, and the Union line was found to extend some distance south of the turnpike and to occupy a very strong defensive position. The situation called for caution. The unknown factor was the force near Manassas. If that could be neutralized or eliminated, it would be an easy task for Longstreet to crush the Union left rear. When he returned and reported to Lee, he advised against an attack along the turnpike in a southerly direction. Lee's disappointment was keen and quite understandable. Nevertheless, he accepted Longstreet's recommendations.

²⁰ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 319, gives the hour as 10:30. The leading elements—Hood's advance guard—did arrive about an hour earlier—i.e., at 10:30. See also John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies* (New Orleans, 1880), 33; Walter H. Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, with Personal Reminiscences* (Norfolk, 1906), 107; Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 163; *Official Records*, XII, Pt. II, 563; and Matthew Forney Steele, *American Campaigns* (2 vols.; Washington, 1906), I, 258. Steele said that Longstreet wasted time.

²¹ This conclusion is based primarily on the writer's experience as a soldier and is one which has received support from contemporary writers who are conversant with military tactics. See Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 135 ff.; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 209. Freeman held a contrary opinion. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 325 ff.

Just then Stuart rode up with the information that the Manassas force was moving against Longstreet's right. It turned out to be McDowell and Porter with a combined force of more than a corps. What would have been the situation now, as this hostile detachment came within striking distance, had Longstreet already plunged into the woods and become heavily engaged? The new threat had to be met promptly. Wilcox was sent out with three brigades to cover the right, and preparations were made to receive the advancing enemy. Either because Longstreet's presence had been discovered or for some other reason, McDowell chose to avoid battle. Longstreet soon reasoned, and rightly, that this force was not strong enough to venture to attack him. Again Lee was informed of the situation. Longstreet has described what followed: "General Lee urged me to go in, and of course I was anxious to meet his wishes. At the same time, I wanted more than anything else, to know that my troops had a chance to accomplish what they might undertake. The ground before me was greatly to the advantage of the Federals, but if the attack had come from them it would have been a favorable opportunity for me."²²

Toward the end of the afternoon McDowell moved away from Porter and nearer the Union center, leaving about ten thousand men facing Longstreet. When this information was verified, it was almost dark.²³ Lee again became anxious that an attack should be launched; but Longstreet once more counseled patience and advocated a delay, since the night was almost upon them. Instead of an attack down the Groveton Pike—which Lee suggested—Longstreet again recommended a reconnaissance during which the troops could be moved into attack positions, from which they could be thrown into battle early the next morning. He was undoubtedly right. The imprudence of attacking with large forces too late in the day had already been demonstrated. The enemy would not attempt to withdraw—Pope's attitude was enough to ensure that the Union army would remain on the field—and McDowell's movement toward the Federal center was indication enough that Longstreet's exact whereabouts were as yet not known. By preparing for a long sustained attack on the following morning, a much more valuable victory might be won.

An analysis of the situation shows that Lee was urging nothing less than a piecemeal attack on an unknown force over unknown ground. Now that all the facts are known as to the location of the troops, it is quite easy to say that Longstreet might have had an early victory over Fitz John Porter before McDowell could have returned to aid him. But it would have been the height of folly for Longstreet to jeopardize the fate of the army by an ill-advised move.

²² Freeman criticized Longstreet severely. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 325.

²³ Longstreet, "Our March Against Pope," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 519.

Jackson was in no condition to withstand Pope, and no other support was available. Notwithstanding Pope's befogged state of mind, a piecemeal attack that late in the day would have been inconclusive, and the Federal reserves could have caught Longstreet in the flank and held him off while the balance of Pope's army proceeded to dispose of Jackson. No amount of brilliancy could have overcome the disastrous effects of a severe tactical defeat at that moment.²⁴

Late that afternoon, Longstreet's troops had just started to feel their way down the Groveton Pike when they ran headfirst into a similar movement, which Keyes's Union division had initiated. The fighting was furious and lasted until about 9 P.M. without material gain to either side. About midnight, or shortly thereafter, Longstreet withdrew his line to its original position. This retrograde movement in the middle of the night led Pope to conclude that the Confederate army had begun to retreat. This was his fatal blunder.²⁵

Longstreet was now firmly established on Jackson's right and had some knowledge of the ground and of the enemy dispositions. His line ran slightly forward and formed an obtuse angle of about 160 degrees with that of Jackson. He was ready to make an attack or to receive one. When the first light of dawn crept over the hills, Longstreet was off to ride the lines in search of some weak point where the head of his assault might crash through. There seemed to be none.

Throughout the day the massing of the Federal troops against Jackson continued; but through some blunder or a lack of knowledge of the true situation, Pope neglected to bring pressure against Longstreet's wing. It was as if Longstreet were not included in Pope's calculations.


At 3 P.M., the assault on Jackson began in earnest. The first Union wave attacked sharply, while a second line and a third followed in close support. As the rival forces clashed, the Federal lines came abreast of Longstreet's point of observation. He saw the unguarded flank—the great chance to enfilade with destructive artillery fire. Quickly he ordered two batteries to open and called for additional guns to come up. In a few moments the entire Union attack seemed to collapse under the heavy and well-directed bursts of shot.

Just as Longstreet had seen the opportunity to enfilade Pope's assaulting waves, Lee had sensed that Jackson needed help in handling the situation. Even before Jackson called for reinforcement, Lee had sent word to Longstreet to rush supports to the left. When the message reached Longstreet, he had already ordered the batteries to open fire. He realized that it would take more than an hour to move troops around to Jackson's side. A much more effective and instantaneous support could be rendered by putting all of his artillery in action in preparation for an early counterattack. With his sound

²⁴ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 325–26.

²⁵ Freeman held the opposite opinion. See *ibid.*, 325–28.

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN **POSITIONS OF TROOPS** **AUG. 30, 1862.**



knowledge of tactics, Longstreet brought pressure to bear at the critical point where it would do Jackson the most good. The result was a complete collapse of the Union attack. Although technically Longstreet had failed to obey Lee's orders, he had complied in full with the spirit of Lee's message. Jackson had been supported in the most effective manner; and when Lee asked him whether he still needed reinforcement, Jackson replied: "No, the enemy are giving way."²⁶

Longstreet watched eagerly the effect of his artillery on the Union lines. The time soon came for the counterattack. He sensed the moment even before the efforts to rally the Federal lines had failed. He gave the signal; and as the wild rebel yell pierced the heavy overtones of the battle, the wavering Union divisions crumpled under the dash of the right wing. All the pent-up fury was spent in this savage counterassault; nothing could stand against it. The day was won for the South. In choosing the moment to launch his corps at the Federal lines, Longstreet had anticipated Lee's orders for the same movement by the length of time necessary for a staff officer to cover the distance between them. That the two leaders had sensed the break in the attack at the same moment was a remarkable coincidence. The wild confusion which spread among the Northern soldiers was proof of the success of the counterattack. Jackson paid tribute to Longstreet when he said that the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet on the right had relieved his troops.²⁷

Instant pursuit was in order; and Jackson, who was nearer to the Federal right, was sent to envelop the north flank and cut off retreat while Longstreet pressed from the rear. With the coming of darkness the heavens opened; and, as after the first battle of Manassas, a terrific downpour deluged the country and prevented any connected pursuit. Operations were suspended until morning, when the cavalry, moving out under Stuart, soon discovered that Pope had escaped during the night to a strong position near Centreville. Jackson followed by way of Sudley Ford, but the condition of the roads and the great fatigue of his men prevented any energetic movements. He managed to reach the Little River Turnpike by dark on August 31 and Fairfax Courthouse the next day, as he continued to try to bring Pope to a stand.

Late on September 1 contact was made with the Union rear near Ox Hill, and A. P. Hill was thrown forward into action. There followed a scattered and disconnected maneuver, which the enemy resisted with all stubbornness. The skirmishing went on in a cold driving rain until dark, when Pope disengaged his rear and marched rapidly on Alexandria.

While Jackson pushed the pursuit, Longstreet took charge of the battlefield

²⁶ *Official Records*, XII, Pt. II, 563.

²⁷ For Pope's conclusions, see Pope's report, *ibid.*, 20-21.

and assembled the scattered troops. It was not known just what Pope would do, so the men were re-formed, the wounded cared for, the dead decently buried, and the field combed of its quantities of abandoned arms and munitions. As soon as the true state of affairs became known, Longstreet assumed command of the main body of the army and took up the direct pursuit. He arrived on the field of Chantilly just as Jackson emerged the victor from that stubborn fight, but he was unable to take part in the battle.²⁸ No further opportunity to damage Pope was offered, as he had fled with his army to the shelter of Washington. For a second time the Federal advance on Richmond had been stopped and thrown back on the Northern capital.

²⁸ Jackson's report, *ibid.*, 531.

The First Northern Invasion

THERE WAS NO DOUBT OF POPE'S DEFEAT. WITH HIS RETIREMENT TO THE FORTIFIED zone of Washington, all danger to Richmond was removed for the time being. The people of the South could well indulge in praise of Lee and his army; for Lee had accomplished marvelous things since the day when he assumed command of the poorly organized force which faced McClellan just east of Richmond. Two large armies had opposed him, and he had turned them back in defeat.

The Confederates rested over September 2. Although victory had been sweet, it had been costly. The ranks were thinned, and more than one of the brilliant lesser leaders had been struck down. It was a source of gratification to Lee, however, that there was none of the demoralization which had followed the first battle of Manassas.

It was a time for careful planning. Should an attack be made on the Northern capital, the result would be unsatisfactory. Pope was safe within the ring of forts, and the Army of Northern Virginia was too weak to engage in siege operations. If Lee withdrew to the vicinity of Richmond, there was nothing to stop another invasion of northern Virginia. To retire behind the Rappahannock would have been an admission of weakness. Lee could not stay where he was because of the limitations in the system of supply. The country had been well plundered for a radius of fifty miles or more, and supplies had to be brought over a line some 150 miles long. Lee's mind was soon made up: he would invade Maryland and bring strategic pressure to bear on Washington. Thus he would be able to keep the Federal forces out of Virginia and hope to improve the prospects of the Confederacy in the eyes of Europe.

Longstreet's reaction to the Maryland campaign has been variously criticized. Vague statements have appeared from time to time which seem to imply that he was opposed to the movement. It is difficult to reconcile these statements with the facts. Not only did Longstreet feel that "there was but one opening . . . across the Potomac," but he encouraged Lee when that commander was in doubt as to the feasibility of supplying his troops so far from their base.¹ Did they not, urged Longstreet, exist for two days on roasting ears

¹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 200; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 352.

and green oranges in the Mexican War? Hence, why fear—especially when the fields of Maryland were bursting with the plenty of the harvest.

General Lee weighed the difficulties and, in the end, decided on the movement. The army set out from near Germantown on September 3 and, after passing Chantilly, turned by the left flank with its destination the fords of the Potomac near Leesburg. The leading troops arrived on September 5, and by dark the next day the entire army had crossed without incident. There was no obstruction to the advance, and on the seventh the infantry units came together. The first phase of Lee's plans had matured successfully.

As was his custom, Lee rode with Longstreet. Early on September 7, as the two were riding at the head of the column, the sound of artillery in action came from the direction of Point of Rocks. This was interpreted by Lee as meaning that the Federal forces were concentrating for the defense of Harper's Ferry. He is reported to have proposed to Longstreet that he take sufficient force, move on Harper's Ferry, surround it, and capture it. Longstreet objected instantly and later described his reasons for doing so:

I thought it a venture not worth the game, as we were in the enemy's country and presence, that he would be advised of any move we made in a few hours after it was set on foot; that the Union army, though beaten, was not disorganized; that we knew a number of their officers who could put it in order and march against us, if they found us exposed, and make serious trouble before the capture could be accomplished; that our men were worn by very severe and protracted service, and in need of repose; that as long as we had them in hand we were masters of the situation, but dispersed into many fragments, our strength must be greatly reduced.

As the subject was not reintroduced, Longstreet dismissed it from his mind as but a passing fancy of Lee's.²

By September 8, the troops had settled down about Frederick; and when camp duties had been supervised, Longstreet visited Lee's headquarters. He found the flaps of Lee's tent pinned down. Inquiry made to one of the staff brought the information that Jackson and Lee were in conference. As Longstreet turned to go away, Lee heard his voice, hailed him, and asked him to join them. Once drawn into the conference, Longstreet discovered to his sur-

² Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 201. Cf. David L. Thompson, "With Burnside at Antietam," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 662; and Freeman, *Lee*, II, 359-61. It is difficult to determine whether this was Longstreet's view at the time. His memoirs were written long after the war and at a time when many military critics had agreed that it was a hazardous venture for Lee. Considering the events as they did occur, one may assume that Longstreet expressed some opposition to the proposed movement, but the exact words quoted may not have been spoken. One accomplished scholar has stated in a personal letter to the writer: "... events at the time and McClellan's temperament urged the decision." Be that as it may, however, Lee did disperse too widely, and the evidence indicates that Longstreet objected. For Lee's proposal to enter Maryland, see Lee to Davis, September 3, 1862, and *id.* to *id.*, September 4, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. II, 590-91.

prise that Lee had not only been seriously considering the movement on Harper's Ferry but was even then arranging the details with Jackson. Finding that Longstreet had scant sympathy for the idea, Lee had broached it to Jackson, who was eager to accomplish the mission.³

The plan for the reduction of Harper's Ferry was not only complicated; it called for careful timing. Considering the great amount of straggling and the lack of march discipline characteristic of the Confederate troops, it was an extremely risky plan. Jackson, with his three divisions, was to pass by Harper's Ferry on the north side of the Potomac, cross on the fords above the city, and descend on the place by way of Crampton's Gap to Maryland Heights while John G. Walker's division recrossed the Potomac at Check's Ford and occupied Loudoun Heights. D. H. Hill was to provide the reserve and move to a position in readiness near the western base of South Mountain, where he could guard the trains, pick up stragglers, and intercept any escape of the garrison at Harper's Ferry. The cavalry was given the mission of interposing between Lee and McClellan (who had relieved Pope on September 5), should the latter attempt to come up. Longstreet, with a depleted corps, was assigned to the independent task of moving by way of Turner's Gap to occupy Boonsborough.⁴

The sheer audacity of the plan was enough to take away one's breath. Three separate columns were to move by different routes—with but little chance for intercommunication while en route—to make a concerted attack on Harper's Ferry. Longstreet would have been justified in stating his objections again that Jackson might hear them; but it appears that he remained silent except to request that McLaws be reinforced by R. H. Anderson's division for additional protection and that his own mission should be to halt near the point where Hill would be until the outcome of the attack. Longstreet must have viewed this dispersion of force with scant sympathy. The risk, as he had said, seemed to outweigh any benefits that might come. The outcome exonerated his judgment, for had it not been for the sluggish movements of McClellan, the invading army might well have been destroyed.⁵

The several columns cleared Frederick as ordered, the men sweeping along

³ John G. Walker, "Jackson's Capture of Harper's Ferry," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 604-605; Thompson, "With Burnside at Antietam," *ibid.*, 662; James Longstreet, "The Invasion of Maryland," *ibid.*, 663. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 359-61. Freeman's assertion that Longstreet "sulked" is an assumption without adequate basis of fact.

⁴ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 358-59, gives a good description of the state of the discipline in Lee's army. For Lee's orders of march, see Special Orders No. 191, September 9, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. II, 603. When Lee received intelligence that Federal troops were advancing on Hagerstown, he changed Longstreet's destination to that place.

⁵ Freeman said that Longstreet was not sympathetic to the plan and that he urged Lee against further dispersion. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 361. It is not clear, however, whether Freeman meant that Longstreet opposed Lee's plan at the previous conference of Lee with Longstreet or at the present conference with Jackson. Longstreet was essentially a tactician and battle leader, and his strategic views were colored thereby.

to the tune of "The Girl I Left Behind Me." It was the march to victory and to end the war. The men felt it; Lee had great hope of it. Jackson recrossed the Potomac on the night of September 11, and the next day he assembled his divisions in Martinsburg. He captured a few stores of rations, foraged, and manned the defensive works on Bolivar Heights. Longstreet advanced without interference by way of Turner's Gap to the western base of South Mountain, where it had been planned for him to halt. Things were going so well, however, that Lee ordered him to continue on to Hagerstown to block a hostile force reported to be marching from Chambersburg.⁶ This modification of the original plan should be kept in mind, as it had a profound effect on the operations of the Federal army and was to prove to be Lee's salvation.

Through one of those strange and startling accidents that often occur in war, a copy of Lee's Movement Order No. 191 was left behind when the Confederate troops evacuated Frederick. When the advancing Union army occupied the town on September 13, a soldier of the XII Corps discovered the copy while prowling around the abandoned Confederate camp site. It was rushed through the several headquarters, and before noon McClellan had in his hands the key to Lee's destruction. The only thing he needed to do to profit by this good fortune was to move promptly.

And what of Lee? On the morning of September 13, Jackson came down from the west against the Union pickets at Harper's Ferry. McLaws was holding Pleasant Valley between Elk Ridge and South Mountain, his head facing Solomon's Gap in Elk Ridge and his left front watching Brownsville Gap about one mile north of Brownsville. Fronting McLaws was a determined enemy, who was prepared to cut his way out; and behind him was Franklin, who at least had sufficient information to move on him that day. D. H. Hill had been left at Turner's Gap with two brigades, while the remainder of his division had moved on with the trains to Boonsborough. Longstreet was at Hagerstown; Walker was southeast of Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah. The distances between these scattered elements were somewhat as follows: between Longstreet and Hill, one day's march or fourteen miles; between D. H. Hill and McLaws, about half that distance; between Jackson and Hill, at least twenty miles. Lee was at Hagerstown.

The actual dispositions of Lee's army indicate that had McClellan moved out at once, only Jackson could have been certain of return to Virginia; the rest of the invading army—except Walker, who was in Virginia—would have been destroyed or captured. "Fortunately for Lee," Alexander wrote later, "a citizen of Frederick whose sympathies were with the Confederate cause,

⁶ At least, this was suggested to Freeman as Lee's reason for the change in orders. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 365. It was a logical bit of grand tactics typical of Lee. Cf. Lee to Davis, September 16, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. I, 140.

was accidentally present at McClellan's headquarters during the afternoon of the 13th and heard expressions of gratification at the finding of the order, and learned of directions being given for a vigorous advance the next morning. With full appreciation of its importance he made his way through the Federal lines, and brought the information, after dark, to Stuart, who at once sent it on to Lee, then in camp at Hagerstown."⁷ Fully twelve hours after the Union soldier found the order, the news that a copy was lost reached Lee. The bulk of the Union army was but a scant day's march from the passes which were so lightly held by Lee's cavalry. The moon was clear and nearly full; the main roads out of Frederick were in good condition; the opportunity was one that comes but seldom—yet McClellan failed to put his army in motion until the next morning.

Lee, however, was stung to action. The scattered brigades of Hill's division, which had sprawled over an area some five miles from Turner's Gap, were ordered to concentrate in that pass at once. They arrived barely in time to dispute the passage of McClellan's advance. D. R. Jones and Evans were directed to support Hill, and Longstreet was sent in the direction of Boonsborough.⁸

It was nearly four o'clock on the hot and sultry afternoon of September 14 when Longstreet's tired men reached the scene of action at Turner's Gap. They had marched some fifteen miles from Hagerstown over a bad road with dust ankle-deep, and most of the way the route lay uphill and over rough ground. The men were on the verge of exhaustion from the heat and dust. Eight brigades made the march, and only Toombs was left behind to guard the wagons and care for a militia force which had been reported moving down from Chambersburg. It was a killing march, and the way was dotted with the prostrate bodies of men who had broken ranks through sheer exhaustion.⁹

When Longstreet's leading elements crowded up the slope of the gap, Hill's division had had a good day's fighting against the I and IX Union Corps. The

⁷ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 230. Cf. the statement in Freeman, *Lee*, II, 368, that this story is pure fiction. Lee and Longstreet were in Hagerstown on September 12 and 13, 1862. Cf. also Lee to Davis, September 12, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. II, 604; *id.* to *id.*, September 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 605; and Lee to Lafayette McLaws, September 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 606. Lee left Hagerstown during the morning of September 15. Cf. R. H. Chilton to McLaws, September 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 608; and A. L. Long to McLaws, September 15, 1862, *ibid.*, 609.

⁸ Longstreet saw—from the condition of his troops and the poor roads over which a march must be made—that the time was barely sufficient for him to join D. H. Hill at Turner's Gap with sufficient force to stop McClellan. He urged Lee to direct D. H. Hill to fall back on Sharpsburg—a fine defensive terrain—and that the troops at Hagerstown march directly to that place. Lee decided, however, to reinforce Hill at Turner's Gap in spite of the adverse conditions and unsatisfactory time element. T. M. R. Talcott to McLaws, September 13, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. I, 607; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 219–20; James Longstreet, "The Invasion of Maryland," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 665–66. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 368.

⁹ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 38–39.

Federal attack had been made with eighteen brigades of infantry supported by the same number of batteries of artillery, and Hill's pitifully weak line was already outflanked on both ends. Longstreet's men plunged up the hill and moved alternately to the right and the left, thickening and extending Hill's front. There was no chance to rest; Lee's outnumbered force had no choice but to carry on with dogged and stubborn courage until each unit was forced back. Darkness came at last, and with it came the end of the battle. The enemy had been held back in the pass.

The helpfulness of Lee's change in Longstreet's orders can now be understood. All during the day McClellan's intelligence service had been unable to locate any of Longstreet's troops, who were supposed to be near the western exit of the gap. Consequently, McClellan had proceeded with undue caution and had held a very large reserve out of the fight. Had he realized that Longstreet was at Hagerstown, he would have used all his available troops to push home the attack, and nothing could have saved Hill from destruction before Longstreet's brigades could arrive.

All hope of a triumphant entry into Maryland had now vanished. Lee must concentrate his army quickly and strive to hold off the enemy until a way could be cleared to quit the country. As he had had no opportunity to view the fighting—being unable to ride because of an injury to his hands received on the day following the second battle of Manassas—Lee sent for Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Hood to report to him at the foot of the mountain. After dark the generals descended the rugged footpath to meet their commander. He questioned them eagerly as to the day's doings and called on the three men for recommendations. The news that his lieutenants brought was more than disturbing—it caused Lee to decide to return to Virginia. His oral instructions were for an immediate retirement and a march to Keedysville that night. Already the Federal scouts were creeping around the flanks. Should the Confederate forces stand until daylight, the Union attack would be so strong that no retirement would be possible.¹⁰

There are few examples of greater skill than that with which Longstreet and D. H. Hill disengaged their troops from the alert enemy. As the regiments filed out silently and moved like shadows toward the west, there were no hostile demonstrations. Just as silently, the cavalry moved in as relief. No better evidence is needed to show the tactical efficiency of both Longstreet and Hill than the orderly manner in which their men were withdrawn from before

¹⁰ Hood was late in arriving and found Lee and Longstreet already in conference. *Ibid.*, 41. Freeman stated that although Lee had determined on returning to Virginia, he had not communicated his decision to his generals. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 374. Lee did write McLaws at Harper's Ferry: "The day has gone against us and this army will go to Sharpsburg and cross the river [into Virginia]." Lee to McLaws, September 15, 1862, in *Official Records*, LII, Pt. II, 618-19.

an overwhelming enemy, re-formed, and marched away to new positions.

The march toward Keedysville was barely started when the further distressing news came that Crampton's Gap had been forced. It was now thought too late to effect a concentration north of the Potomac. Once again the plans were changed, and the word was passed along the hurrying columns to assemble behind Antietam Creek and prepare for a stand on the low hills surrounding the village of Sharpsburg, about ten miles from the place of the day's battle.

While McClellan was moving slowly toward Lee, Jackson reached Harper's Ferry. The pressure of the converging forces did not cause a Federal evacuation, as General Lee had anticipated. Jackson had covered nearly sixty miles in his wandering march through Martinsburg and, at noon on September 13, was facing Harper's Ferry with a command all but exhausted. The other columns managed to reach their respective destinations at about the same time, although McLaws was behind the others. Jackson knew nothing of Lee's predicament. He intended to offer the opportunity of surrender to the Federal garrison, but the sound of the battle at Crampton's Gap led him to engage at once. From about noon on the thirteenth until late afternoon the next day, his troops made little headway. But during the night of the fourteenth, Jackson shifted his brigades to form a cordon around the Union works, so that when daylight came on September 15, the assault was made from all points at once. In spite of the superior locations of the Confederates, however, the Federal commander maintained his position all day; and it was night before Jackson received the surrender of the twelve thousand Federal soldiers.

No sooner had the formalities of surrender been accomplished than Jackson, who had now learned of the changed situation from Lee, turned over to A. P. Hill the details of accepting the prisoners; and he himself, with the bulk of his forces, left shortly after midnight for Sharpsburg. Meanwhile, McLaws, who had managed to gather his scattered battalions and escape the double Federal column which had him all but caged at Crampton's Gap, marched into Harper's Ferry. Finding Jackson gone and knowing Lee's dire need, he continued his march until about midnight on September 16, when his tired soldiers lay down to rest some two miles short of Shepherdstown. They had had little food and no rest in two days.

A. P. Hill did not follow McLaws at once; the details of the surrender consumed all of his effort until the morning of the seventeenth. It was shortly after 7 A.M. when his division took the road for Antietam.

A courier brought word to McLaws to hasten his march. Although the troops sadly needed a few hours of rest, they were assembled well before daylight and started toward Sharpsburg. They arrived at the field of battle when the fighting had reached its height on the morning of September 17. After

having had little rest and less food for four days, these men of McLaws' division were thrown into battle almost on the moment of arrival.

Longstreet's problem had been equally perplexing. The withdrawal from Boonsborough had been accomplished without much difficulty, but the long march that followed was full of trouble. The narrow dusty roads and the fatigue of the men caused much stumbling in ranks and considerable straggling. But march discipline was enforced with necessary harshness; and when daylight came on the fifteenth, Longstreet and D. H. Hill selected their line of battle on the hills back of the town of Sharpsburg, on the west side of Antietam Creek.

When, on the morning of the fifteenth, the expectant Union soldiers found that their foe had escaped, they were hastily put in pursuit by McClellan; and after a march of about seven miles, the advanced elements were brought into contact with the Confederate rear. In spite of the alert Southern cavalry, had McClellan then moved to the attack, he could have severely damaged the force of not more than ten thousand men who were crowding toward the Potomac over the narrow road. But he did nothing. The remainder of the day was spent in useless maneuver. On the morning of September 16, McClellan was joined by Burnside's IX Corps, which had been some distance in the rear. Other reinforcements came from Franklin's VI Corps, which had been skirmishing with McLaws in Pleasant Valley. The Union commander now had some eighty-seven thousand well-equipped men. Still he hesitated, and it was not until after two o'clock on the afternoon of the sixteenth that any offensive move was made.

Lee was still without advices from Jackson when dawn came on September 15. His first impulse had been to put the Potomac between him and the Federal army; but in the afternoon, a courier brought the news of the capture of Harper's Ferry and the more welcome intelligence that Jackson was hurrying to him. With this information, Lee, after a conference with Longstreet and D. H. Hill, changed his mind about crossing the river, since Jackson was certain that he could bring his troops up in ample time. In spite of the promised reinforcement, the risk of a stand at Sharpsburg was very great.¹¹

Lee's line of battle on September 16 had Longstreet on the right from the Burnside Bridge to where D. H. Hill's division occupied the center near Keedysville Road. On Hill's left, W. T. Wofford's and E. M. Law's brigades of Hood's division extended beyond the Hagerstown Pike. Jackson's own division and Lawton's (formerly Ewell's) division, which had arrived in good season, took the extreme left, while Stuart massed his cavalry well forward on

¹¹ See Freeman, *Lee*, II, 378-80; Jackson to Lee (announcing the surrender of Harper's Ferry), September 15, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. I, 951. See also the critical discussion in *Ropes, Story of the Civil War*, Pt. II, 348.

the left front and flank. John G. Walker had the reserve in rear of Longstreet. Yet to arrive were the divisions of McLaws, R. H. Anderson, and A. P. Hill. Lee's maximum strength available for battle did not exceed thirty-five thousand men; and this tired, hungry, footsore, and apprehensive body of soldiers must beat down the assaults of McClellan's greatly superior numbers.

McClellan's plan was to send a large enveloping force under Hooker and General J. K. F. Mansfield across the Antietam Creek against the Confederate left while a smaller force attacked the hostile right by way of the Burnside Bridge. When one or the other of these attacks proved successful, he planned to advance his center and drive Lee into the river. The first attack, made by Hooker coming from the northwest toward the Dunker Church late in the afternoon of September 16, fell on Hood, who met it with desperation. The fighting lasted until dark, when both Hooker and Hood drew back their lines to rest the men and cook supper. Except for a single issue of a half-ration of meat, Hood's men had been without food for three days. Part of Lawton's division of Jackson's command took Hood's place in line and provided security for the night.

66760

The troops had little rest that night, and before the first sign of the new day the pickets were at it again. A few moments later the artillery opened fire. For a second time, Hooker led the Union assault—this time against the center of Jackson's wing. The fighting was furious. About 6 A.M. Hooker was heavily reinforced, and Lawton was forced in turn to call on Hood for help. While the kettles, bubbling with the half-cooked breakfasts not yet eaten, were left to sing unattended, the brigades of Hood, commanded by Wofford and Law, jumped into the fray. Once again Hood's Texans went forward through the cornfields, now filled with dead and dying, and Hooker's advance was stopped. According to Hood, it was "the most terrific clash of arms that has occurred during the war."¹²

The pressure continued on the Confederate left. Jackson was slowly forced back. By seven o'clock on the morning of September 17 he had fired his last round, and his divisions had to be withdrawn from the line under cover of Stuart's artillery. Hood stood his ground, with John G. Walker extending his left and G. T. Anderson solidly placed on his right. As Jackson withdrew, Stuart eased back on the extreme left, while Walker, Hood, and D. H. Hill made a sharp counterthrust at Mansfield's XII Corps, which had bedded itself in Jackson's front. Then followed a lull in the fighting while the artillery on both sides redoubled its efforts. Hooker retired to rest his men, and fresh troops came up on the Union right to continue the battle.

The first of the Confederate units which Jackson had left behind at Harper's

¹² Alexander, *Memoirs*, 254; Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 44.

Ferry now commenced to arrive. McLaws, who had forced his men so strenuously, came up shortly before 9 A.M. and, after giving his division a brief rest, joined Longstreet on the line of battle. R. H. Anderson's division was rushed over to the aid of D. H. Hill, whose ranks had been badly thinned; and as these leg-weary troops came up on the line, the Federal columns were observed crossing the Antietam and moving to the attack. It was Sumner's II Corps, fresh and eager for the work. Sedgwick, with a carelessness hard to understand, led his division in a column of brigades across McLaws' front. The Confederates opened fire at once and caught Sedgwick's flank. His march was first staggered and then arrested. His left was crushed back against the main column. While he strove desperately to re-form, the other elements of the Southern line directed their fire on his front and rear. Caught in a semicircle of hot fire, his troops breaking badly, Sedgwick tried to change front and meet this attack. But McLaws and Walker followed up their success promptly and pushed the broken Federal line well back on its reserves.

Backwards and forwards swayed the battle during the long forenoon, the advantage resting first with Lee and then with McClellan. The very intensity of the fighting exhausted the combatants and forced a slowing down of the fire about noon. Taking advantage of this lull, Lee, who had been with Longstreet most of the morning, suggested a ride along the lines. D. H. Hill joined the two men when they passed in rear of his sector. They stopped behind a low knoll to discuss the situation.¹³ Both Lee and Longstreet dismounted, but Hill rode his horse to the crest of the ridge. Shortly afterward a well-aimed shot cut down the third horse to be shot from under this doughty warrior on that eventful day.

Apprehensive of a serious drive on his right, Longstreet had placed Toombs in defense of the high ground overlooking the Burnside Bridge. The time now came when the fate of Lee's army depended on the courage and fidelity of this man. Longstreet had told him to hold, but if forced back by overwhelming numbers—Toombs had but 500 muskets—to retire in echelon to the right rear and thus open the way for supporting fire to pass from troops in the second line. Once dislodged, Toombs was directed to maneuver his command in a wide circle so as to rejoin his division, which was posted on the forward shoulders of the low hill in the rear.

Burnside had issued orders that the bridge must be carried. From ten in the morning, when the order was first given, the Union soldiers strove mightily

¹³ It was at this point that Lee could have retired without serious inconvenience. Most critics seem to agree that Lee should have retired across the Potomac without fighting on September 16, as Jackson had finished his assignment at Harper's Ferry and was strategically well located to cover Lee's withdrawal and block any subsequent attempt of the Union leader to pursue. Cf. Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 441; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 412.

to cross the river and reach Toombs. The men of the Second Maryland and the Sixth New Hampshire were caught in masses on the bridge and melted under the fire that was poured into them. Burnside repeated his orders: the bridge *must* be carried! Fresh troops came up and worked their way under cover to a point behind and to the west of Toombs. He was thus brought under fire from front and rear and slowly forced out of position. By 4 P.M. the bridge was open, and the Union divisions began crossing in mass and commenced to advance up Sharpsburg Heights, which was defended by Longstreet's right wing.

The first Union wave overreached Longstreet's right and doubled it back. The indications were that Lee's formations would be crushed together and annihilated. Meanwhile Toombs, working his way in a wide circle, had managed to round the head of the Union envelopment in time to join forces with D. R. Jones, who had also been cut off from Longstreet's right. Toombs and Jones together led their men into position to move against the Federal advance—facing somewhat north—and opened the battle with all the troops which they could gather together. But even this unlooked-for aid could not have saved Longstreet's right from being driven back, had not further aid come at the moment when Longstreet's line commenced to break. Then, Dame Fortune sent the warmth of her smile to enliven the dogged Southerners. The troops under A. P. Hill, which Jackson had left behind at Harper's Ferry to gather the plunder and secure the prisoners, arrived on the scene in a position to do the most good. With them were the two regiments from Toombs's brigade which had been guarding the trains. Coming up in rear of Toombs, they rushed their deployment and bore down swiftly on the Union flank in a surprise attack. Tired as they were, they tore into Burnside with a fury which nothing could stop. Longstreet later described the effects of this assault all too briefly: "The strong battle concentrating against General Burnside seemed to spring from the earth as his march bore him farther from the river. Out-flanked and staggered by the gallant attack of A. P. Hill's brigades, his advance was arrested." As Burnside fell back toward the bridge, the eager brigades of Hill, Toombs, and Kemper crowded in and drove the harassed enemy back across Antietam Creek.¹⁴

The failure on the right marked the end of the fighting. By tacit consent, both armies left off their slaughter the next day to bury the dead. McClellan made no offer of further battle; and when night came on September 18, the evening stars looked down on the rear guard of Lee's army as it crossed over into Virginia after a campaign that had been marked by amazing military events.

¹⁴ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 261.

The eighteen-hour battle at Sharpsburg will remain forever a classic in the history of American warfare. In fierceness and intensity there is nothing that can compare with it. Between dawn and four o'clock in the afternoon of this day, almost twenty-five thousand men on both sides had been stricken. It was the most costly single day's battle of the war. To Robert Toombs of Georgia—one of Longstreet's men—belongs the credit for saving Lee's army. But for the tenacity with which Toombs held his ground and the skill which he displayed when forced to fall back, the Army of Northern Virginia might have been forced back on the Potomac to be drowned like rats or gathered up as prisoners.

A reconsideration of this battle and the events leading up to it gives opportunity to study again Longstreet's tactical concepts and his ability as a field general. Much of the criticism that might be directed against Lee has been hushed by the admiration felt for the fighting qualities displayed at Turner's Gap and at Sharpsburg. It is well to look dispassionately into some of the fundamental principles involved.

The invasion of Maryland was probably the best move that Lee could have made under the circumstances. Longstreet was in active accord with this program. He only raised objection when the diversion against Harper's Ferry was proposed. Had Lee kept his army together, the situation created by the lost order might not have developed. It was not vital to Lee's plans to have Harper's Ferry reduced. The trouble brought on by the loss of the order was that which Longstreet had feared. Lee's dispersion of his forces was such as to justify severe criticism. As D. H. Hill put it: "The Confederates, with more than half of Lee's army at Harper's Ferry, a distant march of two days, and with the remainder divided into two parts, thirteen miles from each other, were in good condition to be beaten in detail, scattered and captured."¹⁵

And if the lost order had not been found by McClellan? The efficiency of his intelligence service would have determined how soon the knowledge of Jackson's movement on Harper's Ferry would have reached the Union headquarters. Had McClellan acted with reasonable promptness, he could probably have interposed between Jackson and Lee before the former could have finished the work at Harper's Ferry. It must not be overlooked that McClellan was in possession of considerable information concerning Lee's movement even before the order was found. The data thus supplied only served to clear up any doubts and gave McClellan the full details of the Confederate plans. One can only wonder how much of this was in Longstreet's mind, and whether it was knowledge—or mere instinct—that made him object to Lee's plan.

¹⁵ Cf. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 213-14; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 395-402; Daniel H. Hill, "The Battle of South Mountain, or Boonsboro," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, II, 560.

Sharpsburg was the first battle in which Longstreet's entire force was not together as a unit. During this engagement, Longstreet was, instead of troop leader, more commander of a sector than of a battle unit. No better proof of the high quality that characterized his work as a soldier can be found than the conduct of his subordinate commanders at Sharpsburg. McLaws, to whom much credit is due for his untiring efforts during the two days leading up to the battle of September 17, was one commander who had imbibed the spirit of his chief. And then there were the two Andersons and the impetuous Hood, whose hungry men left their waiting kettles of food, not once but twice, in order to render aid to their hard-pressed comrades. These were all Longstreet's men. And behind them was A. P. Hill, whose rare judgment and real fighting helped to turn defeat into victory at the very end of the battle. The spirit of Longstreet had also been stamped on the men who stood in ranks with empty muskets and awaited the oncoming Union assault. Their ammunition gone, they were ready to use their guns as clubs. Rocks were used, too—and naked fists.

It was with more than pride that, the battle over, Lee placed both hands on the shoulders of Longstreet—who stood in torn clothing, his face smudged with the smoke of battle and his feet covered by an old pair of red carpet slippers because of an infected heel—and hailed him: "Here is my old war horse."¹⁶

But why did Lee fight the battle of Sharpsburg? The campaign was doomed from the moment that the lost order was found by the Federals; and when Jackson had captured Harper's Ferry, all possible under the circumstances had been accomplished. Even if Lee could have defeated McClellan more definitely, he was in no condition to pursue, and the victory would have gained nothing of substantial military value. It might have helped politically and aided in securing financial aid abroad; but the losses in men, munitions, and supplies would have been serious, and in the end Lee would still have been faced with the necessity of returning into Virginia.

There is no evidence that Longstreet opposed the stand on the heights above the Antietam, but he could have done so with all sincerity and propriety. He had seen the first danger, and he would have been blind indeed not to have seen the greater hazard of making a stand in front of overwhelming numbers with an unfordable river at one's back. One fatal slip and Lee would have been gone. If Toombs had been less tenacious at the Burnside Bridge; if D. H. Hill and Hood had not stood their ground so bravely; if Jackson had delayed as little as six hours; if A. P. Hill had not come up so fortuitously at the end; if

¹⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 262. Freeman gave a slightly different wording. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 403.

McClellan had used all of his available forces—the many ifs are startling, and the military historian may well ask, Why did Lee stand and fight when there was so much to lose? Jackson should have covered a withdrawal into Virginia before the fighting of September 17, and Lee should have retired at once after his fortunate escape from Turner's Gap—or, at the latest, during the night of September 16–17. There would then have been but a negative Union victory to justify the Proclamation of Emancipation which President Lincoln had waited so many weeks for a favorable opportunity to publish. And, without doubt, European opinion would have been more kindly.¹⁷

It is useless to speculate on what might have been. Of the army which Lee led from the battlefields of the second battle of Manassas, twenty thousand failed to cross the Potomac because of straggling, weakness, lack of shoes, or other cause. Of those who did enter Maryland, thirteen thousand fell on the field of battle during the campaign and twelve thousand or more became prisoners of the North. In the short space of less than a month, something had happened to change the conquering army of the South into what Longstreet has called a horde of disordered fugitives, turning away from the same army which two weeks earlier it had sent flying disgracefully into the fortified zone of Washington.¹⁸

Of the many studies of this campaign, that by General J. C. Palfrey is the best. His initial praise of Lee's plan of campaign is greatly mitigated by this later comment: "If Lee had been in McClellan's place on the 17th of September, and had sent Jackson to conduct the right attack and Longstreet to force the passage of the lower bridge and turn the Confederate left, the Army of Northern Virginia, though commanded by a second Lee, a second Jackson, and a second Longstreet, would have ceased to exist that day."¹⁹

Still the campaign had not been entirely in vain. The fall of Martinsburg brought needful supplies of ammunition, some five thousand pairs of shoes (which would cover the raw and bleeding feet of part of Lee's soldiers), fat beeves and hogs, and wagons filled with forage and grain—all of which the retreating Confederates carried with them into Virginia as Longstreet's troops covered their retirement from the field of Sharpsburg.

¹⁷ Alexander said that "Lee had everything to lose and nothing to gain." Alexander, *Memoirs*, 270. Freeman, however, was of the opinion that Lee was fully justified in fighting at Sharpsburg. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 373–77, 412. Cf. Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. II, 351–52; Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 441; Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 224 ff. For the possibility of foreign intervention, see Donald Jordan and Edwin S. Pratt, *Europe and the American Civil War* (Boston, 1931), *passim*.

¹⁸ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 283. This is Longstreet's somewhat bitter comment, made long after the war. The facts seem to show that Lee's army was tired, that there was much straggling, and that the uncertainties of the campaign had dampened the offensive urge so evident after the second battle of Manassas.

¹⁹ J. C. Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg* (New York, 1882), 17.

Fredericksburg

FOLLOWING THE ESCAPE INTO VIRGINIA, THE ARMY CAME TO REST IN THE AREA that lay between Winchester and the Potomac. McClellan was quite content to risk no more victories and held his troops north of the river. The period was a busy one for the Confederate army. Although the ravages of the campaign had been widespread, they were slowly obliterated; and the spoils went far to strengthen the wavering morale. Nearly all the men were shod, and the harvest of the fertile valley of the Shenandoah brought food in plenty. As the troops settled down to a season of comparative quiet, the stragglers drifted back to their companies, and the men who had been forced to quit the march through weakness or other legitimate cause began to rejoin their comrades. By the first of October the strength of the army was considerably greater.

General Lee was by no means convinced that another movement north of the Potomac was impracticable. He wanted to chance it again, but the fear of increased straggling caused him to abandon the idea. He had written to President Davis that he would attempt to entice McClellan into the Shenandoah Valley, where the Union army would be at a disadvantage. This was the alternative which he offered in place of an immediate invasion of the North. It must have cost Lee much pain to have to write that "a great many men belonging to the army never entered Maryland at all; many returned after getting there, while others who crossed kept aloof."¹

Shortly after the return from Antietam, a third step in the organization of the Confederate army took place. Full recognition was now given to the tactical necessity for army corps. Because of the qualities which had kept Longstreet high in the estimation of his chief, it was Lee's pleasure to recommend him for promotion to the grade of lieutenant general. This promotion, announced on November 6, 1862, in Special Orders No. 234, also assigned him to the command of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.²

Two corps were formed, Jackson being promoted to command the other.

¹ Lee to Davis, September 21, 1862, in *Official Records*, XIX, Pt. I, 143. Cf. also Lee's remarks regarding straggling in his letters to Davis of September 22, 23, 25, and 28, 1862, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 617, 622, 626, 633.

² Special Order No. 232, November 6, 1862, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 698. Although Freeman was generally hostile to Longstreet, he said that "Lee unhesitatingly endorsed [the appointment of] Longstreet" as commander of his First Corps. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 418.

In these assignments, Lee performed the happy marriage of temperament with tactics. One of the corps was to be commanded by a man of substance—solid, tried, and thoroughly dependable. The other was to come under the leadership of the one person in the Confederacy whose spirit was in tune with Lee's own. While Longstreet took over the corps which was to perform the substantial tactical missions and do the heavy bludgeoning, Jackson was available for those audacious schemes which marked Lee as a peculiar genius in the art of war.

While reorganizing his army during the breathing spell afforded by McClellan's inactivity, Lee was alive to the necessity for learning what his enemy was planning. Stuart, who had proved so able at riding in behind the Federal armies, was sent on another of his raids on October 12. He plunged deep into the enemy territory, and the news that his troopers had set foot on Northern soil again occasioned the Federals renewed fear for the safety of Washington. McClellan was put in motion. He crossed the Potomac on October 26 and moved down the east side of the Blue Ridge with the evident purpose of interposing between Lee and Richmond. Lee's movements conformed. Jackson was assigned to cover the Valley and the passes to the east of it while Longstreet marched his powerful corps along routes parallel to those taken by the Union army. McClellan headed for Warrenton; and Longstreet moved to the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse, which he reached on November 5. Except that Jackson was in the Valley, the position of the rival forces was now somewhat as it had been before Pope turned back toward Washington.

Then a change took place in the Federal command. Lincoln, dissatisfied with McClellan's ineptitude, removed him; and the command was turned over to General Ambrose E. Burnside. The new leader assumed charge on November 9 and soon changed McClellan's plan. Instead of moving on Lee's army, his proper objective, he prepared for an advance on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg.⁸

Thrusting forward toward Gordonsville as a feint, Burnside started his army southeast along the Rappahannock, the leading grand division marching out on November 15. By November 17 the movement was correctly interpreted by Lee, and Stuart was directed to occupy the Fredericksburg and Acquia Railroad and interrupt all traffic. On the eighteenth Longstreet sent

⁸ W. C. Church, "American Arms and Ammunition," in *Scribner's Monthly* (New York), XIX (January, 1880), 442 ff. See also W. Roy Mason, Major, C. S. A., "Notes of a Confederate Staff-Officer," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 101. There is evidence that both Lincoln and Halleck opposed the crossing at Fredericksburg. Henry W. Halleck to William B. Franklin, May 25, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXI, 1007; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 286-88. Longstreet was somewhat indefinite about the matter. Longstreet, "Battle of Fredericksburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 85. If Burnside's tactics at Sharpsburg are any indication, he was fully capable of ordering such a costly and hazardous operation.

two divisions (those of McLaws and General Robert Ransom, Jr.) toward Fredericksburg to meet the Union threat while he led a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Warrenton. He discovered that the entire Union army was en route toward Fredericksburg. When Lee received this information, he ordered the remainder of Longstreet's corps to join McLaws and Ransom and instructed Jackson to close in on Orange Courthouse.

Many new ideas had become part of Longstreet's military philosophy since the day when he entered the battle of Seven Pines under Johnston's oral instructions. He had learned the wisdom of issuing warning orders in writing—so as to give his commanders ample time for preparation. His orders set forth exactly what his subordinates should do. For example, note the concise distribution of tasks in his orders of November 17: Ransom was directed to move by way of Orange Courthouse to Hanover Junction, following the waters of the Anna River downstream; McLaws, starting the next day, was to march via Raccoon Ford to Chancellorsville and vicinity and to come to rest on the Ny River; Fitzhugh Lee and his cavalry were to cover the movement by way of Ely's Ford and Chancellor's Ford, with a point of concentration fixed at Fredericksburg. While these independent marches all led to the probable crossing point of Burnside's army, no chance was left for that commander to surprise Longstreet by turning one of his columns and thus to gain his right rear. Late on the eighteenth of November the situation was further clarified. The location of each Union grand division was verified and Burnside's final destination definitely determined. Longstreet then directed McLaws to move at once to Fredericksburg and sent word to Ransom to change the route of his march so as to reach Guiney's Station on the Richmond and Potomac Railroad that day.⁴

Early on the morning of the nineteenth, there was a final conference between Lee and Longstreet, at the end of which Longstreet left for Fredericksburg to assume command of the troops as they came up. Longstreet wrote later: "I rode with the leading division for Fredericksburg, and was on the heights on the 19th."⁵ If this is true, it must have been quite late when he arrived; but no matter how late the hour of arrival, the ride was one that called for a maximum of physical endurance. It is nearly forty miles from Culpeper Courthouse to Fredericksburg by way of Raccoon Ford; and if Longstreet joined McLaws at Raccoon and then rode at the head of the division, the greater part of the distance was marched at a rate of about two and one half miles an hour.

Longstreet assumed command at Fredericksburg on November 20 and thus

⁴ Orders of march sent by Longstreet from the headquarters of the First Corps, November 16, 17, and 18, 1862, to McLaws and Ransom, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 645-48.

⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 293. Alexander stated that Longstreet arrived on the twentieth and the remainder of the First Corps on the twenty-first. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 286.

became responsible for the preliminary defensive arrangements. He selected the line from which the army would give battle and made the reconnaissances covering the emplacement of the guns.⁶ In this responsibility, he not only had to post his own corps advantageously, but he had to view the entire front through the eyes of his chief. The chances were that what he decided then would stand; it behooved him to choose wisely, and he did.

The Rapidan meets the Rappahannock a few miles northwest of Fredericksburg, and the latter stream soon passes between high banks with higher parallel ridges close behind. The ridges on the north bank swing into line with the river near Falmouth and command a narrow ledge on the west side. A series of commanding hills is connected by chains of ridges, which terrace down to the river bed; there a narrow belt of level ground gives footing for the town. From Taylor's Hill—the location of the Confederate left—on across Marye's Hill to Lee's Hill (the latter were so named after the battle of Fredericksburg had occurred), a fine view of the valley greets the eye. A broad plateau extends back from Marye's Hill for about half a mile, until it is lost in a second line of hills. Below Marye's Hill was a sunken road, which had been constructed some years before; this ran along the face of the hill and was flanked by stone walls and ditches about breast high. To the east of the road, the ground dropped away gradually, with practically no cover as far as the canal. From the Gordonsville Plank Road to the Telegraph Road—about one mile in distance—there existed a natural position which was most powerful.

South of the Telegraph Road the ground rose to the wooded slopes of Lee's Hill and almost immediately dropped away on the west side to the basin of Deep Run. Beyond Deep Run the slopes ran almost due east and were covered with woods to beyond Hamilton's Crossing. Because of the recesses south of Lee's Hill, which were open and easily passable, the position was not only of high natural defensive worth but also formed a trap from which hidden forces could close in on both flanks of an attack column.

The terrain facilitated the employment of tiers of fire, while the ridges, which were covered with woods, gave ample opportunity for the moving of reserves to any part of the line without exposing them to view. Even the roads were admirably suited to the defense; for one of these was perpendicular to each separate front, and in the rear they facilitated the use of interior lines by their lateral extension. Perhaps at no other battlefield of the war—except Allatoona Pass—were the topographical features so decidedly favorable to the defense and so obviously unfavorable to the attacking forces.

The question as to who first suggested the river-crossing operations at Fredericksburg in the face of Lee's army is still unsettled. The conclusion of the

⁶ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XXI, 569.

writer is that Lincoln advanced the idea and that Burnside agreed without question and proceeded to put the plan into effect regardless of Halleck's objections. Otherwise Burnside would have bowed to Halleck's will. It is not probable that Stanton or anyone in the War Department had anything to do with planning the operations, as Stanton did not accompany Lincoln to the conference at Acquia Landing.⁷

In response to Longstreet's instructions, McLaws took over the area of the heights directly in rear of the city, with one brigade occupying the sunken road in front of and below the Marye house. The remainder of his division extended to the right across the Telegraph Road to include a small copse of woods on Lee's Hill. Ransom was put in reserve near the center of the corps. When R. H. Anderson came up, he moved to Taylor's Hill; Pickett placed his division in echelon to McLaws' right and rear; and Hood covered the right at Hamilton's Crossing. These movements were all made before dark on November 21.

The Union army had been opposite the city for several days. General Sumner, on November 21, demanded the surrender of the town and included in the demand a threat that if an answer was not received by 5 P.M., he would bombard the city. This letter was sent to Longstreet, who returned it to the mayor with the information that all firing from houses and the operation of the factories would be discontinued as the letter had demanded, but that the town would be defended and could be taken only by force of arms. It would not be surrendered. Had Sumner wished, he could have crossed the river and occupied Fredericksburg before the arrival of Longstreet's corps; but Burnside had vetoed this move.⁸

The threat of bombardment was sufficient to cause many of the noncombatants to flee, with resulting hardship and the sequence of tragic, and sometimes humorous, events which are always present when war visits a civilian community. Some of the wealthier citizens paid tribute to the taste of Longstreet's soldiers by sending up choice casks of Madeira and other vintage wines. Fully expecting the town to be shelled and then overrun by the Yankee troops, they thought it better to have these fine old wines passed around the Confederate campfires to be "quaffed in gulps" from tin cups than to have them become the prize of the northern barbarians. Sorrel reported the men would have better liked whiskey, but they did not refuse the wine.⁹

⁷ But cf. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 286, and Freeman, *Lee*, II, 432, which say that it was Burnside's plan.

⁸ See Lee to Cooper, November 22, 1862, in *Official Records*, XXI, 1026; E. V. Sumner to Mayor of Fredericksburg, November 21, 1862, and Mayor to Sumner, November 21, 1862, *ibid.*, 783-88; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 434; William Swinton, quoted in Alexander, *Memoirs*, 286.

⁹ In connection with the evacuation of the city, it is interesting to note that after the battle of Fredericksburg Longstreet started a campaign among the troops for donations to aid the refugees.

General Longstreet prepared for the defense by developing the natural features and keeping a covering of small forces on patrol on the river front. All the skill of the Confederate engineers was employed to make the position impregnable. Large reserves were held out while the work went on, and routes were marked so that any point of the river could be reached without delay or confusion.¹⁰

As the Union army concentrated, Jackson was called to the vicinity of Orange Courthouse—some forty miles from Fredericksburg—and later was ordered up to Longstreet's right. His coming made some readjustment of the lines necessary. Hood was pulled over to the left in order to permit Jackson's left division to occupy the Deep Run area. Hood's division now extended the line somewhat in echelon to the right rear with its right in behind Jackson's left. Pickett was moved into the woods just south of Lee's Hill as general reserve, but with orders to protect Hood's left flank.¹¹

Longstreet's letter to Hood of December 13 repeated the main features of the Confederate defensive plan: "The design is to sustain the enemy's attacks and repel them until they become exhausted and demoralized. When this takes place, General Jackson, from the right, will bear down on them, and if possible force them back, when the opportunity for the advance of our front will present itself. . . ." For brevity of expression and clearness of the general purpose, this note should serve as a model. There was present in Longstreet's mind at all times the necessity for assuming the offensive, and both he and Lee were unusually gifted in the ability to sense when the decisive moment to do so had come.¹²

The Federal plans were slow in maturing. At first a feint was made at a ford some fourteen miles below Fredericksburg; but when Burnside discovered the ford to be well guarded,¹³ he returned to the original plan of forcing a crossing opposite and below the city of Fredericksburg. The contemplated maneuver provided for one column to be thrown against the north side of

Official Records, LI, Pt. II, 665. One of his organizations gave \$1,391. See General Orders No. 53, December 18, 1862, *ibid.*, 663; Sorrel, *Recollections*, 143.

¹⁰ Note Longstreet's instructions with reference to the construction of five trenches, in Longstreet to Ransom, December 13, 1862, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 662. According to Sorrel, "only a few earthworks were thrown up." Sorrel, *Recollections*, 132, cited in Freeman, *Lee*, II, 441. This condition may have been true on the right (Jackson's wing), as Jackson's troops arrived on the scene several days after the First Corps. A study of available sketches and photographs showing the terrain conditions, as well as of contemporary accounts and official reports, indicates that the trenches and fieldworks in Longstreet's front were quite complete by the time the battle started.

¹¹ Longstreet's orders to R. H. Anderson, Pickett, and Hood, all dated December 11, 1862, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 659-60.

¹² Longstreet to Hood, December 13, 1862, *ibid.*

¹³ Alexander stated that Burnside knew then that his plan had been discovered. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 288.

the town while a second column forced a crossing on temporary bridges and attacked the troops on the slopes beyond Deep Run. The main blow was to be delivered against the sector occupied by Longstreet's corps, while a wide enveloping movement was to be started through the interval between Longstreet and Jackson when the latter became dislodged.

All was finally ready, and on December 11 the movement began. Early in the morning small detachments of Federal troops crossed under the cover of a dense fog to lay a pontoon bridge. These were discovered by General William Barksdale, who commanded the line of pickets at the river; and his fire drove them back. There was no Federal success during the morning. Shortly after noon, however, the Union detachments returned to their task with strong artillery fire covering the operation. Under this shelling, Barksdale was forced to retire, all the while fighting desperately to hold back the ever-increasing numbers of Union soldiers who were swarming around his flanks. He made good his escape and withdrew to the main line of resistance. No obstacle was now present to the laying of the other bridges, and Sumner's grand division passed over to the west side of the river and occupied the town.

Below the city and opposite Deep Run, Franklin laid two bridges without serious opposition; and before night his grand division was massed in front of Jackson's corps. Because of the shelter afforded by the shelving banks, Jackson could not determine the strength of Franklin's forces and therefore assumed that it was greater than it was. In fact, he believed that the main attack would be made against him.¹⁴

All that afternoon and during the bitterly cold night that followed, the Union columns crossed the river under the cover of the fog and the protection of Sumner's bridgehead. Before daylight on December 12, the town was occupied throughout. No break came in the heavy fog which clung to the ground; and, as the lines could not be formed, no attack was attempted that day. The gray blanket covered the massed brigades so well that no targets were visible, and the Confederate artillery was therefore silent. By nightfall the Federal troops on the west side consisted of the II Corps in Fredericksburg and, in sequence downstream to the left, the IX, the VI, and the I Corps. Supporting these troops were 104 guns in Sumner's command and 166 with Franklin. The total Union strength was about 113,000 men, as against Lee's maximum of 78,000.¹⁵

Longstreet made a final inspection of his sector just before daylight on the thirteenth. His line was broken and some three miles in length. Its one weak

¹⁴ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XXI, 570; Freeman, *Lee*, II, 454.

¹⁵ Lee's strength, December 10, 1862, in *Official Records*, XXI, 1057; Union strength (total including Shenandoah Valley and Washington), December 10, 1862, *ibid.*, 1121; Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 96.

point was on the right, where Hood faced open ground without any natural defensive features. In the other sections, there had been ample time to construct fieldworks and rifle trenches. To offset Hood's weakness, part of Pickett's division had been posted on the south side of Telegraph Hill, where its fire could flank any Union force which pressed Hood too closely. The arrangements for a band of defensive fire were worked out carefully and thoroughly.

Early morning on the thirteenth found Fredericksburg still bathed in fog. Somewhere in that gray blanket over one hundred thousand men stood ready to assault, while along Stafford Heights on the opposite bank of the river 147 reserve guns were awaiting the signal to open fire. From the depths of the white stillness came muffled voices which told of the preparations for battle. The Southern lines waited with nerves taut and fingers tightened on triggers. About 10 A.M. the sun broke through the mist and revealed the mighty panorama in the valley below.

On the night of December 12, Franklin's grand division had got into position on the Federal left near Hamilton's Crossing. Facing this threat was Jackson's command, holding the right of Lee's line, with Stuart and his cavalry protecting the flank by extending the Confederate line to the Rappahannock River. Before 9 A.M. on the thirteenth, Franklin's command, led by General G. G. Meade's division, began moving forward; but it was so interfered with by enfilade artillery fire from Stuart's line that it was noon before an organized advance was begun. Jackson's line poured volley after volley into the advancing Federals, but still they came. After severe fighting, Meade was able to get a foothold within Jackson's line, but a vigorous counterattack drove the Federals back. Soon, harassed by fire in front and on the flank, Franklin's grand division retired to more sheltered positions. By midafternoon the fight on the Confederate right was over; the battle on the left had hardly begun.

Longstreet the soldier became Longstreet the poet as he spoke of Franklin's brave forty thousand—supported by some of Hooker's men—arrayed in force against Jackson's thirty thousand. He wrote, "The flags of the Federals fluttered gayly, the polished arms shone brightly in the sunlight, and the beautiful uniforms of the buoyant troops gave to the scene the air of a holiday occasion rather than the spectacle of a great army about to be thrown into the tumult of battle. From my place on Lee's Hill, I could see every soldier Franklin had, and a splendid array it was."¹⁶

As yet the attack against Longstreet had failed to materialize. About noon, seeing that Jackson was pressed, Longstreet ordered his artillery to fire on fugitive targets as a diversion in favor of Jackson. Longstreet's fire brought on

¹⁶ James Longstreet, "The Battle of Fredericksburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 76.

Sumner's attack against the Confederate left. Marye's Hill, the critical point of Longstreet's center, was held by T. R. R. Cobb and McLaws, with Ransom in close support. The first assault was launched against this part of the line. The Union soldiers swarmed out from Fredericksburg and formed while the artillery played among them. As the line moved forward, it was torn to pieces by the sweeping effect of flanking fire. But on it came! The ranks closed, and a steady step was maintained. It was magnificent, but it was suicide.

As the Federal assault approached Cobb's men, who had previously held their fire, a perfect storm of lead plowed into the Union ranks and turned them into shambles of dead and wounded. The charge was broken, and the survivors ran pell-mell into an old railroad cut which seemed to offer some protection. Again the artillery sought them out. A battery on Lee's Hill saw the line break and brought a devastating fire to bear on the survivors, who had sought vainly for cover. They were annihilated.¹⁷

Sumner's grand division had been broken and shattered on its first advance. Now it tried again. Cobb's men held their fire this time until the advancing wave came within a score or so of yards. Again the Federal attack was shattered. The ground was strewn with mutilated bodies; so thick were they that they interfered with the approach of the third assault. History records no braver effort than that made by Sumner's men on December 13, 1862. Three times they dashed up the slope against a perfect defensive position, where quiet and determined men could shoot them down at will.

Lee became uneasy that a fourth charge might break through; the ammunition was running low. Longstreet bristled: "Look to your right; you are in some danger there, but not on my line."¹⁸ It would seem that the mere suspicion that his men might break was enough to send the blood coursing through James Longstreet's veins. But, notwithstanding a justifiable pride in the fighting qualities of his soldiers, he did send General J. B. Kershaw to the aid of Cobb, who was hard pressed. Although Longstreet has stated that Kershaw was sent not as reinforcement but merely "to carry ammunition," it was indeed fortunate that he arrived when he did; for Cobb fell on the fourth charge, mortally wounded, and Kershaw's men ran down the slope just in time to sustain Cobb's brave men.¹⁹

Six times the Northern soldiers faced that sunken road, and six times they were cast back in confusion. The field was heaped with the bodies of the dead; the nearest was within a hundred feet or so of Cobb's position. The fire of the defenders had killed or wounded almost five thousand; the guns of the First

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*; William Miller Owen, "A Hot Day on Marye's Heights," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 98.

Corps accounted for two thousand Union soldiers stretched on the slopes of Marye's Hill, never to rise again. No wonder Lee turned away from the scene with the sad words "It is well that war is so terrible, else we should grow too fond of it." Night came, and the blessed curtain of darkness shut out the awful sight.²⁰

That night a lost Federal courier was picked up by the Confederate patrols, and in his pouch was found a copy of Burnside's plan of attack for the next day. When this information reached Lee, he issued orders at once that the rifle pits be manned and preparations made to receive the assault, and for two days the Southern troops waited for a renewal of the Union attack. But it never came. The Union army had been decisively whipped. Although Burnside, stubborn and unconvinced, was willing to try again, his generals objected. They would not subject their weary troops to further slaughter.

The plans which Longstreet had outlined in his letter to Hood were never put into force. The hope that Burnside would renew the attack held up any counterattack until it was too late to launch one; for when daylight came on the sixteenth of December, it was discovered that the Union army had withdrawn to the safety of the eastern banks of the Rappahannock. The disappointment of the Confederates was keen. Lee reread the copy of the captured orders; gently laying his hand on Longstreet's shoulder, he remarked that he was losing confidence in Burnside. That the Federal withdrawal had been made without detection does not speak well for the Confederate service of security, even though wild winds and rains had assisted in covering the movement.

James Longstreet had now risen to the fullness of his military ability. His mistakes had been forgotten in the sum of his accomplishments. Stride by stride, he had marched his way to the top of his profession, leaving behind him a trail of steadfast friendships and deeds well done. His name epitomized military capacity and was known to the lowliest man in ranks. A thrill seemed to move along the line when it was known that Old Pete was up with his corps. More than once his hand has fallen heavily on a subordinate, yet always with the measure of justice that inspires loyalty rather than breeds resentment. It seems a far cry from the Longstreet of Fredericksburg to the Longstreet who had engaged with Huger in a stupid bit of wrangling over rank and precedence during the Seven Days' battles. It was a bigger James Longstreet—bigger in every way—who turned to Lee with a smile of satisfaction on his face when the Federal army turned away from Fredericksburg and departed, a thoroughly defeated organization. This new James Longstreet had risen to the

²⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 311; Longstreet, "Battle of Fredericksburg," in Johnson and Bucl (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 81 ff. Freeman gave a full account. Freeman, *Lee*, II, 457-69.

highest place of troop leadership, earning his rank fairly and honestly by his demonstrated worth on the field of battle.

Between Lee and Longstreet a bond of deep affection had developed. Outsiders found that Longstreet was best pleased by praise of Lee; and to bring forth the warm glance of Lee, one had but to praise Longstreet. It has been said that Lee permitted Jackson to operate at a distance because he could trust him—a statement which carries the implication that he kept Longstreet close at hand because he required constant watching. One finds little justification for this view.²¹ A much safer explanation lies in Lee's tactical management of his two-corps army. True, Lee and Longstreet had a great liking for each other, and Lee welcomed the advice that Longstreet was able to give in the prosaic matters of organization and supply. Day by day an intimacy had grown between the two men until they were almost inseparable. They were in frequent, almost daily, conference; they met over the breakfast table at Lee's headquarters or in long rides along the front. The innermost thoughts of the brilliant commander of the Army of Northern Virginia were laid before his friend, who had sufficient love and respect for his chief to be honest with him—sometimes even to the point of tactlessness. Little is known of the real Lee—he seemed always to be dressed to play a part—but much that is known comes from the revealing sequence of letters that passed between him and Longstreet. The real Lee spoke to his friend as he spoke to few others in the armies of the Confederacy. As one turns the pages of the *Official Records* and reads the notes that passed between the two, one finds ever-increasing and convincing evidence of Longstreet's intense loyalty to his chief.

Seemingly undaunted by his terrible defeat, Burnside sought presidential approval for another effort at forcing Lee's defense of the river. At first the War Department refused but later gave reluctant consent. Banks's Ford—about four miles above Fredericksburg—was selected as the point of crossing. Although preparations were made with some secrecy, the Confederate high command knew that something was afoot; and Longstreet guessed correctly that the movement would be directed against Lee's left—that is, against his own front.²² Burnside put his army in motion on January 20, but with so much stir that Lee was able to follow every Union move. As the troops marched out with their three days' cooked rations, the clouded heavens unloosed their

²¹ Lee employed what may be called "cavalry tactics" in using his two-corps army. Longstreet, with the heavier corps and generally with more artillery, made the holding attack, while Jackson's light and fast-marching corps made the enveloping attack. The cavalry was used for screening, reconnaissance, and pursuit. Note the contemplated use of Jackson's corps at Gaines' Mills and his actual employment at the second battle of Manassas and at Chancellorsville.

²² Longstreet to McLaws, January 21, 1863, *id.* to Pickett, January 21, 1863, and *id.* to Hood, January 21, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 671. Longstreet guessed that Falmouth and Port Royal were the probable points of crossing.

pent-up rain and deluged the plodding soldiers. The roads quickly became rivers of mud, and the supply trains and artillery sank to their hubs in the rich Virginia silt. Soon the march was stopped, and the men devoured their rations and rested as best they could under wretched conditions. For several days Burnside could neither go forward nor return to camp. The roads were filled with pontoons, vehicles, and artillery; the men were hungry and utterly out of the notion of fighting. It was useless to go on, so Burnside started the troops back to their respective camps on the twenty-second, while the Confederate pickets yelled words of derision across the raging stream at their floundering adversaries. This mud march, as it has been called, was the last action of the season.

Both sides now went into winter quarters and attempted to repair the ravages of the campaign. Men went on furlough; others went absent without leave; still others deserted—until Lee's army had dwindled to some seventy thousand effectives.²³ Food supplies were low: there were not over a week's rations of meat—estimated at four ounces a day per man—and the cereals were similarly lacking.²⁴ This matter was one of grave concern to Lee. However, with no active operations in immediate prospect, men could be rested, animals could be pastured at not-too-distant points, and energetic efforts could be instituted to bring the railroads into better shape for hauling supplies. Military matters lagged for the moment; even the switch of command from Burnside to Hooker seemed to bring little comment among Lee's staff.

Necessarily, the Confederate army had to widen its defense so as to include all probable crossings both upstream and downstream from Fredericksburg. Longstreet extended his lines northwesterly from Fredericksburg to Port Royal; Lee moved his headquarters to a wooded knoll just back of Hamilton's Crossing; and Jackson spread his observers down the Rappahannock. Things quieted down—except for an annoying amount of long-range shelling from the new rifled cannon of the Federals. Longstreet now busied himself with the problem of making his defensive lines secure.

First he constructed a comprehensive series of trench-connected fieldworks all the way from United States Ford to the end of the road leading from Fredericksburg to Spotsylvania Courthouse. This series of works soon became known as the "line" of the Rappahannock; and the trenches, located so as to control all roads and easy open ground, were built strongly enough to be held by a skeleton force with moderate safety. At least, a surprise attack could be held long enough for the reserves to come up. Longstreet did not fear another

²³ The returns for January, 1863, give a grand total of 72,226 as present for duty in Lee's army. *Official Records*, XXV, Pt. II, 601-602. This number is so large that it seems unlikely that it could have been made up exclusively of real effectives.

²⁴ Lee to Secretary of War J. A. Seddon, January 26, 1863, *ibid.*, 597.

direct attack from Hooker. It was obvious that the Union army could not move directly on Richmond—that had been tried with disastrous consequences. Either General Hooker must move up the Rappahannock and cross by the upper fords to descend on Richmond from the northwest—that is, make a wide turning movement around Lee's left—or he must transfer his army south of the James River and start his operations against Richmond and Petersburg from the southeast. Longstreet laid out his defensive line of works to block the direct move; the flanking movements would have to be met by maneuver. However, he constantly seemed to envision a movement against his left such as Burnside had attempted earlier in the year.

In prosecuting the work of making trenches and firing pits to neutralize the Union superiority of strength, Longstreet's command made one of the great contributions to modern defensive tactics. This was the traversed trench. It is not known definitely to whom credit should go for the original idea. It may have been General E. Porter Alexander, who served Longstreet both as an engineer and as an artillery officer, who thought of the scheme. At all events, the work proceeded under Longstreet's watchful eye, and much of the credit should go to him. The new rifled cannon and improved shells of the Federals gave them a decided advantage in range. The Union batteries could now take position well in rear of their lines, beyond the range of Confederate counter-battery fire, and shell the Confederate lines at will. While the casualties were few, the fire was annoying and bad for morale. It was quite out of the question to send a raiding force against these batteries. Jackson was exasperated. He came over to see what Longstreet had to suggest. With pride, Longstreet escorted Jackson along the lines and pointed out the short rifle trenches that had replaced the long pits; he called attention particularly to the stubby traverses which separated the squad trenches, giving excellent protection against the lateral bursts of the Yankee shells. From this small and somewhat crude beginning grew the highly complicated modern systems of field fortifications in depth. If James Longstreet had contributed nothing else to the science of war, this alone should place him on the list of those whom posterity honors.²⁵

With his lines secure and the Union forces quiescent, Longstreet might well have grown complacent. But the Fates had larger things in store for him. It was not long before he must leave the Rappahannock and the understanding consideration of Lee and launch forth for himself under new conditions, a new environment, and a vastly increased responsibility.

²⁵ Longstreet to Jackson, January 18, 1863, *ibid.*, XXI, 1095-96. The earlier rifle trenches were little more than long, open ditches, with dirt thrown to the front to make a low parapet and with a bank or step cut out of the forward wall on which the men stood to fire. There was no lateral protection. The traversed trench has stubby blocks or walls of earth separating periodic short sections of trench. These earth walls or blocks were thick enough to stop rifle and musket balls as well as shell splinters. They did not stand up under direct hits of artillery.

The Spring of 1863

THE WINTER MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED FREDERICKSBURG MARKED THE PERIOD when, for the first time, General Longstreet exercised independent command. He had been tried and found able as a tactician; he had proved himself a skilled leader of men. He was a good corps commander—the equal of any in either army—and his steady progress in the art and science of war was not unknown to his superiors. The time had now come to test his worth and ability in a larger field.¹

General Hooker had two strategic moves open to him. He could advance on Richmond from the northwest, or he could transfer his army to the lower James and advance on Richmond from the southeast. Either was possible when the roads were dry enough to support an army. Hooker's first move was handicapped by Lee's defensive line of the Rappahannock. The move via the James, however, was not only possible but also greatly feared by Richmond in view of the weakened defenses in that area. Furthermore, if the Union advance were toward Petersburg, the railroads—which were now the life lines connecting the meat- and cereal-producing areas of the lower South with Lee's hungry army—would be in danger. Trouble loomed in the Southeast, and the problem grew in the minds of the Confederate War Department from the moment that Burnside was halted at Fredericksburg.

Late in January, 1863, the War Department sought a means of increasing the defensive forces in North Carolina and southeastern Virginia. The subject was one of increasing correspondence between Lee and Secretary of War James A. Seddon. If the vital railroads leading from the supply areas were to be given adequate protection, it was imperative that the area between Petersburg, the Blackwater River, and Wilmington, North Carolina, be occupied and that the outer defenses of Petersburg be put in the best possible state of defense to cover Richmond from the south. Lee was now satisfied that no offensive movement in force would be attempted by Hooker because of the condition of the roads and that this immobility of the enemy might last all winter. He could be guided by the conditions of the ground and anticipate a hostile ad-

¹ The activities of Longstreet during this period have been so misunderstood, and misconceptions have formed the basis for so much adverse criticism of him, that a more detailed citation of the *Official Records* is necessary. The indulgence of the casual reader is solicited for the benefit of those who are seeking the truth about this Southern fighter.

vance in ample time to assemble any of his forces which might be scattered. Lee turned his attention to the southern part of his territorial command and wondered about the Union reinforcements said to be moving toward the Carolinas. He was not convinced that Wilmington, rapidly becoming important as an entry port for blockade runners, was the objective, nor was he inclined to believe that any drive on Richmond was in prospect. He conjectured that any transfer of Federal troops to North Carolina might be a shrewd attempt on the part of Hooker to cause the Confederates to do likewise and thus make it possible for the Federals to drive through the weakened Southern lines and capture Richmond.² Two weeks had passed, and Secretary Seddon was not sure. He thought the movement much more serious than Lee was inclined to believe. He cautioned Lee to remember that the line of Wilmington should be considered as really a line for the defense of the capital.³

The situation south of the James was a logical result of McClellan's occupation of the mouths of the York and the James. When the bulk of McClellan's forces were withdrawn during the summer of 1862, the Confederate government had too many emergency missions elsewhere to spare men to challenge the Union occupancy of Yorktown, Gloucester Point, Suffolk, and Norfolk.

It is apparent that alarm over the situation in January, 1863, must have been very real to President Davis, for he called on Lee for men. Lee, however, had none to spare; his veterans had enough to do to hold the overwhelming forces on the Rappahannock. But Richmond must be protected, and the troops must be fed.

Lee had already written often about the shortage of food. He had pointed out, also, that there was no possible source of supply in the areas surrounding his army.⁴ True, there was some wheat in the counties of the upper Rappahannock, but there was no transportation to move it.⁵ The supply of Lee's army was possible only by way of the railroads leading down into North Carolina.⁶ In addition to these alarming notices which President Davis received from his field commander, the month of January witnessed Governor Zebulon Vance's demand for additional forces for North Carolina, Beauregard's anxiety for

² Lee to Davis, January 13, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXI, 1091-92. See also *id.* to Seddon, February 4, 1863, *ibid.*, XIV, 762-63.

³ Seddon to Lee, February 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 763-64.

⁴ Lee to Seddon, January 12, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 669. See also Lee to Seddon, January 26, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 598.

⁵ See J. R. Crenshaw to L. B. Northrop (commissary general of the Confederate army), January 12, 1863, *ibid.*, XXI, 1088-89.

⁶ Lee's army was successively supplied from (1) the vicinity of the Rappahannock, (2) western Virginia and the upper Shenandoah Valley, (3) southwestern Virginia, and (4), at this writing, south central North Carolina and Georgia. In addition, blockade-runners landed their cargoes at Wilmington, North Carolina, and other ports, and these were shipped over the railroads to Richmond via Petersburg. It will be seen, then, that the rail lines south from Petersburg were important to Lee and also to Richmond.

the coast of both the Carolinas, Bragg's uncertainty in Middle Tennessee, and General John C. Pemberton's feverishness in planning to hold Vicksburg. It is surprising that the decisions which were made were as sound as they were. Vance insisted that Lee come down and bolster up the waning courage of the North Carolinians.⁷ A month passed with increasing tension, until Beauregard was certain that Wilmington and Charleston would be in the hands of the enemy in a few days.⁸ It was all very confusing to official Richmond.

Meanwhile, Lee pondered these matters and came to the decision that he ought at least to send part of his force to the Southeast.⁹ His plan to send troops toward Richmond was held in abeyance when Burnside started his mud march of January, 1863; troop transfers were suspended for the time being.¹⁰ Once the Union threat was ended, however, Lee again took up the matter of sending some troops toward Richmond and southward, as President Davis had desired—but not in any large force.¹¹ This would ease the President's apprehension as to the capital, and the troops would be better able to move into North Carolina in case of urgent necessity. Part of Longstreet's corps was designated, and Longstreet was to go in person, should the conditions justify transfer of the major part of the First Corps. Meanwhile, the War Department had assigned D. H. Hill to the command of the troops in North Carolina.¹²

The Army of Northern Virginia had already widened its defenses so as to cover a large part of the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. Now it was to be weakened still further so that troops of the First Corps could set forth on a variety of missions southeast of Richmond. President Davis had rather definitely set up the primary mission of protecting the southern and southeastern approaches to Richmond and allaying apprehension in North Carolina. A necessary adjunct of this mission was the task of putting the defensive works around Petersburg in the best of shape. Little or no work had been done on these trenches because of the shortage of labor.¹³

Hardly had this first, or Davis-assigned, mission been made known to Lee when Secretary of War Seddon introduced a second mission of driving back the Union forces in southeastern Virginia and central North Carolina so that

⁷ Davis to Lee, January 12, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXI, 1088. See also *id.* to Vance, January 12, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 670.

⁸ See Beauregard to Seddon, January 2, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 813.

⁹ See Lee to Davis, January 13, 1863, *ibid.*, XXI, 1091-92.

¹⁰ *Id.* to *id.*, January 19, 1863, *ibid.*, 1096; *id.* to *id.*, January 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 1103; Davis to Lee, January 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1108.

¹¹ Lee to Davis, January 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 1091-92; Davis to Lee, January 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1108; Lee to Davis, January 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 1111.

¹² Special Orders No. 32, February 7, 1863, assigned D. H. Hill "to the command of the troops in North Carolina." *Ibid.*, XVIII, 872.

¹³ For evidence of the labor shortage, which continued to be acute, see J. F. Gilmer to Lee, March 9, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 682; and Davis to Letcher, March 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 683.

the food stocks and forage available there could be secured and transported to Richmond to supply Lee's army. Because no large forces had been quartered in that vast seaboard area, it was a plentiful source of supplies, but these stocks were largely within the enemy's sphere of operations. Lee soon learned that the Secretary wanted greater effort made to get supplies from that quarter and that there would be no better employment for the forces in North Carolina than to aid and protect foraging operations.¹⁴ The railroads, too, needed the encouragement of better protection against raids, which, because of their bad state of repair and inadequate equipment, contributed to the shortage of food by delaying transit and delivery.¹⁵ Thus, before Longstreet's primary, Davis-assigned mission could be accomplished, it became secondary to that set up by the Secretary of War, the conducting of large-scale foraging operations. This second mission was to become primary. Longstreet's third mission, that from Lee, called for the disposition of his forces so that they would be usable by Lee in connection with the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia. Later Secretary Seddon was to introduce still a fourth mission—that of capturing Suffolk. While the Davis-assigned mission of protecting Richmond could be combined easily with the Seddon-prescribed foraging mission, these two were in opposition to the assignment of conforming to the operations of Lee's army. It will be seen that the three controls over Longstreet were confusing to him and caused considerable waste of effort. The many conflicting orders which he received are evidence that Davis, Seddon, and Lee did not exchange full information concerning their respective advices to Longstreet. It may be added that this sort of thing was normal throughout the entire war and contributed—possibly in a large measure—to the ineffective employment of detached large bodies of the Confederate armies.

After McClellan's retirement to Harrison's Landing in July, 1862, and his subsequent removal to Acquia Creek, one division of Keyes's IV Corps had been sent down the Peninsula to Williamsburg and Yorktown; the other, under General J. J. Peck, was located in the neighborhood of Norfolk with detachments in and about Suffolk, which was important because it was in the midst of, and controlled, a large and fertile agricultural country. Situated at the head of the Nansemond River and across the Weldon Railroad running north to Petersburg, it was the key to the approaches to the lower reaches of the James River north of the Dismal Swamp.

In late September, 1862, a Federal force of nearly ten thousand men under Peck had moved into Suffolk and begun to fortify it. Late in December, after

¹⁴ Seddon to French, February 20, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 681.

¹⁵ Wadley to Seddon, February 10, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 874; Seddon to Lee, February 10, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 609; Lee to Seddon, February 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 612.

his defeat at Fredericksburg, Burnside had proposed to move his army around Lee's flank and join Peck at Suffolk, so as to approach Richmond from the southeast; but President Lincoln had refused to approve the transfer.

By the beginning of 1863 there were nearly twenty thousand Federal troops scattered through northern North Carolina in position to move toward Wilmington or toward Suffolk. The Federal navy kept up connection between the various land forces, protected them in case of need, and participated in reconnaissances and small raiding expeditions. The scattered Confederate forces in this area, numbering about sixteen thousand men, were stationed there either to repel attacks on Wilmington or to move against Suffolk. In January, 1863, the Federal government decided to reinforce General David H. Hunter at Beaufort, South Carolina, with troops from General J. G. Foster's North Carolina command. Quarrels and lack of co-operation between Hunter and Foster encouraged D. H. Hill, who was in command of the Confederate troops in North Carolina, to demonstrate against Foster.

The menacing stations and activities of Federal troops in North Carolina and the Suffolk area and the need for supplies prompted Lee to plan a twofold operation for part of his army—sending some of the First Corps south to allay the President's fears for the safety of Richmond, as mentioned above, and using his cavalry to clear the Shenandoah Valley of the enemy and thus safeguard his own left flank.¹⁶ The added task of gathering food and forage, as outlined by Seddon, could be well performed by the troops already selected to go toward Richmond. Lee thus planned to combine the protection of the railroads and the approaches to Richmond with the exploitation of the sources of supply in southeastern Virginia and North Carolina. He advised Seddon on February 14 that Pickett's division would leave for Richmond on the sixteenth, and that if additional forces were needed, Hood could follow Pickett. Thus, the first of Longstreet's units was detached from the Rappahannock and headed away for the first time from the army in which the men had become veterans. Pickett was instructed to march leisurely toward the Chickahominy and, on arrival there, to select good rest camps. Hood was ordered to assemble his division at Hanover Junction and await further orders.¹⁷

No doubt Lee hated to see these divisions go. He had wanted badly to make a quick thrust at the Federals—to do something productive—but the souplike roads had prevented any offensive movement; this was, as he wrote the Presi-

¹⁶ Lee to Stuart, February 13, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 621. See also *id.* to Davis, January 13, 1863, *ibid.*, XXI, 109, in which Lee first broached his plan.

¹⁷ *Id.* to Seddon, February 14, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 623; Seddon to Lee, February 15, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 877. This appears to have been the first call on Lee for an "adequate force." See also Lee to Longstreet, February 18, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 632. But see Seddon to Lee, February 3, 1863, *ibid.*, XIV, 759; Lee to Seddon, February 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 762; and Lee to Seddon, February 15, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 624. See also *id.* to Longstreet, February 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 624-25.

dent, "the most lamentable part of the present condition of things."¹⁸

On February 18, Longstreet received orders from Lee to take charge of these movements toward Richmond.¹⁹ In these orders there was little that was specific except a repetition of the instructions given to Pickett and Hood. Longstreet was advised that Seddon had been informed that this detachment had been put under the direct control of the War Department as a means of saving time in carrying out instructions.²⁰ The Secretary of War had already informed Lee that Pickett would be moved at once to the south side of the James, as he was certain that it would be in that area that the next serious battles would be fought. The hostile movements appeared far too extensive and serious to be a mere feint. Lee concurred in this view and ordered Hood nearer to Richmond. At the same time, he informed the War Department that he was detaching Longstreet for duty south of the James, where he could assume command and direct the operations designed to protect Richmond and the railroads south of there. The remainder of Longstreet's corps was to be held ready to move, if needed, just as soon as weather conditions permitted.²¹

Longstreet's status, as yet, was hardly that of an independent commander. Lee, in his letter of instructions, had advised Longstreet to report directly to Seddon, as the Secretary of War. But Lee still had command over Longstreet, if under no other authority than that Longstreet's area of operations was within Lee's territorial command; and there is nothing to show that Lee did not, at this time, consider the First Corps as an organic part of his army and subject to his orders. In other respects, however, when Longstreet went south with most of his corps, he was an independent commander, reporting directly to the War Department.²² Lee wrote Davis on February 26 that he considered the line south of Richmond to be safe now that Longstreet had gone there with two of his veteran divisions.²³

Longstreet's divisions moved leisurely toward the James. Pickett reached the Chickahominy on February 17 but was given little chance to rest; instead he was hurried across the James to cover the neighborhood of Drewry's and Chaffin's bluffs. He was ordered to keep closed up and ready to move into Petersburg to defend that place. Four days later he was ordered to report for further instructions to "Lieut. Gen. J. Longstreet, commanding Department

¹⁸ *Id.* to Davis, February 16, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 627.

¹⁹ *Id.* to Longstreet, February 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 632.

²⁰ *Id.* to Seddon, February 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 627.

²¹ *Id.* to *id.*, February 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 630-31; *id.* to Davis, February 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 631-32.

²² *Id.* to Longstreet, February 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 624-25; abstract returns, Army of Northern Virginia, February and March, 1863, *ibid.*, 650, 696; Lee to Longstreet, February 18, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 884. With reference to the extent of Longstreet's command and authority, see Lee to Davis, March 9, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 675; *id.* to Cooper, March 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 672.

²³ *Id.* to Davis, February 26, 1863, *ibid.*, 642-43.

of Virginia and North Carolina."²⁴ Hood moved on the night of February 15, first to Hanover Junction and then on to Petersburg, where he assembled his command about February 23.

Richmond commenced to feel easier now that Longstreet's men were at hand. They had marched through Richmond, where their "general appearance, spirit, and cheerfulness afforded great satisfaction." So wrote Seddon to Lee on February 22, adding: "General Longstreet is here, and under his able guidance of such troops no one entertains a doubt as to the entire safety of the Capital." Seddon did not mention the heavy fall of snow and the bitter weather. John B. Jones, a clerk in Seddon's department who kept a famous diary, did, however, and he said that the troops were pale and haggard. No matter which description was the nearer correct. Longstreet's troops were hard; they were veterans of many a battle; they could be depended upon to stand fast. Richmond *was* safer with these men standing watch.²⁵

Longstreet was not long in turning his thoughts toward offensive operations. Although the defense of Petersburg had originally been included in his primary mission of protecting the approaches to Richmond, he appears to have withdrawn his attention from that phase of his operations somewhat abruptly; for just two days after he assumed command he wrote D. H. Hill urging a joint movement of his forces and Hill's in an effort to reduce New Berne, which was occupied by the Federals. In his suggestions to Hill covering joint operations, he added that the confiscation of supplies from the areas nearest the Union troops would be a necessary adjunct to the maneuvers. As Longstreet did not know where these food stocks were stored, he wrote to the War Department for information of them. He estimated that additional cavalry would be needed to scour the country quickly and that unless prompt action was taken vast quantities of supplies would be removed or destroyed.²⁶

Hill must have been thinking along the same lines, as a letter from him to Longstreet making the same suggestion crossed that of Longstreet to him.

²⁴ Cooper to Pickett, February 18, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 884. Special Orders No. 44, February 21, 1863, directed Pickett to report to Lieutenant General James Longstreet, who was in command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. *Ibid.*, 889. Longstreet's complete departmental staff is announced by name and assignment, February 26, 1863, *ibid.*, 896. The sending of Longstreet into southeastern Virginia caused G. W. Smith, who had commanded in that area since the previous summer, to resign. Cf. *ibid.*, 742, 748, 872. On February 25, 1863, Longstreet was assigned "to the command of the department recently made vacant by the resignation of General G. W. Smith." He assumed command on February 26, 1863. *Ibid.*, 895-96.

²⁵ Lee to Seddon (saying that Hood has been "directed . . . to move to Hanover"), February 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 880. Seddon to Lee (saying that Hood and Pickett have "passed through" Richmond), February 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 890; Longstreet to D. H. Hill (advising that Hood is at Petersburg), February 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 898. See also Longstreet to Lee, March 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 893; and Jones, *Rebel War Clerk's Diary* (February 18, 1863, entry), I, 261.

²⁶ Longstreet to D. H. Hill, February 28, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 898; *id.* to Cooper, February 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 900. These letters make it clear that Longstreet had joined the Davis-



Photograph by Peter A. Juley & Son

GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET, C.S.A.

This portrait was painted by Howard Chandler Christy in 1940 and is used here by permission of Mrs. Howard Chandler Christy.

Longstreet was delighted. It looked as if some action could be developed. He quickly went into details of battle tactics and methods for realizing his plans. In spite of a bad throat, which incapacitated him for several days, Longstreet remained gripped by a desire for action. He felt that if there was a chance of doing anything he should not be idle. Longstreet liked Hill and was quick to compliment him and to ask for his views. As "all of your ideas are good," he wrote in his letter of March 1, "you need not hesitate about expressing them."²⁷ He advised Beauregard to be quick to take advantage of the reported quarrel between the Union generals Hunter and Foster: "When generals differ their troops will not fight; that is, they will not fight a severe battle."²⁸

While Longstreet was organizing his operations south of the James, Lee, left with a weakened army stretched out along the Rappahannock, tried to rationalize the whole eastern theater and come to some reasonable conclusion as to what the renewed enemy activity in North Carolina meant. It could not mean an offensive against him—the weather and road conditions were surety against that. Lee was in doubt as to the real Federal program. From the first he had discounted any strong move from the sea into southeastern Virginia. He was almost convinced that the objective was Wilmington. On March 3, he was convinced that his former conclusions were wrong and that the enemy had deceived him. All of this activity in North Carolina was, in his opinion, but a feint to cover the transfer of large forces to the West.²⁹ Longstreet's chance for a master stroke against the enemy was gone, Lee wrote, and Longstreet had best now confine himself to foraging and to bringing in provisions from the farms of North Carolina.

Longstreet's mission was to protect Richmond, to gather supplies and to be ready to hasten back to Lee should he be needed. This was quite different from the positive action to which he had become accustomed and which he preferred. Longstreet proposed to D. H. Hill that, jointly, they move on the enemy. In all probability, as the Comte de Paris later wrote, Longstreet was anxious to distinguish himself by some brilliant exploit. If so, what of it? Such is the dream of the soldier and especially one of Longstreet's temperament, suddenly put on his own.³⁰

assigned mission of protecting Richmond with the Seddon-assigned mission of foraging. From this point on the Seddon-assigned mission gradually assumed paramount importance, and the Davis-assigned mission became lost in the other.

²⁷ *Id.* to D. H. Hill, March 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 902-903.

²⁸ *Id.* to Beauregard, March 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 905.

²⁹ Lee to Longstreet, March 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 906-907; Peck's report, May 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 275; J. A. Dix to H. W. Halleck, March 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 558.

³⁰ Longstreet to Cooper, March 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 907. See also Sorrel to D. H. Hill, March 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 908. Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleans, Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, ed. John P. Nicholson (Philadelphia, 1875-88), III, 132.

On March 5, Longstreet went to Goldsborough, North Carolina, to see Hill. While there he received from General Arnold Elzey, who was commanding the Richmond defenses, a letter which read: "Secretary Seddon requests me to write to you and to say that he desires you to have a close reconnaissance made of Suffolk with a view to attacking and carrying it, if you think it advisable and it can be done with advantage. . . ." ³¹ Under the existing state of affairs, such a move did not seem prudent to Longstreet. If he were closely engaged before Suffolk, the enemy might steal a march on him, ascend the James as far as the obstructions, and thus be able to operate against his left flank. There was too much danger in it, thought Longstreet, at least until the batteries along the James could be made strong enough to hold back the enemy's transports and war vessels. When the subject came up again, early in April, Longstreet said that with the aid of the navy and a good stroke of luck, there was a chance for the capture of the Union garrison. ³²

As an independent commander, Longstreet had routine headquarters details to care for—something foreign to his earlier experience as a corps commander. Administrative difficulties arose from time to time, and once he forgot to notify the War Department of the strength and location of his command. ³³ Perhaps he could now understand something of Lee's problems—and the bad points, as well as the good, of being independent.

By mid-March Longstreet's wagons were as far south as Tarborough, North Carolina. Evidently he had not lost sight of his primary mission of foraging. But the projected attack on New Berne was still in the planning stage. Longstreet continued to urge that operation on D. H. Hill, advising him in detail as to the tactics that might prove successful. Longstreet wanted to participate; failing that, he assured Hill, he would create a diversion in his favor. But Longstreet could not go to North Carolina. He had business along the Blackwater, and the next few days found him in the little town of Franklin. ³⁴

While Longstreet, in the Southeast, was trying to co-ordinate his many tactical activities and solve the many petty problems that arose, Lee was having his periods of anxiety along the Rappahannock. Things were not as quiet as the accounts would indicate. There was always the chance that Hooker might

³¹ Sorrel to Elzey, March 6, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 910, acknowledging Elzey to Longstreet, March 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 871.

³² Longstreet to Elzey, March 12, 1863, *ibid.*, 918; Elzey to Longstreet, March 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 919. The correspondence between Elzey and Seddon does not appear to be of record. See Longstreet to Cooper, [April 6, 1863?], *ibid.*, 910. (This letter is dated March 6, 1863, in the *Official Records*, but the date is obviously in error, as the subject matter clearly indicates that it belongs later.)

³³ Whiting to Cooper, March 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 913; Cooper to Longstreet, March 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 914.

³⁴ Sorrel to French, March 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 914; Longstreet to D. H. Hill, March 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 920-21.

try some surprise move and put enough men across the river to make things embarrassing for Lee. The Confederate communications between Lee and the capital were weakly held or left unguarded. Scares were frequent. One, early in March, seemed at first to be serious enough to necessitate recalling some of Longstreet's force. Stuart met the enemy, and the danger was over for the moment. Lee telegraphed that no more troops were needed, and Longstreet's men turned back to their foraging.⁸⁵

Hooker's spurts of activity soon painted a clearer picture to Lee. About the middle of March he arrived at the conclusion that the next major Union activity would be on his front. He wrote to Longstreet on March 16 and forecast accurately that Hooker would move against him just as soon as the road conditions would permit. These continuing cavalry raids, Lee surmised, were for the purpose of feeling the Confederate lines and also to note the condition of the roads around Lee's flanks. He wrote: "From present indications it is fair to presume that we shall be called upon to engage him first on the Rappahannock, and I desire you to be prepared for this movement, and make endeavors to keep yourself advised of the dispositions and preparations of the enemy on our front for moving the troops recently detached from the First Corps, or such of them or others as may be necessary in that direction."⁸⁶ The import of this letter is clear. It may be that this communication is the basis for much of the criticism of Longstreet for not being at Lee's side at Chancellorsville. That such adverse criticism is not well founded will be shown by the subsequent instructions given Longstreet both by Lee and by the War Department.

By this letter of March 16, Lee left it pretty much to Longstreet to decide when he should abandon his foraging in North Carolina and southeastern Virginia. It was not a very reasonable request for Lee to make, since Longstreet's missions of protecting Richmond and gathering forage were controlled by the War Department, and it was the responsibility of Richmond to decide when those activities should cease and the troops be returned to Lee. The dual control over Longstreet was confusing if not embarrassing to him. But Longstreet did not raise the issue. In reply to Lee he stated that he would see that Hood's division remained on the railroad ready for a move in any direction and that he would be ready to rejoin Lee at any moment unless there should develop a fine opportunity to strike a decided blow. In such a case, wrote Longstreet, he would "act promptly and trust to your being able to hold the force in front in check until I can join you."⁸⁷ But even this response was beyond

⁸⁵ Lee to Cooper, March 18, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 672. See also *id.* to Davis, March 19, 1863, *ibid.*, 675. This latter communication indicates that Lee still held command over Longstreet's corps, irrespective of Longstreet's position as a department commander.

⁸⁶ *Id.* to Longstreet, March 16, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 921-22.

⁸⁷ Longstreet to Lee, March 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 923-24.

the province of Longstreet to guarantee. The Confederate War Department controlled Longstreet's mission, even though Lee might consider that he could withdraw the troops at will.

On March 17 Longstreet wrote Lee he was about to start for the Blackwater, but he was still in Petersburg the next day when he suggested to Lee that the defensive might be assumed on the line of the Rappahannock, if necessary, so that his full force south of the James could be used offensively to clear the area of the enemy in order to secure the abundant supplies. It was becoming increasingly more important to gather food and forage. Commenting on Lee's proposal to withdraw Hood, Longstreet wrote, ". . . with the force left here by the withdrawal of Hood's division nothing can be done more than to hold our fortified positions and railroads. . . ." Longstreet saw clearly that these extra troops were necessary to push out and secure all the food. He visioned defensive tactics elsewhere—for a month or so—and energetic but minor offensive measures in his sector until the supplies were gathered. However, he was ready to send Hood if he were needed by Lee to meet a situation of heavy battle. He preferred that the railroad be used rather than that the men be tired by forced marching. Meanwhile, he informed Lee, he would go to Richmond, where he could gain better intelligence as to Lee's situation.³⁸

On March 18 Lee called for Longstreet to return both the divisions of Hood and Pickett. The restless stirrings in Hooker's camp and the cavalry activity betokened some surprise move. Immediately on receipt of the message, Longstreet telegraphed D. H. Hill to take over affairs in the department—advising him that Pickett would not be moved for the present—while he prepared to move with Hood. He feared to take Pickett away until something more definite was learned of the hostile concentration which was reported at Newport News. If there was prospect of a real battle on the Rappahannock, Longstreet knew—and frankly told Hill—that he could expect no further aid until the issue had been settled by Lee's army. The enemy might learn that a shift of troops was in progress and choose to take advantage of the weakened condition in the department and push forward from the Blackwater. If so, well and good; Hill must prepare to meet the enemy in Virginia and arrange also to defend Wilmington at all hazard.³⁹

Longstreet was in Richmond on March 19 and wrote at length to Lee about the situation in his department. His letter betrays some evidence that he had been hurt by an unjust accusation. "I know it is the habit," he wrote, "with individuals in all armies to represent their own positions as the most important ones, and it may be that this feeling is operating with me; but I am not

³⁸ *Id.* to *id.*, March 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 924-25; *ibid.*, 915-17.

³⁹ Longstreet to D. H. Hill, March 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 925. It was Peck's reinforcement by Getty that alarmed Longstreet. See Longstreet to Lee, March 18, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 924.

prompted by any desire to do, or attempt to do great things." He went on to point out that the enemy had some forty thousand men in the department and that if Lee insisted that most of Longstreet's forces were to be kept in reserve as probable reinforcements for Lee's army, he would not dare commit them to any offensive action, since he might become too involved; and, if forced to operate with the reduced strength, he would not care to risk his small numbers. If Pickett and Hood should be withdrawn or restricted in their operations, only a brigade and the Richmond garrison would remain to oppose twenty thousand Federal troops, which could take Petersburg, he thought, without the loss of a man.⁴⁰

These questions were significant. What Longstreet really asked Lee to do was to redefine the main objective of the Confederate forces in southeastern Virginia and North Carolina in accordance with the new situation. Petersburg was vulnerable, even though fortified; and if Petersburg fell, every rail line extending south and east from that place would be in the hands of the enemy. Pressing the point still further, if the railroads were interrupted, what would then become of Longstreet's mission of gathering food and other supplies? Longstreet asked these questions so that he might better understand and perform his duty. He agreed with Lee in the idea of concentrating the Confederate army in order to administer a crushing defeat to the enemy, but the place where they should concentrate was indeterminate. Should they concentrate to attack the hostile main body, asked Longstreet; or should they bring their forces together for the purpose of cleaning up the enemy's detachments first, defeating them in detail while the main hostile force was detained on the Rappahannock by a stubborn defense, and then concentrating against this main force and destroying it? In this same letter, Longstreet advanced his personal view as follows: "It seems to me to be a matter of prime necessity with us to keep the enemy out of North Carolina in order that we may draw out all the supplies there, and if we give him ground at all it would be better to do so from the Rappahannock."⁴¹

Fortunately, Lee did not have to answer Longstreet's questions at the time. The supposed advance of Hooker's army turned out to be a feint—or at most, a raid—and Longstreet heard from Lee, through the War Department, late the same day that the divisions of Hood and Pickett were not needed. They could be returned to their former mission. Subsequently, Lee informed Longstreet that the scare was over. "I need not remind you," Lee went on to caution Longstreet, "that it will be necessary to maintain great vigilance in your front as well as here, and to hold the troops at both points ready to cooperate whenever

⁴⁰ Longstreet to Lee, March 19, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 926–27.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* No specific force to be concentrated was mentioned. This was a general term used in the discussion and probably meant the armed forces of the North operating in the eastern theater.

it is correctly ascertained where the attack of the enemy will fall." Again Lee told Longstreet that he hoped he would turn all energies of his department toward gathering up forage and food in North Carolina. Thus, on March 19 Lee reaffirmed that Longstreet's primary mission was to secure subsistence supplies. Lee further stated most clearly in his letter that Longstreet must also be prepared to operate on interior lines to meet an enemy thrust from either the north or the east. Lee's uncertainty as to the enemy's intentions is significant. He was not completely fooled, but the fog of war was certainly drifting close around his head. Nor can it be said that Longstreet had any clearer understanding of what Hooker would attempt.⁴²

With the hostile cavalry turned back on March 17 and Lee again in comparative security, Longstreet turned his attention to the threat against Wilmington and prepared to send heavy reinforcements to D. H. Hill. He proposed sending Pickett to take charge of field operations so that Hill could remain in Goldsborough and keep his hand on the situation as a whole. The footnote to this letter indicates one of Longstreet's pet charities—that of protecting subordinates from doing themselves injury by indiscreet remarks. Hill had complained about being swindled by the War Department when they sidetracked him in North Carolina. Longstreet wrote: "I presume that this was not intended as an official communication and have not forwarded it." He also advised Hill to rewrite the letter.⁴³

Ten to twelve inches of snow fell on Petersburg on March 20, and the mercury dropped well below zero. Bad weather was just one of Longstreet's troubles. But the business of collecting supplies from farms and villages continued at full speed, with everyone too much occupied to worry about snow and cold weather. Longstreet welcomed the opportunity to restrict somewhat his sphere of operations. He advised Lee that he did not consider that Hood's division was available for this work, since Lee had urged that it be kept in quasi-reserve in case it should be needed on the Rappahannock. In spite of the high banks of snow, Longstreet looked with longing eyes toward the garrisoned town of Suffolk, where he believed that he could, with but slight reinforcement, wage advantageous battle in about two weeks or so.⁴⁴

Lee was somewhat disappointed that Longstreet could not manage to con-

⁴² John Withers to Longstreet (regarding the return of Hood and Pickett), March 19, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 927; Lee to *id.*, March 19, 1863, *ibid.*

⁴³ Stuart advised Lee on March 17: "Enemy is retiring. He is badly hurt. We are after him. His dead men and horses strew the roads." *Ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 685. The trimonthly return of the Department of Virginia for March 31, 1863 (*ibid.*, XVIII, 574), gives the following as the effective strength of Peck's and Getty's divisions and miscellaneous troops at Suffolk: infantry, 17,599; cavalry, 2,255; artillery, 1,254 men and 44 guns; and total, 21,108. See also Longstreet to D. H. Hill, March 20, 1863, *ibid.*, 931. Kemper's brigade was sent to aid Garnett.

⁴⁴ Longstreet to Lee, March 21, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 933.

duct his operations with still fewer troops and keep Picket as well as Hood in reserve. He was still of the opinion—in spite of Longstreet's repeated advices—that Picket and Hood were not needed. He wrote to Longstreet, suggesting that they could be retained in reserve. "I am confident," he continued, "that in all times and in all places you will do all that can be done for the defense of the country. . . . I only wish you . . . not to feel trammelled in your operations other than is required by the general plan of operations when an opportunity offers for you to advance the object of the campaign."⁴⁵

Longstreet turned his attention again to North Carolina, where the Union occupation of some of the posts and the spreading Union patrols were proving embarrassing to D. H. Hill. Longstreet suggested on the twenty-second that a quick move be made to take the port town of Washington, North Carolina, which lay on the left flank of any operations directed against New Berne. In his letter he outlined some general tactical maneuvers that ought to work and promised to contain the garrison at Suffolk and prevent reinforcements from going to the enemy at Washington until Hill had finished his task of cleaning up eastern North Carolina. Knowing that Hill had been unwell, Longstreet included in his message a promise to come down in person to lead the offensive if Hill felt himself not physically equal to the task. He emphasized to Hill that the real object of the campaign should be to drive in all outlying enemy forces and to collect all meat rations that could be found. Whatever was done, he insisted, must be done quickly, as the pressure in the West might cause the dispatch of troops from the eastern theater. Furthermore, important operations could be expected along the Rappahannock about April 10. It behooved Hill, said Longstreet, to decide and act promptly. Two days later, Longstreet modified these suggestions by saying that the capture of Washington was not so important after all.⁴⁶

Food and forage, forage and food. These words were dinned into Longstreet's ears by an endless series of letters and telegrams. Seemingly, everything was subordinated to this particular matter, because it was vital to the South and her military program. To meet this need, Longstreet wanted to extend the field of his operations to include sections of the country still held by the enemy. But with some twenty-seven thousand able enemy troops in Suffolk in addition to those facing Hill in North Carolina, he felt that he would require additional strength in order to drive the enemy from the Blackwater and conduct foraging operations at the same time. As to a move against Suffolk with the idea of its capture, Longstreet felt that it would not be practicable. At all

⁴⁵ Lee to Longstreet, March 21, 1863, *ibid.* Longstreet put Hood in reserve along the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond but used two of Pickett's brigades in the foraging operations.

⁴⁶ Longstreet to Hill, March 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 937.

events, he felt the need of, and suggested, a personal conference with Lee.⁴⁷

Lee replied at length on March 27. It would not be practicable to arrange a conference, he wrote, but he considered Longstreet's proposition to push back the enemy so as to uncover supplies to be the proper move to make. He cautioned Longstreet to move discreetly when invading the enemy district but to be sure to draw off all available provisions and forage to be found. He took up the matter of the attack on Suffolk which Longstreet had mentioned. Such an operation could be managed successfully by Longstreet, Lee stated, but he would not decide as to whether it should be undertaken. Longstreet was on the ground, and Longstreet must be the judge as to its practicability. Lee wrote as if he thoroughly understood Longstreet's position and problems. In this letter Lee took up the other matter which Longstreet had suggested: that of holding on the Rappahannock with a light force while a concerted effort was made in the Southeast to clear away all opposition. Lee's expression of his willingness to do this, if it were really necessary, is a definite acknowledgement of the importance of Longstreet's operations at this particular time. Lee wrote: "You have about 40,000 effective men; the enemy can bring out no more. I feel assured that with equal numbers you can go where you choose. . . . A sudden, vigorous attack on Suffolk would doubtless give you that place. . . . If operations in that quarter should draw re-enforcements from General Hooker, more troops could be spared from this army; but I hope you now have available troops in North Carolina sufficient for the purpose. . . ." ⁴⁸

Crossing this important letter, dated March 27, from Lee to Longstreet was one from Longstreet to Lee of the same date, intimating strongly that Longstreet had made his decision to move against Suffolk. He asked Lee to assist in obtaining naval co-operation during the forward movement and informed him that he planned to extend his present line laterally from near Mayfield on the Blackwater River, to a point on the James about equally distant from Suffolk. This lateral extension would protect his left and, at the same time, give timely notice of—or block—any attempt on the part of the enemy to steal up the south bank of the James and threaten Petersburg.⁴⁹

The enemy was active. On March 28, he reached for Longstreet's right rear by moving up the Roanoke River with the apparent object of taking Hamilton. D. H. Hill saw the danger to Longstreet's operations and directed that Hamilton be held. While Longstreet kept an anxious eye on these movements, Lee was puzzling the meaning of the report that Burnside had moved to the West with the entire Union IX Corps. He asked what Longstreet thought about it. The troops had left Newport News—Longstreet knew that much—but he

⁴⁷ Longstreet to Hill, March 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 943; *id.* to Lee, March 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 942.

⁴⁸ Lee to Longstreet, March 27, 1863, *ibid.*, 943.

⁴⁹ Longstreet to Lee, March 27, 1863, *ibid.*, 944.

supposed that they had gone to North Carolina. Writing later, he advised Lee that the strength of Burnside's command was reported as twelve thousand. Lee's knowledge of the movement was the more correct, and he so told Longstreet after the reports had been verified sufficiently.⁵⁰

It must not be supposed that Longstreet moved against Suffolk with the intention of capturing it. His main objective was to drive in the scattered detachments of the enemy which were controlling the sections of the country from which a large supply of food could be drawn off. He knew that he should not attempt to occupy the place unless he could have a much greater force than the enemy.⁵¹

He was convinced, as he wrote to Lee, that there would be considerable profit in building up a larger force south of the James and thus making possible the extension of the sphere of foraging operations; and, despite Lee's fears, he could see no chance for the enemy to move against Lee for some time to come because of the road conditions. His view was that it would be better for his soldiers to be employed gainfully in the foraging operations south of the James than for them to be inactive in wet camps along the Rappahannock. He proposed reinforcing the troops stationed along the Blackwater so as to defeat the enemy decisively there and then, before Hooker could put his army across the river, to transfer them to the line of the Rappahannock in condition to battle on favorable terms. This plan was sound and workable, provided the railroads could be depended upon to run smoothly. Since the element of transportation was the important item in the plan, and it was, to say the least, decidedly uncertain, the plan involved too much risk for the probable gain. If the two wings of the Confederate army could not be reassembled quickly, Hooker could defeat one wing before the other could arrive on the scene.⁵²

Problems of administration as well as of tactics constantly engaged Longstreet. Not all of these could be shunted off on the shoulders of a willing staff. The geographical setting and limits of his department were such as to increase the difficulty of managing all sections from one headquarters. Actually, Longstreet was in charge of three distinct areas of activity: that north of the James which headed up into the defenses of Richmond; that south of the James between the Blackwater, the boundary of North Carolina, and Petersburg; and that of the state of North Carolina. The focal center of this last area was at Goldsborough rather than at Wilmington. After discussion with the Secretary of War, it was arranged that while Longstreet commanded the whole, Generals Elzey, Samuel G. French, and D. H. Hill would have quasi-independent

⁵⁰ Lee to Longstreet, March 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 946. See also *id.* to *id.*, March 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 949; and Longstreet to Lee, March 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 950.

⁵¹ Longstreet to Lee, March 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 950. The writer believes that this letter is a reply to Lee's letter to Longstreet, March 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 949.

⁵² Longstreet to Lee, March 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 950.

status, in so far as local administrative matters were concerned, for the areas in the order named.⁵³

Longstreet's reiterated desire for a force large enough to sweep southeastern Virginia and North Carolina received only partial support from Lee. Lee could see no reason for giving Longstreet an increase, since the departure of Burnside with his corps had had the effect of providing Longstreet with more troops. In respect to fighting ratio, Lee was right; but Longstreet still had the geographic element to consider, irrespective of the size of the garrison in Suffolk or the nearby cities. Lee thought that Longstreet was now in a position to make any move he might wish. He recognized that if the enemy insisted on remaining in his fieldworks, the only profitable action which Longstreet could take would be to draw provisions from the invaded district. Instead of asking for more troops, Longstreet was warned, he must employ his force advantageously where it was, or his divisions would be recalled to the Rappahannock. If Hooker did not move soon, Lee proposed to seize the initiative and drive him into some kind of action.⁵⁴

Reports as to the size of the Union garrison in Suffolk varied from some eighteen thousand to as high as fifty thousand. Longstreet was not duped by these exaggerations. He had an efficient espionage system and was quick to write Hill that he thought there could not be more than sixteen thousand. But even if this estimate of the enemy's numbers was correct, it constituted a force too large for Longstreet to attack. He could not assemble an equal force without abandoning part of his foraging operations. Also, it may be added, Longstreet was not unmindful of the fact that troops on the defensive behind good fieldworks can hold out successfully against more than twice their number. In Longstreet's department, his cavalry were outnumbered two to one, a fact which gave him constant concern as to the security of his right flank and even caused him to pull back from D. H. Hill some needed troops so that the line near Franklin could be stiffened.⁵⁵

In summarizing Longstreet's conclusions as to an attack on Suffolk, it is to be noted that he was satisfied that he could take the place but that doing so would involve a loss of some five thousand men. If he were strongly reinforced, he could drive against the city and take it with greater ease and smaller losses. It is also interesting to note Longstreet's conclusions as to the effect that could be expected, were Lee to weaken his line still further. Lee had demurred about sending any more troops from the Rappahannock on the grounds that he

⁵³ General Orders No. 34, April 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 953. This order also states that Lee is in command of the whole area.

⁵⁴ Lee to Longstreet, April 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 954.

⁵⁵ Longstreet to Hill, April 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 957. Longstreet's chief mission was that of gathering food and forage. In connection with the statement in the text, the reader is reminded that Hood was still held in quasi-reserve.

would then be obliged to give up that line and move back to the North Anna and South Anna rivers. Longstreet's logic and cold analysis of the problem made it impossible for him to accept this argument as valid. If that were the sole reason why Lee did not want to increase the forces in southeastern Virginia at the expense of the Rappahannock, the objections were not insurmountable. Longstreet was, perhaps, too blunt in pointing this out. He replied to Lee: "I cannot now appreciate the necessity of your retiring to the Annas in case you send off more troops from the Rappahannock. There you are fortified on the river and on the heights; on the Annas you would have neither." In some ways, Longstreet was an obstinate sort of fellow. Although he was close to Lee and, without doubt, encouraged in offering advice, it seems that he pushed the matter of taking further troops from Lee a bit too far.⁵⁶

Longstreet did not need much in the way of reinforcements to scour the entire countryside for supplies. He did need strong reinforcement in the event that he still planned to take Suffolk. From the long series of letters in which he asked for additional troops, it seems reasonable to assume that he did have some idea of taking both the city and the garrison. He knew that even though Suffolk was strongly fortified, it would take the enemy at least three days to bring in any aid to the garrison. On his part, Longstreet calculated that the movement of troops between his front and the Rappahannock would take only two days—thus permitting the free exploitation of interior lines. This two-day estimate was certainly optimistic in view of the condition and performance of the railroads; it must have been dictated by Longstreet's hopes rather than by his intellect. He could not attack safely with his available force, and it was becoming abundantly clear to him that Lee was not planning to send him any more men. Longstreet was brought face to face with the question, Is the attack worth the risk involved? He thought not. Once the decision was clear in his own mind, his movements for the future were indicated. He would cross the Blackwater and make strong demonstrations against the Union works, and he would send all other available troops far and wide in pursuit of his main objective—foraging. Longstreet announced this plan of operation to Lee in a letter dated April 3. He outlined what he considered to be the maximum that he could do, but he added that if more could be done without great sacrifice he would do it.⁵⁷

This sequence of letters between Lee and Longstreet is illuminative of certain characteristics of both men. The casual student might say that Lee lacked firmness and that Longstreet was too insistent. No doubt Longstreet wanted a victory to his credit. He had received hint after hint that the capture of

⁵⁶ Assuming, of course, that Longstreet intended to capture the place and occupy it. See Lee to Longstreet, March 27, 1863, *ibid.*, 943; and Longstreet to Lee, April 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 958–59.

⁵⁷ Longstreet to Lee, April 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 958–59.

Suffolk would make everyone happy except the Union forces in Suffolk. But with these hints came words of caution—brakes applied to Longstreet's enthusiasm. If his superiors wanted him to capture Suffolk, Longstreet reasoned, why did they not say so and why did they not give him the necessary force to do so? One may assume that some such reasoning lay back of his repeated requests for men. Some have intimated that Longstreet wanted a large command so as to achieve a larger sense of importance. It is difficult to find proof for that picture of Longstreet in his letters. It seems much more reasonable simply to attribute his reiterated requests for reinforcements to his specific desire to take Suffolk.

On the other hand, Lee wanted Longstreet to take Suffolk but failed to make it one of his objectives. Later Lee saw the futility of attacking Suffolk at all, since even if the Confederates were to take the city, they would have no forces to leave there as a garrison. Once it was evacuated, it could be reoccupied at will. Had Lee told Longstreet plainly and definitely that the capture of Suffolk was not one of his missions, the situation would have cleared at once for Longstreet. But Lee's argument about the results to be expected if he sent more men from the Rappahannock was not sound. Longstreet could see that and was not hesitant in saying so.

Operations Around Suffolk

THE MONTH OF APRIL, 1863, BROUGHT TO THE CONFEDERACY NO PROSPECT OF relief from the encroaching troubles. The situation in the West was not encouraging, for Joseph E. Johnston found difficulty in attempting to co-ordinate the efforts of the two widely separated armies of Braxton Bragg in Middle Tennessee and John C. Pemberton at Vicksburg. The threat against Charleston was ever present, and the Army of the Potomac loomed large on the northern horizon. Longstreet was still held at Suffolk. People were hungry and apathetic. Troops were hungry, too, and many of them left for their homes—with or without leave. Truly, these were dark days for the South.¹

Longstreet, through some influence of which we cannot be certain, turned his thoughts toward the western theater—even though he was pretty well occupied by his immediate problems. In his letter to Lee on April 4, Longstreet discussed a new factor in the military problem of the eastern theater. "There seems but little doubt," he wrote, "but the enemy is inclined to make his great effort in the West, but we may break him up in the East and then re-enforce in the West in time to crush him there."²

Longstreet saw himself as leader of a substantial reserve to be thrown into the scale in the East or the West at a crucial time, and, in the meantime, as a department commander, leading the minor, but essential, foraging activities in the Suffolk area. He saw, also, the potential value of operations on interior lines between the two major sections of the Confederacy—the East and the West. In the letter to Lee he advanced the idea of having Bragg avoid battle in Tennessee until affairs in the East were so arranged that it would be practicable and safe to send troops to aid him. As to Longstreet's own operations, he estimated that it would take another four weeks to scour the area thoroughly. The letter does not indicate whether Longstreet figured on having any of his own troops sent west. There is some hint of a contrary meaning in Longstreet's question: "Can we afford to consume this time [until about May 1] and reach you before the enemy can move?"³ Lee's reply ignored this question. He did say, however, that he expected Hooker to advance—a hint, one might say, for Longstreet to close his affairs promptly. True, some ten days

¹ Freeman, *Lee*, II, 500 ff., gives a good account of conditions.

² Longstreet to Lee, April 4, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 960.

³ *Ibid.*

later Lee wrote President Davis that Longstreet should complete his operations so as to be back on the Rappahannock by May 1, but there does not appear to be any record that the President conveyed this information to Longstreet.⁴

Longstreet was not alone in his concern for the West. When Bragg relinquished his position at Murfreesboro after the drawn battle of Stone's River with Rosecrans, he had retired some thirty miles south to Tullahoma, which was located on the railroad to Chattanooga, and barred Rosecrans' movement southward. Johnston, in command of the Department of the West, had the task of interpreting the conflicting reports which he received from Pemberton, who was holding Vicksburg in the face of Grant's varied efforts to get at that place, and from Bragg, who was somewhat confused as to Rosecrans' intentions. Periodically, almost, Johnston's concern swung between the possibilities of a drive on Bragg and a concerted attack on Pemberton. In April, 1863, the indications were that Bragg, and not Pemberton, was to be the primary Union objective. In view of this probability, the relative weakness of Bragg's army, coupled with the inadequate and unschooled staffs and the tendency of the subordinate generals to refuse Bragg complete and loyal co-operation, gave President Davis much concern. It looked very much as though Bragg might be overrun and the way opened into Georgia.⁵

Davis had thought to send Longstreet to reinforce Bragg as early as March 28.⁶ Perhaps he discussed the matter with Longstreet. As a result of his deliberations with Secretary of War Seddon, the question was referred to Lee.⁷ But Lee could not be drawn from his habitual reluctance to decide questions of a political or superstrategic nature. He turned the question back to Seddon: "I must, therefore, submit your proposition to the determination of yourself and the President."⁸ Lee admitted that working along interior lines would be the natural method for bringing reinforcement to Johnston's department, but the facts seemed to show that the enemy could operate much the faster. Lee's alternative—and it should be marked as being an indication of what he planned for the distant future—was an offensive into Maryland.⁹

Lee gave up any fleeting idea of having Longstreet capture Suffolk when he wrote Davis on April 16 that Longstreet should confine his operations to the obtaining of all the subsistence possible prior to May 1, as on that date Lee would like to assume the offensive, maneuver Hooker across the Potomac, and

⁴ Lee to Longstreet, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 966-67; *id.* to Davis, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 724.

⁵ See D. B. Sanger, "Some problems facing Joseph E. Johnston," in Avery Craven (ed.), *Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd* (Chicago, 1935), pp. 257-90, for a detailed account of the military problem in the West from January to July, 1863, inclusive.

⁶ Davis' endorsement, on Lee to Cooper, March 28, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXV, Pt. II, 689.

⁷ Seddon to Lee, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 708.

⁸ Lee to Seddon, April 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 713-14.

⁹ *Id.* to *id.*, April 9, 1863, *ibid.*

thus relieve the pressure in the West. These operations, thought Lee, would be most effective in bringing definite relief to the hard-pressed Confederates in Tennessee.¹⁰ And here, one may well say, lay the genesis of the Gettysburg campaign.

This digression from the discussion of events in southeastern Virginia seems justified, as it concerns Longstreet most intimately. It was his command that was considered for the West.¹¹ It may have been as a result of the discussion of this question during April that Longstreet, while in Richmond about a month after the battle of Chancellorsville, again urged the idea of his own transfer to the West.¹²

In the meantime, however, Longstreet continued his operations in the Southeast. When Lee learned of his plan to drive the Federals back into their works at Suffolk and extend the field of foraging operations, he cautioned him to make careful reconnaissances before he advanced too strongly against Suffolk or any other fortified areas. He suggested that Elzey could assist by making a diversion down the Peninsula against Fort Magruder and Yorktown.¹³ Elzey proved more than willing—not only because Lee had asked him to co-operate but also because he had a genuine interest in having Longstreet succeed.¹⁴

Longstreet had not learned to be patient when things failed to work as planned. Because his own advance was slow in getting organized, he fretted at D. H. Hill and wrote him complainingly that they had been idle too long.¹⁵ Doubtless Hill saw the enemy still holding Washington, North Carolina, and the surrounding country just as sorrowfully as Longstreet viewed the Union fieldworks southeast of the Blackwater. The Confederate navy was too leisurely in its part of the plan; the engineers were slow in removing the obstructions from the lower James.¹⁶ All of these vexing delays gave Longstreet a new respect for those who labored under even heavier burdens. There was much to irritate Longstreet—too much advice, for instance, from too many sources.¹⁷ No doubt, he wanted to do big things, even though he had assured Lee that

¹⁰ *Id.* to Davis, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 724.

¹¹ See n. 6 and 7, *supra*.

¹² For Longstreet's plan to go west after Chancellorsville, see Alexander, *Memoirs*, 364-65; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 20; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 327; James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," in *Annals of the War, Written by Leading Participants North and South* (Philadelphia, 1879), 416-17.

¹³ Lee to Longstreet, April 6, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 966-67.

¹⁴ Elzey to Longstreet, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 965-66; Lee to Elzey, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 966.

¹⁵ Longstreet to D. H. Hill, April 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 969.

¹⁶ Seddon to Longstreet, April 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 968. See also Gilmer to Seddon, April 10, 1863, *ibid.*, 1007.

¹⁷ The opinion of the writer is that it was a general practice in the Confederacy to have too many people authorized to give instructions to commanders in the field. In this case, Longstreet received orders from President Davis, Secretary Seddon, Adjutant General Cooper, and General Lee. No doubt there were many conflicts; and the uncertainty created thereby contributed consistently, in a greater or lesser degree, to the ultimate defeat.

that was not his real interest. He pushed his plans, however, and fretted. Just as he was about ready to advance, he received from Lee a word of caution, admonishing him to try to outmaneuver rather than outfight the enemy. "You know how much depends on your divisions . . .," wrote Lee.¹⁸ He wanted them spared too much hazard.

Lee's letter of April 6 put Longstreet in a quandary. Did he dare risk strong demonstrations against the enemy? If any idea of changing his plan entered Longstreet's head, he dismissed it. Meanwhile, Seddon renewed his suggestion that Longstreet take Suffolk, even though he must proceed without naval cooperation.¹⁹

Longstreet ignored this letter. He issued orders for General Micah Jenkins to force a crossing of the Blackwater and establish a bridgehead opposite Franklin. Once over, Jenkins was to be ready to push out against the outer works by April 10. Pickett and Hood would cross the river under cover of this bridgehead some twenty-four hours later. Four days' cooked rations were to be carried by all of the men, and the movements were to be made in concert so that the maximum pressure would be brought to bear before the enemy was aware of what was happening. Longstreet came down from Petersburg on April 9 to give final instructions.²⁰

Things failed to work out as planned. The enemy was too much on the alert, and Jenkins had trouble in forcing his way across the stream. He was delayed at least a day in moving forward. By this time all chance of surprise was lost. Longstreet soon saw that he was facing a strong series of earthworks, well defended by an alert enemy armed with heavy cannon. It was doubtful whether the main works could be forced without great loss. He pushed the converging lines forward as far as the main line of resistance and then commenced to consolidate the position as if to make a siege. Longstreet was now free to exploit the country. If he wanted to take Suffolk, it would require a turning movement combined with siege operations. If he continued the pressure and received some heavy guns, the city might fall. But meanwhile the supplies had been well gathered. The bacon and hams that have made the vicinity of Smithfield famous for generations were hauled toward Richmond and sent to Lee's hungry soldiers. The main mission of gathering food was in a fair way of being accomplished.²¹

When he was preparing to cross the Blackwater, Longstreet reported that he thought he could get all the supplies out in two weeks if he used all his

¹⁸ Lee to Longstreet, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 966.

¹⁹ Seddon to *id.*, April 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 968. See Longstreet to Lee, April 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 970.



²⁰ Longstreet to Jenkins, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 963. See Jenkins to Longstreet, April 6, 1863, *ibid.*

²¹ See Captain Causey's report, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 993. Cf. Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War*, III, 134.

DISMAL
SWAMP

JERICO CANAL

MILITARY MAP
OF
SUFFOLK AND VICINITY •



force. But he had hardly crossed the Blackwater when he received telegraphic orders from Seddon to send reinforcements to North Carolina. This message reached Longstreet in the field some seven miles southeast of Suffolk.²² He replied hurriedly that a brigade would be worth little if Beauregard was in as serious trouble at Charleston as reports indicated; that Beauregard ought first to call on D. H. Hill in North Carolina, for support, and if Hill found himself in difficulties, he could then call on Longstreet.²³ Later in the day, when his own situation was clarified, Longstreet expanded his first message by adding the suggestion that there would be ample time to help Beauregard before the situation got too critical, but that his own operations around Suffolk ought now to be pushed without halt.²⁴

Davis thought otherwise. He disliked—so he said—to intrude on Longstreet's operations at the time, but the situation admitted of no delay. Longstreet was directed to support Beauregard by moving troops toward Charleston, even at the expense of his own operations.²⁵

No wonder Longstreet was perplexed. All of these orders and counterorders, hints and wishes were enough to bother any commander. Longstreet said little about it and made his operations conform. It was Whiting who exploded to D. H. Hill: "I have received so many orders and counter-orders from so many different sources that really I am puzzled how to answer."²⁶ No change was made in Longstreet's mission. He still had his foraging to complete but a brigade less with which to do it. He had little chance to extend his operations against Suffolk, and he faced an energetic enemy which might counterattack. The troops were clamped down hard against the Union works, and Longstreet sent for heavier artillery to compensate for the reduction in men. He faced many perplexing problems: big cannon that burst,²⁷ the sad deficiency in cavalry,²⁸ the many strings that seemed tied to his movements. Nevertheless, he was able to co-ordinate the various activities to a surprising degree and even managed to preserve some semblance of humor. He sent word to Hill that he had plenty of Yankees to trouble him in the vicinity of Suffolk—to keep his Yankees to himself.²⁹

There was too much dispersion in the department. Longstreet saw this and tried to concentrate,³⁰ but with little success. Slowly he enveloped Suffolk—

²² Longstreet to Seddon, April 10, 1863, *ibid.*, 977; Seddon to Longstreet, April 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 979.

²³ Longstreet to Seddon, April 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 979.

²⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, April 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 981.

²⁵ Seddon to Longstreet, April 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 983. See [P.] G. T. Beauregard, "The Defense of Charleston," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 10 ff.

²⁶ Whiting to D. H. Hill, April 14, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 987.

²⁷ Longstreet to French, April 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 989; *id.* to Hill, April 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 991.

²⁸ *Id.* to Hill, April 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 989-90.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.*; *id.* to *id.*, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 991; Pettigrew to *id.*, April 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 990.

pushing well down from the Blackwater—until the road from Suffolk to Norfolk, as well as the roads to Petersburg, were in his hands³¹ and batteries were located so as to deny the Nansemond River to any Federal attempt to reinforce by sea.³² Behind this tightening line, foraging parties swept the country in all directions.

Lee was greatly pleased by Longstreet's progress. However, he could offer little in the way of material aid, although he did suggest that Longstreet might correspond directly with the War Department regarding his pending operations against Suffolk.³³ Longstreet was not slow in following this advice. He wrote Seddon that he had stopped the firing on Suffolk, as it was too wasteful of ammunition. He said also that he did not intend to assault the works, as it would cost him some three thousand men and much ammunition—neither of which was justified. If he were assured of naval support, he might be able to take Suffolk—especially if the *Richmond* could sail down the James and block the mouth of the Nansemond. But, said Longstreet: "The principal object of the expedition was to draw out supplies for our army. I shall confine myself to this unless I find a fair opportunity for something more."³⁴ The taking of Suffolk was not important; supplies were much needed.

In spite of suggestions that he might do this or might do that, Longstreet was steadfast in holding to his mission and obtained fine results with a minimum loss. His operations were approved by the Secretary of War, who wrote him: "Your proceedings in regard to Suffolk are deemed judicious and fully approved. I concur in thinking the object not worth the sacrifice to be entailed by an attack. . . . The main object of your expedition is, I am happy to believe, being fully accomplished."³⁵ Seddon may have come to realize also that while gathering the food was comparatively easy, the question of getting it safely across the Blackwater and into the warehouses in Richmond was a different matter. There was a lamentable shortage of transportation, and the impressment of wagons was an urgent necessity.³⁶

The enemy was not disposed to take the Confederate pressure without retaliating. He fought back furiously on several occasions. Once he was successful. It was a sad blow to Longstreet's pride when the enemy rushed in and captured a battery on the west side of the Nansemond. Although the Union raid was executed with great skill, Longstreet nevertheless felt that the loss was due in no small measure to a lack of vigilance on the part of some dis-

³¹ Captain Causey's report, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 993.

³² Longstreet to Hill, April 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 989.

³³ Lee to Longstreet, April 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 996.

³⁴ Longstreet to Seddon, April 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 996.

³⁵ Seddon to Longstreet, April 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 999.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

grunted North Carolina infantry. His anger was evident in his letters, even though they were written with studied calm.³⁷

By April 19, Longstreet saw that it would still require some two weeks to gather the remaining supplies from the counties occupied by his advancing units. There was a large area yet to be exploited, but prices were being forced up by the competitive buying of the agents of the commissary general.³⁸

Since an assault on Suffolk was not contemplated, Longstreet kept a minimum number of men to hold the Federals in their works, while others were assigned to foraging duty. Certain defensive works had to be constructed and the impression given that siege operations were planned.³⁹ The crack of the whip was heard by day and by night as bacon, corn, and other necessities were hurried toward Petersburg from the rich farm lands east of the Blackwater. That was the big mission, and Longstreet sent many a letter to his subordinates insisting on haste. He knew that the enemy would not remain idle along the Rappahannock indefinitely. Could he hope for two weeks longer? Lee could not say—he was in a quandary as to Hooker's plans.⁴⁰

Longstreet was still sputtering about his captured battery. He inclined somewhat toward placing on General French the blame for the mishap—which blame, however, French very promptly laid on Hood's shoulders.⁴¹ What really concerned Longstreet was his conviction that this raid was the forerunner of a strong hostile movement up the James intended to interpose between him and Petersburg.⁴² Lee had been apprehensive of this sort of movement and had written Secretary of War Seddon about it on April 9 and again on April 21, asking that naval support be furnished Longstreet.⁴³ Longstreet wanted all of his scattered troops returned to him—especially those sent to aid Beauregard, as the movement against Charleston seemed by then to have been abandoned. The Union forces in Suffolk were growing increasingly more aggressive and were making strong local attacks, as if in preparation for a main effort.⁴⁴ Longstreet grew more and more apprehensive. All this activity seemed to bear out his belief that the route of the James was

³⁷ S. G. French to Longstreet, April 20, 1863 (two letters), *ibid.*, 1003 ff. See also Longstreet to French, April 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 1009; Longstreet to Seddon, April 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1014; and Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 21, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 692.

³⁸ Seddon to Longstreet, April 19, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1002. See also Jones, *Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, I and II, *passim*.

³⁹ *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 693–98; Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War*, III, 134.

⁴⁰ Lee to Longstreet, April 17, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 996.

⁴¹ Sorrel to French, April 21, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 1009; *id.* to *id.*, April 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1016; French to Sorrel, April 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 1010. Longstreet's views are contained in Longstreet to Seddon, April 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1015.

⁴² Longstreet to Seddon, April 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1014.

⁴³ Lee to *id.*, April 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 974; *id.* to *id.*, April 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 1009.

⁴⁴ Longstreet to *id.*, April 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 1015; *id.* to French, April 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 1020–21.

to be the avenue of a strong Union advance on Richmond. He ordered all wharves and landing places on both banks of the James as well as of the Nansemond destroyed as an additional measure of precaution—a rather foolish one, since the vessels could tie up anywhere.⁴⁶

Letters continued to pass frequently between Longstreet and Lee. The Union army was stirring along the Rappahannock, and both generals knew that it was only a question of a few weeks at most before Longstreet must again be at Lee's side. Both men knew that Hooker had reorganized his army and that the morale of his soldiers had been raised to a high pitch. The ranks had been filled, and toward the end of April Hooker was expected to have more than 125,000 officers and men and some 400 or more pieces of artillery. According to Hooker himself, he had the finest army on the planet. To meet this threat, Lee had something less than 60,000 men and 228 guns.⁴⁸ As the end of April approached, the restlessness of the enemy warned Lee that the day when Hooker would move was not far distant. Stoneman's cavalry had made an abortive attempt to gain Lee's left on April 14, but heavy loads and an alert Stuart had turned him back and forced him to swim a fast-rising stream to reach his camps in safety.

With all of these warnings, it is indeed strange that Lee did not give Longstreet a final date on which his foraging operations should cease and his troops start back toward the Rappahannock.⁴⁷ But Lee was still uncertain as to Hooker's intentions as late as April 27, when he wrote Longstreet—although he must have known that Hooker was about ready to move. The Union army had been heavily reinforced; and the Union cavalry, under Stoneman, had become increasingly more active near Warrenton. Lee asked Longstreet whether any of the troops in North Carolina could be spared to come nearer and requested him to state how long it would take to complete the foraging activities. And here, in a most surprising way, Lee once again hinted at the capture of Suffolk—intimating that Longstreet might act along those lines in accordance with his own good judgment.⁴⁸ This was on April 27, and Lee had already informed the President some time previous to this that Longstreet should be ready to return to his side by May 1.⁴⁹ There is no extant evidence that Davis had ever informed Longstreet of Lee's wishes in this regard.

Longstreet had a right to expect either Lee or the War Department to notify

⁴⁶ Sorrel to Hood, April 26, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 695; *id.* to Elzey, April 26, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1023.

⁴⁷ See Peck to Hooker, April 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 583; Keyes to Peck, April 10, 1863, *ibid.*, 593; General J. A. Dix to Peck, April 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 626; returns of May 10, 1863, for the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, *ibid.*, 915-16.

⁴⁸ Freeman admitted that Lee was in error in this respect. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 5-6.

⁴⁹ Lee to Longstreet, April 27, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 1024.

⁵⁰ *Id.* to Davis, April 16, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 724.

him when to cease operations in southeastern Virginia. He had written to Secretary of War Seddon some days earlier, stating that if the reports of his subsistence officers could be believed there was a large quantity of provisions still to be secured and that it would take about a month to remove these supplies from the areas near Suffolk. He recommended at that time that the troops be held to their present stations until the task was accomplished. He had given up all thought of making further advances against Suffolk itself.⁵⁰

On April 30 news was flashed to Longstreet which must have startled him, even though it was not entirely unexpected: he, French, and D. H. Hill were informed that Hooker's grand offensive had started.⁵¹ Hooker had pushed across the Rappahannock above and below Fredericksburg while Stoneman had made ready to cross at Warrenton Springs and move on Gordonsville. Lee had feared that movement, and he now urged that troops be sent to Gordonsville by rail and that Longstreet's divisions be returned to him on the Rappahannock. The War Department, spurred to action by Lee's danger, directed that the activities south of the James should be terminated and that all of Longstreet's command who could be spared without serious risk should be concentrated on Richmond with the utmost dispatch.⁵²

This was a rude awakening for Longstreet, who on that very day had planned to hold his lines for two weeks longer while he gathered in the last of the supplies. He was certain that he could stand an attack on his front if Hill, in North Carolina, could keep Foster from hitting him in the right rear.⁵³ Picture Longstreet's situation: He had had no warning from Lee that things were apt to happen so soon; indeed, on the twenty-seventh, Lee had left it to Longstreet's judgment as to whether he should attack Suffolk. His troops were scattered in a wide semicircle from the west branch of the Nansemond along the general line of the Norfolk and Suffolk Railroad to the edges of the great swamp. With an aggressive enemy bottled up in the city, it would be no mean task for Longstreet to withdraw his forces across the Blackwater and have an uninterrupted march toward Richmond. His problem was almost the same as that which Joseph E. Johnston had faced in 1862 during the operations on the Peninsula. Longstreet was unacquainted with the happenings on Lee's front until late on April 30. He wrote D. H. Hill of the probability that his command would soon be moved to the Rappahannock. With this contingency

⁵⁰ Longstreet to Seddon, April 17, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1025.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 1028-29. But some previous intimation of the turn of affairs must have reached Longstreet's headquarters. See Major William Norris to Longstreet, April 27, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 696.

⁵² Lee to Cooper, April 29, 1863, quoted in Cooper to Longstreet, April 29, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1029. See also Lee to Cooper (telegram), April 29, 1863, quoted in Cooper to Longstreet, April 29, 1863, *ibid.*; and Cooper to Longstreet, April 29, 1863, *ibid.* A close study of all these dispatches indicates that this particular message was not received at Longstreet's headquarters until late on the thirtieth.

⁵³ Longstreet to D. H. Hill, April 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 1031.

in mind, he had written Hill of the tactics to pursue; he had stated that when the troops left, he planned to move with them, but he had added that no move would be made for several days.⁵⁴

No matter what Longstreet's intentions, the ink was hardly dry on his letter to Hill when messages began to pour in. The last of these arrived late on the thirtieth and directed Longstreet to move without delay to Richmond and join Lee.⁵⁵ Orders flew out from Longstreet's headquarters, including instructions to French to hold back the enemy, and orders to scattered units to break contact and prepare to march toward Petersburg.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Longstreet had put to the War Department the perplexing question of whether he should abandon his trains and risk a quick withdrawal of all troops. By no means, came the reply. He was directed to secure all possible dispatch without incurring loss of trains or any unnecessary hazard of troops.⁵⁷ Longstreet's troops were being spurred by frequent pressure,⁵⁸ but he knew full well that the movement would involve days and be attended by some risk. He was not averse to a fight,⁵⁹ but he could see only additional delay if he were forced to make a stand. Unfounded optimism amounting almost to criminal folly prompted General Samuel Cooper to advise Lee that although Longstreet would be delayed somewhat in gathering his trains, he expected Longstreet's command to be in Richmond on the evening of May 2. Cooper was too experienced a soldier to have failed so completely to comprehend Longstreet's task.⁶⁰

The day that Longstreet's command was expected to be in Richmond found Cooper telegraphing to Longstreet that he should march his columns to Ivor, since no rail transportation could be sent as far as Franklin. Crossing this wire was one from Longstreet stating that he could not move unless the entire command were moved and that it would take several days to reach Fredericksburg.⁶¹ Without doubt this message was a reply to the three messages sent from Richmond on April 29, wherein Longstreet was directed to return such portion of his command as could be spared without serious risk. Longstreet knew that it had to be all or none. Even if all withdrew, the troops in Suffolk might pursue. A skeleton force left in observation would be overwhelmed, and a confident enemy would catch up with him and perhaps give him reason to regret dividing his forces.

⁵⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, April 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 1032.

⁵⁵ Cooper to Longstreet, April 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 1032.

⁵⁶ Sorrel to French, April 30, 1863 (two letters), *ibid.*, 1032-33.

⁵⁷ Cooper to Lee, May 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 1034.

⁵⁸ Sorrel to Chief Quartermaster, May 1, 1863, *id.* to H. L. Benning, May 1, 1863, and *id.* to *id.*, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 700-702.

⁵⁹ Longstreet to French, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1037.

⁶⁰ Cooper to Lee, May 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 1034.

⁶¹ *Id.* to Longstreet, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 1037. The distance from the crossing over the Blackwater at Franklin to Ivor was about forty miles by road. Longstreet to Cooper, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*

Longstreet's command was soon gathered. Plans were completed and orders issued late on May 2. The entire force was to cross the Blackwater after dark on May 3 under protection of heavy rear guards; bridges were to be destroyed and trees felled to impede the progress of the pursuit. There was need for haste, as two or more enemy detachments were reported to be converging on Richmond from the north.⁶²

French did not relish the idea of covering Longstreet's withdrawal. He protested forcefully to Longstreet that the task was beyond him. He needed an additional brigade to cover the forty miles from Fort Powhatan to South Quay. French sent an even stronger complaint to Secretary of War Seddon. His two brigades, numbering four thousand, were no match, he said, for the Union force of twenty-five thousand. Nevertheless, he was ordered to defend the Blackwater with the two brigades, although Longstreet did send him some additional cavalry.⁶³ There was sharp skirmishing on May 3, but the Confederates broke loose to cross the river on schedule. Had cars been available at Franklin, some troops could have been sent from there on May 4.⁶⁴ Hood's column was able to come within easy marching distance of Ivor so as to arrive there by 8 A.M. on May 5.⁶⁵

With the withdrawal well under way and further clashes with the enemy unlikely, Longstreet left the task of loading at Ivor to his senior subordinate and went on to Petersburg with a few members of his staff.⁶⁶ Hood and Pickett, with their troops, were ordered via Ivor to Richmond, to await further orders; the artillery was to proceed overland to Petersburg and halt there for further instructions. After a survey of the situation, Longstreet advised Seddon, late on May 5, that he would leave Petersburg that night for Richmond. There was much to do in Petersburg. Orders had to be sent out disposing of D. H. Hill's command to prevent a junction of the Union forces south and west of Richmond; changes in march orders were made necessary by the lack of rail transportation; French had to be encouraged as well as instructed.⁶⁷

Petersburg had a real war scare. Longstreet found there a scant two hundred men who could be called soldiers, and available arms were being distributed

⁶² These were reported to be "two detachments certainly, perhaps three, of enemy's cavalry, with some light infantry. . . . Hurry as fast as possible re-enforcements." Longstreet's special orders of withdrawal, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 1038. See also Seddon to Longstreet, May 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 1039.

⁶³ French to *id.*, May 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 1043; *id.* to Seddon, May 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 1042; Sorrel to French, May 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 1044-45.

⁶⁴ French to Seddon, May 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 1042.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Hood, with most of his division, had been brought to the Blackwater to participate in the general forward movement.

⁶⁶ Longstreet to Elzey, May 5, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 777.

⁶⁷ Special orders for the artillery, May 4, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1045; Longstreet to Seddon, May 5, 1863, *ibid.* It should be remembered that Petersburg was Longstreet's department headquarters.

to citizens. His own troops, still distant from the city, were tired. For two days they had been on the march. Some of his units had marched thirty-four miles over poor roads between the evening of May 3 and the early morning of May 5. They were scattered, but arrangements were under way to hurry them up. On the morning of May 6, however, Longstreet was at the War Department, ready to assist Lee as well as to handle his own department, which reached southward from Richmond to include North Carolina.⁶⁸

While Longstreet was transferring his command from the Suffolk area to the Rappahannock, the battle of Chancellorsville took place. On April 30, Hooker's advance troops under General D. N. Couch began crossing the Rapidan; by the next day five Federal corps were assembled on the south side of the river and prepared to march on to Richmond. Hooker attacked; Lee counterattacked, and Hooker fell back. While Hooker stood on the defensive on May 2, Jackson made a march which took him part of the way around the Federal army. Late in the afternoon of May 2, Jackson struck Hooker's unsuspecting right with his full force and drove it back, beaten and demoralized. In the darkened forest, Jackson was mistakenly shot down by his own men. Ten hours later, on May 3, the Confederate attack was renewed. Hooker's army recrossed the Rapidan on the morning of the sixth. It was a brilliant Confederate victory—a superlative example of Lee's tactical genius—but it was dearly bought at the expense of the loss of Jackson.

Several students of this exciting period have intimated that Longstreet ought to have been and *could have been* at Lee's side during the battle of Chancellorsville. It seems important to digress for a moment to consider the situation as it was and Lee's frank statement in regard to it. At best, it took Longstreet's command all of eight days to disengage and arrive at Petersburg and at Richmond. The Rappahannock was still some distance away. Suppose Lee had demanded Longstreet's return on April 20, for example, an arbitrary assumption as to date: Longstreet should have been on the Rappahannock with the bulk of his forces at least by May 1. But we see that Lee was undecided even as late as April 27 as to what Hooker planned to do.⁶⁹ On this date, he left to Longstreet's judgment the decision as to further operations against Suffolk. Lee surmised then that Hooker was about to make an aggressive movement, but he failed to make it clear to Longstreet that it was of immediate concern. Longstreet had a definite task—one that was important to the Southern armies. Lee's battle experience must have told him that Longstreet could not break loose from an active enemy with whom he was in close contact without some preparation. It would have been beyond the ability of any general to have arrived at Lee's

⁶⁸ As yet (May 6) none of Longstreet's command had arrived in Richmond. Longstreet (from Richmond), to D. H. Hill, May 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 1047.

⁶⁹ See n. 48, *supra*.

side in time for the battle of Chancellorsville under a similar sequence of events. Longstreet had too many "bosses." It was a period of uncertainty and indecision for Lee—perhaps one might say that it was a time when Lee momentarily lost faith in his own ability to divine the enemy's purpose.

Lee's letter of May 7 contains no intimation that he expected Longstreet to be with him at Chancellorsville. He was very definite on this point. He stated that his message to Longstreet on May 1 was meant solely to be informative of intended movement and contained the wish rather than the expectation that *one* of Longstreet's divisions could have co-operated. True, Lee had cautioned Longstreet to keep one division in reserve; but ever since Longstreet's forces had crossed the Blackwater, the matter of a reserve division had been forgotten. Longstreet needed all of his force in southeastern Virginia, and Lee had given tacit if not specific consent. Lee went on to say:

I did not intend to express the opinion that you could reach me in time, as I did not think it practicable. The emergency that made your presence so desirable has passed for the present, so far as I can see, and I desire that you will not distress your troops by a forced movement to join me, or sacrifice for that purpose any public interest that your sudden departure might make it necessary to abandon. The only immediate service that your troops could render would be to protect our communications from the enemy's cavalry and assist in punishing them for the damage they have done.⁷⁰

Longstreet was closeted with President Davis on the evening of May 6. No doubt he gave a full report of his operations in southeastern Virginia, and the discussion was extended to include the situation along the Rappahannock. Davis urged Longstreet to move at once with his command to join Lee. That was a perfectly logical request, since Lee's army seemed to face the greatest danger. What answer Longstreet made is not known. The next day he was convinced, however—and so informed Seddon—that the greatest aid which he could render would be in protecting Richmond and in opening and securing Lee's lines of communications to the south.⁷¹

It would be interesting to know at what time of day this letter was written to Seddon. It would be most revealing, also, if we could know whether Longstreet had received the May 7 letter from Lee, quoted above, before he wrote to Seddon. If he had not, it is evident that Longstreet had a broad view of the whole situation and was in agreement with Lee as to the best method of giving Lee's army the opportunity to move against the enemy without fear for the safety of Richmond or danger of attack from the rear. Only sound conviction or a desire to support Lee to the utmost would have driven Longstreet to such an utter disregard of the President's wishes. Davis was not one to brook lightly

⁷⁰ Lee to Longstreet, May 7, 1863, in *Official Records*, XVIII, 1049. See also *id.* to Davis, May 2, 1863, *ibid.*, XXV, Pt. II, 765.

⁷¹ Longstreet to Seddon, May 7, 1863, *ibid.*, XVIII, 1050.

such conduct, so it was well for Longstreet that Lee was in full accord with his decision.⁷²

The next day, May 8, Longstreet reported that the enemy cavalry was retreating toward the Rappahannock. Part of Longstreet's command was moving slowly toward Hanover Junction sweeping the country as it went, repairing roads, and coming slowly within the orbit of Lee's active operations. As Longstreet's troops moved northward, North Carolina felt her loss of them. If Wilmington was to be defended, Whiting wrote, Longstreet would have to help.⁷³

On May 12, Longstreet wrote to D. H. Hill that no further large-scale operations could be expected in the department south of the James. "By threatening the enemy's capital," he added, "we will be able to draw all of his available force here, and as our strength here increases his must do the same." This letter, which was written from the vicinity of Fredericksburg, is of peculiar importance with respect to Longstreet's view as to the larger strategic problem of the Confederacy. Longstreet had gone to Fredericksburg sometime before May 12, probably on May 9. Whether he remained there has not been determined. The chances are that he did and that while he was absent from his department he exercised only a nominal command over it. He was in Fredericksburg on May 20, and it was on this date that Lee wrote the War Department that he wanted D. H. Hill to relieve Longstreet. Longstreet's letter to Hill indicates most strongly that Longstreet and Lee talked over the future employment of the Army of Northern Virginia.⁷⁴

Longstreet stated in his memoirs that when he arrived in Richmond on May 6, he suggested to Secretary of War Seddon a plan whereby a concerted effort to aid Bragg might relieve the pressure on Pemberton, who was striving to save Vicksburg. Longstreet repeated his suggestions on May 9 when he joined Lee, who, though he admitted the soundness of Longstreet's reasoning, nevertheless had made up his mind to launch an entirely different series of operations. He planned, instead, a drive across the Potomac. This decision must have been made before May 12, the date when Longstreet hinted to Hill the nature of the coming operations, but it had not as yet been approved by the President. Official approval undoubtedly came during Lee's visit to Rich-

⁷² The conclusion of the writer, based on a long study of Longstreet's actions under varying situations, is that he was informed of Lee's wishes before he wrote to the Secretary of War. There is much evidence that several communications in the sequence of letters between Lee and Longstreet are missing from the published *Official Records*. These may have been lost or destroyed at the time. In this connection, see *ibid.*, 1040-56.

⁷³ Elzey to Pettigrew, May 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 1052; Whiting to D. H. Hill, May 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 1052.

⁷⁴ Longstreet to D. H. Hill, May 12, 1863, *ibid.*, 1057. See also *id.* to *id.*, May 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 1061. Lee had also recommended that Hill relieve Longstreet as department commander. Lee to Seddon, May 20, 1863, *ibid.*, 1066; Sorrel to Hill, May 8, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 705.

mond on May 15. The propriety of Longstreet's divulging Lee's plans in advance cannot be discussed, since it is not known whether Lee enjoined secrecy. At all events, it was certainly indiscreet of Longstreet to put such vital intelligence in a letter subject to interception.⁷⁵

When the matter was put to President Davis, he decided to support Lee, even though it might mean disaster in Tennessee and Mississippi. Virginia meant more to Lee than did the western country: he may have admitted the force and logic of giving active support to Bragg and Pemberton, but he did not seem to be impressed with the idea that if the West were to be lost, the Confederacy would be lost. Knowing Bragg, one can understand why Lee would not care to trust his army to such leadership. Yet success in the West seemed possible; and had Lee gone there in person to command the operations, the success gained might have proved more lasting than any secured through an invasion across the Potomac could be. What the President failed to see was that the question was not one of choosing between Virginia and Mississippi but one of choosing between Virginia and the Confederacy—that in the loss of Vicksburg the way was paved for the loss of the South. Though Longstreet was not comparable with Lee as a strategist, his common sense at this time gave him the best strategic insight. His probably was the better plan because it had the double purpose of breaking up any serious offensive in the West and launching a subsequent offensive into an area that was known to be anti-Lincoln and almost as much antiwar. There was more political benefit to be gained by dividing the Union west from the Union east than by a series of victories in Maryland, even if they should culminate in the capture of Washington.

With the question as to the West settled, the two generals returned to the Rappahannock to prepare for the reorganization of the army which the death of Jackson had made necessary. Three corps were formed. Longstreet retained his First Corps, less R. H. Anderson's division. A new corps, the Third, under A. P. Hill, who was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, was formed from Anderson's division and part of what had formerly been the Second (or Jackson's) Corps. Ewell also was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and assumed command of the weakened Second Corps.

The elevation of Hill and Ewell caused some adverse comment—principally against Hill. It was felt that though Ewell was a soldier and undoubtedly merited his promotion, Hill lacked the requisite ability and was not deserving of such honor. The memory of Gaines's Mill should have taught these critics

⁷⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 327–28, 331. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 15, which is not quite fair to Longstreet. See also *ibid.*, 19, for Lee's conference in Richmond. Cooper wrote D. H. Hill on May 15, 1863, that "General Lee is now in this city . . ." *Official Records*, XVIII, 1062. Longstreet's hint is to be found in Longstreet to Hill, May 12, 1863, *ibid.*, 1057.

that Hill was a fighter and probably as well qualified for higher command as any division commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. Throughout the war, men of small experience had to be tried out in positions of leadership, and on the whole the South fared better than her adversary in such selection.

What was more serious was that the change from two corps to three necessitated a complete change in Lee's theories of tactical maneuver. Lee had become expert in the employment of his two heavy corps, and he knew just what to expect from them and how best to co-ordinate them. He and his staff now had to learn to use entirely different tactics. Instead of two main units, Lee now had three; and neither he nor his staff had had field experience in managing a three-unit army. One of the chief causes for the confusion and failure at Gettysburg may have been due to the fact that the campaign followed so closely on this reorganization that there had been insufficient time for all to learn how to maneuver and control the arrangement.

In the conference at Richmond on May 15, Lee had proposed a plan of crossing the Potomac and invading the industrial area of Pennsylvania as an alternative to the western operations suggested by Longstreet and others. Lee's arguments were convincing. President Davis knew as well as Lee that the Army of Northern Virginia was not strong enough to seek out Hooker's army and try its chances in open warfare. Furthermore, Virginia was stripped bare by the hungry armies; Hooker was building a bigger force, and it took no particular genius to determine that a move against Richmond was extremely probable unless great pressure could be exerted elsewhere. Lee felt that he must either go forward or retire; he could not stay where he was. Should he stand still and await the coming of an augmented Federal army, it was unlikely that Hooker would make the same mistakes that he had made at Chancellorsville. The North had not forgotten this battle; and the politicians were timid when the city of Washington became a potential objective. If Lee could avoid Hooker and still bring pressure to bear against the capital, the resulting flurry would undoubtedly cause President Lincoln to pull back all available Union troops to man the fortifications that surrounded Washington. Lee could then work his will amid the rich farms and richer towns of Maryland and southern Pennsylvania.

It should be added that the foreign situation had a large share in influencing President Davis to consent to Lee's plan of operations across the Potomac. The star of the South was in the heavens when the Britisher Lord John Russell and his associates favored the granting of substantial recognition to the Confederacy. The Confederate loan in England was going nicely—indeed, in some places it was being quoted at a premium. All signs seemed to point toward

early and material support for the South. Even Napoleon III had consented to the use of French shipyards for fitting out certain vessels of war and making them ready to prey on Northern commerce. All the South needed was another Chancellorsville, or some other substantial threat against the Northern peace of mind. A thrust at Washington or into the richly populated industrial regions, with some hope of victory should the Union army venture to attack Lee in position, would have far more political impact than the mere stopping of Hooker's forces at the Rappahannock. The West figured little in Europe. The President approved the second invasion of the North.⁷⁶

When the decision was reached, Longstreet gave Lee's plan his wholehearted support. In discussing the several details, he suggested that the campaign should be based on defensive tactics—that is, on such maneuvers that the enemy would be forced to attack. Lee readily assented, Longstreet later wrote. Longstreet's scheme of maneuver, which planned a strategic offensive coupled with a tactical defensive, was nothing less than a bluff. The suggestion has been severely criticized; but if the invasion of Pennsylvania had been decided upon instead of the better military program of an offensive in the West, a campaign of bluff would be a very good weapon in the hands of a man like Lee. In view of Lee's arguments in support of the plan to march into the North, Longstreet's suggestion covering the general conduct of the operations was sound; it was time for Lee to bluff.⁷⁷

The details of the proposed offensive involved the exercise of considerable skill and, above all, the full co-operation of the War Department. Hooker's army had to be contained, and this important part of the scheme was to be Longstreet's mission. It was against the veteran wall of the old First Corps that any Yankee attack was to crash and fall. It was to be Longstreet's task to hold Hooker's much larger army on the Rappahannock until Lee got his remaining forces well into the enemy's country. A second and vital part of the scheme as Lee planned it, but which he delayed in bringing to the President's attention, was to gather the scattered elements of all other troops in Virginia

⁷⁶ Jordan and Pratt, *Europe and the American Civil War*, 183 ff., gives a general view of the situation and the reaction in England and France. J. M. Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Confederacy* (Baltimore, 1901), 182-83, 202 ff. is still the standard authority on this subject. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 18-20, discusses the problem from a pro-Southern, pro-Lee viewpoint. E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2 vols.; New York, 1925), II, 116 ff. is excellent. See also Charles Francis Adams, *Trans-Atlantic Solidarity* (Oxford, 1913), 99 ff. and *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography* (Boston, 1918), 185-89.

⁷⁷ The writer believes this to be the correct interpretation of what Longstreet suggested and Lee consented to. It was logical in the situation. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 331; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 21; Cecil Battine, *The Crisis of the Confederacy* (London, 1905), 331. Longstreet's suggestion has been greatly misinterpreted. Forcing the enemy by maneuver to attack at a disadvantage is considered by most professional military students to exemplify the highest art of war.

and the Carolinas and put them under Beauregard, who was to make a strong feint directly at Washington just as soon as the way was opened.⁷⁸ This combined general offensive was designed to put the Northern War Department in the position of having either to move to block Lee in Maryland, with the possible loss of Washington, or to let Lee work his will in the industrial area, with the consequent loss of political support at home and possible loss of prestige abroad.

Feeling certain that his plans would be approved by the President, Lee went ahead with the movements. When his invasion of the North was already well started, however, he was informed that that part of the plan which contemplated the use of other forces under Beauregard could not be approved because there was not sufficient time to assemble the troops. Lee was largely to blame for this lack of co-ordination because he had withheld from the President all of the essential details of the plan in fear of premature publication or some leak whereby the enemy could divine what he aimed to do.⁷⁹

The first element in Lee's grand tactics called for the Second Corps, under Ewell, to move into the Shenandoah Valley and clear away the scattered groups of Federals, thus ensuring a safe crossing of the Potomac. This was the strategic advance guard. Ewell was next to pass over the Potomac and march rapidly up the Cumberland Valley into Pennsylvania as soon as the remainder of the army could withdraw from the Rappahannock. Lee's orders provided for the division of the Second Corps into two columns upon its arrival in Maryland. One column was to march by an interior route from Williamsport toward Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and Harrisburg while the other took the more easterly route from Sharpsburg through Emmitsburg to Gettysburg, with a final destination at Wrightsville, where the main highway bridge crossed the Susquehanna. Both columns were to have ample cavalry for screening and for locating the supplies that Ewell's battalions were to commandeer.

Longstreet's part of the plan was to hold Hooker until the others were well started and then move deliberately up the Rappahannock, all the while enticing Hooker into making a parallel march. Once Hooker vacated his position

⁷⁸ Cooper to Lee, June 9, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. I, 757. See also Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 336-37; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 366-67; Lee to Davis, June 23, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 925; Davis to Lee, June 28, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 76; Cooper to *id.*, June 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 75.

⁷⁹ Lee wrote Davis on June 23, 1863: "Should you agree with me, I need not say that it is desirable that the execution of the plans [for the assembling of an army under Beauregard at Culpeper Courthouse] should immediately begin. The enemy will hear of it soon enough, and a proper reticence on the part of our papers will cause them to attribute greater importance to it." *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 925. Because of lack of time and the pressure on Bragg in Tennessee and Pemberton at Vicksburg, nothing came of the suggestion for assembling an army under Beauregard at Culpeper Courthouse. Cf. Lee to Davis, June 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 930; Davis to Lee, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 76; Cooper to *id.*, June 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 75.

and was safely headed north, A. P. Hill, with the Third Corps, was to cross in rear of Longstreet and pass down the Shenandoah Valley; then, taking a position in the center, he was to march rapidly into Maryland. When Hill was safely in the Shenandoah Valley, Longstreet's next move would be to become the strategic right flank guard of the army: marching along the eastern face of the Blue Ridge, covering all gaps and passes, he was to interpose his corps between Hooker and the main Confederate army. Stuart and his cavalry had a rather indefinite mission of scouring the country thoroughly and covering the right front. The preliminary details were carefully worked out.

.

On to Gettysburg

THE FIRST MOVEMENT OF THE SECOND INVASION OF THE NORTH COMMENCED ON June 3.¹ McLaws, of Longstreet's corps, marched out from Fredericksburg in the direction of Culpeper Courthouse. Hood fell in behind from Orange Courthouse on the next day; and Rodes, of the Second Corps, followed. The remainder of Longstreet's command, under Pickett, took the road on the fifth. Meanwhile, Stuart, with his cavalry, had established a defensive screen north and east of Culpeper, which was the concentration point for the first phase of Lee's operations. A. P. Hill, with the Third Corps, was left in observation at Fredericksburg. Ewell, leading the Second Corps, followed Longstreet; and by the eighth they were at Culpeper.²

When the Confederate line thinned somewhat in his front, Hooker displayed a little uneasiness and sent some reconnaissance parties across the river. He was determined to know what the activity meant. Both Longstreet and Hill met these reconnaissances with sharp counterthrusts and managed to keep the Union forces at a distance. The Federal curiosity caused Lee some delay, however, as he did not care to continue on to the Potomac until he knew whether Hooker was in earnest or merely testing the line. Apparently Longstreet's prompt resistance caused the Union commander's fears to subside; he soon recalled his troops to the left bank of the Rappahannock, and the eager Confederates hurried on to Culpeper.³

There was another delay of a day at Culpeper to give Hooker a chance to quiet down; and then, all seemingly at rest, the march was resumed. No sooner had the troops started forward than Hooker's cavalry general, Alfred

¹ See Lee to Seddon, June 8, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 868, in which Lee stated that he was forced to take the offensive, or otherwise Hooker would have advanced; and Lee's report, June 7, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 293. Lee's final report, dated January [?], 1864, can also be found on pp. 313-25 of this volume of the *Official Records*, which contains most of the published reports of the Gettysburg campaign. A few unpublished reports of secondary leaders may be found in the Old Records Section, formerly in the Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., but now in the National Archives.

² L. Guild to S. P. Moore, June 6, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 863. Longstreet and Ewell arrived at Culpeper Courthouse on June 8. Lee's report, July 31, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 305; Lee to A. P. Hill, June 5, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 859.

³ Correspondence of Hancock, Meade, Butterfield, and Buford regarding Lee's movements, June 5, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 8-10; Pleasanton to Williams, June 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 3; Lee to Davis, June 7, 1863; *ibid.*, Pt. II, 293; Hooker to Sykes, June 6, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 17; *id.* to Dix, June 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 70.

Pleasanton, heavily reinforced by infantry, crossed his brigades of cavalry at Beverly's and Kelly's fords and converged on Brandy Station. At first it looked as if Lee's secret would be uncovered, but the smile of good fortune again rested with him. Happily, Lee had assembled his cavalry for a grand review; and when the converging Union columns crashed through Stuart's outguards on the morning of June 9, they met the mass of the Confederate cavalry corps in head-on collision. A spirited battle followed, and for a time it seemed to favor the Northern horse. The rattle of musketry reached Longstreet, who sent his nearest infantry to help Stuart in what he thought to be a desperate fight. But before these slower-moving troops could arrive, the cavalry combat was over. Stuart had won again; but only at the expense of severe losses and the greater misfortune of having had captured secret dispatches which exposed Lee's immediate plans. As a reconnaissance in force to gain information, Pleasanton's raid had been highly successful.⁴

There was no further interruption to the advance. Ewell passed into the Shenandoah Valley by way of Chester Gap on June 10 and came into collision with General R. H. Milroy near Winchester on June 12. When Ewell emerged into the Potomac Valley some days later, Milroy's command had been scattered and the Shenandoah region cleared. A welcome gain was the rich booty of munitions and subsistence stores which the Federal garrisons had had no time to remove. Ewell's march to the Potomac was hardly obstructed, and he crossed the river without incident on June 15. Once over, he pushed on vigorously to occupy Sharpsburg and Hagerstown, sending General John D. Imboden's brigade, which was attached as corps cavalry, in the direction of Chambersburg.⁵

Meanwhile, the main body of Lee's army had been slowly disengaged from Hooker. Stuart's general mission was that of covering Longstreet until he crossed the Potomac; then he was to move toward Baltimore as a feint and force the Union concentration far to the east of Lee's line of communications. Had he followed this mission strictly, the result probably would have been to have made known Hooker's concentration for an advance, thus giving

⁴ Venable to Stuart, June 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 876. Hooker was satisfied on June 7 that no important move was in prospect on Lee's part. Meade to Butterfield, June 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 26. See also instructions to Union cavalry commander, June 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 47-48; Lee's report, July 31, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 305; and Thomason, *Jeb Stuart*, 397-98. An excellent and vivid eyewitness account will be found in Justus Scheibert, *Sieben Monate in den Rebellen-Staaten Während des Nordamerikanischen Krieges, 1863* (Stettin, Germany, 1868), 78 ff. The fight began in the early dawn and continued until the late afternoon of June 9. See Pleasanton to Hooker, June 9, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 38.

⁵ Lee to Davis (regarding movements of Ewell and Hill, June 10-14, 1863), June 15, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. II, 295. See Milroy's report, *ibid.*, 42-52; Tyler to General Robert C. Schenck, June 15, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 124; Lee to Cooper, June 18, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 296; and *id.* to Davis (regarding Imboden and Ewell), June 20, 1863, *ibid.*, 296-97.

Lee a choice of position and the opportunity to fight a defensive battle. No one in Lee's army seemed to doubt that this clash would result in a decisive victory for the South. Then, following Hooker's defeat, Lee would be in a position to dictate terms to the North. But something intervened to spoil this plan of operations.

Through the persuasiveness of his young and dashing cavalry leader, Lee on June 13 gave assent to a plan which would permit Stuart to cross the Potomac around the rear of the Union army. It is difficult to understand why Lee, with his consummate understanding of grand tactics, should have permitted his cavalry to depart from the important and vital mission of screening in order to stage a spectacular but hazardous raid. He did try to protect himself: in a second letter of June 23, which became Stuart's authority for the unusual operation, Lee cautioned Stuart that, once across the Potomac, he should place himself on Ewell's right and continue with his offensive screening. However, he left entirely to Stuart's judgment the question of whether he could make the circuit safely. Lee wrote that Stuart would be "able to judge whether . . . [he] can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountain." General Sir Frederick Maurice said tersely, "These were the fatal words."⁶

Much has been said about Longstreet's connection with this affair, and some have gone so far as to intimate that Longstreet himself issued the order which authorized Stuart to cross by the Federal rear. This view is hardly tenable. There seems to be no doubt that Lee had ordered all but a small force of the cavalry detached from Longstreet's corps. His letters to Stuart and to Longstreet were quite convincing on this point. Longstreet was something of a go-between, since he had the mission of covering Lee's right and rear. Lee's first letter to Stuart was sent through Longstreet, and others must have followed; but if so, one or two of these are missing from the *Official Records*. Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's staff operations officer, has offered the suggestion that Lee conferred with Longstreet about Stuart's proposed operation. As Longstreet controlled the right flank and rear, which Stuart was screening under his general supervision, the time when Stuart could depart and the immediate route he should follow were left somewhat in Longstreet's

⁶ Lee to Stuart, June 23, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 923; E. M. Stanton to T. A. Scott, June 10, 1863, *ibid.*, 55; and Pleasanton to Hooker, June 10, 1863, *ibid.*, 49. See also Longstreet to Lee, June 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 915; *id.* to Stuart, June 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 915; Lee to *id.*, June 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 923; and Stuart to Robertson, June 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 927. The whole of this vexing controversy is treated ably in Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 199-210. An elaborate defense of Stuart is contained in McClellan, *Life and Campaigns of Major General J. E. B. Stuart*, 315 ff. See also Thomason, *Jeb Stuart*, 412 ff.; and H. B. McClellan, "Jeb Stuart and the Gettysburg Campaign," in *Cavalry Journal*, IX (June, 1896), 172-80.

hands. It was Lee's responsibility, however, to assign Stuart a mission and to grant—or refuse—any modification of his orders that Stuart may have wished. If an error was made—and some seem to think that one was—it was that of granting Stuart the authority to depart from his primary mission of providing offensive screening for Lee's army.⁷

It cannot be charged against Lee that he intended to permit his cavalry to abandon completely its contact and offensive screening. He stated in definite language in his June 23 letter that after crossing the river Stuart should feel the right of Ewell's troops, and from a study of the entire letter it seems clear that he meant after the *immediate* crossing of the Potomac. He did not contemplate that Stuart would traverse the whole state of Maryland before rejoining Ewell, even though the direct route, in view of Ewell's changing position, would put the point of junction somewhere near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

It should be noted also that Stuart was directed to provide, or on his own initiative arranged for, a strong brigade of cavalry to remain behind to cover Lee's right and rear. This force ought to have given sufficient protection against surprise and provided necessary reconnoitering patrols. It surely was strong enough, if well handled, to have kept Lee fully advised of the movements of Hooker's main army and to have prevented any such surprise as actually occurred. But Lee's failure, in his subsequent report, to credit this strong cavalry detachment with performing its mission of security and reconnaissance suggests that it was not properly employed. If true, this gives rise to a changed opinion as to how far Stuart was liable. It is also possible that Lee expected that the smaller force under Beauregard could come up from South Carolina in ample time to hold Hooker in place south of the Potomac or near Washington. All of these factors may account in part for Lee's apparent neglect of what should have been a routine precaution.

Nevertheless, Lee did assume grave risk to his plans when he authorized the bulk of his mounted service to put itself on the far side of a dangerous and powerful enemy with but scant chance of rejoining the main Confederate column until it was well up into Pennsylvania. The writer believes that Lee erred; and the facts seem to indicate that his chief error lay in assuming that Hooker would do nothing or that he would move back nearer Washington. Lee seems to have failed to grasp the fact that Hooker would move on interior lines and keep between the Confederate army and Washington. Since one

⁷ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 210. The sequence of letters here discussed is as follows: Lee to Stuart, June 22, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 913; Longstreet to Lee, June 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 915; *id.* to Stuart, June 22, 1863, *ibid.*; a letter is missing here, probably Lee to Longstreet, June 23, 1863; Lee to Stuart, June 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 923; Stuart to Robertson, June 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 927. See also Lee to Davis, June 18, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 295; *id.* to *id.*, June 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 297.

of the main reasons for the campaign had been to entice Hooker out of Virginia, it is indeed strange that Lee did not fashion his grand tactics around this strategic objective. It does not seem probable from the evidence that Lee entertained the notion that the Army of the Potomac would move promptly, even though he knew as early as June 18 that Hooker was planning to cross the Potomac.⁸

A close study of the developing situation seems to indicate that Lee was at a point of complete physical and spiritual exhaustion and needed a rest badly. Such a condition would have been only logical as a result of his heavy responsibility, his continuous hard work and lack of recreation, his rheumatism, the poor food, and the heavy blow of losing Jackson.

The first phases of Lee's movement away from the Rappahannock were executed with great skill. The Union commander had no idea what Lee was about. Even as late as the afternoon of June 18, General Daniel Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff, was not sure of Lee's whereabouts or intentions. The reports of Pleasanton, Hooker's chief of cavalry, were a sequence of amusing deductions, none of which was correct. On the fourteenth of June, Pleasanton was certain that Longstreet was to swing around the Federal right by way of United States Ford—a movement which Hooker feared. The real destination of the Confederate army was judged more correctly by Halleck to be an invasion of the North. The extent of the Confederate plan was also guessed by some of the rank and file, as one young officer in the II Corps wrote in his diary on June 12: "General Lee is trying, I think, to get the inner line to the Potomac."⁹

Milroy's defeat at Winchester and Ewell's subsequent exploitation of the victory, coupled with the great uncertainty as to where Longstreet was and what object Lee had in mind, precipitated what was almost a stampede in the North. General D. N. Couch telegraphed the Federal secretary of war, E. M. Stanton, from Harrisburg on June 15 that all was being done that could be done to repel an invasion. He was satisfied that Lee intended to hurl his army at the rich industrial district of western Pennsylvania, where there was no organized military force to protect the vast booty that awaited the taking. Panic was evident in the cry that all territory south of the Sus-

⁸ Lee to Stuart, June 23, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 923. See also *id.* to Davis, June 19, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 296; and Stuart to Robertson, June 24, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 913.

⁹ Butterfield to J. F. Reynolds, June 18, 1862, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 193; Pleasanton to Hooker, June 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 107. It had been reported also on June 14 that Lee was about to enter Maryland. Pleasanton to Hooker, *ibid.*, 101; Stanton to T. A. Scott, June 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 112; Halleck to W. T. H. Brooks, June 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 113; an extract from the diary of Thomas F. Galwey, Eighth Ohio Infantry, in the possession of Major Geoffrey Galwey, U.S. Army. The thanks of the writer are due Major Galwey for permission to make use of this helpful material. See also the Proclamation of President Lincoln, June 15, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 136-37.

quehanna would be invaded. Proclamation followed proclamation, and the sister states of the North were urged to rush to the support of the Keystone State.¹⁰

Longstreet marched on serenely with his corps, his rear elements covering the gaps in the mountains while A. P. Hill moved up leisurely to the Potomac and crossed into Maryland. Ewell was already well up in the Cumberland Valley, busily exchanging bundles of Confederate currency for fat hogs and corn-fed beeves. Longstreet's scout, a man named Harrison, who had been with him since he faced the Union trenches at Suffolk, now lined his pockets with gold and set forth for Washington with orders to obtain something definite in the way of information and then to return at once. "Where shall I find you?" asked Harrison. "At the head of my corps on the march," was Longstreet's cautious reply. Scout Harrison might sell out to the Yankees; Longstreet took no chances.¹¹

The First Corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on June 24 in the wake of the Third Corps, which had occupied Shepherdstown a day or so before. Both corps now converged on Hagerstown. There was no need for haste, and the army proceeded as if on its way to a rest camp rather than to battle. "The officers and men," wrote Pickett, "are all in excellent condition, bright and cheerful, singing songs and telling stories, full of hope and courage, inspired with absolute faith and confidence in our success. There is no straggling, no disorder, no dissatisfaction, no plundering, and there are no desertions. . . ." Pickett's love for his troops may have obscured from his thinking the many stragglers and deserters of whom Lee complained. However, the conditions were not nearly so bad as in the Maryland campaign. The camp gossip now was that Lee would surround the entire Union army and capture it, man and horse.¹²

Lee rode constantly with Longstreet. And with them rode Lieutenant Colonel A. J. L. Fremantle, an observer from the British army. Sorrel called him a delightful acquisition and a fine fellow. He now enters this story in the role of an impartial and scientific observer of what took place at Gettysburg.

¹⁰ For correspondence by Schenck and others regarding Lee's advance into Pennsylvania, see *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 128 ff.; Schenck to Couch, June 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 209; Butterfield (chief of staff, Army of the Potomac) to Slocum, June 19, 1863, *ibid.*; *id.* to Ingalls, June 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 174-75; Couch to Stanton, June 15, 1863, *ibid.*, 129; Butterfield to Tyler, *ibid.*, 218. See also Lee to Davis, June 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 930-31.

¹¹ For the disposition of the Union Army on June 18 and at the opening of the campaign, see *ibid.*, 198. For reference to Scout Harrison, see Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 324, 333, 346; and Alexander, *Memoirs*, 379.

¹² See General Orders No. 16, June 22, 1863, *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 725; George E. Pickett to his wife, June 27, 1863, in *The Heart of a Soldier: As Revealed in the Intimate Letters of Genl. George E. Pickett, C. S. A.* (New York, 1913), 85; Pleasanton to Stanton, June 14, 1863; *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 105; Schenck to Halleck, June 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 294, and Meade to commanding officer, I Corps, June 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 307.

To the quick eye and understanding mind of this capable officer history is indebted for a critical—although limited—account of what happened on the Southern side. Fremantle had a soldier's eye for battle detail. Better, he had nothing at stake. Because of this freedom from attachment to either cause his diary, most of which he kept during his three months with the Confederate army, is of more value to the historian than the impassioned accounts of those who participated in the fighting at Gettysburg.

The First Corps reached Chambersburg on June 27. Here the men were rested while they feasted on blackberries and cherries; and Lee preached a sermon, as Pickett called it, on the meaning of *meum* and *teum*. There must be no looting, nor must the horses be allowed to raid the fields of ripening wheat. The strict obedience of the men to these orders constituted a remarkable exhibition of Lee's command over his troops, especially because the ravages of Benjamin F. Butler and Milroy were still fresh in the minds of Lee's soldiers. They stared with astonishment at the wide roads and the bursting granaries and looked with envy at the fat, lumbering horses and mules and the sleek cattle. These were all to be picked up later by the efficient Major Raphael J. Moses, Longstreet's commissary officer.¹³

Longstreet made his camp with that of Lee in a small grove of oaks just outside the town of Chambersburg; and there, about 10 P.M. on the night of the twenty-eighth, the pickets arrested a suspicious-looking character who was endeavoring to break through. Sorrel, when awakened by the guards, identified scout Harrison; he had returned with the information—until then completely unknown by the Confederates—that Meade had replaced Hooker and that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac on June 25 and was even then moving northward, its left nearing Gettysburg. This was news indeed. Longstreet hurried Harrison off to Lee. Lee listened with composure as he pondered the situation. Here was information that should have come from Stuart. Where then was Stuart? And why was he not between Lee's army and the enemy? The widely scattered condition of the army spelled ruin if the Federal commander should learn the true situation. Lee acted with speed, sending hurried orders to the far-flung units of A. P. Hill and Ewell to concentrate at Cashtown.¹⁴

Longstreet and Lee, as the records indicate, had not credited Hooker with the inclination or the ability to make a decided movement against Lee. All

¹³ Longstreet destroyed the railroads north and south of the town, however, as well as a large stock of whiskey at Scotland Depot. See Sorrel to McLaws and Hood, June 29, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 729; Couch to Halleck, July 7, 1863, *ibid.*, XXVII, Pt. III, 942; and Sorrel to Hood, June 29, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 730.

¹⁴ General Orders No. 194, Army of the Potomac, June 27, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 369; Special Orders No. 66, June 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 373-74. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 61; Mauric, *Aide-de-camp*, 218; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 347.

had underestimated his energy. The assumption that the Union army would hug the fortifications of Washington while Lee's army wandered at will over western Maryland and Pennsylvania was a serious blunder. Subsequent events—especially Lee's order to concentrate at Cashtown and the later shift to, and dispersion at, Gettysburg—betray only too clearly that the Confederate high command did not expect the Union army to move against them. It is hard to believe that Lee could have been so ignorant of the general location and disposition of the Union army, particularly since he had known for some days that Hooker intended to cross the Potomac.¹⁵

A great deal is still unknown about the sequence of events from the day Lee abandoned his line of communications¹⁶ through July 3. There is a strong indication that orders were in course of preparation on the night of June 27–28, 1863, directing the concentration of the Confederate army behind (west of) South Mountain.¹⁷ Lee knew at least by the night of June 28 of Meade's appointment and of his advance toward Gettysburg; and this fact, as many writers concede, makes Lee's reported surprise on the next night seem most extraordinary. It is inconceivable that Lee's rear cavalry had not sent him some intelligence of the main Federal army—at least enough for him to have estimated the situation more closely than he appears to have done. The absence of reports from Stuart was significant, but its full import seems to have been lost on Lee and his staff. The many explanations made thus far are not convincing. The indications are that the Army of Northern Virginia was not well in hand. Lee was sick. Was he too ill and exhausted to command his army?

Picture the situation of that army on the night of June 28. Ewell had reached well up into Pennsylvania and was stretched out between Carlisle and York, some twenty-five miles from Chambersburg. He was two full days' march from Cashtown, even with the roads clear and all other conditions favorable; and the enemy was pushing his advance into this area which separated the main Confederate army from its absent corps. A. P. Hill was dispersed over the Cumberland Valley with his main force near Fayetteville. Longstreet, with the only available troops at hand, was concentrated in and about Chambersburg. Stuart was striving to reach Ewell's right flank—as he had been instructed to do—but his march was impeded by hostile demonstrations and the tremendous amount of booty taken by his men when they had captured a large train destined for Meade's army. His wanderings had been many. Crossing the Potomac near Dranesville somewhat later than he had expected,

¹⁵ For the Confederate order of march for June 28, 1863, see *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 375.

¹⁶ See Lee to Davis, June 25, 1863, *ibid.*, XXVII, Pt. III, 930–31.

¹⁷ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 219–20.

he had passed between the Union army and Washington and then moved on toward Rockville. Here he had run into the Federal supply train and captured it. Loaded with his plunder, he had marched to Cooksville, where he had been forced to rest after a long running fight with the gathering Federal cavalry which had struck him near Brookeville. When Stuart finally arrived at the Susquehanna, he found that Ewell had gone.¹⁸

The next morning, June 29, Lee's situation was even more critical. There was still no news of Stuart, and the only effective concentration was that made by Longstreet when he pulled in his troops to Chambersburg. The rear cavalry was covering the crossings over the Potomac, with the bulk of the brigade still in Virginia. Ewell was occupying about the same positions between Carlisle and York, even though Lee's orders to retire on Cashtown must have reached him. He was intent on holding the line of the Susquehanna, where he was expecting Stuart to appear on his right at any moment. But, as has been pointed out, Stuart was having difficulties in eluding his opponents. Part of his force under Jenkins was delivering a smashing attack on the outskirts of Harrisburg, while the remainder was driven off the direct line of march to the vicinity of Sykesville.

Longstreet did not change his headquarters from the immediate vicinity of Lee's tent. Here, under cover of a small grove of trees about one mile out from Chambersburg on the Gettysburg Pike, the plan of operations was discussed. Amid the confusion of the surprise, repeated orders were sent to Ewell to assemble his forces at Cashtown. Lee was peremptory; he was in great danger. Longstreet's staff plunged eagerly into the preparations. It was common gossip among the soldiers that a great battle was imminent. That it had come upon them as a surprise was a matter of concern, but the growing tenseness and confusion did not seem to affect Longstreet. He remained as calm and unconcerned as if going on parade. Battle was no strange business to him or to his men. He said little, but it was noted that he was called into conference frequently by Lee.¹⁹

The march toward Cashtown commenced early on the morning of June 30. Pickett's division was left behind in Chambersburg as provost and rear guard until the cavalry could come up from Virginia. Just before taking the road, Longstreet and his English guest, Colonel Fremantle, who had been assigned to Longstreet's mess and headquarters, visited General Lee for a

¹⁸ On June 29, Union intelligence of Lee was fairly complete, although his strength was exaggerated. Simon Cameron to Lincoln, June 29, 1863, *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 409; S. Williams to commanding officer, XI Corps, June 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 415. For Meade's orders based on this intelligence (effective June 30), see *ibid.*, 416.

¹⁹ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 164; A. J. L. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States* (London, 1863), 128 ff., 259-60.

final conference. Following this meeting Fremantle recorded his impression of the great bond of affection and sympathy existing between Lee and Longstreet: "The relations between him and Longstreet are quite touching—they are almost always together. Longstreet's corps complains of this sometimes, as they say they seldom get a chance of detached service, which falls to the lot of Ewell. It is impossible to please Longstreet more than by praising Lee. I believe these two generals to be as little ambitious and as thoroughly unselfish as any men in the world. Both long for a successful termination of the war, in order that they may retire into obscurity."²⁰

Fremantle joined Longstreet as he led his corps toward Gettysburg. This first day's march of concentration, which commenced at 7 A.M., was in single column and covered approximately seven miles.²¹ The corps closed up on its head at the small mountain village of Greenwood, where it bivouacked for the night under the hanging bluffs beneath which the hamlet nestled. Longstreet, his staff, and their British companion sat far into the night discussing the probable place of the battle; all agreed that it must take place somewhere along the Gettysburg Pike. Positions were plotted, and Longstreet discoursed at length over the news brought by his scout. There was much speculation as to the effect of Meade's replacement of Hooker. Longstreet admitted soberly that Meade, whom he had known in the old army as an engineer, was an honorable and respectable man; he was probably as good as Hooker, but he lacked Hooker's boldness. There was also some talk of cavalry inefficiency, especially in pursuit, and a bit of criticism of Stuart. But all were sanguine, and everyone spoke with confidence; each seemed oblivious to the possibilities of an accidental clash.

The First Corps held to its bivouac through the next morning, unable to take the road because it was thronged with A. P. Hill's marching troops. The advance, which finally started about noon, was halted again after a short distance because one of Ewell's divisions, under orders from Lee, entered from a side road and moved in with its trains ahead of the First Corps. There seemed to be no system for the concentration. The logistics were bad; but in view of the Confederate situation on June 28, it is surprising that conflicts were so few. This was the beginning of the failure of Lee's staff to execute his plans with efficiency.

Longstreet rode forward and came abreast of General Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps during the passage of the gap through South Mountain. Johnson's men were from Virginia; and when they realized that Longstreet was passing, many moved closer to gaze upon him and others broke

²⁰ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 129; Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 220; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 350.

²¹ Sorrel to Hood, June 29, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 729.

ranks at double time just to get nearer the man who had such a reputation for fighting. For Longstreet was known to be the best fighter in the Southern armies. This was a true soldier compliment, and even Colonel Fremantle remarked it.

While the march of concentration was progressing, General Harry Heth directed Pettigrew to move in on Gettysburg with his brigade. The story is that a large stock of shoes was the objective. The troops reached town late on the thirtieth and were establishing themselves for the night when John Buford's Federal cavalry swarmed among them and drove them back some six miles to Marsh Creek. Here Pettigrew met his division commander and A. P. Hill, to whom he reported the Union advance. When the incident was communicated to Lee at his headquarters near Cashtown, the situation cleared for him at once. He saw that Gettysburg was the point of concentration for the Union army; and, accepting the challenge, he sent orders to Ewell to march on Gettysburg. A. P. Hill also was directed to move to Gettysburg at once with all his force and sweep away the leading elements of Meade's gathering host. Heth's division of Hill's corps, approaching the city from the northwest, was in the lead and soon moved in to occupy the town and the hills to the southeast. Heth first clashed with Buford; then he met the advanced units of O. O. Howard's XI Corps, which he crumpled and drove back up the slopes of Seminary Ridge. Here the fighting stopped for the night.²²

The battle was resumed about 9 A.M., July 1, but against a Federal resistance stiffened by the reinforcements that had come up during the night. Shortly after noon, the head of Ewell's corps arrived to support Heth; but a want of confidence or a lack of information kept Ewell's troops out until after Heth was badly cut up. Every enemy move seemed to come as a surprise. Later Early, of Ewell's corps, deployed and dashed into the fight just in time to rally Rodes's shattered brigades, which had taken over the brunt of the battle from Heth. Next, W. D. Pender's reserve brigades were thrown in, and the Confederate attack gained momentum. Without waiting for artillery support, Jubal A. Early led the way, and Howard's defense broke under the fierce assaults. About 4 P.M. the Union resistance ended, and Howard was driven from the slopes of Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Hill. He lost several hundred prisoners when J. B. Gordon's Georgians of Early's division forced their way into the horde of fugitives who crowded into the streets of Gettys-

²² There are so many studies of this battle that it is difficult to select a single work that is comprehensive and accurate. Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, gives an excellent account with emphasis on the Southern tactics. Freeman, *Lee*, treats it in detail but with bias toward Lee; however, it will be found generally sufficient for the average reader. No really good comprehensive critical works concerning the battle as a whole have been written from the Northern viewpoint. Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, is as reliable as any, but its value is weakened by the fact that the authors did not have access to materials now generally available.

burg. The Confederate victory was now assured, although had the attack been reinforced earlier, the same success could have been gained by midday.

At 4:30 P.M. on July 1, Longstreet and Colonel Fremantle came within sight of Gettysburg. Fremantle later wrote: ". . . we . . . joined General Lee and General [A. P.] Hill, who were on top of one of the ridges which form the peculiar feature of the country around Gettysburg. We could see the enemy retreating up one of the opposite ridges, pursued by the Confederates with loud yells. The position into which the enemy had been driven was evidently a strong one. His right appeared to rest on a cemetery, on top of a high ridge to the right of Gettysburg, as we looked at it." ²³

Gettysburg was a sizable and prosperous German community, the center of a rich farming area. It lay in a hollow between two chains of hills at the head of the valley of the Monocacy River. The ground between the hills was some three miles in width and was enclosed by the waters of Willoughby Run on the west and Rock Creek on the east. Inside this area were two parallel ridges: on the west was Seminary Ridge, which was wooded on its western but open on its eastern slopes; on the east was Cemetery Ridge, which was shaped like an inverted fishhook, with its point and back lying east and southeast of town and its shank bending through the village and thence running south for nearly six miles to the two wooded knobs of Round Top and Little Round Top. These two ridges reached southward from the heights north of Gettysburg as legs from partly opened dividers. The distance along the crest from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops—the center of the Federal position—was just under three miles. Seminary Ridge presented a seven-mile convex front to the east, with its crest extending from the Cashtown Pike (northwest of Gettysburg) to the bend in Marsh Creek (opposite, and two miles west of, Round Top).

Between these parallel ridges lies a narrow valley, open but scarred by jutting rocks as it reaches up the slopes on either side. Opposite the center of the Confederate position there was at that time a wide depression called the Peach Orchard, which afforded shelter from hostile fire. Protecting stone walls lay along the face of Cemetery Ridge, and natural buttresses of shelving rock gave similar protection to the riflemen along Seminary Ridge. The center of the valley is drained by Plum Run, a small stream which circles the Round Tops. At the northern end of the valley, the hills range from eighty to one hundred feet above the valley; midway, they drop to about thirty feet on the eastern side; and at the Round Tops, the ground rises to a tangled mass of ravines and jagged slopes, topped by domelike knobs some two hundred feet above the waters of Rock Creek. Between the Round Tops and

²³ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 260.

the Peach Orchard lay a mile-square jungle of vines and rocks, traversed by two difficult ravines. The larger of these, called the Devil's Den, was filled with interwoven masses of shrubs and briars, almost defying penetration. South of this the valley opened and was dotted with small farms. Such was the field that was exposed to Longstreet's gaze as he studied it through his field glasses when he first attained the slopes of Seminary Ridge.

The afternoon was waning when Longstreet joined his chief. Together they stood and viewed the preliminaries. Before them lay the great stage on which they were to place their players for the greatest drama of the war. It was at this time that there took place the first of the discussions between the two generals from which critics were later to draw the conclusion that Longstreet was not in harmony with Lee. This first disagreement was slight; but gossip and prejudice so enlarged upon a molehill of fact that later generations have seen it become a mountain of evidence—most of it bad—separating friend from friend and bringing in its swelling growth a bitterness that even the grave did not still.

Since the actions of Longstreet have been made the basis for so much caustic criticism and acrimonious discussion, it is well at this time to state the charges against him. The facts that have a direct bearing on the subject will therefore be marshaled in the succeeding pages. Before stating these charges, however, there is one observation that should be kept in mind: no whisper of any of these accusations was made until after death had come to still the lips of that great leader of the South Robert E. Lee, and to this date there had not been produced one shred of acceptable evidence that Lee ever instigated or authorized any charges or knew that they were being considered.

General William N. Pendleton in an address delivered on January 17, 1873, at the dedication of the Lee Chapel at Lexington, Virginia, charged Longstreet with disobeying an order from Lee to attack at sunrise on July 2.²⁴ General John B. Gordon addressed a larger audience. He published the statement that "General Lee died believing (the testimony on this point is overwhelming) that he lost Gettysburg at last by Longstreet's disobedience of orders." The lesser charges against Longstreet included those of unnecessary and deliberate delay on July 2, both in arriving on the field and in disposing his corps for the attack; failure to support Pickett on July 3; and maintenance of an attitude of disloyalty to Lee throughout the entire battle. These were serious charges.²⁵

²⁴ Pendleton's address was printed the year following its delivery as "Personal Recollections of General Lee," in *Southern Magazine* (Baltimore), XV (July-December, 1874), 603-36. The reference to Longstreet at Gettysburg is on pp. 623-29. See also Susan P. Lee, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton* (Philadelphia, 1893), 286-88, 463.

²⁵ For a severe criticism of Longstreet's role at Gettysburg by one of his contemporaries, see John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York, 1903), 160-61. The extreme in

To determine to what extent these charges were true becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. When one views the events and incidents through the medium of time, the evidence is not "overwhelming," as General Gordon wrote; on the contrary, it is doubtful whether any of the charges can be supported. Those who offered the fact that they had participated in the battle as proof of the accuracy of their charges against Longstreet may well have been laboring under misimpressions. Even had they intended to be truthful, the confusion of the battle would have prevented the participants from having the necessary detachment from the swift-moving action to assess each phase of it accurately. Furthermore, gossip and rumor, if untrue at first, can never become more true with the telling.

It is fortunate that there were witnesses who were not only able to view the whole battle, but who, in addition to possessing a sense of detachment, were trained observers. Colonel Fremantle saw practically all of the fighting from a vantage point on Seminary Ridge and heard much of the discussion and most of the orders. He heard the particular conference upon which most of the charges were based. With him was a soldier who was the product of an even more exacting school. This was Captain Justus Scheibert, a Prussian officer, who had been sent to the Confederate army as an official military observer. He, too, saw the battle from a favorable point of observation. These two soldiers of experience and ability provided some of the best available evidence of what happened during the next three days. A third and even more valuable witness was Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's aide and military secretary. His notes, while not written at the time, were compiled soon afterwards; and if they are anywise biased, they should be so in favor of Lee.

To return now to Longstreet, who was in conference with Lee at a point overlooking Cemetery Hill just as dusk settled on the scene of the preliminary Confederate successes. He later wrote:

I drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land surrounding. General Lee was engaged at the moment. He had announced beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the enemy's country. After the survey and in consideration of his plans, noting movements of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg Road, the relative positions for maneuver, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes from it, all marking the position as clearly

adverse criticism by a modern writer will be found in Freeman, *Lee*, III, especially pp. 86-161. Much of Freeman's evidence against Longstreet is distorted (as, for example, his statement on p. 552 of Volume III that "Longstreet issued his orders for the advance of his troops on the road to Gettysburg at 5:30 P.M. on the afternoon of July 1" and his citation of Sorrel to Walton, July 1, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 733, as his authority—when actually this order applied solely to the artillery). However, in spite of its pro-Lee, anti-Longstreet bias, Freeman's book is probably the best concise account of Gettysburg.

defensive, I said, "We could not call the enemy to a position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital." This when said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as striking the air with his closed hand, he said, "If he is there tomorrow I will attack him."²⁶

There is no other record of this conversation. From a position on Seminary Ridge it is quite possible to view the surrounding landscape for some distance. It is not possible, however, to see the terrain for a distance sufficient to warrant making the strategic movement proposed without added reconnaissance. It is obvious, therefore, either that Longstreet was already familiar with the geography of the area or that when he wrote, some strange trick of memory had convinced him that his hindsight was actually his foresight. One cannot construe his words to mean a tactical envelopment of Meade's left; they mean a strategic turning movement and an interposition of the Confederate army between Meade and Washington.


In view of Longstreet's experience and after close study of his tactical suggestions, it seems more likely that what he did suggest to Lee was a wide tactical envelopment of the Union left flank. He must have seen the necessity for battle; he was a skilled tactician. It was possible to view enough of the terrain and the general disposition of the Union forces to note that all factors seemed to favor such a plan. A very strong attack was clearly possible, and it might have succeeded if it could have been well co-ordinated.²⁷

Lee's manifest irritation is understandable. He had been surprised into battle on ground of the enemy's choosing. He must either fight or withdraw; he could no longer enjoy an uninterrupted exploitation of the rich areas of the Pennsylvania countryside. He also was upset by the fact of Stuart's continued absence, but it is difficult to understand why all needful information of the Union rear areas could not have been supplied by B. H. Robertson's cavalry, which was supposedly on his right flank and rear. Of course, he could have awaited Meade's attack—which might or might not have come—but such an attitude was not in keeping with Lee's character.²⁸ When one remembers that he was a sick man, having suffered for some time from a stubborn case of rheumatism, his irritation and apparent loss of poise are all the more understandable. Any general would have been irritated by such a

²⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 358. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 72-76.

²⁷ See Sickles to Butterfield, July 1, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 468; General Meade's circular of July 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 458-59; Reynolds to Butterfield, June 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 417; and Geo. G. Meade and Daniel E. Sickles, "The Meade-Sickles Controversy," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 413.

²⁸ See Stuart to Robertson, June 24, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 927; and Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 229. Cf. Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 56.



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

combination of circumstances. Longstreet's suggestions evidently ran counter to what Lee had already decided on, and for the moment his emotion took control and brought forth an expression of determination. Or it may have been a burst of anger—anger and chagrin at being caught in such disadvantageous circumstances.

Longstreet's recommendations were proper for one of his position. He evidenced the highest form of loyalty.²⁹ The intimacy that had long characterized the relations of Lee with his chief subordinate would have justified even greater protest on the part of Longstreet had he believed his commander to be in error. No censure, therefore, should be made of this act of Longstreet's; nor should Lee be criticised for rejecting it in favor of direct attack. He was in command, and his was the final decision.

As the first day of fighting came to a close, nine thousand of the forty thousand men engaged were killed or wounded, and more than five thousand Union prisoners had been taken. Of all those engaged, only Early had displayed the necessary energy and quick perception to bring about a local success. Had Heth and Rodes been equally as wholehearted, the Federal army might have received a crushing defeat, and Lee would have had a much better chance to occupy a strong position at Gettysburg and on the hills to the southeast. As the fierce fighting ended, five of the nine Confederate divisions were still on the march, and the whole of Longstreet's corps—which, owing to indifferent staff arrangements, had been passed by the trains of A. P. Hill's Third Corps—was too far distant to reach the field that night. Of the four divisions engaged, two were exhausted; but Early's and Pender's were fit for further action. Had they but pressed on, the result would most probably have been the capture of Cemetery Hill. Having received discretionary orders from Lee, Ewell did not permit Early to clinch his first success.³⁰

When night came, Lee, seeking some solution to his problem, seems first to have entertained the idea of attacking the Union right; but Ewell, with whom he conferred, countered with a plan that fresh troops should assault the Union left while he enveloped the flank which Early had driven back. Although not wholly convinced, Lee tentatively accepted Ewell's plan, which he later announced to his corps commanders, who had assembled on Seminary Ridge. Neither Ewell nor A. P. Hill was present when the conference began; but Hill soon arrived, remarking that he had been unwell for the last

²⁹ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 74. Freeman did not admit that Longstreet's action was proper.

³⁰ Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, 205. In reference to the actual rate of march of one element in Lee's army late on June 29, General Howard reported that it took A. P. Hill's corps, with a reported strength of 22,740 men, 68 pieces of artillery, and the transportation following each brigade, from 4:30 P.M. until after 10 P.M. to pass through the town of Gettysburg. O. O. Howard to Butterfield, June 30, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 422.

day or so. He looked out of sorts and commented somewhat complainingly on the fact that he had had two of his divisions engaged nearly all day, but he emphasized that they had driven the enemy back to Cemetery Hill.⁸¹

When the conference ended, it was understood that Longstreet should push his march and come up on the right of the Confederate line promptly to make the attack on the Union left, and that the battle on the left—that is, Ewell's attack—should start with the sound of Longstreet's guns. No detailed orders were published, nor did Lee set an hour for the attack to open. Too much depended on when sufficient troops could arrive to warrant launching the attack. In fact, there seems to have been a decided reservation in Lee's mind that conditions the next day might not justify the plan of battle which had been tentatively settled upon. After another reconnaissance in the morning, final orders could be given.⁸²

In this connection, it should be borne in mind by the reader that Longstreet did not know at the time of this conference—at the end of the first day's battle—just where the right of the Confederate line would be on the next morning. The right of the line during the battle of the first day was at Seminary Ridge. When the battle of the second day started it was considerably farther to the south. Longstreet marched directly to the right of the line as it was at the end of the first day's fighting and opposite where the conference had taken place. He might just as well have marched across country, and under cover, to the Round Tops, had he known for certain that that position was to be the right of the line. The evidence is too indefinite to be certain as to the point to which Lee, in the early evening of July 1, wished Longstreet to march. What he wished at about 10:30 the following morning was expressed in his orders to Longstreet and may have been something entirely different.

Although the question has been raised as to whether Lee should have fought at Gettysburg, the events of the first day had made a retreat inadvisable and hardly feasible. He was too far committed to action to reverse the march of his huge column, which was now cumbered with several thousand wounded and prisoners. One third of the Federal army had been defeated. The thought of victory loomed large in Lee's mind; the obvious strength of Meade's position he ignored. Could he but bring up his forces and employ them promptly and in concert, victory would come to the South. Lee decided to attack.

⁸¹ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 260.

⁸² At 5:30 P.M., July 1, Longstreet sent word to his chief of artillery to push the march. See Sorrel to Walton, July 1, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 733; and Freeman, *Lee*, III, 74 ff.

The First Corps at Gettysburg

AFTER THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN DETERMINED TO ATTACK THE Union position the next day (July 2), General Longstreet and Colonel Fremantle rode side by side along the Cashtown Pike back to the headquarters of the First Corps. Progress was slow, and it was late in the evening when they dismounted before their bivouac near the eastern exit of the little mountain village of Cashtown. For some miles they had passed the tired, straggling veterans of the First Corps, who were marching through the darkness to positions near the battlefield.

A frugal supper awaited the tired officers, and during its course Longstreet found a ready listener in his British guest. He spoke soberly of the strong enemy position—which he considered very formidable—and went on to say that the Union troops would undoubtedly add to its defensive power by entrenching during the night. The almost accidental clash of the afternoon before called forth much critical comment from Longstreet and his staff. Ewell, in particular, was mentioned unfavorably. Fremantle received the impression that neither Lee nor Longstreet had intended that the fighting should begin that day. It had deranged the Confederate plans, especially the idea of June 28 for a leisurely concentration and the retention of the initiative. Also, it destroyed at once all chance for Lee to continue the tactical defensive. To withdraw now would be to court disaster. Longstreet saw all this clearly and had advanced his solution to Lee's dilemma only to have it rejected. He remained unconvinced that Lee's plan to attack Meade in position was either sound or called for by the situation. He considered his plan to be the better of the two. But it had become his fight, and he felt and talked as if he had an equal responsibility with Lee.

In considering the great battle which opened the following day and Longstreet's part in it, certain data should be kept in mind. A heavy burden of criticism has been directed against Longstreet for an allegedly unnecessary delay on July 2, both in arriving with his corps at the scene of battle and afterwards in moving into his assigned position.¹ From the known elements of

¹ Battine wrote that the divisions of McLaws and Hood continued the march at dawn but were halted at Willoughby Run until noon, awaiting the arrival of Law's brigade. Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, 221. Colonel Battine was confused as to the details of the march. For

time and space, the size of the forces involved (which can be determined with reasonable accuracy), and the facts which are of record, it is possible to reconstruct the movement of the First Corps with some degree of exactness. Also, there were witnesses who were both impartial and competent.

Colonel Fremantle has stated: "We all got up at 3:30 A.M., and breakfasted a little before daylight. . . . I arrived at 5 at the same commanding position we were on yesterday, and I climbed a tree in company with Captain Scheibert of the Prussian army. Just below us were seated Generals Lee, Hill, Longstreet, and Hood, in consultation General Heth was also present. . . ." ² This would seem to fix the time of Longstreet's arrival in person as before 5 A.M.

The real point at issue is the hour at which Longstreet's corps came up. How soon could it have come up? The main body of the First Corps had bivouacked between Greenwood and Cashtown, while some of the leading troops (McLaws' division) were strung out along Marsh Creek—about four miles west of Gettysburg. These leading elements did not reach their camp sites until after midnight.³ As nearly as can be determined, some of McLaws' division camped along the pike between Cashtown and Marsh Creek. The men rose about 3:30 A.M. on July 2. It would have taken them at least an hour to complete camp duties, breakfast, form, and move out on the road. If the preparations were made promptly, the head of the column would have started at about 4:30 A.M. The rate of march could not have exceeded two miles an hour, as the road was one-way, uphill, and probably choked with stragglers, the wounded, and broken equipment. The rate may well have been forced back to one and three-quarter miles an hour. The earliest that the head of the column could have reached the point of assembly on Seminary Ridge would thus have been about 7 A.M., and this would have called for a forced march, good march discipline, and contained progress.⁴

"At 7," wrote Fremantle, "I rode over part of the ground with General Longstreet, and saw him disposing McLaws' division for today's fight."⁵ What Fremantle had reference to, undoubtedly, was the fact that the head of McLaws' division had come up at that hour and that Longstreet in person was conducting it to an assembly area as part of the development for battle. Now as to the remainder of the column: On the eve of the clash at Gettysburg, the First Corps—that is, those of the First Corps who were up—numbered in round figures 15,000 officers and men, 84 guns and at least as many

statements by Longstreet's contemporaries that he deliberately delayed on July 2, see Walter H. Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*. . . . (New York, 1877), 99; Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 161; Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 234; and Sorrel, *Recollections*, 167.

² Fremantle, *Three Months*, 263.

⁴ See Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 56.

³ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 361.

⁵ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 263.

caissons, and about 150 wagons in the combat train.⁶ This would give a minimum for logistics computations. The road space for the First Corps (less Pickett's division, which was still at Chambersburg) was 13,950 yards or 7.9 miles. This assumes that the march discipline was perfect, that there was no straggling, and that the men marched in fours well closed up and with no gaps in the column. Translated into time, the distance represents 3.5 hours at a rate of two and one-quarter miles per hour, 3.96 hours at a rate of two miles per hour, or 4.5 hours at a rate of one and three-quarter miles an hour. From head to tail of Longstreet's column there was a time element of better than three and one-half hours; or, stated otherwise, the tail of the column would arrive at the assembly area at approximately 10:30 A.M. on July 2.

Could it have come up earlier? A forced march during the night would have gained an hour or so—but at the risk of having the troops unfit for battle on arrival. Had they arrived earlier under such march conditions, a rest would have been imperative; so it matters little whether they rested at Marsh Creek or on Seminary Ridge, as far as the time element is concerned. It must be remembered that to take part in battle calls for the utmost in physical and moral power. Longstreet's men had had a tiresome march on the previous day; they had reached their bivouacs late, had risen before daylight, and had a march of some three hours to face with the prospect of battle when the march was ended. To have demanded more of them at that time would have detracted from their battle efficiency when they did arrive on the ground. ~~There seems to have been no unreasonable delay during this march to battle.~~⁷

Once up, did Longstreet delay in putting his troops into the fight? It seems fairly well established that Lee was engaged in making a reconnaissance along the line that morning and at 10:30 A.M. was somewhere on his left front. Although a tentative decision had been made the evening before, Lee had not fully decided just where he would strike. During this morning survey, he decided to attack the Federal left and attempt to seize the ground before the Round Tops. He then, at 11 A.M., issued his orders. The next move

⁶ The data as to the strength of Longstreet's command have been taken from the official returns in the *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. II, 291, and reconciled with those given in Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. III, Book II, 414, in an effort to determine the exact strength of the First Corps as of June 30, 1863. The field returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for June 10, 20, and 30 and July 10 were recorded in the *Official Records* as "not on file," but the field returns of July 20 give for Longstreet's corps a total of 13,003 present for duty. *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. II, 291. The "returns of casualties," Army of Northern Virginia, July 1-3, 1863, *ibid.*, 346, give the Gettysburg losses as 7,539; this total differs only slightly from the table of losses following Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, 364. The number present for duty—13,003—added to the Gettysburg losses—7,539—equals 20,542. Allowing for stragglers, it seems reasonable to assume that a total of 15,000 went into battle.

⁷ A frank discussion of this point is to be found in Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns*, 98 ff. Freeman also gave much space to these matters. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 80-90. See also Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. III, Book II, 448.

was to conduct the troops to their place in the line of battle. The distance from where the men were assembled to the center of the front to be occupied by Longstreet was some three miles as the crow flies. If, however, we consider the twists and turns of the mountain trails and the routes to be followed in order to hide the movement from the enemy, this distance may be doubled or trebled. A march across country moves at a slower speed than a march on roads. It rarely progresses faster than one mile an hour. The minimum time required for Longstreet's movement to the right would be greater than three hours, and the maximum would run over six. Considering the distance and the type of march, arrival in position for attack could not be expected before 2 P.M. and might be extended to about 6 P.M. Anything between these extremes may be assumed with equal propriety.⁸

Various accounts have stated that Lee was disturbed and irritated because the First Corps was slow in getting into position. That is quite possible. The marching of the First Corps was normal; and when one is anxious to get down to business, anything that is normal appears to be slow. Lee wanted to launch his attack. One must not forget that the problem confronting him was such as to cause him great concern. Already he had been forced to fight on ground of the enemy's choosing, with limited information concerning the hostile dispositions; and he was probably disappointed that nothing fruitful had come from the discretionary orders which he had given Ewell the previous afternoon. Anyone in Lee's position that morning would have been distressed that the entire army was not up and ready for instant battle. But this does not mean that any one of his corps commanders had failed to make every effort to be there.⁹

The most significant answer to the charge that Longstreet delayed is that the march to the right was made under the control and guidance of one of Lee's staff. Sorrel, who occupies the position of Longstreet's Boswell, has said that "much valuable time was lost by this trial [that is, seeking covered routes of approach], which with better knowledge of the ground by General Lee's engineers would not have been attempted." Some delay also was occasioned when the infantry halted at a road fork which was exposed to hostile observation while the guide sought new routes. According to Alexander, this held up the battle some two hours. Longstreet's comments on the delay are caustic. Finally, taking matters into his own hands, he doubled Hood's column and marched it directly into position under cover of its own

⁸ Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 93 ff.; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 365-84. See also Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. III, Book II, 448-49.

⁹ Lee to Davis, June 23, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 925, 931-32; Davis to Lee, June 28, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 76; Cooper to *id.*, June 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 75.

scouts. Whatever slowness there was in the approach march may, therefore, be charged against Lee's engineer and reconnaissance officers.¹⁰

In the lead and on the side nearer the enemy, R. H. Anderson, of A. P. Hill's corps, had small skirmishes while moving up. Since his division was the base of the deployment, some delay occurred until the enemy was quieted. Eventually the First Corps arrived. Anderson was the right of the middle corps, and on his right came McLaws and then Hood. Longstreet has stated that he had no cavalry to cover the extreme right. Hood spread his troops in a partial envelopment of the Federal left (General Daniel E. Sickles), while McLaws massed his brigades near the forward crest of the Peach Orchard. The ground in front of McLaws was not difficult; but that facing Hood was rugged, broken, and hard for foot troops, and it offered little opportunity to use artillery. Hood made repeated requests to be permitted to move his division more to the right so as to cut around Sickles' left, but each request was denied by Longstreet with the statement that Lee had directed that the attack be made up the Emmitsburg Road.¹¹

The artillery preparation commenced about 3:30 P.M., and the infantry attack followed some thirty minutes later. In Longstreet's front was the III Corps in a very strong position, with supports immediately available from the II and V Corps. The defensive position was so laid out that A. A. Humphreys and D. B. Birney, who held the line on the right and left, brought flanking fire to bear on the Confederate skirmishers as they crossed the ground, dodging from boulder to boulder. A concerted advance was impossible. In rear of the first enemy line and between the position and Little Round Top was the section of terrain known as the Devil's Den.

Hood's attack went forward fiercely, with McLaws in close support. The Union line broke; it was then pushed back beyond the Devil's Den to the line of the Round Tops. The fighting was terrific; the losses, sickening. Hood went down; and E. M. Law, who had marched at 3 A.M. from Chambersburg,

¹⁰ According to Freeman, this officer was Captain Samuel R. Johnston of the Engineers. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 86, 89, 94, 96, 97. See Johnston's statement, quoted in Fitzhugh Lee, "A Review of the First Two Days' Operations at Gettysburg and a Reply to General Longstreet," in *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Richmond, Va.), V (April, 1878), 183-84; Sorrel, *Recollections*, 169; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 392. The writer computes the loss of time for this cause at about one hour. If the conclusions expressed in Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. III, Book II, 448-49, are correct the additional hour could well have been that period during which Longstreet waited for McLaws. Although Livermore did not say so directly, he did intimate that Longstreet did not march for an hour. Other accounts indicate that Longstreet commenced the march but stated that he would like to wait for McLaws. See also Freeman, *Lee*, II, 96-97; and Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 366.

¹¹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 365; Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 57 ff.; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 394; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 98-99. See also paper by the writer, "Was Longstreet a Scapegoat?" in *Infantry Journal* (Washington, D.C.), XLIII (January-February, 1936), 39-46.

succeeded to the command. Longstreet was out in front, leading his troops in person with splendid effect, as Sorrel has said; "his fine horsemanship as he rode, hat in hand, and martial figure were most inspiring." Alexander later wrote that it was unfortunate that Lee was not present, as the concerted attack of the whole line failed because of lack of co-ordination. Ewell and A. P. Hill were supposed to support Longstreet strongly, but their effort was limited to artillery fire; R. H. Anderson's division became spectators, and the attack was made piecemeal. Alexander said further: "Longstreet, of course, is responsible, but every commanding officer takes great risks when he leaves such important movements without supervision. . . . Few battlefields can furnish examples of worse tactics."¹²


But was Longstreet charged with co-ordinating the whole Confederate attack? No; but he *was* responsible for the co-ordination of his own attack. It would seem that he failed in this.

When darkness settled over the field, the assault was stopped and the lines adjusted. Longstreet's losses exceeded six thousand, which was not surprising, as his fifteen thousand men had been pitted against the left of the Union army in single combat while the remainder of Lee's forces took little part. The First Corps had fought to the point of exhaustion; and while Longstreet had been losing men on all sides, the Federal army had been growing stronger hourly. The fighting died away as the line was fixed along Plum Run and the Devil's Den. Thus the second day at Gettysburg ended with still some slight advantage to the Confederates.

During this day Longstreet twice offended Lee. He first did so by recurring to his proposed movement by Meade's left. While awaiting the arrival of his corps at the assembly point on Seminary Ridge, he again urged Lee to abandon the direct attack in favor of a strong advance around the Union left. He spent precious time in arguing with his superior in the attempt to impose his ideas on Lee, who had already announced his course of action.¹³ Though this caused no delay, as the First Corps was not yet arrived on Seminary Ridge, it was certainly impolitic. Longstreet may have felt—and somewhat justly so, in view of his past relations with his chief—that as second in command he was possessed of a freedom to make suggestions whenever he chose. The question of when a principal lieutenant must cease to give advice is always a moot one. But it would seem that as Lee had announced his decision, suggestions for a change in the general plan were out of place; and, furthermore, according to accounts, when Longstreet was making these suggestions,

¹² Sorrel, *Recollections*, 168; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 397. It is assumed that Alexander's account is an eyewitness one.

¹³ Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, 220.



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

he exhibited a degree of impatience with Lee that is deserving of unfavorable comment. It is also true that Lee himself was not possessed of his usual poise during this conference. A much better attitude on the part of Longstreet would have been for him to have accepted the decision of his superior and to have thrown himself into Lee's program with enthusiasm.

[Longstreet's second offense was much more likely to have caused disaster. In fixing his attention on personal troop leadership, Longstreet failed to co-ordinate his attack. The progressive infiltration of brigades did not work out well, and some of his units failed to get into the fight in time to be of use. It is a curious thing that this, the most serious charge to be laid against Longstreet on this day, has gone unnoticed by nearly all his critics. To express the opinion of a soldier, it is impossible to find any justification for a corps commander taking a position in front of a regiment and there, mounted and with hat in hand, waving it on to the attack. In thus stepping down from his proper place and assuming the duties of a regimental commander, Longstreet lost control of the battle as a whole. There was no necessity for any such action.

The results of the second day's fighting were sufficient to warrant a continuation of the attack next day. Longstreet's corps bivouacked on the ground which it had won; on the left, no further success had been gained by either Hill or Ewell. The Confederate left had been engaged at one time or another—sometimes heavily—but the assaults were never made in concert. The results were of no help to Longstreet, nor were they of much aid in furthering Lee's plans. The losses had been heavy—unusually so among the higher-ranking officers—but the indications were that the Union losses had been equally great. In fact, the pressure of the Confederate attack had been so strong that Meade had called a council of war; and the decision to remain in position for another day's fighting had been the result of a vote of a majority of Meade's corps and division commanders.¹⁴

Night descended to blot out the scene of strife, and the tired troops lay down to catch what rest was possible. Longstreet remained with his soldiers, sending a staff officer to report to Lee, who was at his headquarters some four miles distant. The pressing need was to reconnoiter the ground before any further attack was made, and this duty was supervised in person by Longstreet. Scouting parties roamed the front throughout the night, seeking some weak point which could be made the opening for an attack to crush the Federal left. This point was found—just where is not stated—and Longstreet was

¹⁴ See General Gibbon's account, John Gibbon, "The Council of War on the Second Day," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 313.

commencing to make needful changes in his dispositions when Lee rode up.¹⁵

It was now daylight on the third. The two leaders made a joint inspection of the front, and shortly thereafter Lee stated the substance of his plans for the day. He announced that he had decided on an assault of the Union center by a column of detachments from both McLaws and Hood together with Pickett's division, which had come up from its provost duty at Chambersburg on the previous day. Longstreet raised instant objection to the weakening of either McLaws or Hood. Neither could spare men from their lines, as they were faced by twenty thousand determined Federal troops—who could, at the first indications of a lessening of the forces in their front, bear down on the Southern right, catch any assaulting column in the flank and crush it, and thus open the way for a move across Lee's line of communications. On Longstreet's right was some hostile cavalry, seeking constantly to drive in and cause embarrassment. Longstreet argued further that a minimum of thirty thousand men should be in this grand assault. With the exception of Pickett's division—and even he had had a heavy march—the others had been through severe fighting on the second. Longstreet pointed out that the front over which the assault must move for nearly a mile was exposed to both artillery and small-arms fire and that the way lay up a uniform grade which could be swept by a devastating flanking fire from the Federal salients on either side. This protest, made in all seriousness, was perfectly proper.¹⁶

Lee again expressed impatience. He estimated the open distance at about fourteen hundred yards of maximum exposure, and he added that Hood and McLaws should remain on the defensive while Pickett would be reinforced by divisions from the Third Corps. Lee next designated the point of the attack and stipulated that the column should be composed of fifteen thousand men. Longstreet again registered opposition and stated his objections frankly. His reply to Lee, if we may trust the wording in his story of the affair, was dignified, yet verging on insubordination: "I have been a soldier, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body of fifteen thousand men who could make that attack successfully." This amounted to a flat declaration that Longstreet had no faith in Lee's tactical program.¹⁷

¹⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 385, seems to be the only authority for this. See, however, Freeman, *Lee*, III, 107, which intimates that Longstreet had some special tactical plan in mind.

¹⁶ Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*, 103. All accounts agree that Longstreet was considerably upset by Lee's proposal and registered strong objection on the ground that it was tactically wrong. Lee's insistence must have been a great shock to Longstreet.

¹⁷ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 386; James Longstreet, "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 343.

What Lee could have done (as he had done when Longstreet declared his lack of faith in the Harper's Ferry venture during the Maryland campaign) was to designate some other officer to arrange for the attack—that is, if he had decided to go ahead with it in spite of Longstreet's strong advice to the contrary. Instead of this, however, Lee betrayed intense displeasure, loss of poise, and impatience and gave Longstreet direct and peremptory orders to carry out his wishes. There was nothing else for Longstreet to do but to obey these orders, which he did. He notified Pickett and made a detailed reconnaissance of the position to be assaulted. He next conducted the troops to their place in the line and there ordered them to lie down and get what rest was possible. He then gave orders for artillery preparation. Having done all this, and having left the conduct of artillery fire in the hands of E. P. Alexander with instructions to notify him when the fire was effective, Longstreet rode to a small copse of trees, dismounted, and lay down to rest.

It is of interest to examine the details of the orders for this supreme effort and to consider the problem facing Pickett. According to Colonel Walter H. Taylor, who was present at the conference between Lee and Longstreet, it was never intended that Pickett's weak division of about five thousand men should bear the entire burden of the assault. Taylor's understanding of the plan was that Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front. Lee evidently planned to strengthen Pickett's attack with reinforcements drawn from his center (A. P. Hill's corps). Heth was designated as being available, as were J. H. Lane and A. M. Scales from Pender's division. The charge was to be preceded by intense artillery preparation by the guns under Alexander. This was intended to silence the hostile batteries and open the way for a sweeping forward movement after the main assault had penetrated the Union lines. Fifteen thousand men were to cross an open slope, first going downward to a small stream and then moving up to the heights on which the Union army was in position. These slopes were gently undulating, and there was no cover on them to block the effectiveness of the enemy fire. And from the Federal right center on Cemetery Hill, flanking fire could be brought to bear on Pickett's left flank and on his supports echeloned in rear.¹⁸

The advance was to be made in three waves, each somewhat in rear of the left of the preceding line. Pickett, who was to lead, was the farthest to the right; then Pettigrew and I. R. Trimble were to follow. C. M. Wilcox's brigade (of A. P. Hill's corps) was to cover Pickett's right and close the gap between it and McLaws' division. The direction of the attack was to be straight to the front and directed at the hostile left center. The objective was to pierce the Union line and then to turn back the flanks. As a general support, Ewell

¹⁸ Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*, 103 ff.

was directed to assault the enemy extreme right simultaneously, which action would prevent the movement of the Federal reserves toward the center; A. P. Hill was ordered to engage the center along his front to create a diversion. On the Confederate right, the remainder of Longstreet's corps had the mission of keeping the enemy quiet on the Round Tops and in the valley to the west. Longstreet also had to watch Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry, which threatened his right rear.¹⁹

Lee was now so committed to the action that he must go through with it. He could not now turn back without serious consequences. On the morning of July 3, it was apparent that some decisive blow must be struck that day, as the munitions were low and the supplies limited. The attack on the left on July 1 had failed; the next day's assaults on the right had been stopped short of their objective; and now, this third day's effort was to be made against the center. Had Longstreet's plan for an envelopment of the Union left been followed, this stalemate might have been avoided; at least it could have resulted in nothing worse. But now the time for such a plan was gone. Meade had shown that he was not going to retire—that much was plain—and Lee could not extricate his army from contact without chancing this last effort. He did not fear the result; he expected to win. The days of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had taught him that audacity plus skill were more than a match for greater numbers. He was determined in his course; and neither the manifestly superior numbers and position of the enemy nor the advice of one who had shown his loyalty and ability in many a hard-fought battle could turn him from his purpose.²⁰

The artillery opened fire at 1 P.M. Two hours later, as the Federal batteries slackened, Alexander sent word to Longstreet that the attack must be launched or it would be too late. Pickett rode up to Longstreet for orders. Knowing what those orders must be, Longstreet felt that he could not bear to meet Pickett's flashing eyes and view his gallant figure. He later wrote: "I was convinced that he would be leading his troops to needless slaughter, and did not speak. He repeated the question, and without opening my lips I bowed in answer. In a determined voice Pickett said: 'Sir, I shall lead my division forward.' He remounted his horse and rode back to his command."²¹

General Pickett's description of this scene is not less filled with emotion. In a letter to his wife written just after the return to Virginia, Pickett said:

¹⁹ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 237 ff.

²⁰ See Lee to Davis, July 31, 1863, in Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches*, 108-11. In this dispatch Lee gave a brief "unofficial" account of the battle and stated that he expected to be successful.

²¹ Longstreet, "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 345.

At the beginning of the fight I was so sanguine, so sure of success! . . . I had been assured by Alexander that General Lee had ordered that every brigade in his command was to charge Cemetery Hill; so I had no fear of not being supported. Alexander also assured me of the support of his artillery. . . . At about a quarter to three o'clock, when his written order to make the charge was handed to me, and dear Old Peter after reading it in sorrow and fear reluctantly bowed his head in assent, I obeyed, leading my three brigades straight on the enemy's front. . . . They moved across that field of death as a battalion marches forward in line of battle upon drill. . . . Two lines of the enemy's infantry were driven back; two lines of guns were taken—and no support came. Pendleton, without Alexander's knowledge, had sent four of the guns . . . to some other part of the field, and the other three guns could not be found. The two brigades which were to have followed me had . . . been seriously engaged . . . the two previous days. Both of their commanding officers had been killed, and while they had been replaced by gallant, competent officers, these new leaders were unknown to the men. . . .²²

Just what had happened? When Longstreet clasped the hand of his friend and comrade, Pickett, and gave him the signal to move forward, it was with the expectation that Pickett would fail and his gallant division be cut to pieces. Although Lee had planned for Ewell and A. P. Hill to make simultaneous attacks in support of Pickett's assault, Longstreet doubted that this support would be forthcoming. The experience of the previous two days had convinced him that the lines were too extended for concerted action.

→ There was every indication that this attack must fail because it did not have sufficient weight to crash through the Union lines and still provide protection for the flanks after the break-through. To reach the Union center would be comparatively easy; but to lock it in mortal combat and escape destruction, Pickett must count on, and be furnished with, a strong supporting attack on both flanks. He could expect little further help from the First Corps, as it had a flank mission and was already facing a hostile cavalry force reinforced by infantry. Pickett must receive support from Ewell and A. P. Hill in order to pin the enemy to the ground and deal the death blow at the center.

Pickett moved out. As he sat lightly in the saddle leading his troops, the breeze set in motion the long hair which flowed down over his shoulders. The solid line marched forward over the crest of the slope as if on parade. Alexander's gun sights were lifted, and the shot poured over the heads of the advancing infantry. Gaps now began to appear in the ranks, and the hillside was soon spotted with small black dots. The gaps closed; the march went bravely forward. Longstreet watched it with straining eyes, and soon he ordered McLaws and Hood to move in closer and be ready to charge the

²² Arthur Crew Inman (ed.), *Soldier of the South: Pickett's Letters to His Wife* (New York, 1928), 105–106.

moment Pickett struck the Union center. But the Federal line was too long to be contained by the remainder of Longstreet's corps. It commenced to give trouble on the right; and although support had been promised from A. P. Hill on the left, none came. General Edward Johnson, who had been reinforced by two brigades from Rodes's and one from Early's division to make a diversion on the extreme left, had not waited for Pickett to advance. He had plunged forward into battle before the preparations were completed; and by the time Pickett started, the attack on the left had worn itself out. Colonel Marshall offered the explanation that as Johnson had already committed his forces to the assault, it was too late to recall him to await the main attack.²³


But the Third Corps was not committed to battle. Although Lee was with A. P. Hill at the time and was surrounded by his staff, no effort appears to have been made to throw all of the Third Corps into the fight to ease the pressure on Pickett. Thus, the entire Federal army maneuvered at will to bring maximum fire power and mass to bear against those gallant brigades, which had now reached the line of the Union artillery.

Pettigrew, who was echeloned in rear of Pickett's left, could not keep up; and a fatal gap appeared between the two. Wilcox, in rear of Pickett's right, commenced to give ground, and thus he let in the Union counterthrusts. The Union line to the right and the left of Pickett was not occupied in meeting supporting attacks and was therefore able to turn a concentrated fire on Pickett when he became imbedded in the Federal line. Wilcox soon became so seriously involved in holding his own that he could give no further support to Pickett. The trouble came largely from the right front. The weakness on Pickett's left was corrected when Trimble moved forward, but the pressure on Wilcox and the left of McLaws' division grew stronger.

Garnett went down—killed—and Kemper and Trimble fell, severely wounded. Lane took command and, with Pettigrew's aid, helped to steady the ranks and hold the left intact. The impact against Pickett was terrific, yet he crashed through the first hostile line and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Union gunners. He was surrounded by infantry, but still his men fought on. General Lewis A. Armistead, who led the second wave, strove manfully to bring effective support to Pickett; but he was shot down. Pettigrew was wounded but refused to quit the field. The hostile infantry closed in on Pickett; he was surrounded. There was but one thing for him to do and that was to get out as best he could.

When Pickett saw the press of the enemy reinforcements and realized the hopelessness of his position, he gave the order to retire. The troops withdrew slowly and in good order under a terrific cannonade and a devastating small-

²³ Colonel Marshall's statement, in Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 238.



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

arms fire. The last charge had failed. It was beyond the ability of even fifteen thousand to hold against such overwhelming numbers.

How far is Longstreet to be blamed for the results of this third day's attack? He was charged with the preparation for the advance and the formation of the troops; he was given the power to decide when the attack should begin. But he was not charged with the co-ordination of the supporting assaults on the left. This was Lee's responsibility. Why had Pickett failed? Not because of Longstreet. Sheer weight of superior numbers had forced his retirement. There was no concert of action. And the blame for this rests squarely on those members of Lee's staff who were charged with the mission of co-ordinating the whole action. They should have been all along the line giving needful orders in the name of their commander to ensure that the plans would go through successfully. The ultimate responsibility must rest with Lee, since he was in a position to view the action and thus direct those movements which were not being undertaken as had been contemplated. He was in command.²⁴

Longstreet had no heart for the task before him; that much was evident. He forecast the result. Did he do all that he could to make the assault a success? It might be charged that his lack of faith in the attack was transmitted to his troops, with a subsequent lessening of morale.²⁵ Such a conclusion is hardly warranted; at least, the conduct of the attack does not lead one to that conclusion. Too much has been made of the incident. Had Lee deemed it of sufficient importance, he would have selected some other commander. Our knowledge of Lee makes this conclusion inescapable.

It also appears that not all of the Confederate artillery participated in the preparation—a fact which was noticeable after the infantry attack was launched. Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery, who personally made severe charges against Longstreet in afteryears concerning this very same engagement, had moved some of the guns which Alexander had planned to use to support Pickett's advance. When Pickett actually moved forward, there were no reserve guns or additional ammunition. Colonel Marshall has said that the fact that artillery ammunition was so far reduced was not reported to Lee. The failure to keep Lee advised on these matters seems clearly to have been a matter of neglect on the part of his chief of artillery—another indication of faulty staff work. As a result, Pickett reached the crisis of the assault with little or no artillery support. It seems a bit unfair to lay all the blame upon Longstreet, as Colonel William Allan did.²⁶

²⁴ On this subject, see Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, 255.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 257.

²⁶ Colonel Marshall's statement, in Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 238-40. See also William Allan, "A Reply to General Longstreet," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 356; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 107-109.

After Pickett's repulse from the Union lines, Longstreet's emotions cooled. His disagreement with Lee was forgotten as he prepared to meet the changed situation with all the skill at his command. His calm and deliberate estimate of the situation evidenced a greater strength of character than he had shown before. Fremantle thought him perfectly balanced and unperturbed; and when the British colonel remarked that he would not have missed the day's fighting for the world, Longstreet answered: "The devil you wouldn't! I would have liked to miss it very much. . . ." Longstreet at once made the necessary changes in artillery locations and other troop dispositions so as to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the Confederate repulse. By his force and personality he rallied the broken ranks and corrected any tendency to break for the rear. He was savage. He was brutal in his snap and drive. He was sarcastic and uncompromising with those who were on the verge of quitting the field. Witness his reply to Pettigrew's complaint that he could not get his men to move: "Very well; never mind then, General, just let them remain where they are; the enemy's going to advance, and will spare you the trouble." But he had gentleness, too—a gentleness which softened his rebuke to those who thought the end had come. Never before had he evidenced his high qualities of leadership so fully as when he laid his arms across the shoulders of Pickett's men as they stumbled back from that vale of Gettysburg.²⁷

"If Longstreet's conduct was admirable, that of General Lee was perfectly sublime." Thus Fremantle paid ungrudging tribute to the worth of the two leaders. Lee was with his troops at once and his quiet voice brought calmness to his frightened and sullen soldiers. Each general had his particular mode of approach; each met his men as the situation required; each was successful. The tide to the rear was stemmed before it rose to flood proportions, and the veterans turned steadily and formed ranks to meet Meade should he venture to cross the valley. The remembrance of Longstreet's remonstrance with Lee is blotted out by the memory of his gallant and helpful leadership and his zealous loyalty during the aftermath of this fateful day. The incidents surrounding Longstreet's objection to the charge had passed from the minds of both Lee and Longstreet, and it was only after the great Southern leader was at rest that the tongues of those who could not speak with authority, made the charges of failure to obey Lee's orders.

That night, when the battle was over and calm had been restored, Longstreet was still with his men or at the side of his commander in consultation. We do not know what words passed between the two men, yet we may be certain that the strong bonds of loyalty, courage, and comradeship which had been forged were still intact.

For Lee's failure at Gettysburg, many causes have been advanced. Most

²⁷ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 272-73.

critics seem to desire to absolve Lee from any and all responsibility. This is unfortunate and something which Lee would object to if it were possible for him to speak. Lee tried for the impossible—and lost. He wrote to President Davis on July 31: "No blame can be attached to the army for a failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public—I am alone to blame, in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and valor."²⁸

Heth's impetuosity in attacking Buford was the direct cause of the accidental clash at Gettysburg and the subsequent piecemeal development for battle. In the three days of fighting that followed, there were three distinct battles rather than one continuous engagement. On July 1, Buford carried on a delaying action with Heth's advance guard. When the Union cavalry became exhausted, the I Corps arrived opportunely and took its place. About noon the XI Corps came up and prolonged the Federal line around the north of Gettysburg. It had barely deployed when Rodes's Confederate division marched to the assault. Early soon joined Rodes and, with his accustomed energy, drove home a smashing attack, which crumpled the Union XI Corps and destroyed the right of the I Corps. The Federal line was driven back on Cemetery Hill with disastrous loss. Here the fighting stopped. No further assaults were launched, although Lee had urged a continuation of the effort if practicable. There seems to have been no compelling reason why the Confederate advance should not have topped Cemetery Hill that night. Stopping the attack seems to have been Ewell's blunder.

The plans for the second day's battle involved a co-ordinated attack, with Longstreet making the main effort against the Union left while Ewell made a strong enveloping attack around the Union right. At least four miles separated the two wings. Co-ordination was to have been effected by Ewell's moving at the sound of Longstreet's guns. At best, this was risky procedure. Longstreet's corps was too far away to enable it to come up at dawn. The delay in launching the combined attack gave opportunity for the Federal commander to bring up reinforcements and to strengthen the position. "It is easy to see now," as Colonel Cecil Battine has said, "that an attack at dawn against Cemetery Hill with the whole available strength of Hill's and Ewell's corps would have been the best course for the Confederate General. Longstreet's corps coming up in reserve would have been available before noon to turn the scale had the victory been doubtful, and to have initiated a relentless pursuit had the battle been won by that hour."²⁹ Success failed on the second day because Lee chose to execute the most difficult of the plans proposed by

²⁸ Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches*, 110. See also Fitzhugh Lee, *General Lee* (New York, 1898), 281, and Freeman, *Lee*, III, 147-53.

²⁹ Battine, *Crisis of the Confederacy*, 206. Note the time set by Colonel Battine for the arrival of Longstreet's corps.

Ewell; it required perfect co-ordination—something which was not possible without staff work of superior quality.

Having twice tried vainly to dislodge Meade, Lee laid his plan to pierce the center on the third day. This, too, failed of success, because the main thrust was made without supporting attacks all along the line which would prevent or hamper the movement of the Federal reserves. The determining causes of the three successive failures seem to lie in the tactical error of the Confederate commander in not supporting any one of the attacks at the right moment. Stuart's absence made the clash premature; Ewell's hesitation lost the first day's opportunity; faulty staff work made the assaults of the second and third days unproductive.

Lee was surprised into battle; and once he was in the fight, the cold analytical quality of his reasoning seems to have been blunted. At all events, he was not himself. Perhaps he succumbed to one or two spasms of intense anger—there seems to be evidence that he did. He failed to see that the odds were against him in an attack on the positions which Meade occupied. The one man who spoke up, and declaimed passionately and with insistence that the foe stood fast only because he was ready and willing to accept the decision of battle, was James Longstreet. But Longstreet, even though we may admire his reasoning, was not without his sins of omission. He could have given Lee more generous support; he could have shown a willingness to subscribe to Lee's plan, even though it may not have been the best plan to follow. Longstreet erred—but not to the extent that most writers have asserted.

The Return to Virginia

IT WAS A SERIOUS GROUP OF MEN THAT GATHERED AT LEE'S HEADQUARTERS SHORTLY after daybreak on July 4 to confer with their commander. The events of the three days previous had brought to Lee the saddening realization that the Union army was not to be driven from its position. Now he had further news of determining influence: the ammunition was insufficient for another day of fighting. There was nothing to do but to return to the source of supply. Lee's problem was that of pulling his troops free from contact, withdrawing behind South Mountain, and regaining Virginia over the roads leading down the Cumberland Valley.

Of the sixty-eight thousand Confederates who had so cheerfully invaded Pennsylvania, fewer than forty-nine thousand remained. But in spite of the risk and these heavy losses Lee would not hurry. He decided to remain through July 4 in the hope that Meade might be induced to attack the Southern position. But Meade was too thankful for his victory to indulge in any offensive movement. Neither his nor the Confederate army was capable of further effort without some rest and a replenishment of ammunition. Perhaps these conditions were sufficient to impose a period of inactivity on Meade; perhaps he did not care to chance an attack on Lee and his stubborn followers.¹

When the conference was over, Longstreet walked back to his headquarters with Colonel Fremantle. He discussed recent events and the fatality which seemed to follow the Army of Northern Virginia whenever it crossed into enemy territory. He spoke calmly as he related the sequence of incidents which seemed, in his opinion, to be the cause of the Confederate failure. No word of criticism of Lee or his staff passed his lips; his comments were made in a detached manner with little sense of participation. He pointed out to Fremantle the great danger of a hostile advance immediately after the re-

¹ Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (New York, 1907), 215, gives a total Confederate loss of 31,621 and a total Union loss of 23,186. Livermore estimated the total Confederate losses at 28,063. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 102-103. Lee's army had an effective strength of 46,937 when the battle was over. The Confederate returns of July 20 show 50,178 as the aggregate present. This small gain may be accounted for by the return of stragglers as Lee crossed the Potomac. Lee's situation was fully understood at the Federal War Department. See Stanton to L. Thomas, July 4, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 526. At 1:30 A.M., July 4, 1863, Longstreet issued orders for his artillery to be prepared for attack. Latrobe to Walton, July 4, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 734.

pulse of Pickett's charge and told of the steps he had taken to safeguard the command and prevent further disaster. These steps must have been effective, as Fremantle, a military expert, said that Meade was right not to advance.²

In spite of the tragedy of the third day's fighting, there were still touches of humor. Much amusement was caused when a bearer of a flag of truce came over the lines early on the morning of the fourth with the information that Longstreet had been wounded and captured and the promise that he would receive kind treatment. Longstreet replied that neither had happened and that he was quite able to care for himself. He thanked the Union commander, however, for his courtesy in notifying him of his wound. Longstreet's denial of the report did not halt its spread, however. It soon reached beyond local circles, with the added embroidery that Longstreet had died; this, at least, was the story told with no end of rejoicing among the Northern soldiers. The report caused much distress among the Southern troops until they were reassured that it was greatly exaggerated.

Shortly after noon on the fourth there began to fall a torrential rain, which soon changed roads to rivers and made the camp sites seas of mud. The movement to the Potomac commenced about dusk with a withdrawal of the Third Corps, led by A. P. Hill, from Seminary Ridge. Amid pelting rain and crashing thunder, accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, the ambulances crawled along the mountain roads and the foot troops plodded through the mud. The retirement was fraught with danger and extreme discomfort; the wounded were jounced over the rough roads,³ and the night was made hideous with the cries of the sufferers. All day on the fifth the road to Fairfield was choked with Ewell's Cumberland Valley plunder; and the masses of vehicles, horses, and beeves caused serious delay during the night and the next day.

The First Corps remained in position west of the Peach Orchard until daylight on the fifth, covering the withdrawal of the Third Corps. Toward dawn on the fifth, Ewell's corps moved into the positions abandoned by Hill and closed on Longstreet's left. As the tail of Hill's column passed Longstreet's rear, Pickett's division fell in behind with over four thousand prisoners. By noon all of Longstreet's corps had cleared and were pushing down the Fairfield Road on a quick march to the Potomac with a mission of securing the crossings.⁴ It is fortunate that pursuit was not immediate, as the men had little or no ammunition. Kilpatrick did drive in with some cavalry in an attempt to destroy Longstreet's train, but he succeeded in burning only a few wagons. While the continual rain made the journey one of discomfort and

² Fremantle, *Three Months*, 281.

³ W. A. Roebling to G. K. Warren, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 606.

⁴ See Longstreet's orders, July 6, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 734-35.

risk, it aided the retirement in that it delayed Meade, who launched his pursuit east of the mountains on roads which were rivers of mud. Lee thus was able to escape contact with large bodies of the enemy.

In spite of the discomforts and the losses, the morale of the troops continued high. Hard marching failed to stop the boisterous calling from group to group, and the pangs of hunger were alleviated by the ripened cherries which laid a crimson band along the mountain highway. On the sixth—if we may believe Fremantle, who had rejoined Lee and Longstreet—there was nothing at all to eat but ripe cherries from five in the morning until late that night; and Sorrel later wrote of his gratitude for the luscious fruit, which took away the taste of his terrible breakfast of fresh-made bread and apple butter.

The march had humor as well as pathos. While Longstreet consoled himself with cherries, McLaws and his staff were remembering the sumptuous dinner which they had eaten the night before as Longstreet's uninvited guests. As the First Corps had halted on the night of the fifth, Longstreet had visited a nearby tavern and arranged for a dinner for himself and his staff. As meal-time approached, the party turned toward the inn with appetites sharpened by anticipation. On entering the smoky dining room they were astounded to see McLaws and his officers rapidly finishing the huge platters of food. Fortunately there was enough food left for the latecomers, which they washed down with goblets of homemade wine. When the table was cleared and the chairs scraped back, the sound of a scuffle was heard in the adjoining room, and a hard-faced woman pushed her way into the dining room with cries of "Which is the General? Which is the great officer? Good heavens, now they are killing our fat hogs, our milch cows are now going!" "Yes, Madame," said Longstreet, "it's very sad, very sad; and this sort of thing has been going on in Virginia more than two years, very sad." One wonders whether Lee's orders against foraging were carried out as strictly as he intended that they should be.⁵

On the seventh Fremantle, bound for England, came to pay his final farewell. He rode along the Williamsport Road seeking Longstreet. The leave-taking was affectionate; his last message for the South was a hope for a speedy termination of the war. To this, Longstreet fervently agreed. Fremantle grasped Longstreet's hand; then he mounted his horse and turned his face toward the Union lines. So he passed from the scene.

News of the disaster at Vicksburg on the Mississippi came as Lee and Longstreet plodded the weary trail back to the Potomac. It is doubtful whether the full extent of the catastrophe appreciated. Coming as it had on the heels of the repulse at Gettysburg, it had nullified the benefits gained by the

⁵ Fremantle, *Three Months*, 286 ff.

victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and had destroyed all chance of foreign intervention. The dream of the South that King Cotton would win the war had been shattered by General U. S. Grant's slugging assaults on the trenches at Vicksburg. Although no one realized it, the chance for success through military effort had already been lost. The sole remaining Confederate hope lay in the possibility of a stalemate—a negative victory which might be gained through the inability of the North to compel the South to return to the Union. If the South could prevent a Northern victory, she might yet win her political objectives.

The retreat continued slowly over the roads knee-deep in mud and in defiance of the incessant rain that beat down on the straggling columns. Longstreet's corps moved to the river in an orderly manner and, on July 8, took up positions covering the fords and the bridge at Williamsport. The situation at the Potomac was far from promising. The waters boiled across the fords, and a Federal raiding party had succeeded in creeping behind the lines from Harper's Ferry and destroying the bridge at Falling Waters. Now came anxious moments. Longstreet's infantry deployed and constructed defensive works. It seemed impossible that the army could escape without Meade's crowding down to dispute the crossing.

Meade's mission was that of cutting off Lee's army before it could reach Virginia and safety. Why he was unable to intercept at least a part of the fleeing troops is difficult to understand. True, the Union cavalry failed to act in concert; possibly, also, Meade recognized and feared Lee's superior ability as a general. These factors, together with the mud—Lee's best ally—contributed to Meade's inability to reach the Potomac first. It was not until July 12 that the Union advance caught up with the Confederate covering forces. With heavy reinforcements and ample artillery, Meade moved into attack position and slowly encircled the desperate Confederates. Instead of launching an immediate assault, however, he chose to construct fieldworks as if for a siege. Although the Southern position was strong, Meade lost his best opportunity to crush Lee by his hesitation at this point.

During the night before the thirteenth, the waters receded slightly, and the fords became passable. Lee sent for Longstreet and informed him that the march would start that night. The strain of the past few days had left its mark on Lee. He withdrew from active command and left to Longstreet the problem of crossing the army. The rain came in bursts of showers—sometimes in blinding sheets—and the black night was stabbed by the few torches which the guides were able to keep alight. The roads and approaches were deep in mud, and the hills ran streams of souplike silt. The guns stalled; and as the lightning flashed to sharpen the picture, an ambulance filled with

wounded missed the roadway at the point of crossing and tumbled off into the river, pitching its helpless cargo into the swift stream. The marching column broke at once to aid the poor unfortunates, who were dragged back to safety.

Such was the night of confusion and anxiety. Seemingly the enemy slept; and a sigh of relief went up as the movement continued without interruption from the Union artillery. Being the first to reach the Virginia shore, the Third Corps took position to protect the retirement of Longstreet's men. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry covered the right, but his dispositions were faulty. When the Union cavalry discovered the movement of Lee's army, Kilpatrick came in close to Fitzhugh Lee, and the result was a sharp action in which the losses were severe. Meade's horse swept through the line of Confederate skirmishers, mortally wounding General Pettigrew and taking three stands of colors, some artillery, and about two thousand prisoners. This was the only time that Meade was able seriously to interrupt the withdrawal, which, despite most difficult conditions, was well handled. The fact that Lee escaped with so little loss is the best evidence of the skill with which the First Corps managed and covered the retirement into Virginia. By noon on the fourteenth, the last Confederate soldier was across the Potomac and the pontoon bridges had been withdrawn.

The line of retreat lay up the Shenandoah Valley. Meade crossed at Harper's Ferry on July 17 and 18 and promptly moved east of the Blue Ridge, seeking to intercept Lee at one of the many gaps. Longstreet's corps proved the more fleet of foot. His men reached Ashby's Gap first and garrisoned it; then the smaller passes as far as Front Royal were occupied before the arrival of the Union advance. Longstreet covered the left (or east) flank of Lee's retreating army, but high water kept his main body west of the Shenandoah until he reached Chester Gap.

Meade's cavalry was first into Manassas Junction and Manassas Gap, but Hood's division held the pass while McLaws hurried on to secure Chester Gap. As the march continued, there were occasional brushes with the alert enemy horse. Finally, the race ended on July 24 with Longstreet's tired soldiers occupying Culpeper Courthouse well in advance of the enemy. Lee had won; the Confederate army was once more ready to move into its defensive positions behind the Rappahannock.

Meade advanced leisurely, and on the last day of July he had brought his army together near Warrenton. Though the march had not been without several minor engagements, it was not until the armies had come to rest that a serious battle was fought. After the arrival at Warrenton, a large Federal detachment on a reconnaissance mission forced a crossing of the Rappahan-

nock at Kelly's Ford, fell on Stuart's cavalry (which was on picket duty), drove it some distance, withdrawing only when Longstreet sent up heavy infantry support. The Union force was thrown back beyond Brandy Station and suffered considerable loss.

Noting the latent offensive power in the Federal army, Lee wisely determined to take up a defensive position behind the Rapidan. Ewell's corps was brought down from the vicinity of Madison Courthouse, and the First and Third Corps were moved into place on familiar ground. The occupation of the new line was completed on August 3; and during the next few weeks, the Confederate army was busy reorganizing and re-equipping itself.

After Gettysburg, the First and Third Corps established themselves in good camps along the Rapidan; Longstreet set up his headquarters on the fine estate of Erasmus Taylor. The scene changed from the strife of campaign and the hardships of the march to the relaxation of a country house. The prettiest girls came from miles around, and the twang of the fiddle replaced the rattle of musketry. There were picnics, and riding excursions over the browning slopes; and joy reigned supreme for a brief period. The trials of the Confederacy were lost in the zest for pleasure. Ah! Those were lovely days—at least, they left their mark in the memory of Longstreet's chief aide! ⁶

But all was not play. Lee was never far from Longstreet; and while the latter's post of command resounded to the laughter of the gay and youthful, at general headquarters a tired, disillusioned man took stock of himself and, on August 8, penned his resignation to the President of the Confederacy. Lee cited his inability to do what he wished to do and begged that a younger and abler man might be appointed. The three letters that embrace this incident (including Lee's letter to Davis, the latter's reply, and Lee's acknowledgment) form an inspiring trilogy.⁷ Lee asked that he might be permitted to lay down his tremendous burden and accept a lower place—the lower the better, as he put it. Wisely, President Davis refused to accept the proffered resignation. He replied on August 11: "To ask me to substitute for you someone, in my judgment, more fit to command, or who would possess more of the confidence of the army or of the reflecting men in the country, is to demand an impossibility." Since Lee had accepted full responsibility for the failure at Gettysburg, the President's action was generous as well as wise.

Toward the latter part of August, Lee was called to Richmond, and the command of the army fell on Longstreet. Replacements were coming in

⁶ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 183-84.

⁷ D. B. Sanger, "Three Letters," in *Infantry Journal*, XXXVI (June, 1930), 632-35. The "Three Letters" are Lee to Davis, August 8, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 752-53; Davis to Lee, August 11, 1863, in *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 639-40; and Lee to Davis, August 22, 1863, in *ibid.*, 660-61.

slowly; but local supplies were comparatively plentiful, and the tin cups rattled against the whiskey barrels as the men recovered their good spirits. Though the Federal artillery was annoying, nothing occurred to indicate that a strong offensive was being planned. The Army of Northern Virginia was in no condition to take the field against Meade, and it soon appeared that Meade himself was not in the mood for operations. Neither side cared to disturb the comparative quiet. Sensing the status of an armed truce, Longstreet turned his mind again to the West, where matters were in a sorry state. Presuming on the attitude of the Secretary of War, who had received him so courteously when he was en route from the Blackwater in the previous May, Longstreet, on August 15, had written to Seddon and suggested that the Union advance toward the borders of Georgia was too serious to be ignored and that unless it was stopped it would certainly result in a loss of morale and might also result in disaster. He suggested that the army in Virginia should go on the defensive, and that reinforcements should be sent to Tennessee in sufficient strength to co-operate with the western armies and crush Rosecrans before he could be reinforced. Longstreet pointed out the opportunity to operate on interior lines. By skillful leadership, he argued, the weaker force could overcome the stronger; and if the movement were made promptly, there was a considerable chance of success.⁸

Affairs in the West did need some energetic guidance. By July 1, W. S. Rosecrans had succeeded in maneuvering Bragg out of Middle Tennessee. Bragg had abandoned Tullahoma without a struggle and had withdrawn along his main line of communications to Chattanooga. All Tennessee west of the Tennessee River was in Federal hands. Once in Chattanooga, Bragg commenced to fortify the town while Rosecrans gathered his army and prepared to cross the Cumberland Mountains and wrest this back door from the Confederacy. Union volunteer forces were being organized in the occupied areas, and all scattered Confederates were being driven off. Meanwhile, the approach of A. E. Burnside toward Knoxville from the west was threatening General Simon B. Buckner's small Confederate garrison. If Burnside succeeded in dislodging Buckner, the lateral railroad from Virginia to Chattanooga through the Great Smoky range would be in the enemy's hands and the back door to Richmond and Lee's left flank would be open.⁹

In going over Lee's head with a suggestion for the disposition of a part of

⁸ See Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 433-34; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 448; and Longstreet to Lee, September 3, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 693.

⁹ Garfield to Stanley, September 7, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. III, 432. See also Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. III, Book II, 374; Andrew Johnson to Lincoln, August 16, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. III, 54; Van Cleve to Starling, August 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 70; Lincoln to Stanton, September 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 399.

the army, Longstreet was only repeating a practice which was common among the Southern generals and which was seemingly encouraged by the President. But it cannot be excused on any ground. The channel for such communications was through the superior who was affected. Longstreet's own comment makes it still more difficult to defend him: ". . . the subject had not been mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach." Later, Longstreet informed Lee of what he had done. Without commenting on the feasibility of the plan or rebuking Longstreet for his unmilitary action, Lee asked him whether he would care to go west and take charge of things; Longstreet replied in the affirmative. Several days later Lee went to Richmond to discuss the military situation with the President. The conference covered the whole military program of the South. Among plans discussed was one for taking the offensive against Meade; another was Longstreet's suggested transfer of troops to Tennessee. The President, however, did not immediately make a decision.¹⁰

Longstreet, in reply to a letter from Lee of August 31, advised him that he was preparing the army for offensive operations. He said, however: "I do not know that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much here by offensive operations, unless you are strong enough to cross the Potomac. . . . I know but little of our affairs in the west, but I am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee." Several days later Longstreet expanded his argument and definitely recommended going on the tactical and strategical defensive in the East while hastening the concentrations essential to strong operations in the West. If there should be hesitancy in trusting such operations to Bragg, he would willingly swap places with him, at least temporarily. Longstreet thought such a change would involve no great risk and that a great deal might be gained. He added that he had no personal motive in making the suggestion and doubted that Bragg had confidence either in himself or his troops.¹¹

Many interpretations can be put on these expressions of Longstreet's. In the James Longstreet of these years of war and peace, one finds little of self-seeking. He was sincere. There was no occasion for him to quarrel with Bragg. It may be that he was gripped by a compelling egotism and saw visions of startling successes with an army under his leadership. It may also be that he saw only too clearly the danger to the South unless the western gateway could be freed from the pressing Union armies. The time for action had come. The

¹⁰ This conversation is recorded in Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 434.

¹¹ Lee to Longstreet, August 31, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 761; Longstreet to Lee, September 2, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 693-94; *id.* to *id.*, September 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 699; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 434-35; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 448.

Gettysburg venture had failed. Now was the time to try what he had suggested before the fateful march across the Potomac.¹²

If Rosecrans could defeat or elude Bragg the way would be open for a march into Georgia, the very heart of the deep South. The Confederate problem in Tennessee was complicated further by quarrels between Bragg and his generals and the feeling of many that he had lost the confidence of his troops. With Gettysburg and Vicksburg fresh in their memories, no wonder Longstreet and other Confederate leaders were perturbed.

While Lee was in Richmond, Davis suggested that he should go west and take personal command of the western armies. He thought Lee's presence in the western army would be worth more than the addition of a corps. But Lee preferred to remain in Virginia, saying that his unfamiliarity with local conditions near Chattanooga would be too severe a handicap to overcome. It is probable that Lee did not want to be drawn into the controversy between Bragg and his subordinates. Furthermore, Lee was a Virginian; his mission, he thought, was to remain where he could watch Meade and defend Richmond. Longstreet's desire for western service made him seem the logical available substitute. Lee had faith in Longstreet and believed him able to do much. After some discussion, it was decided to send Longstreet to the West with the bulk of the First Corps in the hope that with these reinforcements Bragg would be able to resume the offensive.¹³

While Longstreet's advice to hold in Virginia with two corps while the third moved into Tennessee was excellent and was based on a clear appreciation of the danger to the South, it actually came too late to be of positive value. Though much could be done to stave off ultimate defeat, Bragg had lost his chance to win in the West by force of arms when, on the last day of December, 1862, he had failed to turn his initial victory at Murfreesborough (Stone's River) into something more than a stalemate.

Rosecrans had not yet crossed the Tennessee. But on September 4, the day following the final conference at Richmond, he succeeded in deceiving Bragg. He put his army across the river in three columns and moved at once on Bragg's main body. Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on the night of September 8 and withdrew behind Pigeon Mountain—south of Chattanooga on the La Fayette Road.

After detaching one corps (that of General Thomas L. Crittenden) to occupy Chattanooga, Rosecrans pursued Bragg promptly. On the morning of

¹² See T. R. Hay, "Braxton Bragg and the Southern Confederacy," in *Georgia Historical Quarterly* (Savannah), IX (December, 1925), 293 ff.; Longstreet to Lee, September 5, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 699.

¹³ Davis to Lee, September 8, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 702; Lee to Davis, September 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 700; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 166 ff.

September 10, the Union advance was ranging the hills along Chickamauga Creek, seeking to close in on Bragg's army. In the meantime—on the ninth—Burnside had completed the capture and occupation of Knoxville. This was the situation when Longstreet's corps prepared to entrain for the West.¹⁴ If Rosecrans could be defeated in the coming battle, there was still hope that an energetic pursuit would force him back to the Ohio.

Had the decision not been so long delayed, Longstreet could probably have been at Bragg's side by the night of September 6.¹⁵ Chattanooga might then have been saved; and the augmented Confederate army could have moved against Rosecrans with every expectation of success, since the Union army was then badly dispersed. But it was not until the ninth that the first train arrived at Richmond to convey the First Corps to Tennessee. At this time the loss of Knoxville and Chattanooga compelled the routing of trains through the Carolinas and Georgia, as the direct line through Bristol and Knoxville to Chattanooga was closed to the South. McLaws and Hood were the two division commanders selected to go with Longstreet, while Pickett's division was assigned to duty near Richmond—probably because of the great shortage of officers and veterans in that division. To fill Pickett's place in the corps, Henry A. Wise and Micah Jenkins, with troops from the Richmond defense zone, brought their strong units. These additions more than compensated for the sadly decimated division which had charged at Gettysburg.¹⁶

It was hard for Lee to see Longstreet's brigades detached from his command. Perhaps they would never be returned to him. As Longstreet prepared to mount his horse Lee urged him to "beat those people out in the west." Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of Lee's staff, perhaps best reflected the feeling of his chief: "We all disliked very much to see this splendid section of our army leave us. No better troops could be found anywhere than those under General Longstreet, and he was so strong in defense—our 'Old War Horse,' as he was familiarly called. There was never any doubt about the security of a position that was held by him."¹⁷

Longstreet's farewell letter to Lee exhibits a trait unnoticed before. This taciturn old fighter, whose emotions rarely lifted even under the stress of battle, was betrayed into sentiment when he penned his final note: "If I did

¹⁴ Lee to Davis, September 9, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 706; *id. to id.*, September 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 720.

¹⁵ See *id. to id.*, September 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 706; *id. to id.*, September 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 700-701; Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist. His Letters, Papers, and Speeches* (Jackson, Miss., 1923), VI, 28; Lee to Davis, September 14, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 720.

¹⁶ Lee to Davis, September 14, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 720; *id. to id.*, September 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 706.

¹⁷ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 437; Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns*, 223.

not think our move a necessary one, my regrets at leaving you would be distressing to me, as it seems to be with the officers and men of my command. Believing it to be necessary, I hope to accept it and my other personal inconveniences cheerfully and hopefully. All that we have to be proud of has been accomplished under your eye and under your orders. Our affections for you are stronger, if it is possible for them to be stronger, than our admiration for you."¹⁸

On September 9 the trains arrived at Hanover Junction and other appointed points; and although the cars were in wretched condition, they were loaded. Good luck rather than mechanical perfection kept them on the rails as they wobbled their devious course through the Carolinas and Georgia. Day after day they were shunted and jostled, and there were frequent stops for repairs; but finally the trains began to arrive at Catoosa Station, just east of Chattanooga, Hood's division coming in first in the late afternoon of September 18.¹⁹

The battle along Chickamauga Creek had already started. McLaws followed Hood but was not in time for the first day's fighting. The artillery was delayed and did not arrive until September 25. Nine days had been consumed by a journey that ought to have been accomplished in two or three.

¹⁸ Longstreet to Lee, September 12, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 713.

¹⁹ Temporary headquarters were established by Longstreet's staff in the Spotswood Hotel, Richmond, on September 8. J. B. Walton to E. P. Alexander, September 8, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 763. Because of the wretched railroad conditions, the horses were not sent forward with the guns and wagons. Cooper to Withers, September 18, 1863, *ibid.*, 768.

Chickamauga

THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA LAY BETWEEN MISSIONARY RIDGE AND Pigeon Mountain, in the hill country of northwestern Georgia not far from the Tennessee line. In this narrow valley, two armies faced each other across a stream called West Chickamauga Creek, which coursed northeast between the hills, was tree-fringed, and had precipitous banks. Missionary Ridge was northwest of, and somewhat lower than, Pigeon Mountain; but it was equally rugged and covered with woods. It was not passable except through the few gaps leading toward Ringgold on the east and La Fayette on the south. Aside from the tree-clad slopes, the valley was open, but it was studded with bramble patches and small groves of pines and oaks.

On the morning of the eighteenth of September, Bragg held the advantage of position. The Union army—the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General W. S. Rosecrans—occupied the west side of Chickamauga Creek with its back resting against the southern slopes of Missionary Ridge. George H. Thomas, with the XIV Corps, had the left (or north) of the Union line; on his right was T. L. Crittenden's XXI Corps. A. McD. McCook, with the XX Corps (including J. S. Negley's division of Thomas' corps), was on the extreme right. On the left General Gordon Granger, with a small corps, was in reserve near the Ringgold Road; R. B. Mitchell, with the Union cavalry, covered the right flank from the vicinity of La Fayette. Rosecrans' total strength was 59,965 officers and men and over 200 guns.¹ His position was precarious: one division held Chattanooga and the lines of communications while the remainder of his army was loosely disposed along a treacherous stream with a high ridge close to his rear. In case of a forced retreat, he had but three available passages through the mountain: that near Rossville, one three miles to the southeast at McFarland's, and a small rugged gap near his extreme right. He had little or no chance for maneuver.

Bragg's army, coming up from behind Pigeon Mountain, was ranged along the south bank of Chickamauga Creek, with his right extended beyond the Union left. His strength, until the arrival of Longstreet's forces, was less than

¹ Livermore gave the effective Union strength as 58,222. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 105-106.

forty-nine thousand.² Just prior to the battle, Bragg organized his army into two wings and spread his troops along the Union front, with his mass concealed opposite the Union left. Although backed against a stiff wooded slope, Bragg had ample roads and sufficient room for maneuver behind the cover of the mountain. On the extreme Confederate right, N. B. Forrest's cavalry faced Granger's reserve corps; in his right wing, Bragg put most of Leonidas Polk's corps reinforced by P. R. Cleburne's division of D. H. Hill's corps. Until the arrival of Longstreet and his command, the left wing was composed of a small detachment from Polk's corps, supplemented by nearly all of Buckner's corps. When Hood of Longstreet's corps came up on the afternoon of the eighteenth, this added support brought Bragg's available strength to a parity with that of Rosecrans. The advantage was clearly Bragg's, from the standpoint not only of position and initiative but also of the element of surprise; and the probabilities were that he would be successful in the coming struggle for the gateway to the West. Also, he had strong supports en route to him.

The preliminary skirmishing commenced on September 18, and during the course of it the Confederate right wing forced a crossing of the Chickamauga and seized strong ground on the Union side of the creek. With this success, Bragg was in a position to carry out his plan, which contemplated holding the left wing fast as a pivot while the right drove in between Rosecrans and his base at Chattanooga. Successive movements by echelon would then uncover the mountain passes all the way from Rossville at the north end of Missionary Ridge to the right of the Federal line near Lee and Gordon's Mills. The enemy could then be driven south into the angle formed by the Confederate left wing and the steep slopes of the southwest end of Missionary Ridge. Rosecrans was planning a similar maneuver, but Bragg moved first. Should Bragg's scheme work successfully, nothing would be left for Rosecrans but surrender or a desperate but futile attempt to cut through the entire Confederate army. He could not hope to escape.

The attack opened in full force on September 19—but with such regularity that Rosecrans correctly interpreted the Confederate maneuver before it was well launched. The element of surprise was lost, and when Bragg was ready to throw his main force into the assault to dislodge the Union left, he found the Federal army massed against it. Rosecrans had moved his divisions from right to left in ample time to beat off each successive attempt to break his line. Longstreet wrote long afterwards—basing his statement on secondhand

² Livermore gave the total number of Confederates engaged as 66,326, grouped as follows: Army of Tennessee, 30,871; Longstreet, 5,942; others, 15,253; cavalry, 14,260. *Ibid.* Cf. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 450-52, which gave Bragg's effective infantry strength as 52,066 men and 174 guns, and Rosecrans' as 53,919 men and 204 guns.

information—that Rosecrans soon came to understand Bragg's plan as well as Bragg did and made his arrangements accordingly. At the end of the day, the Federal army had been successful not only in stopping the Confederate attack but also in regaining many of the positions from which it had been driven that morning.³

Although part of Hood's division detrained in time to participate in the fighting on both the eighteenth and the nineteenth, Longstreet did not arrive at Catoosa Station with the next body of troops until about 2 P.M. on September 19. Up to this time the advantage had rested first with Bragg and then with Rosecrans. The earliest indication that came to Longstreet that perhaps things might not be going any too smoothly was the failure of Bragg to send a guide or staff officer to meet him at the railroad station. This neglect was unpardonable, since Longstreet was new to the ground and understood nothing of the situation. One would think that Bragg would have been only too anxious to hasten Longstreet's steps. The train with the horses and Longstreet's advanced troops arrived some two hours later, and by the time they were unloaded and ready to march, the sun had set. Although only a part of his staff and troops were available, and the artillery under Alexander was still several days' journey behind him, Longstreet mounted his horse and started out in company with Sorrel and Major P. T. Manning to find Bragg's headquarters. He was prepared to enter at once into the battle.

The sound of the distant musketry told Longstreet and his companions that the battle was not far off, and they at once inquired their way of a stranger and rode out on the main road in obedience to his advice. They followed the narrow road into the night while a bright moon lighted the way. A sharp challenge brought them to a halt. Although the answer "Friends" was given promptly, the sentry was none too sure. Longstreet stopped to parley with the soldier and soon learned from the fact that the man spoke of numbered brigades and divisions that they had run into a Federal picket.⁴ It was too light under the full moon to chance making a run for it, so Longstreet called out with characteristic coolness, "Let us ride down a little way to find a better crossing." The ruse worked. Leisurely the party moved away and soon gained the cover of the forest, which they now traversed with great care. It was fully 11 P.M. when Longstreet dismounted at Bragg's headquarters.

Picture the situation for a moment. Here came an officer leading strong reinforcements destined to take part in a battle which had already gone on

³ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 439. For an excellent critical study of this battle, see T. R. Hay, "Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga," in *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, VII, (September, 1923), 213-50.

⁴ The Confederate brigades and divisions were named for their respective leaders and were habitually referred to by name.

for more than a day. He had had no opportunity to make a reconnaissance of the ground; he had little hope that even the bulk of his corps could arrive in time for the next day's fighting. Should the entire force arrive through unusual good fortune, they would be in poor condition after the long and tiresome ride over the rough rail lines through Georgia. It would be safe to conclude that none of these troops would be of great value on the twentieth. A wise commander would have put them in reserve for at least time enough for them to rest from the trip and for the lesser commanders to acquaint themselves with the terrain. It is extraordinary that Longstreet expressed no desire to have his command rested and fully in hand before entering the battle as first-line troops. He accepted the situation as it was and went at once into conference with Bragg to learn as much as possible of the situation and to ascertain Bragg's plan of battle. As a result of his discussions and his observation of conditions, he sensed the fact that Bragg needed reinforcements of fresh men as well as moral support. By midnight the plans were made, and Longstreet learned that he was to play a principal part in the next day's assaults as the commander of Bragg's left wing.

The difficulty of Longstreet's task was further enhanced by the fact that his command was to be a makeshift. The left wing was to be organized from two brigades of McLaws' division which had arrived two hours behind Longstreet, Buckner's corps, a division under General T. C. Hindman, and three brigades which had come with Hood on the eighteenth. In addition to being unacquainted with most of these troops, Longstreet found that they were scattered over the battlefield and were even then groping around trying to find their comrades and evolve some sort of order. Buckner's corps was cut in two with a division on either end of the left wing, and McLaws' brigades were feeling their way across Chickamauga Creek under a screen of scouts in an uncertain attempt to find a vacant place in the Confederate battle line. Could a general be ordered into battle under such conditions and still hope to accomplish anything?

When the conference was ended, Longstreet took a short rest and then went to his front. He found considerable confusion among his troops.⁵ In the darkness of the woods, it was almost impossible to locate units or to assemble the divisions into any reasonable sort of battle formation. He was forced, therefore, to adapt his tactical dispositions to the situation of the troops as he found them on the ground. He located A. P. Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, Hindman and William Preston in the front, from right to left. With

⁵ General Bragg stated in his report that "Lieutenant-General Longstreet reached my headquarters about 11 P.M. and immediately received his instructions. After a few hours rest at my campfire, he moved at daylight to his line, just in front of my position." *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. II, 33.

some slight readjustment, this was his front line of battle. Hood, who had suffered severely during the assaults late on the nineteenth, was directed to assemble his division and move in rear of Johnson's division as a general reserve. McLaws, who was coming up through the woods with Kershaw's and B. G. Humphreys' brigades, was ordered to a position somewhat in rear of Hood, where he would form in depth and await orders. Longstreet planned to use McLaws in a culminating shock attack, where the formation in depth would give great penetrating power. There was little need for Longstreet to arrange anything but the simplest form of maneuver, as Bragg's plan was not complicated. Longstreet was still ignorant of the character of the men he was to lead and knew little more about their commanders. Furthermore, there was no time for changing the troop dispositions; he had to accept the situation as it was.

General Bragg had issued oral instructions to both Longstreet and Polk shortly before midnight on the nineteenth. Polk's right wing was to initiate the movement promptly at daybreak while Longstreet's wing was to remain in position awaiting the attack on the right, ready to take it up promptly when it was safely launched. When dawn came, however, there was no movement on the right. Although Polk seems to have sent out orderlies to his several subordinates, that sent to D. H. Hill failed to locate him, and as a consequence Hill's troops were not in position to attack. They were in the rear, busily engaged in drawing rations. The exact locations of the several division commanders of the right wing were not known to each other, nor were any of them known to Polk. In view of this lack of knowledge of the locations of the several units, it is small wonder that the attack failed to start on time. Two hours were lost while the assaulting units were led through a thick fog into their attack positions. These were helpful hours to the enemy, and the Federal left under Thomas took full advantage by strongly fortifying its position with logs and cut brush.

General J. C. Breckinridge, of Hill's corps, was first up and led off at about 9:30 A.M.⁶ He was soon followed by the remainder of the corps in echelon to his left rear. But his line was thin, and he had provided for no local supports. When his line struck head on against the Union breastworks, it staggered and then was forced back. Not having the depth to sustain a continuous pressure, the line broke, and the men scattered into isolated fragments to carry on local assaults. Had reserves been at hand, the attack could have been maintained while the shattered first line was re-formed for continuing

⁶ Longstreet said in his report that the attack commenced at 10 A.M. The several other reports indicated that the attack began somewhat earlier. The hour stated seems to agree with most reports. *Ibid.*, 288.

the fight. There was little co-ordination. Perhaps in no other battle was the staff work so poor.

This sort of dogged fighting kept up for some time without any appreciable gain. Although the battle raged with fury and repeated attempts were made to break the Union defense, all failed. Finally, after practically the entire right wing had been fed piecemeal into the fight, the attack was stopped. One unit—B. F. Cheatham's division of Polk's corps—appears to have become lost; at least, the five brigades of that division did not take much part in these attacks of the right wing. Without the success of his right wing, Bragg could not hope to have his plan succeed. With Polk's failure, it appeared as if the whole attack would come to nought.

Meanwhile, on the left, Longstreet was waiting his chance to enter the fight. About 11 A.M., he received orders from Bragg that a general assault would be made all along the line. No direction for the attack was given, and it seemed as if Bragg had abandoned his plan and left every general to himself. There was now neither a co-ordinated plan nor any arrangement for concert of action among the assaulting divisions. It was the last, and seemingly a hopeless, attempt to break through the Union defense.

In all this disjointed fighting against the front and left of his position, General George H. Thomas, commanding the Union troops, appeared to be holding his lines, though he was forced to call for heavy reinforcement. There was nothing alarming in the situation; but General Rosecrans lost his poise, and his adjutant general, James A. Garfield, lost his head. The Union right was unduly weakened—far beyond the limit of safety. Supports were called for and put into the fight too early, and through some misunderstanding of the actual situation, someone blundered. The rear of the Union position was soon crisscrossed with the trails of the Federal divisions which were being hurried back and forth to support first the center and then the left. Rosecrans feared for his left; he was blind to the danger on his right.

Shortly before noon, information reached the Union headquarters that J. M. Brannan was out of line and that Reynolds' right was exposed.⁷ This misinformation caused the mischief. General J. J. Reynolds was holding the right of Thomas' salient, with his right resting on the La Fayette Road. Behind him, and to the right, but still properly on the line, was Brannan, who had moved up from the reserve. T. J. Wood, who had replaced J. S. Negley's division earlier in the day, was well established on Brannan's right. The line was loosely held, but there were no gaps. As the assaults pounded away on Thomas, repeated calls were made for reinforcements. Rosecrans' fears for

⁷ Quoted in Rosecrans' report, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 59. Cf. T. J. Wood's report, October 21, 1863, and Rosecrans to Wood, September 20, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 646.

his left, under the assumption that Bragg was massed against him there and not on the right, caused him to weaken McCook by pulling out brigades until the line was too thin. A few gaps appeared as the men drew together for better control and support. A staff officer saw what appeared to be a serious break in the line of Reynolds' right. This fact was reported to Thomas, who, in turn, notified Rosecrans.⁸

Now, it seems that Reynolds was not in need of any assistance, as Brannan was on his right, although somewhat in rear of the general line of battle. Without further investigation, Rosecrans directed Wood to "close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him."⁹ Wood pulled out of his position, although in close contact with the enemy, and marched by the flank to join Reynolds. He encountered Brannan, who was engaged with the enemy. Cutting in rear of Brannan, Wood paused in rear of Reynolds' right; but not being needed there, he prepared to move farther to the left to support General Absalom Baird, who was holding the angle of the fortified salient of the extreme left of Thomas' position. Wood's withdrawal from the right was a terrible blunder; for when he pulled out, he not only left a wide gap in the Union right between Brannan and General P. H. Sheridan—which McCook's weakened corps could not possibly cover—but he also marched leisurely with his flank exposed and with the enemy close in on his rear.

Longstreet, who had close contact with the Union line in his front, sensed instantly this sudden weakening of the enemy line. He had been awaiting the chance to put his wing into action in accordance with Bragg's plan when he discovered this opening. He hurled his troops into it. Bushrod Johnson led the assaulting column and soon crashed through McCook's left and full into the flank and rear of Wood's moving column. In a few moments the entire right wing of the Union army was in a panic; Brannan and Wood were rolled up, and part of McCook's corps was driven from the field and captured. Longstreet followed up this initial success by throwing his entire wing into the fight under a new plan of his own.

Under the Bragg plan, Longstreet should have awaited his turn in the general movement by echelon from the right. His quick understanding of the changing incidents of battle, however, brought with it the perception that the right-to-left advance could no longer win. He saw the Union troops moving from his front and to their left; this weakening of the Federal line gave him an opportunity to crush the enemy's right and reach around toward its

⁸ Gates P. Thurston, "The Crisis at Chickamauga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 663. See also the testimony in the McCook court of inquiry, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. I, 930-62.

⁹ Thurston, "Crisis at Chickamauga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 663; Crittenden court of inquiry, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. I, 972 ff.; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 460.

left rear in a sweeping envelopment. There was no time to consult Bragg, even had Longstreet wished to do so. Without waiting for orders, Longstreet disregarded the original plan and ordered his troops, when the line was broken, to turn toward the *right* and attack the Union left. After a sharp thrust, Hood broke the enemy line near the Brotherton house, forcing it back. Longstreet's tactics on this occasion remind one of his action at the second battle of Manassas, when he used his artillery so effectively in support of Jackson. His keen battle sense perceived the opportunity; his initiative and courage based on experience impelled the prompt action which brought success before the startled Federal commander could rectify his false position. It was the work of a master tactician.

Longstreet's maneuver was successful because of the speed with which it was launched and also because of his troop disposition. His veteran troops had been placed in a column of brigades at half distance, which gave the driving force needed for a deep penetration and prolonged effort. There was nothing on the Union side that could withstand them. Longstreet used all but one small division (Preston's) of his force. A large segment of the Union line was cut off; twenty-seven guns were taken, and over a thousand prisoners were captured. All the Federal leaders who witnessed Longstreet's attack were convinced that the initial stages of a disorderly retreat had begun.

Finding little resistance in his front, Hindman swung his division still farther to the right and toward the Union rear—a difficult maneuver even when made without the stress of battle—and prolonged the Confederate line that was encircling Thomas' left rear. Everywhere the resistance was breaking down. Shortly before noon, the divisions of Stewart, Hood, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman joined again, facing the right rear of the last Union stronghold. The entrapment of the Union army was almost complete.

Rosecrans had long since given up the day as lost and had retired to Chattanooga. Of those who had started the day, Thomas alone was clinging to the last redoubts while the Confederate line enmeshed him from three sides. All that was needed was another brigade or so to close the net. But Thomas, seated on the ground with his back to a rock, refused to be driven from the center of his horseshoe ridge. Although his commander and many of his associates had fled the field in confusion, when darkness came he was still there—the "Rock of Chickamauga."

About the middle of the afternoon, Bragg sent for Longstreet and asked for a report of conditions. As Bragg's headquarters were some distance in rear of the line of battle, Longstreet was forced to turn over the conduct of the fighting to his staff. He reported the changed situation to Bragg and suggested that he be permitted to pursue down the Dry Valley Road to inter-

cept the corps which had become dislodged from the Federal right. He proposed that the right wing should establish a pivot-defense to hold Thomas in place, and that all troops not actually needed on the right be turned over to him. With these reinforcements, Longstreet planned to cut through in rear of Thomas' position, move down the road to the gaps at McFarland's and Rossville, and seize them.¹⁰ It was hoped that this action would prevent the escape of the Union army. The program was a sensible one and would have accomplished much in view of the disorganized condition of Rosecrans' army. Many more prisoners could have been captured, and the Federal army as an organized body could probably have been broken up. If one permits the imagination full play, the next step could have been an advance to the Ohio with the chance to meet and destroy Burnside on the way. Such a victory in the West would have gone far to re-establish the Confederacy in the eyes of Europe. It might have won the war.

But Bragg was not ready to accept suggestions from his subordinates. He is reported to have said that there was no one left in the right wing with any fight in him. His bitterness against Polk was evident, as was his irritation over the fact that his plan had failed to work out as he had intended. That the Confederate right wing still had plenty of fight left in it was amply established by D. H. Hill, who took command about 4 P.M. and led the right wing farther into battle without any laggards. Hill said later that the men sprang to arms with the utmost alacrity and crashed into and through the Federal breastworks with enthusiasm. The chances are that Bragg did not know the full extent of his success; and when he ought to have been keen for pursuit, he was busy casting criticism and bitter accusations on those who had been unsuccessful during the earlier stages of the fighting.¹¹

While Longstreet was gone, the left wing continued its right enveloping movement and soon brought its weight to bear on Thomas' right rear. Hill's corps also had gained a considerable success. Slowly Thomas' lines were closed in upon each other as, again and again, the assaults drove against him. The Union troops now fought almost back to back, repelling the series of charges made on them. Fully one half of Rosecrans' army was penned up and facing destruction in this fortified position. The fighting was tremendous. When the ammunition ran low, the bayonet came into play; and many were killed with clubbed muskets. Hand-to-hand fighting continued from about 2 P.M. until 6 P.M., when Longstreet commenced to bring long-range artillery to play against Thomas' rear.

¹⁰ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. II, 288; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 452.

¹¹ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. II, 289; Thurston, "Crisis at Chickamauga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 661.

Granger, who had heard the increased firing and sensed that something was going wrong, moved in closer with the reserve. Late in the afternoon he appeared with part of his force after a hard march through the woods and across the trails filled with scurrying soldiers. He plunged into the fight just in time to save Thomas from being completely surrounded. Alive to his danger, Thomas made his preparations with care; and as darkness came to hide the movement, he slipped away and retired to the crest of Missionary Ridge near Rossville, where he remained during the twenty-first. Bragg was left in possession of the field, but the timely arrival of Granger had blocked the capture of the Union army.

As one reflects on this fierce struggle with its heavy losses on both sides, the opportunities for master strokes are seen to have been so obvious that it is remarkable that Bragg could have been so blind as not to have seen them or, once seeing them, not to have exploited his success. Bragg was so little the troop leader that he had no eye for battle and an insufficient understanding of tactics. He seems not to have grasped the fundamentals of proper employment of troops on the field of battle. His original plan of a movement on the right by successive echelons was sound for the first day's fighting only; thereafter he was met by massed enemy reserves whenever he attempted the assault. The element of surprise was lacking from the first, and without the benefit of surprise, the armies were too evenly matched for the Confederates to achieve a preponderance of mass in any one place without there being a corresponding maneuver on the part of the other force. Longstreet had a better grasp of the situation, even though he had but scant knowledge of the actual conditions along the other parts of the front.

From the standpoint of the South, it is a pity that General Polk, even though he was West Point-trained, was so little the professional soldier. He would have seen to more efficient staff arrangements. He would have ensured delivery and acknowledgment of his orders. Had he been better grounded in battle tactics, he would never have faced the Federal left with but a thin line. Had Polk attacked in depth with proper tactical dispositions, his drive might have gone through to a complete success, much loss of life might have been avoided, and the Union left might have been dislodged and the army dispersed.¹² General Longstreet's dispositions, on the other hand, were a distinct contribution to the science of war; they have been studied as models by European staffs. That Thomas escaped was providential and attributable to the timely arrival of Granger and to Thomas' own skillful and stubborn

¹² A study of the battle leads to this conclusion, even if one disregards the heated comments made by contemporaries in their memoirs—as, for example, the discussion in Thurston, "Crisis at Chickamauga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 663 ff.—and the defensive tone of Bragg's official report and allied correspondence in the *Official Records*.

defense. That Rosecrans should have been allowed to escape with his army after such a decisive defeat was the result only of a great blunder on the part of the Confederates.

When night came, all of Longstreet's wing had taken part in the fighting. His last man had been thrown in to gain the hill which lay between the Villetoe and Snodgrass houses—the key to Thomas' position. (See map facing this page.) With the coming of darkness, Longstreet's men had swarmed through the woods ("mopping up," to use a modern term) and had penetrated in disorganized groups as far as the broad highway that led through McFarland's Gap. The Federal army, except for the considerable force clustered around Thomas had melted away. There was no other organized resistance. Longstreet ordered his troops to remain in position, to round up the stragglers, and to secure ammunition in readiness for pursuit the next morning. Thomas could not stay where he was—that much was only too clear to Longstreet. He wanted no barren victory.¹⁸


Now was the chance for Bragg to gather the fruits of his tactical success. Here was where General Joseph Wheeler could serve—or where Forrest could use his horse to best advantage. Fresh cavalry could be used to close the gap which was open in rear of Thomas. But nothing was done. Either Bragg did not know of his success or else he could not believe it. Forrest had dismounted his men to reinforce Polk's wing in the early stages of the attack. But Wheeler, who was comparatively inactive on the left flank, could have been used. Hidden by the deepened shadows of the night, Thomas withdrew toward Chattanooga over an unobstructed route—a route that should have been closed to him. There was no intercepting force, and it does not appear that Bragg ever contemplated arranging for one. Pursuit was next to impossible for those troops who had borne the brunt of the fighting. But there were some fresh troops. Did Bragg know that four brigades of Cheatham's division had done nothing all day and had moved forward to the assault after the Federal resistance was almost ended? Even General Cheatham admitted in his report that his men encountered but slight resistance—and that only for a short while. This was the force that Bragg should have used to block Thomas.

It was a joyful band of Confederates that bivouacked on the field that night. Haversacks were filled with plunder, and ammunition was rushed forward. Old muskets were exchanged for the newer Federal type, and the pouches of the dead and dying supplied the newer type of ammunition. All during the night, the field was combed by busy squads, who reveled in the rich loot that came from the goods the enemy had abandoned. Some 5,000 prisoners, 65

¹⁸ Freeman quoted Longstreet as having said, "If I live," when he replied to Lee's request, to ". . . beat those people out in the west." Freeman, *Lee*, III, 166.

BATTLE-FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA.

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| Positions, Evening of Sept. 18th, 1863. | Confederate. |
| Direction of lines of battle, Sept. 19th. | Union. |
| First lines of battle, Sept. 20th. | Confederate. |
| Last lines of battle, Sept. 20th. | Union. |
| | Cavalry. |



INDICATES POSITIONS OF UNION TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE

guns of large caliber, and 23,000 stand of small arms with 135,000 cartridges were gathered in by the Army of Tennessee.¹⁴

The losses were the heaviest of any single battle of the war if the length of time of the engagement is considered. The two armies had been pretty evenly matched—some sixty thousand each of all arms. The losses totaled seventeen thousand for the South and within a thousand as many for the Union army. The percentage losses in some cases were frightful. It has long been considered that a 25 per cent loss in killed and wounded will break the morale of any but the most experienced and well-disciplined troops. The average loss for Longstreet's command in the two hours of the general assault on Thomas' final position was 44 per cent of the number present when the final assault was started. Nor was this splendid morale in the face of heavy losses peculiar to the Southern army. A score or more of the Federal regiments lost nearly 50 per cent of those engaged. There is no doubt that Chickamauga and Sharpsburg rank as the two most bloody engagements of the war.¹⁵

Failing of success in his desire for an immediate pursuit, Longstreet returned to his command and prepared for any movement that might be ordered. It was a bitter blow to him that the great victory which had just been won should not be followed up immediately. He was still pondering what he should do when, as the sun rose, Bragg rode up to his headquarters to discuss what the next move should be. Longstreet was ready with a plan: he urged upon Bragg a strong and immediate pursuit on Rosecrans until the Union forces were pushed well back and Chattanooga evacuated; then, containing Rosecrans, the Confederate forces were to turn and capture the Federal forces under Burnside which were operating in East Tennessee. Apparently Bragg acquiesced; at least he actually issued the needful orders.¹⁶

But there was no pursuit. Polk's wing was directed to take up the march while Longstreet policed the battlefield. It was dark on the twenty-first when Longstreet with his veterans was ready to march northward and cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga. Such was the general confusion as to supplies and ammunition that he deferred his start until the morning of the twenty-second. Watching the Confederate movements carefully, Thomas held to his position on Missionary Ridge until after dark on the twenty-second; and before dawn came on the twenty-third he was safe within the fortifications of Chattanooga. Evidently by this time Bragg had come to think a

¹⁴ Report of Captain O. T. Gibber (ordnance officer), no date, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. II, 39-43.

¹⁵ Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 105, gives the following percentage losses: Confederate, 25.9; Union, 19.6. Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, 215, gives the following total losses: Confederate, 17,804; Union, 15,851. Cf. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 549.

¹⁶ Circular, headquarters, Army of Tennessee, September 21, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. IV, 679; Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 289. Cf. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 461.

pursuit to be impracticable. Longstreet received orders from Bragg to divert part of his column and march it directly toward Chattanooga. Bragg appears to have dropped entirely the idea of a general pursuit. In explanation, he is said to have remarked that "the people would be greatly gratified to know that his army was marching through the streets of Chattanooga with bands of music." We do not know the reply that Longstreet made. He said that he replied that it would give the people much greater pleasure to know that Bragg's troops had passed the Tennessee River and turned the enemy out of Chattanooga in headlong flight while the pursuing forces pounded away at their broken columns. At all events, there was no pursuit. The situation now changed; Bragg circled the hills of the city with his disappointed brigades while the enemy within went on reduced rations. So ended Bragg's golden opportunity.¹⁷

Now came dark days for Bragg, as he paid the penalty for a loss of that essential harmony and *esprit de corps* which must underlie success. Trouble, which had been brewing, broke out first between Bragg and his erstwhile right-wing commander, Polk. Hardly had the smoke of battle been dissipated when Bragg sent to Polk an official demand for an explanation as to why he had not been ready to attack at daybreak on the morning of September 20. Regardless of the fact that the troops were on the move, a further demand for the same information was made by Bragg on September 25. Polk replied on September 28, advancing the explanation that he had not been able to locate D. H. Hill and had therefore given the attack orders to a member of Hill's staff. Later, Hill denied having received them, and Polk soon succeeded in gaining the partisan support of Longstreet.¹⁸

Before replying to Bragg, Polk had written President Davis on September 27 and again on October 6, putting in bold terms his opinion that Bragg was incompetent and hinting at personal differences that seemed to be at the basis of the controversy. The most significant thing in the October 6 letter was the statement that Polk had been delegated to bring the matter to the President's notice by a self-appointed committee consisting of Generals Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Polk. Longstreet was designated to write to Secretary of War Seddon on the matter, and did so on September 26. After reciting the evils of the existing situation, Longstreet added: "I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander. . . . Can't you send us General Lee?"¹⁹

¹⁷ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 462.

¹⁸ Brent to Polk, September 25, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. II, 54; Polk to Brent, September 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 47.

¹⁹ Polk to Lee, September 27, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. IV, 709; *id.* to Davis (written from Atlanta after Polk had been suspended from command by Bragg), October 6, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 67. See Polk

Prior to the three generals' decision to seek Bragg's removal, Longstreet committed, if the report of General W. W. Mackall was true, a fault which can hardly be condoned. According to Mackall, Bragg's chief of staff and a man clearly disposed in Bragg's favor, Longstreet made a statement in front of the officers and soldiers that Bragg "was not on the field [at Chickamauga] and Lee would have been."²⁰ While Longstreet's statement may have been true to some extent, such an invidious comparison of his present commander with a former one was decidedly impolitic and unbecoming in him. It seems wholly unlike Longstreet to have made a statement conveying the meaning which Mackall evidently intended. At best, the report serves to indicate that relations between Longstreet and Bragg at this date were definitely lacking in cordiality; at worst, it puts Longstreet in a very bad light. Though Bragg may have lost the respect of many of his soldiers and the confidence of his generals, he was none the less their commander and entitled to the outward forms of respect and professional loyalty as long as he held that office.

Without doubt the military situation was unfortunate—indeed, almost catastrophic—but it is always unbecoming in a soldier to engage in conspiracy. The group that seemed determined to secure Bragg's removal were, regardless of their motive, engaged in a conspiracy. Longstreet was impulsive; he worshiped Lee, and he believed that Lee—and probably Lee alone—possessed the ability and the broad human sympathy needed to bring harmony to the western army. But he must have known that Lee would not come west. The subject had been talked over between them before Longstreet himself first came west. Longstreet could pour out his heart to Lee (which he did) without meriting any charge of improper conduct; but for him to enter into the sort of conspiracy which he seems without question to have participated in was a different matter. No doubt Bragg's failure to profit by his opportunities was a bitter disappointment to Longstreet. As he gazed down into Chattanooga and viewed the Federal army busy strengthening the fortifications which had been prepared by the Confederates, he realized the utter futility of Bragg's new plan of trying to shell Rosecrans out of his comfortable quarters. So one can at least sympathize with Longstreet, even though one disapproves of his actions.

The letter to Secretary of War Seddon, already mentioned, was an unusual statement of the situation, to say the least. Had the Secretary of War been a warm personal friend of Longstreet's, or one to whom he had been accustomed

to Seddon, October 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 69; Longstreet to Seddon, September 26, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. IV, 705-706; *id.* to Lee, September 26, 1863, *id.* to *id.*, October 6, 1863, and *id.* to *id.*, October 11, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 549-50; Lee to Longstreet, September 25, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 749, and *id.* to *id.*, October 26, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 549-50.

²⁰ W. W. Mackall to J. E. Johnston, October 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 742.

to write frequently about the characteristics of his military associates, the contents of this letter might possibly be excused. Perhaps Longstreet thought that he was in some degree independent of Bragg's authority, since he had been attached to the Army of Tennessee only for the Chickamauga operations. But neither of these conjectures, even if valid, would seem to justify his action, as his letter to Seddon was an official letter, written by Longstreet in the capacity of a subordinate of General Bragg's.

In this letter of September 26, Longstreet recited the chief events of the battle of Chickamauga and the failure of Bragg to pursue the enemy afterwards. He complained that the army had not been permitted to assault the enemy and, warming to his subject, commented that his chief had done "but one thing that he ought to have done" since the two generals joined forces, and that was to order the attack on September 20. "All other things that he has done he ought not to have done."²¹ Yet it is evident from Longstreet's other correspondence at this time that the one thing he did not want was to take command of this distracted army himself.

Although Longstreet's indictment of Bragg was sincere, there was doubtless something of personal pique behind his complaint. Perhaps he felt that his views had not received the consideration which they deserved. Sensing Bragg's inability to co-ordinate his mind on tactical matters, Longstreet had practically demanded that the enemy be pursued and the fruits of victory seized. Longstreet had come west pledged to "most active" operations and the destruction of Rosecrans' army. All that had been gained under Bragg was a "barren victory." Without some further action on Bragg's part, all the blood and treasure that had been expended in knocking the enemy out of position was just so much waste. A victory that merely changed the geographical position of the rival armies was in no sense a victory. And the decisive results that all had expected were now beyond reach.²²

Davis cautioned Bragg to go slow in the matter of taking action against Polk. His motive was to avoid a controversy which would entail further evil. He told Bragg that the opposition to him, both in the army and out of it, had been a "public calamity" and that he did not want fuel added to the flames.²³

²¹ Longstreet to Seddon, September 26, 1863, *ibid.*, 705.

²² Longstreet wrote Lee on September 2, 1863, that the Confederates must "destroy Rosecrans' army." *Ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 693-94. Lee wrote Davis on September 11, 1863: "The blow at Rosecrans should be made promptly, and Longstreet returned." *Ibid.*, 711-12. Davis wrote Lee on September 16, 1863: "I conversed freely with General Longstreet, and he seemed to concur with me in the propriety of the most active operations, both by attack upon the enemy and expeditions against his lines of communications." *Ibid.*, 725-27. See also Lee to Davis, September 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 754; *id.* to *id.*, October 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 766.

²³ Davis to Bragg (telegram), September 30, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 533. Davis expected Bragg to refrain from further action. *Id.* to *id.*, October 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 535.

The President's aide, Colonel James Chesnut, was already on the ground as the executive's representative, but he was without authority. "Your immediate presence in this army is urgently demanded," he wired Davis on October 5; and a sadly harassed President was forced to put aside more important work and travel southward to salvage an army from the quarrels resulting from the arbitrary and unwise activities of a temperamentally unfit leader. Would the army mutiny? There were some who thought that it might. Davis left Richmond on October 6 after an urgent message from Lee suggesting that the President visit the camps of the western army, where he "would be able to reconcile many difficulties and unite the scattered troops." It was distressing to Lee, and to others, that the dangers to the South should be increased by personal quarrels.²⁴

The President arrived at Bragg's headquarters early on October 9 and immediately called all the commanders together for a conference. After a few moments of casual greeting he asked that each general present give his opinion as to Bragg's qualifications for his command. Commencing with Longstreet, who was the senior, he demanded an answer. Picture the situation: Here sat Bragg with his friend, the President of the Confederacy; before him in the room were all his subordinate commanders. And the President called upon these subordinates to pass judgment upon Bragg. The scene was an extraordinary one, fraught with embarrassment for all the officers present. Was Jefferson Davis bluffing? Did he believe that he could silence these critics of Bragg by calling for an open meeting? Longstreet admitted later that he was quite embarrassed and tried to evade the question. But the President could not be turned aside from his purpose; again he demanded an answer. Longstreet's reply was to the effect that the services of Bragg would be of greater value elsewhere than at the head of the Army of Tennessee.²⁵

One can picture this huge hulk of a man, with flashing eyes and determination written on his face, looking squarely at President Davis as he made this statement, little knowing, perhaps, that he had set in motion a chain of circumstances which ultimately would make him *persona non grata* with Davis. When faced with the issue, however, Longstreet did not flinch. It was for the South that he spoke. He had already expressed his opinion of Bragg in writing—in his letter of September 26 to Seddon. Now he orally stated that opinion to Davis, simply and honestly. After he had finished, the others corroborated what he had said: one by one Polk, Buckner, D. H. Hill, and

²⁴ Chesnut to Davis, October 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 538; Davis to Lee, October 5, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 772; Lee to Davis, October 5, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 771; Pillow to Seddon, October 5, 1863, *ibid.*, Ser. IV, II, 853.

²⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 465-68, gives what is probably an accurate account of the meeting. See also Hay, "Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga," *loc. cit.*, 243-46.

Cleburne—in more or less halting fashion—condemned their leader and characterized him as unfit to command. It was a hard day for General Bragg and an equally hard one for his friend and supporter, President Davis.

The following morning, the President sent for Longstreet, and together they rode out where no one else could hear. The day was largely spent in conversation and argument. The only extant record of this conference is that contained in Longstreet's own account. According to Longstreet, the President offered to depose Bragg and make Longstreet commander of the army. Longstreet declined on the ground that nothing could now be gained by the change—that Bragg had ruined the chances for success when he failed to follow up Rosecrans after his defeat.²⁶

Longstreet should have accepted the task in spite of the difficulties surrounding it. To decline was an error of policy; to mention, as he said he did, that the army belonged properly to General Joseph E. Johnston's department and command compounded Longstreet's tactlessness. Since Longstreet could not agree with, or meet the desires of, Davis, he offered at once the only alternative: his own resignation. This, however, the President declined to accept; nor would he agree that Longstreet should relinquish his command (the First Corps) and accept a transfer to the Trans-Mississippi Department. For, said the President, the troops would not be satisfied with the change. This was undoubtedly true. Longstreet's men were devoted to him; and had he left them, their morale probably would have fallen considerably.²⁷

²⁶ The only record of this conversation seems to be that in Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 466–67.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 465–66. A good recent account of the meeting is in Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of Tennessee: A Military History* (Indianapolis, 1941), 287–89.

Knoxville

AFTER CHICKAMAUGA, THE SCENE OF LONGSTREET'S ACTIVITIES SOON SHIFTED TO East Tennessee, where General Ambrose E. Burnside, the commander of the Army of the Ohio, had some twelve thousand men (exclusive of local militia) in his IX and XXIII Corps, busily engaged in holding the railroad and blocking the Southern communications between the West and Richmond. At the time of the battle of Chickamauga, he had pushed down toward Rosecrans' army as far as Loudon—where the railroad crosses the Tennessee—and, in spite of sporadic attempts to dislodge him, had maintained his advanced forces in that vicinity.

The situation in East Tennessee had been particularly unfortunate for the South even before the battle of Chickamauga. The Union advance to the line of the railroad which connected Chattanooga and Virginia by way of the Holston-Tennessee Valley and the occupation of Knoxville by Burnside on September 2 had interrupted direct communication between the East and the West and had forced the use of a roundabout route through Atlanta. Furthermore, this hostile occupation threatened Richmond from the west—with only a small force under General Sam Jones in the Bristol, Virginia, area barring the way. There existed among the mountain people in this area a considerable Union sentiment, which, when exploited, became a human barrier of disaffection between the two great sections of the Confederacy. The most serious threat, however, lay in the continuing Union occupation of the railroad and Union control of the country between Cumberland Gap through Knoxville to near Loudon on the Tennessee River. The Union object, of course, was to hold this advantage in East Tennessee.¹

Some operations of a minor nature took place in this area as official Richmond kept watchful eyes on this fateful East Tennessee district. Also there were frequent hostile raids, of which one—against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad—led Lee to urge General Sam Jones to move forward into East Tennessee, drive the Union troops out of Knoxville, and secure the line

¹ See Lee to Davis, September 14, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 720; Davis to Lee, September 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 725; Lee to Davis, September 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 742; Rosecrans to Halleck, October 8, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. IV, 175; Lee to Jones, September 26, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 750; *id.* to Davis, September 27, 1863, *ibid.*, 752. See also Jones to Seddon, October 14, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 749; and Halleck to Burnside, October 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 25.

of the railroad. Bragg sent small forces up the river after the battle of Chickamauga; and on October 17, General C. L. Stevenson followed with his division, to co-operate in a general movement intended to halt Burnside's advance toward Chattanooga and force him back to Knoxville. Stevenson went as far as Sweetwater and directed some ineffective operations from that point. Bragg reported on October 29 that Stevenson had succeeded in his mission and was following up his success. But the facts do not substantiate this optimistic report. The enemy was still well forward of Knoxville when November came.²

Meanwhile the Union forces in Chattanooga (which was practically in a state of siege) were being rested and reorganized. General Grant, fresh from his success at Vicksburg, was placed in general charge of operations in the area. He arrived on October 16 and three days later replaced Rosecrans with Thomas. Grant himself at once set about devising means of opening lines of supply and preparing to dispose of Bragg. Late in October the Union troops forced a crossing of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry and opened the famous "cracker line" of river supply; between the twenty-sixth and the twenty-eighth of October, a considerable force under Hooker crossed the river, occupied the Wauhatchie or Lookout Valley, and drove back the Confederate left which was commanded by Longstreet. On the night of October 28, the Confederate commander attempted to drive the Union troops into the river and close the river line of supply into Chattanooga. The attack was unsuccessful, and the Union lodgment south of the Tennessee was made permanent.³

Longstreet blamed the cavalry but, at the same time, called on Micah Jenkins, the local commander, to explain why one of his brigades had quit its position. Bragg blamed Longstreet; and he wrote Davis on October 30 that Longstreet had deliberately failed to obey orders from the twenty-sixth to the twenty-eighth—thus losing important ground. The President sided with Bragg. He expressed himself as bitterly disappointed, both at the fact that the enemy had gained a foothold across the river from Bridgeport and at Longstreet's failure. "Such disobedience of orders and disastrous failures as you describe," he replied to Bragg, "cannot consistently be overlooked. I suppose

² Lee to Seddon, October 23, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 800; *id.* to Sam Jones, November 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 815; Bragg to Stevenson, October 17, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 760. See also Longstreet's report, October[?], 1863 (not forwarded, however, until November 5 or 6), *ibid.*, Pt. II, 289; Longstreet to Brent (Bragg's chief of staff), November 4, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 634; and Bragg to Davis, October 29, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 555.

³ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 475-76; Ulysses S. Grant, "Chattanooga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 690; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 467-72; Hooker's report, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. I, 92 ff.

you have received the explanation due to the government, and I shall be pleased if one satisfactory has been given." ⁴

It is well at this point to stop for a moment and consider Longstreet from a more objective viewpoint. There seems to have been a distinct lessening of his confidence in himself and a lack of harmony among his own command which were foreign to his earlier record. He appears to have ignored Bragg after his participation in the abortive effort to rid the army of its commander and does not seem to have sensed that his position was extremely shaky after Bragg had been sustained on all points by the President. There seems to have been an indifference in Longstreet's actions. Was he chagrined at having been enticed into a rather unsoldierly line of action? He may even have assumed an attitude that nothing could be accomplished under Bragg and that hence nothing should be attempted. Yet there is little evidence that Bragg had gone out of his way to make things difficult for Longstreet, who had been retained in command of his own corps in a place of responsibility and had received Bragg's approval and support in the effort to regain a balanced and adequate force. But it does seem clear that Bragg lacked confidence in his chief subordinate and did not quite know what to do with him. Something of this feeling must have come up in conversation between Bragg and President Davis.⁵

Bragg was indecisive and reluctant to take the initiative. Perhaps these characteristics of his played a part in creating the apathetic and seemingly indifferent Longstreet of the months after Chickamauga. At all events, the Longstreet of this period is not one to whom great deeds can be credited. Had not Bragg needed all the strength he could muster, it is highly possible that Longstreet might have been returned to Virginia just as soon as the Chickamauga campaign was over.⁶

Sensing all of the difficulties, Davis offered Bragg a solution to his problem by suggesting that more extensive operations be undertaken in East Tennessee and that Longstreet, with his two divisions, be given the task of expelling Burnside and restoring communications with Virginia.⁷ President Davis foresaw that should this suggestion be adopted, Bragg would be rid

⁴ Longstreet to Brent, October 30, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 606; Sorrel to Jenkins, October 31, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 557; Bragg to Davis, October 30, 1863, *ibid.*, 556; Davis to Bragg, November 1, 1863, *ibid.*, 558.

⁵ Ropes's general characterization of Longstreet as "singularly lacking in energy and dash" is true for this particular time. Ropes and Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, Pt. II, 149.

⁶ Lee to Davis, September 23, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXIX, Pt. II, 742; *id.* to Longstreet, September 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 749. See also T. R. Hay, "The Battle of Chattanooga," in *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, VIII (June, 1924), 123.

⁷ Davis to Bragg, October 29, 1863, in *Official Records*, LII, Pt. II, 554.

of the immediate presence of Longstreet, and at the same time a more adequate force would be operating in the strategic area of East Tennessee.⁸ It is noteworthy that Longstreet was not a party to this discussion.

The selection of Longstreet to command the forces intended for clearing the enemy out of East Tennessee, as suggested by President Davis, was the direct result of Longstreet's quarrel with Bragg and his own preference as made known soon after the battle of Chickamauga. Bragg had been sustained by Davis after the investigation held on October 6, and those who had taken concerted action to have Bragg removed were soon sent elsewhere. D. H. Hill was relieved on the fifteenth; Mackall rejoined Joseph E. Johnston on the sixteenth; Polk was replaced by General W. J. Hardee on the twenty-third. Of those who had taken an active part, only Longstreet and Buckner remained after the middle of October, but in an atmosphere supercharged with suspicion and ill feeling. At no time during the war was the situation more disturbing because of the inability of the several commanders to work together.⁹

It was not long before Longstreet heard rumors that he would command the East Tennessee expedition. His plan of operations was set forth in a letter to General Buckner on November 5. In this letter Longstreet's lack of confidence in Bragg was only too clearly shown: "As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the General, I thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging his own move. . . ." Longstreet proposed that Bragg should withdraw from the lines about Chattanooga to a strong concentrated position farther south and then detach twenty thousand men for a campaign against Burnside. Then, before Thomas could act, the Confederates were to fall on him front and rear. When this plan was repeated in conference, Hardee is said to have voiced approval. But Bragg paid no attention to Longstreet. So the lines around Chattanooga were thinned, and Longstreet, with twelve thousand men, was soon en route to Sweetwater.¹⁰

⁸ There are no really good strategic maps available except the general maps to be found in Pts. II and III of Calvin D. Cowles (comp.), *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1891-95). These maps should be consulted in order to understand the significance of the South's problem.

⁹ Mackall to Johnston, October 13, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXX, Pt. IV, 742. The president probably made his decision to sustain Bragg on October 13. Bragg to Beauregard, October 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 745. The next day Davis issued to the army a proclamation calling on all for loyal obedience. *Ibid.*, 744. For Davis' suggestion that Longstreet be sent to East Tennessee, see Davis to Bragg, October 29, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 554. See also Archer Anderson to J. C. Breckinridge, October 15, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 752; Special Orders, Army of Tennessee, October 15, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 149; General Orders No. 2, Department of Tennessee, October 16, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. IV, 756; Mackall to Johnston, October 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 742; and Davis to Bragg, October 23, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 547.

¹⁰ See Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 455; Longstreet to Buckner, November 5, 1863,

Longstreet had given frequent thought to operations in East Tennessee which, if successful, might be turned into a strategic offensive through Kentucky. He had made pertinent suggestions to Bragg immediately after the initial success at Chickamauga, and he was not blind to the dangers of a continued hostile occupation of that strategic area. In the conference of generals over which Bragg presided on November 3, Longstreet had made specific recommendations for detaching an adequate force of men for a surprise move against Burnside while the remainder of Bragg's army was withdrawn to strong defensive positions behind Chickamauga Creek. Longstreet's suggestions were sound. He could see the danger in thin lines, against which the enemy could operate powerfully from a central position. He saw also the possibilities to be gained from an adequate offensive into East Tennessee.¹¹

It does not appear that Longstreet knew that the President had suggested the campaign. He thought—as is shown in a letter which he wrote to Buckner—that the idea had originated with Bragg and that Bragg was acting some five weeks too late on the original proposals set forth in Longstreet's letter to Seddon soon after Chickamauga. The President had suggested that Longstreet and his two divisions be sent—and Bragg carried out these suggestions to the letter, adding part of Wheeler's cavalry.¹²

On November 3 Longstreet received his oral instructions to proceed with the campaign. He requested at once that engineer and commissary officers be furnished him; and on November 5 he moved his field headquarters to Tyner's Station, there to await transportation for his command.¹³

Between Longstreet and his objective—Knoxville—lay Burnside's army of some twelve thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, which must be brought to battle and defeated. And according to his orders a line of communications some sixty-five miles in length must be established, railroads must be repaired and guarded, and telegraph lines must be operated, so that the advancing column would be in constant touch with Bragg's headquarters. It was a task calling for high tactical skill and careful administration. It also called for a high degree of mutual confidence and trust between Bragg

ibid., LII, Pt. II, 559; Buckner to Longstreet, *ibid.*, 560; Davis to Hardee, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 609; Special Orders No. 192, Polk's corps, September 23, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 696; and abstract of returns, Army of Tennessee, December 10, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. II, 656.

¹¹ Longstreet to Seddon, September 26, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 705; Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 445; and Longstreet to Buckner, November 5, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 559.

¹² Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 465, 480, 485; Davis to Bragg, October 29, 1863, in *Official Records*, LII, Pt. II, 555; Longstreet to Seddon, September 26, 1863, *ibid.*, XXX, Pt. IV, 703; *id.* to Breckinridge, November 5, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 559.

¹³ Longstreet's report, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. I, 455. Written orders followed on November 4. Bragg to Longstreet, November 4, 1864, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 634; Longstreet to Bragg, November 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 626; *id.* to Brent, November 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 634.

and Longstreet. Could either unbend enough to bring about that essential harmony?

A careful reading of Bragg's written instructions shows that conflicting missions were assigned. Longstreet was not long in realizing this fact, and in the interest of future harmony he requested Bragg to clarify his instructions. Should he maintain the railroad, Longstreet asked, as Bragg had directed? Or should he forget about the railroad and concentrate on what appeared to be his primary mission—that of ridding East Tennessee of the enemy? If he stopped to repair and rebuild the railway, it would be unlikely, as Longstreet stated, that he could even overtake the enemy. General Bragg was quick to sense the uncertainty in Longstreet's mind and replied that he should have limited the assignment to the road to Loudon. He went further: ". . . to relieve you of all embarrassment on that subject, I will devolve the duty on others to hold your communications to that point [*i.e.*, Loudon], so that you may devote your whole time, attention, and means to the primary object—to get possession of East Tennessee. . . ." Certainly these instructions were specific and abundantly clear. General Bragg was to manage the railroad as far as Loudon—beyond that point, it would be up to Longstreet.¹⁴

On November 8, Longstreet was still at Tyner's Station complaining that his supply trains had not reported and that he had heard nothing of their being forwarded. Late that night he was at Sweetwater. Meanwhile, Bragg's aides had been seeking Longstreet unsuccessfully at Tyner's Station to give him the information that the supply trains had gone forward and that it had been so reported to Longstreet's quartermaster. General Bragg's further message was that he wanted Longstreet to push forward with the greatest vigor.¹⁵

The first stage of the advance, which ended at Sweetwater on the tenth, seems to have been poorly handled. The going was heavy, and the increasing jealousy between Generals E. M. Law and Micah Jenkins boded ill for the success of the expedition. The shortage of rail transportation caused vexing delays; and although the pontoons were shipped by rail, it was found that there were no wagons to haul them after their arrival. Furthermore,

¹⁴ The details of Bragg's oral instructions are not of record. The specific missions given in the written instructions should be noted and kept in mind: "Every preparation is ordered to advance you as fast as possible. . . . Your object should be to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee first. . . . You will please keep open the telegraph communication with us here and see to the repair and regular use of [the] railroad to Loudon. The latter is of the first importance. . . . I hope to hear from you fully and frequently." Bragg to Longstreet, November 4, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 634; Longstreet to Bragg, November 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 636; Bragg to Longstreet, November 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 644.

¹⁵ Longstreet to Brent, November 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 670; Ellis to Longstreet, November 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 671.

when Longstreet set forth, he had no maps of the country to be traversed, nor did he secure the services of suitable guides and staff officers. Longstreet has asserted in his memoirs that seemingly no arrangements had been made by Bragg to provide food and forage for the army while on the march. The troops had left their camps with few rations and with the expectation of finding ample supplies at Sweetwater, only to discover when they arrived that Stevenson had shipped back all surplus stocks to Bragg's army quartermaster and was himself on the point of withdrawing. Longstreet's comment was that his troops found themselves in a strange country with less than a day's rations on hand and hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp equipage, "and our friends in the rear putting in their paper bullets. This sounds more like romance than war, but I appeal to the records for the facts, including reports from my chiefs of quartermaster and subsistence departments and General Alexander's account of the condition of some of the battery horses and ammunition." The *Official Records* testify that General Longstreet did not exaggerate.¹⁶

How much of the confusion may be charged to Longstreet? The difficulties with the rail transport certainly were Bragg's responsibility, and some degree of negligence may be laid at his feet. But the care and supply of Longstreet's own troops, the question of ensuring that those troops started with adequate rations, and above all the matter of preserving the internal harmony of his command—these were definitely Longstreet's duties. He was a sufficiently experienced soldier to have known this, and his failure to care for his command properly cannot be charged to the negligence of another. He filled the pages of his memoirs with criminations and recriminations, but the fact remains that he allowed himself to go off on an expedition into an unknown part of the country with less than fifteen thousand men in an attempt to capture or defeat a larger force, with little or no control over transportation and less over the system of supply.¹⁷

Longstreet asked for reinforcements in order to make certain that he could cope with Burnside on even terms. He particularly requested that Wheeler,

¹⁶ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 485-87; Bragg to Longstreet, November 4, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 634; Longstreet to Bragg, November 3, 1863, *ibid.*, 626; Bragg to Longstreet, November 5, 1863, *ibid.*, 635; *id.* to Stevenson, November 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 633; Stevenson's report, November 12, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 10; Longstreet's report, *ibid.*, 454 ff.; miscellaneous reports of Longstreet's subordinates, *ibid.*, 476-549.

¹⁷ Longstreet estimated on November 9 that Burnside had 23,000. Longstreet to Brent, November 9, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 671. Burnside actually had some 28,786 (IX Corps, 5,697; XXIII Corps, 23,089), with 22 pieces of heavy artillery and 142 light guns. See Abstract of Returns, Department of the Ohio, for November, 1863, *ibid.*, 292. This force is far larger than the one which Burnside mentioned in his report as having faced Longstreet at Loudon some few days later. No satisfactory explanation has been found to account for the discrepancy. It may be that Burnside greatly minimized the strength of the force that retreated before Longstreet in order to justify his action in not meeting Longstreet in open battle.

who had been sent to him with inadequate supply arrangements and indefinite instructions, have an additional battery of artillery. He wrote, only too truthfully, that no great success could result from the operations of a small force against a large one. Bragg turned a deaf ear to his plea. He decided that additional artillery would handicap the cavalry and that Longstreet's estimate of the enemy's force was larger than the facts justified. Besides, Bragg had no men to spare from his own position. Wheeler's operations were largely ineffective—a fact which can be charged not to a lack of artillery but rather to Wheeler's ineffective handling of his command and a lack of definite objectives.¹⁸

Longstreet complained that the supply train (which was supposed to have gone forward) was not at Sweetwater and that his troops were not all up. He had no meat—in spite of assurance that there were ample supplies in the country—and he quoted Stevenson as stating that he was ordered by Bragg not to have rations on hand at Sweetwater. In these two letters, Longstreet penned a severe indictment of Bragg's co-operative measures. If what he stated was true, there is justification in his after-the-war account of the inefficiency in Bragg's army. Longstreet was unable to operate successfully because of a lack of transportation and other necessities for active operations, and these crippling deficiencies became Bragg's responsibility once they were brought to his notice.¹⁹

Longstreet's growing bitterness toward Bragg showed in his official correspondence, affected his poise, and lessened his ability to think clearly and promptly. It may have been the chief cause for his lack of control over his own subordinates. Instead of moving his troops with such speed as would have brought Burnside to battle before he could retire into Knoxville, Longstreet was still trying to bring about an orderly concentration of his own force at Sweetwater as late as November 12. Meanwhile, Bragg had reported to the War Department that "Longstreet ought to be over the Tennessee, but I hear nothing from him."²⁰

In spite of the difficulties, the march went on. Each day brought the forward elements of Longstreet's columns nearer to Burnside's rear, which was equally handicapped in its retirement. No word came of the Confederate reinforcements which had been promised from troops stationed in southwestern Virginia. The quarreling and bickering between Bragg and Long-

¹⁸ Longstreet to Bragg, November 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 671; Brent to Longstreet, November 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 680.

¹⁹ Longstreet to Ellis, November 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 680; *id.* to Bragg (telegram and letter), November 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 680.

²⁰ See *id.* to Bragg (telegram), November 12, 1863, *ibid.*, 686; Bragg to Cooper, November 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 681; and Davis to Bragg, November 20, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 562.

street continued. Longstreet commented caustically that the campaign soon appeared to be directed against him instead of against Burnside. But could not Longstreet have foreseen this turn of events? What else could he have expected from Bragg in view of what had happened? Did he not surmise that his letter of September 26 to Seddon had been made known to Bragg? And had Longstreet forgotten the remarks which he had made at the President's October 6 conference?

A strong case for Longstreet can be made on the basis of the official dispatches themselves. Even though Bragg could hardly have been expected to feel kindly toward Longstreet, it is inconceivable that he should deliberately have jeopardized the success of the campaign to free East Tennessee, which was within his own territorial command. Yet Longstreet's dispatches to Bragg contain repeated advices of his need for reinforcements and supplies—advices which in Bragg's replies are consistently ignored. Of course, cases have been known where subordinate staff officers kept dispatches from coming to the attention of a commander—sometimes to cover up their own shortcomings, and sometimes to create a false situation and thus injure a subordinate commander. Although it is not impossible that such might have been the fate of Longstreet's dispatches to Bragg, lack of any evidence confines the possibility to mere speculation. The harm of the situation lay in its effect on Longstreet, who soon convinced himself that Bragg had deliberately set out to destroy him. Much that passed between Longstreet and Bragg was not recorded; much of the meaning of that which was recorded is now obscure. But the lack of harmony and mutual confidence between the two leaders is only too evident from the available records. With such conditions as a basis for active operations, it is small wonder that the expedition failed. Longstreet appeared to be on the defensive with Bragg—almost in fear of him, one might say. He moved with excessive caution and was quick to file complaints.²¹

The advance on Loudon was made in two columns on November 13 under cover of a cavalry diversion toward Marysville. McLaws moved toward Jackson Ford while Jenkins, with the artillery attached, marched directly to Loudon. Once away from the railroad, the artillery found great difficulty in moving; and the foot troops suffered unusual hardships from the biting winds that cut through the thin rags which clothed the veterans of the First Corps. As the men stumbled along, Burnside withdrew from the south side of the Tennessee and destroyed the railroad bridge near Loudon.

²¹ See Bragg to Longstreet, November 12, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 686; Longstreet to Bragg, November 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 687; and Grant, "Chattanooga," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 709.

While part of Longstreet's advance attempted a direct attack on the town, another column succeeded in constructing a bridge at Huff's Ferry (just below Loudon), and a bridgehead was established. Slight resistance was offered by Julius White's Union division when the crossing was made on November 13; but serious skirmishing took place all the next day, with the Union force continually pressing the Confederates back against the bridge. After dark, however, the Union troops withdrew, and White marched toward Lenoir's Station. The movement was conducted in a leisurely fashion, and by daylight on the fifteenth, the entire Union force was on the road. Skirmishing continued without interruption as Longstreet tried to bring Burnside to battle. Burnside, meanwhile, was occupied with the struggle to rescue the wagons, which stuck in the ever-present mud, and used every effort to delay Longstreet until the works at Knoxville could be improved and the Union army could get safely within them.²²

Loudon, the place where the railroad crosses the Tennessee on its eastward run, is some thirty miles from Knoxville. West of the railroad and parallel to it is the jagged range of Clinch Mountain, with its occasional gaps and many blind trails and unfinished roads. Further to the west, and along the base of the Clinch Mountain range, ran the main road to Knoxville as far as Campbell's Station—a distance of seventeen miles—where it intersected the Kingston Road, passed on through a narrow gap, and united with another road which ran east of the mountain spur at Campbell's Station, parallel to and near the railroad.

Longstreet's plan contemplated an advance in two columns. One, under McLaws, was to take the more westerly route; the other (Hood's division), under Jenkins, was to follow the railroad into Campbell's Station by way of Lenoir's. The two forces were to join at the crossroads where the roads to Knoxville and Kingston intersected, about one mile southwest of Campbell's Station. Jenkins made contact with the withdrawing Union troops late in the afternoon of November 15. A stiff rear-guard action took place, in which Jenkins was unsuccessful. Reconnaissances were pushed with the utmost vigor during the night, but the excellent security measures of the Federals prevented Jenkins from gaining any knowledge of their movements. The Union troops withdrew quietly; and when daybreak came, Jenkins marched into Lenoir's, which he found deserted.²³

While Burnside was fighting a delaying action along the railroad, McLaws had practically an uninterrupted march along the more westerly road.

²² See Burnside's report, November 13, 1865, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. I, 373-74.

²³ See Sorrel to Wheeler, November 16, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 703.

Burnside's predicament was serious. He and his wagons must clear the intersection before McLaws could come up and gain his rear. On the morning of November 16, the Union advance guard set out briskly to gain the crossroads; McLaws, with an equal appreciation of the situation, hurried on. The mud was knee-deep and handicapped both, but Burnside proved the faster by perhaps an hour. Passing the intersection, he turned west and took position on the left flank to oppose McLaws, while the rear of his column covered the Loudon Road, along which the trains were struggling toward safety.²⁴

In the meantime, Jenkins was driving hard against the Union rear, which was astride the railroad, with utter disregard for the safety of his command. He had little success. Burnside's rear guard blocked his every effort. Even when guides were impressed to lead flanking detachments through the mountains, the attempts ended in failure. Burnside, inspired by the recognition of his danger, had covered his retirement with great skill.

Longstreet came up in person on the morning of the sixteenth to co-ordinate the attacks of the two columns. About noon, he launched at Burnside's right a vigorous blow, which was repulsed. Again, he tried the center, with equally poor results. Later, after local reconnaissance, he sent Jenkins under the cover of a wooded slope to turn Burnside's left; but even this movement was discovered by the Union scouts, and before its pressure was felt the Federal line had been redispensed to meet it. Longstreet tried in every way to pin Burnside down and bring him to grips, but in each attempt he was unsuccessful. Burnside was too clever, and the disgruntled Confederates were dismayed to see the Union army withdrawing without hindrance along the road into Knoxville. This was quite a different Burnside from the one who had faced Longstreet at Fredericksburg!²⁵

At this point one may well ask, Why was Burnside so successful in his test with what was reputed to be the best fighting corps in the Confederacy? He had hardly more than half Longstreet's strength. Although he was familiar with the terrain, that fact alone could not compensate for the inequality of forces. As part of Grant's larger strategy, Burnside was committed to holding Knoxville, and his immediate task was to withdraw his forces safely into the fortified city. That each step in his sequence of move-

²⁴ Longstreet wrote Bragg on November 18, 1863: "We failed to get to our points by about fifteen minutes, so that he got his position behind the point where I proposed to intercept him—Campbell's Station." *Ibid.*, 707.

²⁵ Longstreet continued: "We have been occupied today in driving the enemy from his advance line of defenses, only succeeding a little before night. Though we had no general battle, we have been skirmishing every day since we crossed the river and have sustained considerable loss." *Ibid.*

ments was handled so skillfully was evidence both of good leadership and of the utmost in support from his subordinates.²⁶

It was not so with Longstreet. Things were not working smoothly in his army. Sorrel, trying to absolve his chief, said that a fine opportunity to stop Burnside at Campbell's Station was lost because of bad roads. He ignored, however, the fact that the Federal army had to use the same roads—and with the added burden of covering a slow-moving wagon train while resisting a series of aggressive assaults. The chance to defeat Burnside was lost chiefly because there was sluggishness and no co-ordination in the infantry attack. Longstreet, in his memoirs, gave credence to a piece of gossip charging that Law deliberately bungled his attack because had it been successful, Jenkins would have received the credit. What an extraordinary statement! What is more extraordinary is that any such situation should have developed at all. A reading of the reports indicates that at this time Longstreet's command did not have the standard of discipline which had characterized the First Corps when it was serving under Lee. Furthermore, it is quite evident that its morale and that of its commander were badly shattered after Chickamauga. Burnside's minor tactics were considerably better than Longstreet's.²⁷

The next day the Union army was safe behind the fortifications at Knoxville, and Longstreet was left to collect his forces and face the more difficult task of attacking a strongly entrenched position. Wheeler's cavalry, however, had been more successful: it had reached behind Burnside, sweeping aside the scattered opposition, and it was in a position to block any reinforcement of Burnside from Cumberland Gap. Some gain had been made during the advance. When the Federal army had withdrawn from Lenoir's, the rear guard had been obliged to abandon a pontoon train and several wagons loaded with tools and other needful supplies. The various supplies were put to good use by the Confederates, and the captured bridge was moved to a bend in the Holston River just below Knoxville, where preparations were made to cross the main body. The weather cleared, and the marches were made more rapidly.

The cavalry joined Longstreet's column on the eighteenth and was assigned the mission of covering the flank along the Tazewell Road and opposite Kingston, where hostile troops had been reported. Meanwhile, the

²⁶ Burnside's report, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 273. See also Halleck to Grant, November 14, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 145.

²⁷ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 211; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 495; Jenkins' report, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. I, 526-27; Longstreet's report, January 10, 1864, *ibid.*, 455-66; Burnside's report, November 13, 1865, *ibid.*, 272-79.

infantry closed in on the Union pickets at the outskirts of Knoxville, and considerable skirmishing took place to within about a thousand yards of the enemy works at the northwest angle of the lines about the city. McLaws' division was ordered to attack the outer works, but after a brave start the men faltered and sought shelter. The position was too strong. Longstreet then decided on siege operations.

Reconnaissances were made; and all was in readiness to make the attack on the twenty-first, or the twenty-second at the latest, when it was postponed. Longstreet halted the operations because in his examination of the ground he had located what appeared to be more favorable positions for the artillery. Two days were lost in shifting the guns to the new locations, and this delay gave the enemy ample time to strengthen his lines. Everything was in readiness again by noon on the twenty-fifth. Alexander, who had command of the artillery, said later that he had anticipated little additional advantage from the new emplacements because the range was increased to the extreme—some 2,400 yards—and the ammunition was so defective that many shells burst at the muzzles or in the guns.²⁸

Again there was a delay—this time to await reinforcements, which were reported en route. And with each day of grace, the Union works were made more formidable. During these delays, the net was gradually being drawn around Bragg, who still sat before Chattanooga with his small army of some 33,467 infantry, 2,597 artillery, and scattered cavalry.²⁹ Grant, who had assumed general command over Thomas' as well as of Burnside's forces on October 18, had skillfully exploited his first success—the penetration of the Confederate left on October 28—and was now concentrating on the destruction of Bragg, leaving Burnside somewhat to his own fate. He had written Burnside on November 15, however, that Longstreet should be held between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville and not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything that winter.³⁰

While Longstreet played at siege operations with Burnside, Grant was busy with his final preparations to bring Bragg to decisive battle before reinforcements could come to him. Unwittingly, Longstreet, by his failure to halt Burnside and the subsequent investiture of Knoxville, had played directly into Grant's hands. Bragg, as department commander, could have withdrawn Longstreet, but he does not seem to have sensed his danger; even as late as November 20 he was transmitting to the President information

²⁸ Longstreet to Bragg, November 21, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 732; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 484.

²⁹ Field returns, Army of Tennessee, December 3, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 783.

³⁰ Grant's report, December 23, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. II, 29-30.

which was damaging to Longstreet and which was doubtless calculated to do him harm, since Bragg's statements varied somewhat from the truth.³¹

On the twenty-first Longstreet evidently received from Bragg a letter in which he exhibited some concern for his left. This letter certainly is not the recorded dispatch which Longstreet received on November 21 and which referred to some movement on Longstreet's left and rear. Longstreet's reply distinctly mentions the danger to Bragg. Since Bragg's other communication is lost, it is not known whether he suggested that Longstreet return to him—although he may well have done so. Longstreet's reply indicated that he wished to stay on and finish Burnside. He wrote:

The enemy's threat against your left is for the purpose of inducing you to retire. If you fail to do so, he will be obliged to retire himself, or throw a very strong force in your rear. If he does put a force behind you, you can fall upon it and destroy it, and then resume your position. With the present bad roads, I doubt if he can put a very large force behind you. If he does, and you let it get well out to your rear, I think it cannot escape you.³²

Two things seem clear from this letter: one, that Longstreet did not see that Bragg's force was the objective of the Union grand tactics (that it was evidenced by Sherman's approach to Bragg's rear); two, that to gain reinforcements for himself, Longstreet minimized Bragg's danger and emphasized the importance of destroying Burnside. Longstreet undoubtedly was sincere in his misinterpretation of the Federal objective, and doubtless his moral standards were such that he was incapable of deliberately attempting to delude Bragg into a sense of false security. However, it is hard to believe that Longstreet did not know that Bragg, at the risk of his own safety, had started two divisions (Cleburne's and Buckner's) to Knoxville and had to recall them only because of Thomas' attack of November 23! It is only too evident that the lack of cordial human relationships (such as existed between Longstreet and Lee) between Bragg and Longstreet had far-reaching consequences.

To return now to the environs of Knoxville, where a disturbed Longstreet faced a determined Burnside: The principal fort northwest of the town—Fort Sanders—was nearly impregnable to assault. Other strong works and forts completed the circle around Knoxville to Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill on the east. South of the river Fort Stanley on the east and the entrenched hill named Fort Higley on the west gave full protection against an advance from that quarter.

³¹ Bragg to Davis, November 20, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 723.

³² *Id.* to Longstreet (telegram), November[?], 1863, quoted in Longstreet to Wheeler, November 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 733. Without doubt, another letter is missing from the records. See also *id.* to Bragg, November 21, 1863, *ibid.*

Bragg's chief of engineers, General Danville Leadbetter, was on his way to Longstreet's headquarters. It seems that while Longstreet was studying how best to dislodge Burnside, General Hardee, Bragg's most dependable subordinate commander, had managed to bring his chief face to face with his own danger. He suggested that a staff officer be sent to Longstreet to explain the situation and Bragg's "views respecting the designs of the enemy," as well as the danger to Longstreet should he be cut off from Bragg. If Burnside had fortified, Hardee thought, a siege would be unwise and Longstreet ought to retire at once. Bragg decided to follow this sound advice—a decision which accounts for Leadbetter's journey to Longstreet's side. He traveled there armed, as Bragg said in his letter of November 22, with all of Bragg's views that could better be presented in person than by letter or telegram.³³

Leadbetter arrived in Longstreet's camp on the night of November 25; two brigades under Bushrod Johnson followed. These troops, however, arrived too late to be of any service to Longstreet. As the attack scheduled for the twenty-fifth had been postponed to await Bushrod Johnson's arrival, Longstreet and Leadbetter made an extensive reconnaissance around the entire Union position on the twenty-sixth. As a result of this inspection Leadbetter preferred an attack on Mabry's Hill at the extreme right of the Union defense line but agreed with Longstreet that Fort Sanders on the Union left was assailable. Because of lack of agreement between the two generals as to the best point at which to direct the proposed attack, another reconnaissance was conducted on the twenty-seventh. As a result an attack on Mabry's Hill was unanimously rejected; it was decided to strike elsewhere.³⁴

After their return the two generals carefully scrutinized Fort Sanders. They were startled to see one of the Union soldiers walking down the reverse face of the parapet and across the ditch. Here was the opportunity. If one of the enemy could walk out of the fort without a ladder or other mechanical aid, there was surely no reason why the entire Confederate army could not walk *into* the position. Detailed reconnaissances uncovered the fact that the ditches were rather formidable—some five feet of slippery clay, surmounted by cotton bales to an estimated height of twelve feet. Despite this discouraging news, Longstreet decided on a direct assault of Fort Sanders at noon the next day—November 28—and felt the unusual necessity to write to his division commanders urging that the assault be made with the "determination to succeed." Longstreet's doubt as to the fighting spirit of his men was not prophetic of victory. He told Jenkins: "If we go in with the

³³ Hardee to Bragg, November 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 737; Bragg to Longstreet, November 22, 1863, *ibid.*, 736.

³⁴ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 485.

idea that we shall fail, we will be sure to do so. . . . Do not let any one fail, or any thing."³⁵

Noon on the twenty-eighth arrived, but with it came no forward movement. The weather was bad, and a dense fog clung to the ground, which was pelted by a torrential rain. There was no visibility and no chance to use the artillery. It was necessary to order the attack postponed until the morning of the twenty-ninth. Range data were computed as well as possible, and the troops crept into alert positions under cover of the fog. Everything was in readiness for a night movement culminating in a general assault just before daybreak. This was risky business.

Both McLaws and Jenkins had expressed a lack of confidence in Longstreet's program—McLaws to such an extent that Longstreet felt compelled to send him a rebuke for making discouraging reports. Now, when the highest degree of co-operation was necessary, Longstreet had ordered a night movement to be conducted by officers who questioned the advisability of the proposed undertaking. The result could have been anticipated. Yet Longstreet felt that he must destroy Burnside. He had failed to do so by maneuver; now it seemed necessary to attempt to do so with the bayonet.³⁶

The details of the changed plan reached General Alexander, who was commanding the artillery, about 9 P.M. on the night of the twenty-eighth, and with them came the information that the guns which had been so carefully placed in position were not to be used. The assault which had been delayed twice because of indecision and bad weather now was to be made without artillery support. The attack was to be a surprise; the assaulting waves were to come up to the hostile line of outposts under cover of darkness and rush forward the moment the light of day made objects clearly visible. Three of McLaws' brigades were to make the direct attack on the fort, while Jenkins was ordered to send one brigade around the east of Fort Sanders and against its rear. With the exception of one brigade to be held in reserve, the remainder of the troops were directed to stage a strong demonstration. The main objective was the northwest angle of Fort Sanders, and the assault was to be made with the bayonet under cover of a strong supporting fire from the flank and rear.

In spite of the care used in moving the troops, the Union pickets became suspicious about 10 P.M. The advanced posts were driven in, and the night

³⁵ Longstreet to Jenkins, November 28, 1863, in *Official Records*, 757; Jenkins to Longstreet, November 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 756; Longstreet to McLaws, November 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 756. An alleged failure to meet Longstreet's wishes in this respect was one reason which Longstreet gave for his subsequent action in removing McLaws from command.

³⁶ See Jenkins to Longstreet, November 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 756; Longstreet to Jenkins, November 28, 1863, *ibid.*, 757; *id.* to McLaws, November 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 758; Sorrel to *id.*, November 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 757-58.

was filled with strange rustlings and the sound of shuffling feet. Two columns of brigades, each in columns of regiments, launched the assault at dawn.

Instead of forming the assault wave close up to the line of the front rifle pits—which would have left but a small space for the assaulting wave to traverse—McLaws formed the line several hundred yards in the rear. Surprise and shock were both impossible when the enemy was able to see the assault coming with time to dispose troops to meet it. Longstreet had planned and ordered a quiet, well-co-ordinated approach, with a sudden charge when the line met the enemy works. Instead, the advance became a rush—started too far back—and a piecemeal scramble of individuals to enter the fort. The leading wave tore away the wire entanglements and rushed on into the ditch. Behind it came the columns, now converging in the haze of the morning, until the men were mingled into a confused huddle, disorganized and incapable of concerted action. The leadership was bad—as bad as at any time during the war. And into this huddle of men fell the first wave after it had been repulsed from the fort, adding to the general confusion. There was no lack of individual courage, but the whole undertaking was futile and hopeless from the very start. Line after line of men crowded on into the ditch—which proved to be from four to eight feet in depth and nearly twice as wide—and most of them stayed there. The slopes of the parapet had been cleverly washed with water, which the frosty night air had transformed into ice. As the men scrambled about on this insecure footing, a murderous flanking fire was poured on them from both sides.³⁷

Longstreet saw the catastrophe from its start. Although at first the men seemed to be in order, he soon noted straggling, then the repulse, then the hopeless confusion. The sporadic attempts to rush the fort were doomed to failure. Next came the spirit-breaking vision of large numbers of men running to the rear, and next the whole attacking force was melting into confusion.

Longstreet ordered the attack stopped. It was hopeless. But some of G. T. Anderson's brigade—Hood's men—either did not hear the orders or would not heed them. They rushed the fort again and again, but they failed as the others had failed.

Some men went through. In small groups they fought their way up the slope by chopping footholds in the ice, only to be met by a rain of light shells (which were rolled down the slopes to explode at the bottom of the ditch), axes, grenades, billets of wood, and stones. When full daylight came, the two hundred or more who still clung to the slopes of the parapet saw that

³⁷ Longstreet's report, January 1, 1864, gives a full account of this engagement. See *ibid.*, Pt. I, 455-61. For Burnside's version, see report, November 13, 1865, *ibid.*, 276-79.

their only salvation lay in immediate surrender. They were hoisted up the slippery bank and marched to the rear as prisoners of war. Longstreet's grand assault had ended in disaster.³⁸

In his memoirs, Longstreet gave the impression that if he had not sounded recall so soon, victory might yet have been attained. (Doubtless the mellowing effect of the years had softened the harsh reality of the picture that was spread before his eyes that fateful morning, for he certainly could not have won after the Confederate assault was smashed.) Even though it seems obvious that he was mistaken in this assumption, the simplicity of his explanation is almost disarming. It had been one of McLaws' staff—Major J. M. Goggin—who had rushed up to Longstreet and declared that it was useless to go on. In his memoirs Longstreet wrote: “. . . I had known Major Goggin for many years. He was a classmate at West Point, and had served with us in the field in practical experience, so I had confidence in his judgment [He had also had confidence in the judgment of General Leadbetter, one remembers.]. . . it seems conclusive that the failure was due to the order of recall. . . .”³⁹ The bitter dregs of the cup of defeat were tormenting Longstreet's lips.

³⁸ See General E. P. Alexander, “Longstreet at Knoxville,” in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 745–49.

³⁹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 506.

Winter in East Tennessee

GENERAL LONGSTREET TURNED AWAY FROM THE DISTRESSING SCENE AT FORT Sanders. The confusion was great, but in a surprisingly short time order was restored. Whether further effort against Fort Sanders would be practicable was not considered, because within an hour of the Confederate recall a message had been received from Bragg that he had been defeated at Chattanooga (Missionary Ridge), dislodged from his positions, and forced back into Georgia. With this news came the information that no reinforcements could be sent to Longstreet. These advices, which had been relayed through General Wheeler, included a request that Longstreet fall back on Dalton if it were practicable; if not, Longstreet would have to depend on his own resources and probably withdraw into Virginia. A hasty but careful consideration of the situation convinced Longstreet that it would not be feasible for him to attempt to rejoin Bragg.¹

The forthcoming campaign in East Tennessee is so important in its effect on Longstreet that its discussion will be divided into two parts: first, a recital of the events as they occurred, and second, an analysis of their effect on the Confederate leader. In no other campaign, perhaps, can Longstreet be seen so clearly and the limits of his ability as a soldier defined so accurately.

Bragg could no longer hope to control or influence greatly the operations in East Tennessee. Circumstances had imposed this limitation on him. Longstreet was now on his own. In the light of the disaster to the Confederate army in the West, Burnside and the operations against Knoxville became secondary matters. Longstreet was brought abruptly to the point where he had to view the situation as a whole and base his decisions on what appeared to him to be best for all in connection with his operations. Winter with all its hardship would soon enfold everything, making it almost certain that major operations would be impossible for either side. He now faced this dilemma: Should he lay siege to Knoxville in a deliberate attempt to starve Burnside into submission, or should he cut loose entirely and make his way back to Virginia and to Lee's side? Either course would be dangerous; the latter involved abandoning East Tennessee. There was an alternative: to camp

¹ Wheeler to Longstreet, November 26, 1863 (received on November 29), in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 760. See also Longstreet to Bragg, December 2, 1863, *ibid.*, 777, which states: "The enemy being between us, I do not regard it as practicable for me to rejoin."


before Knoxville as long as possible, gaining the place through starvation methods if he could, and then to move further up the Holston Valley and hold the upper passes of East Tennessee, blocking the Federal advances and exploiting the subsequent political phase of his mission, which involved a conflict between the Union and Confederate factions in that part of the state and the adjoining mountain country. From the larger strategy this course seemed best. Longstreet decided to remain in East Tennessee.²

When the situation is viewed at long range, it is clear that as long as Longstreet could contain Burnside and assemble a large mixed force on Grant's strategic left flank, he was a threat which Grant could not ignore. It would be unlikely that any Union operations against Bragg could be pushed deeply into Georgia until Longstreet had been forced to withdraw farther to the east or had been definitely neutralized. Longstreet's presence in East Tennessee was, to say the least, disconcerting to the Union high command at a time when Grant was seeking employment for his scattered armies. Sensing that Longstreet was a threat and being unaware of the true situation, Grant had suspended further movement against Bragg and had started three separate columns marching to Burnside's relief. One, under General William T. Sherman, came up from the south; another, under General W. L. Elliott, advanced on Knoxville by way of Dechard; and a third, under General J. G. Foster, came into the upper Tennessee Valley by way of Cumberland Gap.

Longstreet's first problem, now that he had decided to remain in East Tennessee, was to protect his command from these converging Federal columns. Sherman's approach by way of Loudon could be met by General J. C. Vaughn's strong detachment, which was already at that place on a mission of protecting the large cavalry train. The remainder of Longstreet's force could be concentrated at Knoxville in a position of readiness. Orders were sent to Vaughn to retire across the river if the pressure became too great and to fall back on the main body at Knoxville, delaying Sherman as much as possible. Sherman came into collision with Vaughn just south of the river near Loudon. When Vaughn was about to be attacked, he deliberately withdrew, destroying the bridges and casting into the Tennessee all the artillery and stores that could not be removed. Sherman was then to be kept at a distance while Vaughn went about his work.³

² The writer is convinced that Longstreet made his decision to remain in East Tennessee after considering how best he could aid Bragg and assist in warding off further disaster in the West. See Longstreet to Robert Ransom, November 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 758; *id.* to Vance, November 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 759; *id.* to Leadbetter, November 29, 1863, *ibid.*, 760; Davis to W. P. Johnston, December 3, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 571.

³ Note the concern for Longstreet reflected in Lee to Bragg (telegram), November 27, 1863, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 564; Davis to *id.*, November 25, 1863, *ibid.*, 564; and *id.* to *id.*, November 27,



With the destruction of the bridges at Loudon and Vaughn's retirement across the Tennessee, Longstreet was isolated from Bragg. He was huddled in front of Knoxville with two of the three Union columns converging on him. And Sherman was only delayed—not stopped. Longstreet's safest move now was to place his entire command north of Knoxville, gain contact with the Union column under Foster which was advancing southward by way of Cumberland Gap, defeat it, and then turn on Sherman, who was coming up close on Vaughn's heels. It was a flash of the old Longstreet genius which conceived this plan. It was daring (and suggestive of Stonewall Jackson's tactics in the Shenandoah Valley), but it had prospect of success only if the movements could be made with speed. Meanwhile, Longstreet must change his base to the east and secure some adequate means of supply.

Late on December 2 orders were issued, and early on the third the trains were started up the southeast bank of the Holston. The troops did not clear the city until the morning of the fourth. Proceeding up the northwest side of the Holston so as to remain somewhat parallel to the trains and to avoid a dangerous flank movement, the columns marched on Rogersville. On December 5, General Robert Ransom joined with infantry and artillery supports after a hard march from the mountains of western Virginia. The next two days were spent near Rutledge while scouts endeavored to locate Foster. This search having failed, the march was resumed on the eighth. On the next day the troops reached Rogersville—after covering a total of sixty-five miles over bad roads in four marching days. Foster, meanwhile, had avoided Longstreet by leaving a detachment to hold Cumberland Gap while he moved around the Confederates by a circuitous route and entered Knoxville from the south on December 12. General Foster now relieved Burnside from command of the department.⁴

The consensus of Union opinion was that Longstreet was in retreat toward Virginia; one of the lesser leaders, however, had correctly guessed that Longstreet was making a strategic change of position.⁵ General John G. Parke, Burnside's chief of staff and now commander of Burnside's field forces, based his decisions on the hypothesis that Longstreet was in retreat; taking the field, he followed closely on Longstreet's rear. On the day that

1863, *ibid.* See also *id.* to Ransom, November 27, 1863, *ibid.*; *id.* to Johnston, November 30, 1863, *ibid.*; and Sorrel to J. C. Vaughn, December 2, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 779.

⁴ The detailed instructions for the movement bear the date of December 3. *Ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 571-72. These were the written orders confirming those given orally or in fragmentary written form late the previous day. See Longstreet to Davis, December 7, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 792; Davis to Longstreet, December 8, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 574; Foster's report, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 286.

⁵ See R. O. Selfridge to T. J. Wood, December 4, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 331; Grant to Halleck, December 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 345; Burnside, quoted in J. G. Foster to Grant, December 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 351. Cf. Seward to Foster, December 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 353.

Longstreet occupied Rogersville—December 9—Parke was but two days' march behind him, and furthermore he was astride the railroad that Longstreet must use for communications with Virginia. The Confederates rested at Rogersville and filled their haversacks from the ample stores of corn and bacon there. Forage also was plentiful.

It dawned slowly on the Union generals that Longstreet was not withdrawing from East Tennessee. His march had not resembled the scrambling retirement of a body of men intent on quitting an area. Grant grew suspicious. He told Sherman to stay in the upper Tennessee Valley until it was certain that Longstreet would abandon the state. This was on December 8. The same day Grant expressed a fear that Longstreet would be reinforced and strike at Knoxville again, even though the severity of the weather and the bad roads were a handicap to both sides and extensive movements by either side could hardly be expected. Nevertheless, Grant saw danger in the situation if Longstreet should decide to become active. The Washington authorities wanted Longstreet driven off into Virginia. In spite of circumstances which should have dictated a different conclusion, Foster still thought that Longstreet was in full retreat; but Burnside wrote to Parke to be very cautious in his advance.⁶

Longstreet watched his foe with his spirit strengthened by word received on December 10 from President Davis that he had full power over all troops and activities in East Tennessee.⁷ Longstreet planned to turn on Parke and destroy him. Parke continued to close on Longstreet and on the twelfth was in and about Bean's Station with a sizable force of cavalry and infantry. Behind Parke were reinforcements of artillery and additional infantry which had been sent up from Knoxville. Longstreet decided that Parke had come close enough. Now was the time to strike.

Bean's Station, a small mountain village, lay in the valley between Clinch Mountain and the Holston River some ten miles west of Bull's Gap. Except for the narrow valley of the upper Tennessee, the opposing armies were separated only by rugged hills with narrow defiles or all-but-impassable exits between them. Sensing his opportunity to make use of the favorable terrain, Longstreet planned a quick dash at Parke. The infantry was ordered to move down the river directly on Bean's Station and engage, while a detachment of cavalry was ordered to cross the river to the east and envelop Parke's advanced units. The main body of cavalry, under General W. T. Martin, was similarly ordered to envelop the northwest flank and bar any

⁶ Grant to Sherman, December 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 356-57; *id.* to Halleck, December 7, 1863, *ibid.*, 349. See also *id.* to *id.*, December 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 356; Foster to Burnside, December 8, 1863, *ibid.*, 359; Burnside to Parke, December 9, 1863, *ibid.*, 363.

⁷ Davis to Longstreet, December 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 784.

escape to the rear. When the infantry gained contact, the cavalry were to close in promptly on both flanks and surround the enemy.

The infantry fight started just as the Confederates entered the gap near Bean's Station. Full victory was not attained, however, because Martin and his cavalry were so greatly delayed in their march that the hard-pressed Union brigades had time to withdraw without serious consequences. W. E. Jones, the other cavalry leader, who had come up on the west side to close the gap, arrived in ample time and made several fruitful captures of wagons. He failed to take the entire Federal train, however, because his men began to feast on the spoils before their task was done. While the soldiers reveled in real coffee and sugar and good bacon—luxuries long unknown to the half-starved Confederates—the Union army slipped away in the darkness.⁸

The next morning when Longstreet moved proudly into the pass to receive the expected surrender his startled gaze fell on abandoned camp kettles and mess pans, a few muskets, and twelve miserable soldiers who had preferred the risk of capture to fighting their way up the steep slopes. While Longstreet was sputtering at his lost opportunity and Parke was hurrying away, Foster, from his headquarters in Knoxville, was assuring both Grant and Halleck: "Longstreet is moving leisurely up the Valley, foraging as he goes. There are no certain indications that he will stand a fight if we follow him in force."⁹

Foster changed his mind about Longstreet's purpose when he learned of Parke's difficulties. He was not so certain now that Longstreet was in retreat, although he did credit reports that Longstreet had lost most of his artillery and baggage and many prisoners.¹⁰

Longstreet prepared quickly to strike again. He was determined to destroy the Federal column before it could regain the fortifications of Knoxville, and on the thirteenth he ordered his command to push hard after it. Parke, after sending to Foster an appeal for assistance, retired still further toward Blain's Cross Roads. Scenting trouble, Foster had already prepared a relief column, which marched to Parke's side as soon as the call for support was received. These forces were joined before Longstreet could attack. Again delays had interfered with the success of the Confederate operations. One brigade of Hood's old division, which was marching far too leisurely, was some eight miles behind when the advance gained contact with Parke's rear guard on

⁸ A realistic postwar account of the engagement at Bean's Station will be found in Captain Thomas Speed's paper "Battle of Bean's Station, East Tennessee," in *Southern Bivouac, A Monthly Literary and Historical Magazine* (Louisville), II (November, 1883), 113-18.

⁹ Foster to Grant, December 12, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 391; and *id.* to Halleck, December 12, 1863, *ibid.* See also Gordon Granger to Grant, December 12, 1863, *ibid.*, 393, which states that Longstreet was withdrawing into Virginia as rapidly as possible.

¹⁰ Foster to Halleck, December 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 401; Grant to *id.*, December 14, 1863, *ibid.*, 403.

the fourteenth. It was not until noon on the fifteenth that Longstreet's command was assembled.

Parke offered battle; but just as soon as Longstreet deployed to meet him, Parke just as suddenly withdrew. The Union screen was so effective that the retirement was not discovered until it was too late to close in and stop it. Longstreet now had the barren satisfaction of being able to occupy the empty Union trenches near Blain's Cross Roads during the night of the fifteenth. The next morning he plunged forward again and soon caught up with the combined force under Foster. The Federals, with their increased strength (now about twenty-six thousand) were more willing to stop and chance an engagement with Longstreet's twenty thousand; but before the battle could be well launched, the weather changed, and a driving snow storm paralyzed the efforts of both commanders to maneuver their troops. The winter had broken with all severity, and both armies chose to go into winter quarters rather than risk further hardship in a general engagement.¹¹

Following the cessation of hostilities at Blain's Cross Roads, there was little of military importance in the troop operations. Longstreet's problem was to subsist his men and animals and to keep them comfortable during the worst of the winter. The abortive attempt to drive Longstreet farther to the east had irritated Halleck, and it caused Grant to visit Knoxville at the end of December to determine for himself why Foster had been so unsuccessful. While the Union authorities were concentrating on means to eject Longstreet, the Richmond papers of December 12 had expressed confidence that he would be able to hold East Tennessee and protect any approach to the Confederate capital by way of Cumberland Gap. On December 20, Grant served his ultimatum on Foster: ". . . every effort must be made to drive Longstreet from the Valley." Grant had other operations in mind and seemed to realize that Longstreet's presence on his left flank would be too alarming for the Northern War Department.¹²

General Grant's visit to Knoxville on December 31 brought to light the reason why Foster had been so unsuccessful. His army lacked supplies and was as badly off for food as was that of Longstreet. It was nearly a month before the Union forces could take the field in any effective strength; and even when they did, their attacks were easily repulsed by Longstreet. Neither

¹¹ See Foster to *id.*, February 21, 1864, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 286-87.

¹² Grant to Foster, December 12, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 387; Halleck to Grant, December 13, 1863, *ibid.*, 396; Sherman to *id.* (telegram), December 11, 1863, *ibid.*, 381; Grant to Halleck, December 17, 1863, *ibid.*, 429. See also dispatch dated Bristol, December 12, 1863, printed in a Richmond paper, and quoted in Thomas T. Eckert to Grant, December 16, 1863, *ibid.*, 422; Grant to Foster, December 20, 1863, *ibid.*, 453; C. A. Dana to Grant, December 21, 1863, *ibid.*, 457; Halleck to *id.*, December 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 472; Grant to Halleck, December 23, 1863, *ibid.*, 473; *id.* to *id.*, December 24, 1863, *ibid.*, 479.

of two subsequent Union efforts could have been considered as a real threat against the security of Longstreet's position. The Federal activity was chiefly of a harassing nature, being limited to small operations against foragers and to the destruction of food, forage, and other supplies. As was natural among mountain folk, there was also much partisan skirmishing between the rival civilian factions.¹³

Although the troop operations were hardly serious enough to engage much of Longstreet's attention during this period, other matters did. On December 30, for a reason not clearly understood, Longstreet had asked that he be relieved from command. Later in this chapter, this matter will be considered at length. Suffice it to say here that the request was not favorably considered by the War Department. Next in order of interest is the matter of Longstreet's dawning appreciation of the general situation confronting the South. The three months which opened the year 1864 were perhaps the most uncertain of any during the war years for both sides. Apparently no one cared to make a move, and the armies lay idle while their respective leaders strove desperately to pierce the fog of war and determine what their next move should be. In the early part of this period of uncertainty, on January 10, Longstreet wrote to Lee, giving, among other things, a clear indication that he could not grasp the general strategic situation. However, he did picture Meade's army as the proper objective, and he offered a plan whereby decisive results might be gained. He made the novel suggestion that a large force of infantry be mounted for rapid movement, and that Meade be forced into a situation where he would become immobile. Catch him in the mud, urged Longstreet. Then, following Meade's discomfiture, Lee could move strongly on Washington. These were, as Longstreet admitted, suggestions only, for he did not know either Lee's situation or his plans.¹⁴

Lee's reaction to these strange suggestions was a letter stating that he thought that Longstreet ought to remain in Tennessee until it was cleaned up, if only to relieve the country and inspire the people. As to the feasibility of mounting the infantry, Lee wrote that he would make inquiry and let Longstreet know his opinion later. It is the second portion of this letter from Lee that is important, for in it he mentioned the conviction of many that the next major offensive against Virginia would come by way of the Knoxville route and implied that he himself was also of this opinion. Lee's view of the situation explains much: his uncertainty, even up to the very opening

¹³ See Foster to Grant, December 19, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 285; Grant to Halleck, December 31, 1863, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 442; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 529.

¹⁴ Longstreet to Lee, January 10, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. II, 541-42. This letter contains what seems to be the first suggestion for mounting infantrymen to facilitate their rapid movement into attack position. The inference is clear that Longstreet did not plan to use them as cavalry.

of the spring campaigns of 1864, as to where the Union leaders would strike; his support of the proposal for joint operations in Middle Tennessee; and his willingness to have Longstreet remain in East Tennessee, regardless of the hardship involved, throughout the severe winter of 1864.¹⁵

During this period Longstreet's relations with the War Department were chiefly concerned with administration and discipline rather than with tactics and strategy. It will be recalled that General Hood had been wounded at Chickamauga. The command of his division fell, naturally, to the next in rank, General Micah Jenkins. Associated with Jenkins in the same division was General E. M. Law. From the very moment that Jenkins assumed command, there was trouble between the two men due to jealousy. When Jenkins was recommended for promotion, Law was incensed. The feud soon came to a head, and Longstreet removed Law from his command and preferred charges against him. Subsequently Law was restored to his command by the War Department without trial or prejudice. Thereupon, Longstreet re-arrested him and prepared an even stronger set of charges. At the same time he again proposed the promotion and assignment of Jenkins to the permanent command of the division, but this solution was not approved in Richmond. The case was eventually disposed of by the assignment of General Charles W. Field to command the division and the restoration of Law to the command of his brigade.¹⁶

A somewhat different case was that of General McLaws, one of Longstreet's division commanders, who was relieved from command by Longstreet shortly after the fighting ended in the middle of December. The charges in this case centered around McLaws' alleged failure to co-operate in the attack on Fort Sanders and his general unwillingness to support Longstreet's program. As a department commander, Longstreet had full power to relieve McLaws, but he overstepped his authority in sending McLaws beyond the limits of the department. This extraofficial act of Longstreet's brought him prompt censure from the Adjutant General at Richmond. Although McLaws appealed to the War Department for restoration

¹⁵ Lee to Longstreet, January 16, 1864, *ibid.*, 566-67. See also *id.* to Davis, December 3, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 859.

¹⁶ Longstreet to Cooper, December 25, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 866-67; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 495; Lee to Seddon, May 24, 1864, in *Official Records*, LII, Pt. II, 672. In addition to the foregoing citations, regarding Longstreet's efforts to find a commander for Hood's old division, see also Cooper to Longstreet, January 4, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 518; Lee to *id.*, January 16, 1864, *ibid.*, 566; Longstreet to Cooper, February 1, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 578; Cooper to Longstreet, March 4, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 583; Longstreet to Cooper, March 4, 1864, *ibid.* For order assigning General Charles W. Field, dated February 12, 1864, see *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 726. See also Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 303-306, 310-12, 337-38; William C. Oates, *The War Between the Union and the Confederacy and its Lost Opportunities* (New York, 1905), 338-39.

to command, he did not rejoin Longstreet's corps. Later McLaws was court-martialed on charges preferred by Longstreet and found guilty in part, but the findings were disapproved on technical grounds. McLaws did not return to his division, and it was placed under the command of General Joseph B. Kershaw.¹⁷

Another administrative problem which concerned Longstreet was the procurement of necessary supplies and subsistence to keep his small army in good condition for active operations. If he was needed in East Tennessee, Longstreet reasoned, then some effort should be made to keep him strong and ready for any eventuality. The local supplies were quickly exhausted, and the encroachments of the Union cavalry soon restricted the area from which food and forage could be drawn. In his memoirs, Longstreet gave an impression of ample stocks of food and shoes, speaking enthusiastically of the measures which he took to increase them; but his glowing after-the-war account is belied by contemporary letters of complaint and Sorrel's picture of a "ground hard and sharp with ice, and not less than 2,000 . . . without shoes. Their bleeding feet left marks at every step."¹⁸ This problem was made the more acute because the cavalry was indifferent and had to be prodded into any kind of reasonable activity.¹⁹

Longstreet's inability to keep his army fit and ready, plus the discouraging reports that the enemy was being strongly reinforced at Knoxville, led him to consider removing his command from East Tennessee. He had been able to drive Granger back, but there was still ample cause for alarm in the situation: the Union forces freely shuttled back and forth between Chattanooga and Knoxville over the reorganized railroad, and there were other indications of a strong movement against the Confederates—a move-

¹⁷ McLaws' report, April 19, 1864, and the findings of the court martial in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. I, 480-508, contains all of the correspondence of record relative to the controversy with Longstreet. McLaws was relieved on December 17, 1863, and ordered to Augusta, Georgia. Special Orders No. 27, *ibid.*, 497. He appealed to the War Department on December 29, 1863, for restoration to his command. McLaws to Cooper, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 881. In connection with the McLaws case, see Bragg to McLaws, March 4, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 633.

¹⁸ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 515; Sorrel, *Recollections*, 32, 219. See also Longstreet to Davis, February 22, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. II, 789; *id.* to Cooper, December 16, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 837; *id.* to *id.*, January 2, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 508; Sorrel to Martin, January 23, 1864, *ibid.*, 606; A. E. Jackson to Sorrel, January 25, 1864, *ibid.*, 610; Longstreet to Davis, January 22, 1864, *ibid.*, 597; Sorrel to I. R. Foster, March 22, 1864, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 666.

¹⁹ For Longstreet's handling of his cavalry and some of the reasons for its failure, see Sorrel to W. T. Martin, December 17, 1863, in *Official Records*, XXXI, Pt. III, 839; *id.* to *id.*, December 25, 1863, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 581; Longstreet to *id.*, January 15, 1864, *ibid.*, 563; Sorrel to *id.*, January 20, 1864, *ibid.*, 580; *id.* to *id.*, January 22, 1864, *ibid.*, 598; Cooper to Longstreet, March 19, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 654; and *id.* to *id.*, March 19, 1864, *ibid.* For Longstreet's ideas on a proper policy for handling cavalry, see Longstreet to Seddon, December 28, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. III, 871.

ment intended to open the way into Virginia. Longstreet had written whimsically to Lee that he was just strong enough to tempt the enemy to come at him but not strong enough to stand and take it. The President, however, told Longstreet to stand fast in East Tennessee. He might retire as his own judgment dictated, but not behind a line—running from Morristown to Bean's Station—which protected the Cumberland Gap entry into Virginia from any Union advance. Should Longstreet quit East Tennessee, it would nullify the plans that were maturing in the President's mind. Also, Davis wrote, Lee wanted to stay where he was as a protection to Virginia. Even though Longstreet might not be able to take the offensive, the President reasoned shrewdly, he would not allow himself to be knocked out of position by the Union forces then available in East Tennessee. Davis had no men to spare, and things were entirely too uncertain in other quarters of the Confederacy.²⁰

The President and General Bragg—who had arrived in Richmond about March 1 as military adviser to the President—had come to have visions of a decisive movement toward the Ohio from Tennessee. But while a plan was being developed for joint operations by Longstreet and Joseph E. Johnston, with Johnston's army as the basis for a large command, Longstreet on his part was formulating a plan for a strong offensive into Kentucky, with his position as the base. He tried first to induce Lee to come west and head the operation, but in this he was unsuccessful. He wrote: "It is in our power . . . to secure peace upon such terms as we wish within the year or year and a half . . . but to do this we must have our plans and not allow ourselves to be diverted . . . by . . . the enemy." Then he asked that Lee meet him in Richmond. Lee's countersuggestion was for Longstreet to unite with Johnston—probably at Sparta, Tennessee—and gain success in the West; ". . . the enemy's great effort will be in the West," wrote Lee, "and we must concentrate our strength there to meet him. . . . We cannot now pause. I will endeavor . . . to occupy [Meade's army] . . . if I cannot do more." ²¹

²⁰ Longstreet to Lee, January 10, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 541-42. See also Davis to Longstreet, February 21, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 626; Longstreet to Davis, February 21, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 789; Davis to Longstreet, February 22, 1864, *ibid.*, 789; *id.* to Johnston, February 23, 1864; *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 627; Longstreet to Davis, February 24, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 800; Davis to Longstreet, February 24, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 629; Longstreet to Davis, February 25, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 802; *id.* to *id.*, January 22, 1864, *ibid.*, 597; Lee to *id.*, February 2, 1864, *ibid.*, 667; Johnston to *id.*, January 15, 1864, *ibid.*, 559; *id.* to Longstreet, March 13, 1864, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 618; Hood to Bragg and *id.* to Davis (duplicate letters), March 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 606-608.

²¹ The reader should remember that the Union forces held Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga—and the rail lines connecting these points—rather strongly; also, the gaps in the mountains into Kentucky were in Union hands. See Longstreet to Lee, March 4, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III,

Meanwhile the Federal troops crept forward until they held the railroad as far as Morristown. Field, with Hood's old division, was pulled back to the vicinity of Greeneville, to which point the Confederate headquarters had been transferred. The Confederate line was now close in around Bull's Gap, covering the routes into Virginia.²²

This was a period of uncertainty as to what was the best course for the South to pursue. Davis and Bragg were in favor of operations in Middle Tennessee; Lee, too, favored operations in the West—probably those advocated by Davis. Johnston and Longstreet, on the other hand, were opposed to operations in Middle Tennessee, Longstreet planning instead an offensive into Kentucky by way of Pound Gap, under the leadership of either Lee or Beauregard. The differences of opinion were all very confusing.

On March 14 there was an important gathering of Confederate generals in Richmond for an exchange of counsel and opinion. It is reasonable to suppose that one of the purposes of this conference was to obtain some unanimity of opinion as to what would be the best military program to adopt. The appointment of Grant as the Union commander in chief, together with the alarm caused by the internal political and military conditions of the Confederacy, had induced the President to summon all his commanders to his side. Among them was Longstreet, and one may well picture the joy with which he welcomed a respite from the discomforts of his camp. Better still, the very medicine he needed was to be in touch with his old commander. A smile of relief spread over his features as his hand gripped that of Lee, and the two men withdrew into a corner for a moment's exchange of confidences and intimate personal greeting. From this moment, Longstreet seemed to commence to shed his troubles and regain his former self-confidence. But the meeting was one that brought some apprehension to both Longstreet, who had been burning with a host of troubles and injustices both fancied and real, and Lee, who perhaps could see into the future and sense the disasters that soon must overtake them all. For the moment, though, the reunited friends found happiness in each other's presence. Arm in arm they entered the President's office.²³

582; Lee to Longstreet, March 8, 1864, *ibid.*, 594-95; and Longstreet to Beauregard, March 15, 1864, *ibid.*, 627.

²² Grant to Halleck, March 14, 1864, *ibid.*, 366; General Order No. 33 (moving headquarters to Bristol), March 28, 1864, *ibid.*, 678. Sorrel wrote Ransom on March 26, 1864, suspending movement until Monday, March 28, because of enemy occupation of Morristown. *Ibid.*, 677. Longstreet advised Cooper on March 23, 1864, that he must contract his lines due to loss of cavalry. *Ibid.*, 669. See also *id.* to *id.*, March 24, 1864, *ibid.*, 671; and *id.* to Field, March 23, 1864, *ibid.*, 669, which called Field to the vicinity of Bristol.

²³ Freeman, *Lee*, III, 261, gives a full account of this conference. See also Isabella D. Martin

Longstreet entered the conference with the idea of suggesting offensive operations in Kentucky, if for no other purpose than to contribute to Lincoln's defeat at the polls during the coming fall elections. It is a curious thing that he should have had such clear insight into the Northern political situation and yet have been so obtuse, generally speaking, when it came to comprehending that of the South. He knew that if the Confederate armies could hold off the Federal attacks and make some show of force as a threat to the North, it would be almost enough to defeat Lincoln in the fall. With Lincoln failing of re-election, it was practically certain that the war would terminate. Longstreet expressed most of these views to Beauregard in a long letter written on March 15, the day of the final conference:

The political opponents of Mr. Lincoln can furnish no reason at this late day against the war so long as it is successful with him, and thus far it has certainly been as successful as any one could reasonably expect. If, however, his opponents were to find at the end of three years that we held Kentucky and were as well to do as at the beginning of the war, it would be a powerful argument against Lincoln and against the war. Lincoln's re-election seems to depend upon the results of our efforts during the present year. If he is re-elected, the war must continue, and I see no way of defeating his re-election except by military success.²⁴

At Longstreet's request, Lee laid the Longstreet plan for invading Kentucky before the council. It was not very favorably received. The general opinion was that Longstreet should fight his way westward in the face of Union opposition, join Johnston in Middle Tennessee, and advance northward into Kentucky. The fact that Johnston opposed any such movement, and that Longstreet also objected to it on the ground that there was too much risk in a three-hundred-mile march through rugged country with a flank exposed to the enemy at all times, seemed to carry no weight. The atmosphere was tense for a few moments, until Lee changed the subject and turned the attention from the West. At the conclusion of the conference, the President took all plans under advisement, and a sobered group of generals returned to their respective tasks.²⁵

Longstreet left at once for Petersburg, where he spent two days at an important family event: the christening of his young son, who had been born on October 20, 1863, while his father was struggling against Burnside at

and Myrta Lockett Avery (eds.), *A Diary from Dixie, as written by Mary Boykin Chesnut*. . . . (New York, 1906), 299.

²⁴ Longstreet to Beauregard, March 15, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. III, 627. See also Longstreet to Thomas Jordan, March 27, 1864, *ibid.*, 679.

²⁵ Longstreet wrote J. E. Johnston on March 16, 1864: "The President and General Bragg seem bent upon a campaign into middle Tennessee. They may adopt my proposition, however, and move Beauregard and myself into Kentucky by Pound Gap. . . . General Lee came down to assist me in having it adopted, but we do not know yet what will be done." *Ibid.*, 637.

Knoxville. The name of the South's great hero—Robert Lee—was given the boy. The burden of war was laid aside for the while, and James Longstreet lost himself in the joys of his home and the company of his gentle wife. It was during this short stay at Petersburg that Longstreet wrote again to President Davis and urged the offensive into Kentucky by way of Pound Gap, in spite of the President's distinct preference for the concentration of all troops under Joseph E. Johnston in Middle Tennessee. Longstreet never seemed able to take no for an answer. This letter was sent through Lee because, as Longstreet said somewhat plaintively, he could expect his views to receive calm consideration only when they were presented to Davis by Longstreet's former commander. In this letter Longstreet reviewed his operations in East Tennessee, listed his objections to joint operations with Johnston, and put forward strongly the strategic benefits that were certain to be derived from the operations into Kentucky. He wrote also to Beauregard, asking him about leading the advance, and to Lee, begging aid for the venture. In this separate letter to Lee, Longstreet rose to Lee's chiding that he might be too confident: "You complain of my excess of confidence," wrote Longstreet, "but I think it is based upon good judgment and a proper appreciation of our difficulties." How like the old Longstreet! Only one day's contact with Lee had been necessary to restore him to his former vigor. He was bursting with energy. It seemed to make little difference to him that none of those to whom he had propounded his Kentucky plan seemed disposed to agree with him.²⁶

Longstreet returned to his headquarters at Greeneville on March 18 and there informed himself as to the latest developments in the situation. He had been advised while in Richmond that the enemy had advanced hard against his lines. Now he learned that three of the Union corps had closed in on Morristown. Here was a chance to strike a blow, but his army could not move because of the lack of shoes for the men and forage for the horses. He was forced to sit quietly and watch the enemy consolidate its gains.²⁷

Two communications which Longstreet received in late March destroyed any lingering hope which he may yet have cherished for operations in Kentucky. One was a long letter from the President, explaining in detail why Longstreet's plan for invading Kentucky could not be approved. Even more

²⁶ *Id.* to Davis, March 16, 1864, *ibid.*; *id.* to Beauregard, March 15, 1864, *ibid.*, 627; Beauregard to Longstreet, March 18, 1864, *ibid.*, 649; Thomas Jordan (Beauregard's chief of staff) to *id.*, March 19, 1864, *ibid.*, 656; Longstreet to Jordan, March 27, 1864, *ibid.*, 679; *id.* to Lee, March 16, 1864, *ibid.*, 641-42.

²⁷ Sorrel advised Longstreet on March 14, 1864, that the enemy had fresh cavalry and had advanced to Morristown. *Ibid.*, 622. Longstreet reported the lack of forage to Cooper on March 18, 1864. *Ibid.*, 648. On March 19, 1864, he reported the strength of the enemy and repeated that he could not march against them for lack of food and shoes. *Ibid.*, 655.

convincing was the coincident arrival of the report of the War Department's action; the cavalry then with Longstreet's forces was to return to General Joseph E. Johnston, who had made repeated attempts to regain his mounted troops. Since forage could not be shipped into East Tennessee to keep the horses alive, most of the cavalry was ordered away.²⁸

As March turned to April, the hostile demonstration against Longstreet's forces at Bull's Gap was suddenly halted, and the Union troops withdrew toward Knoxville. Notwithstanding the loss of the cavalry, Longstreet had held to his ground, but he was obliged to shorten his lines and concentrate his infantry near the railroad. Headquarters were moved to Bristol, Virginia, and Field's division was moved in that direction.²⁹

On March 31, a message of far-reaching importance was sent to Lee. For some few days there had been rumors that part of the Federal force in East Tennessee had withdrawn from that theater and was en route to the East. The intelligence of that movement was now fairly conclusive, and General Longstreet was able to assure Lee that Burnside and the IX Corps had gone to the East by way of Cumberland Gap. The significance of this change in the Union strength in East Tennessee was not lost on Lee. For some weeks he had been in a quandary. Although Grant had issued orders announcing that his headquarters were with the Army of the Potomac, Lee had considered this but a ruse to cover more important operations elsewhere. He had assumed for some time that the next main enemy thrust would be against Johnston or Longstreet. It is entirely possible that this fear of a western offensive had been the basis for his willingness to have Longstreet join Johnston in Middle Tennessee. But Lee was not long in doubt as to Grant's plans. The news from Longstreet that the forces in East Tennessee were being weakened cleared his mind. When the message reached him, he wrote at once to the President, requesting that Longstreet's army should be prepared to move quickly into the Shenandoah Valley to operate under his command.³⁰

Lee's new estimate of the military situation was almost instantaneous. As late as April 2, he had written that he hoped that Longstreet and Johnston could join for operations in Middle Tennessee. It was on this date that

²⁸ For correspondence regarding the proposal for Generals J. E. Johnston and Longstreet to unite their forces for an advance northward from Chattanooga, see Davis to Longstreet, March 7, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 635; Bragg to Johnston, March 12, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 614-15; Johnston to Longstreet, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 618; Longstreet to Davis, March 16, 1864, *ibid.*, 637-39; Memo. by Colonel J. B. Sale (Bragg's military secretary), March 19, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 643; Cooper to Longstreet, March 19, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 654; Davis to Longstreet, March 25, 1864, *ibid.*, 674-76.

²⁹ Longstreet to Cooper, March 22, 1864, *ibid.*, 667. See also *id.* to *id.*, March 23, 1864, *ibid.*, 669; *id.* to *id.*, March 24, 1864, *ibid.*, 671; and *id.* to Field, March 23, 1864, *ibid.*, 669.

³⁰ Longstreet to Lee, March 31, 1864, *ibid.*, 720; Lee to Davis, March 30, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXIII, 1244; Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches*, 142 ff.

Longstreet wrote again to Lee, confirming the departure of the IX Corps and adding: "I regret that I am in no condition now for any kind of operations. We are living on very short rations, particularly of forage." If he could receive supplies and some aid, however, Longstreet wrote, he wanted to take the offensive about the middle of April against the forces located near Knoxville. It is clear that Longstreet did not read into Burnside's departure the fact that Lee's army was to be the next objective. Events moved swiftly. On April 4, the citizens of the vicinity called on Longstreet to stop taking food away from them; General J. C. Breckinridge, operating near Dublin, Virginia, telegraphed that he could not give Longstreet any forage; and Longstreet was obliged to wire the War Department that his animals were dying for lack of food. He had no striking power left.³¹

This message and Lee's letter asking that Longstreet be returned to him caused the President to give up all further thought of joint operations in Middle Tennessee. Davis made his decision on April 7 and directed that orders be issued moving Longstreet's command to Charlottesville and instructing Longstreet to report to Lee for further orders.³² Thus ended the campaign in East Tennessee. Meanwhile, in the East, titanic forces were being assembled against the disintegrating Confederacy. The tide had turned and had begun to ebb.

Since the operations in East Tennessee were the culmination of a series of events that had a profound effect on Longstreet and, in a large measure, proved a mirror to reflect an inner part of him not heretofore revealed, it is well to digress here and review this sequence of events and consider James Longstreet's reactions to them. These events had wrought vast psychological changes in Longstreet. He had not shown to advantage in the Knoxville and East Tennessee campaigns—indeed, one might well say that he had failed in them. When the leader of the First Corps had gone west to assist Bragg the previous September, he had left Lee's side with a distinct feeling that he could do great things. He had entered the battle of Chickamauga brimming with confidence and had carried out a brilliant tactical operation. From this excellent start at Chickamauga, there was a gradual decline in Longstreet's morale until he became a shambling, indecisive, and at times utterly lethargic man. He was stale. He could not make things work; and he was seemingly unable to rise above the petty difficulties that under other circumstances might have proved annoying but that certainly were not

³¹ Lee to Davis, April 2, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. III, 736; Longstreet to Lee, April 2, 1864, *ibid.*, 737; Memorial, citizens of Sullivan County, Tennessee, to Longstreet, April 4, 1864, *ibid.*, 850-51; Breckinridge to *id.*, April 5, 1864, *ibid.*, 749; Longstreet to Cooper, April 5, 1864, *ibid.*

³² Cooper to Longstreet, April 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 756.

fatal. When one compares the Longstreet of Second Manassas, of Sharpsburg, and of Chickamauga with the ghost of a Longstreet at Knoxville and in the early phases of the East Tennessee campaign, it is difficult to believe that one is looking at the same man. He who had been so outstanding in leadership and in tactical decision became weak and wavering, relying too much on the opinions of others in fields where his own expertness of judgment had been ably demonstrated. All in all, he failed to measure up to the standard required for the role of an independent commander. There was a fatal lack of harmony in his command, and it appeared at times as if he could not handle his own troops and preserve that quality of discipline which he had formerly instilled into the First Corps. Most serious of all, Longstreet for the first time lost confidence in himself.

Now why should these things have occurred? It seems clear that Longstreet reacted violently because of his relations with Bragg, who grew large in his thoughts as a personal menace. Furthermore, Longstreet was dependent on Lee. He worked best in harness; and for reasons of temperament he rose to great heights under Lee and, conversely, sank to almost unfathomable depths under the influence of Bragg. Under Lee he developed real confidence in himself, and what is more important, he convinced others of his competence. Lee had faith in Longstreet as a troop leader and never lost that faith. It is clear that Longstreet did not fear independent command. He had sampled that doubtful pleasure in the Suffolk campaign and had acquitted himself well. But the marked difference between that campaign and the sequence of operations in East Tennessee was that in the former Longstreet was in close touch with, and generally under the supervision of, Lee, while in the latter he was controlled by Bragg—by Bragg himself while he was present, and by the specter of Bragg after that unfortunate commander had left the army after Chattanooga and been assigned to duty in Richmond as the President's military adviser.

The first step in Longstreet's loss of morale seemed to be his lack of faith in Bragg's ability. It was a psychological error for Longstreet to allow himself to go into battle feeling that he was under a leader in whom he had so little faith, even though the events, in his opinion, fully justified this feeling. His action, if not his actual leadership, in the effort to have Bragg relieved was futile, even though it was impersonal and sincere. Longstreet's reaction to the dramatic end to this affair was to harbor the poisonous feeling—which soon became a fixation—that Bragg would neither support him nor aid him in the Knoxville campaign. He feared Bragg, and he brooded too much over the situation, which was, to a large extent, of his own making. From the feeling that he could expect no co-operation from Bragg, it

was an easy step to the belief that Bragg would actively strive to block him and deny him success—hence his lack of confidence in his own efforts to achieve success in the western venture. Bragg left the army shortly after the battle of Chattanooga, but that fact seemed to make no difference in Longstreet's approach to his problems. His resentment against Bragg was still scratching at his soul, making him moody, introspective, and utterly incapable of managing his task. He recognized his inability—a bitter conclusion for him, no doubt—and with courage sought relief from command; he probably did not recognize in his action, however, the influence of the defeatist complex which seemed to have gained an ascendancy over him for the moment. He chose to escape rather than to fight the Bragg nemesis longer. It was on December 30, 1863, that he penned his desire to be quit of his whole responsibility. He wrote to the adjutant general:

If this field is to be held with a view to future operations I earnestly desire that some other be sent to command. If a senior can be sent, I can cheerfully give him all the aid in my power. If none but a junior can be spared, it will give me much pleasure to relinquish in his favor. . . . I regret to say that a combination of circumstances has so operated during the campaign in East Tennessee as to prevent the complete destruction of the enemy's forces in this part of the State. It is fair to infer that the fault is entirely with me, and I desire, therefore, that some other commander be tried.

Certainly there could be no more painful admission for a soldier to make. At least Longstreet was honest in facing the fact of failure in the West and in locating the real seat of the trouble. But had he really failed so completely that his removal was justified? Neither Lee nor the President seemed to think so. Lee's action was positive; the President's, negative. Despite their support of him, however, Longstreet felt himself very much alone.⁸⁸

In view of Longstreet's successful display of strength against Parke and Foster after his failure at Knoxville, his returning confidence in himself (as evidenced by his decision to operate against Foster), and the comparative security of his command, it is difficult to understand why he should have requested relief from his command at this time. He had now weathered the worst of the storm. He was separated from Bragg, and surely his difficulties were no greater than those which he had overcome during the earlier years of the war. In his memoirs Longstreet attempted to explain his request, stating that the appointment of Edmund Kirby-Smith to a full generalcy prompted his action. But this can hardly have been the reason, since Kirby-Smith was not elevated to this grade until the seventeenth of the following

⁸⁸ Longstreet to Cooper, December 30, 1863, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 467. No reply from the War Department seems to be of record. See Cooper to Lee, January 9, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 539; Lee to Cooper, January 10, 1864, *ibid.*, 541.

February—unless, of course, Longstreet had had early information of the prospective appointment. If Longstreet had heard of it in advance, the reason given is somewhat understandable, as he had once before asked to be relieved of his command upon hearing of the promotion above him of an officer whom he ranked.⁸⁴

What is more likely is that Longstreet feared his own inability to manage a situation which was bound to grow more complex. His decision to remain in East Tennessee and make things difficult for the Union high command had been based on a rapid but careful consideration of the most important factors influencing his situation. Then for a brief period the hesitating, rather helpless Longstreet who was brooding over his relations with Bragg had been replaced by the Longstreet whom Lee knew and respected. Irrespective of what caused this change for the better—whether the shock of failure in the assault on Fort Sanders, or the news that Bragg had been decisively defeated at Chattanooga—Longstreet's logic was momentarily cold; his grasp of the situation, keen and broad. His deep patriotism and a soldierly desire to co-operate in repairing the damage done by Grant's victory overcame his petulance and hesitation. There was hope of success with this spiritually reinvigorated Longstreet at the helm in East Tennessee. But when he failed to accomplish anything decisive and administrative troubles crowded in on him, the lack of confidence in himself surged back, bringing with it the bitter realization that he was not adequate to the task of independent command. He knew then that he needed a leader. No more devastating a conviction can come upon a soldier than that of having failed. Longstreet felt that it was the end of all things for him and tendered his request to be relieved from command.

The President said that the matter of whether or not Longstreet could be relieved of his command hinged more properly on the question of where a successor could be found. Lee, when advised of Longstreet's request, was considerably disturbed. The adjutant general wrote to Lee and asked him whether Ewell and Longstreet could exchange places. Lee demurred. "I do not know the reasons that have induced [Longstreet] to take this step," he wrote, "but hope they are not such as to make it necessary. I do not know anyone to take his place. . . . I do not think it advantageous that he and

⁸⁴ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 524. This seems to be another of the many instances in Longstreet's after-the-war account in which his recollection of a specific event and his reaction thereto at the time are open to question. Longstreet's complaint was not of sudden origin. Early in the war he had written: "The placing of persons above me whom I have always ranked and who have just joined this service I regard as great injustice. I therefore request that an officer be detailed to relieve me of this command." Longstreet to Jordan, September 24, 1861, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 310. This case, it should be noted, is not exactly similar to that of Kirby-Smith's promotion.

Lieutenant-General Ewell should exchange corps, believing that each corps would be more effective as at present organized." Lee's reaction was indeed a tribute. Not only had he said in substance that he wished Longstreet retained in command of the First Corps, but he had gone further and described Longstreet as irreplaceable.³⁵

The act of sending the letter asking to be relieved of his command was in itself a relief to Longstreet. He does not appear to have taken any further action in the matter, but he grew a bit more cheerful. No doubt he and Lee exchanged letters; indeed, it would have been strange if they had not done so. Although no letters are to be found in the *Official Records*, the very fact of their absence is significant. Perhaps Lee saw that Longstreet's letter had best be destroyed. Longstreet was apt to be unwise in what he put down on paper when he was emotionally aroused. Once the issue was settled, however, Longstreet put it from his mind and turned to other things. A change in his whole attitude is reflected in the letter which he wrote to Lee on January 10.³⁶

Several things seem to stand out clearly from this letter. An important first is the implication that Longstreet wanted to get back to Lee and again come under his direction as a corps commander. A second is the evidence that Longstreet now recognized that Meade's army—and Washington—were the important military objectives. A third, the novel idea of mounted infantry, indicated that Longstreet was giving thought to the question of mobility—to fire and motion, one might say. Knowing as he did that the infantry had the more effective weapons, he thought that if these weapons could be moved rapidly, decisive results might be obtained through the element of surprise. Perhaps Longstreet's own inability to maneuver in East Tennessee had convinced him of the importance of mobility. Still a fourth fact evident from the letter is that Longstreet had fixed his mind on operations in the eastern theater; this was to be something of a stumbling block in achieving a unanimous opinion among the Confederate high command later, when operations in Middle Tennessee were proposed.

It must not be thought that all of the causes of Longstreet's loss of morale and lack of success sprang from within him. There were many things that could have had no other effect on him than to harass him, irritate him, and drive him to intemperate remarks. But such is often the price which those in independent command must pay for their authority. General Longstreet was the kind of professional soldier who is apt to be impatient with civilian control. In this fault he had plenty of company—most noteworthy being

³⁵ Lee to Cooper, January 10, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXIII, 1075.

³⁶ Longstreet to Lee, January 10, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 541-42.

McClellan on the Union side and Joseph E. Johnston on the Southern. He did not handle the McLaws and Law cases very expertly, seeming rather to allow his personal feelings to become a party to the cause. Much of his trouble with the War Department could have been avoided, had he managed his disciplinary actions against his higher-ranking officers a little more skillfully. It was not normal for him to be so abrupt and challenging in letters to his superiors. The mood in which he lived and acted must have been the moving cause of his unwise remarks.³⁷

The officials in Richmond must also bear a share of the responsibility for Longstreet's lowered morale. Despite the fact that there may have been very cogent reasons why the officers requested by Longstreet could not be made available, the War Department could have given him more consideration in the matter of high-ranking replacements. Of course, it was unwise of Longstreet to write intemperate letters, but one must admit that he had provocation—which, however, under more agreeable circumstances might not have caused him to expose himself to official rebuke.³⁸

The one phase of Longstreet's administrative activity which he handled during this period with the ability one would expect from a soldier of his experience was his cavalry. Indeed, Longstreet seemed to be a pioneer in outlining a proper use of this important arm. He saw in the cavalry something more than an aggregation of mounted orderlies, pickets, and groups that could be chased hither and yon on rather useless raids. Longstreet attempted to make a fighting unit of his mounted force, but in his attempt he was obliged to use strong measures. General W. T. Martin, who commanded Longstreet's cavalry, was a disappointment. How Martin's failure contributed to Longstreet's lack of success against Parke at Bean's Station has already been discussed. During the bleak period from January through March, Martin's obstructionist tactics made the problem of feeding the command almost insurmountable. As the infantry could not go far over the icy roads in their barefoot state, it was the cavalry's mission to forage, keep the Union cavalry at a distance, repel raids, and contribute to the general welfare of the command. Longstreet was much dissatisfied with Martin's manner of operation, and strove not only to teach him what his mission should be but also to compel him to perform it efficiently. He even went so far as to inform the War Department that the cavalry under his command not only was in good condition but had "learned more of its duties since I came here than in all its previous service." When there was an attempt to take Longstreet's cavalry away from him, he used strong language to hold them. He kept his

³⁷ See, for example, *id.* to Cooper, April 26, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXI, Pt. I, 473.

³⁸ A typical example of this discrediting of Longstreet is to be found in Bragg's endorsement of *id.* to *id.*, March 4, 1864, *ibid.*, LII, Pt. II, 633.

cavalry until the very end of the campaign, though he felt forced to prod, to rebuke, and finally to shame Martin into productive activity.³⁹

Though the change for the better in Longstreet dated from about the time that he wrote to Lee (January 10), he was not able to regain his accustomed poise and full vigor until after he rejoined Lee's command early in April. The period had been a dark one for him, and it left its mark on him for the duration of the war. It was a stronger and better Longstreet who had passed through the fire and come from it with much of the dross in his system consumed.

There had been much promise of success when Longstreet first went into the mountain country. However, aside from causing the Union high command a strong degree of concern—a service of indefinite value—his effort had resulted in nothing conclusive. He had somehow been unable to strike a decisive blow, even though the chance to do so had come more than once. Nothing had seemed to work out right. Nevertheless, the campaign is rich ground for the student of military operations, if only to show the evil of uncertainty and the necessity for harmony within an army. For the student of James Longstreet, there is the opportunity to view him objectively and find much that was hidden in former campaigns and that does not come to light until after his first great failure.

³⁹ *Id.* to *id.*, January 22, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. II, 597. For Longstreet's conduct of his cavalry, see n. 20, *supra*.

The Wilderness

THE APPOINTMENT OF ULYSSES S. GRANT AS LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND commander in chief of the field forces of the United States betokened a new military policy for the North. Instead of a general who would maneuver his armies from a desk in the War Department, or in accordance with the plans of a President who was unskilled in the science and art of war, the North now was to have a leader who would direct operations from the field and with some idea of co-ordinating the combined strategic maneuver.

When the war had opened some three years before, the South had had three chances of winning. The first was through force of arms, the second through the intervention of some foreign power, and the third through tiring the North and thus making further effort unpopular. One great chance to win by force of arms was lost in January, 1863, when Bragg withdrew to the Tennessee after the indecisive battle at Murfreesboro (Stone's River). All hope of receiving active foreign support vanished when, in the same week, Vicksburg was lost and Lee turned back from Gettysburg. The final test was at hand. Could the South prevent the North from securing a decisive victory against her armies until after the elections, it was almost certain that Northern public opinion would turn from the President and lean toward the growing sentiment that the South could not be conquered and that further expenditure of blood and treasure should cease. In this last campaign, the South did not need to win a battle; all she had to do was to prevent the other side from winning one. Any lack of tactical success for the North would become a strategic success for the South. This was the underlying basis for Lee's answer to Grant's plan of campaign for the spring of 1864.

Longstreet was one of the first to comment on the probable effectiveness of Grant as commander in chief. In his characterization of Lee's new adversary, he fell into the common error of failing to note Grant's ability as a ruthless and effective troop leader. In charging that Grant's prestige was his sole bid for favor, Longstreet made the mistake of paralleling Grant with Pope.¹ Pope had much understanding of the art of war but was deficient in

¹ Longstreet wrote Lee on April 2, 1864: "If Grant goes to Virginia I hope that you may be able to destroy him. I do not think that he is any better than Pope. They won their success in the

the science of troop-leading and had betrayed grave ignorance of the psychology of the soldier. On the other hand, Grant had shown little of the strategist and was not as yet clearly marked as an outstanding troop leader. He had, however, shown a tenacity of purpose far greater than that demonstrated by any other Union general. In overlooking this outstanding trait, Longstreet committed the cardinal sin of belittling his adversary. Lee was not so blind as his lieutenant and was better informed as to what Grant had been doing. He knew well that the coming struggle would tax his powers to the limit and would transcend anything that he had previously experienced.

Grant came to power on March 9, 1864, when his commission as a lieutenant general was handed him. Following Sherman's advice to get out of Washington, he established his headquarters in Virginia with the Army of the Potomac. He did this because the force opposing Meade was the strongest of the Southern armies. Grant planned to meet this formidable force with his main effort and hoped to break the back of the Confederacy. In addition to this main attack, which was to close with Lee and worry him to death, he contemplated two other important movements. He planned that Sherman, the indefatigable and dynamic leader whom he had left in the West, should penetrate the heart of Georgia and destroy the vitals of the Confederacy. Simultaneously, Butler would advance up the James and direct pressure on Richmond. To effect these plans, Grant had more than a hundred thousand men available in the Army of the Potomac under Meade; Sherman had a force of similar strength; and Butler had better than thirty thousand men for his comparatively easy task of ascending the James.²

To meet Grant's powerful army Lee could muster only some sixty thousand men, and Joseph E. Johnston had about the same number with which to face Sherman. In addition to the handicap of inferior strength, Lee had to rely on a supply system which had reached a state of near collapse. He betrayed his anxiety in repeated letters to the President pointing out the possibility of starvation in the midst of plenty because of the condition of the rail lines. He wisely urged that Richmond be depopulated of all save those needed in its defense; but this Davis, for political reasons, was unwilling even to consider.³

same field. If you will out general him you will surely destroy him. His chief strength is in his prestige." *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. III, 737.

² For the strength of Grant's forces, see *ibid.*, XXXIII, 1036; and Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 110.

³ The Confederate strength in various abstracts from field returns of April 20, 1864, was as follows: cavalry, 8,557 with 20 guns; Ewell, 17,229 with 73 guns; A. P. Hill, 22,344 with 66 guns; Longstreet, 9,158 with 54 guns; artillery, 4,854; and total effective strength of all arms, 62,142 with 213 guns of all caliber. *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. III, 721; *ibid.*, XXXIII, 1297; and *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1038. See also Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, 111.

At the moment of the opening of Grant's campaign, Meade's army lay between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. It had been completely reorganized, by combining the several small corps into three large corps and a cavalry corps. Army headquarters were at Brandy Station, and Union forces were spread over a wide area north of the Rapidan with the II Corps centered around Stevensburg, the V Corps at Culpeper Courthouse, the VI Corps along the Hazel River near Brandy Station, and the cavalry corps in the area between Culpeper Courthouse and Stevensburg, with patrols well out on all roads leading to Richmond and the West. In addition, Grant had reinforced his eastern army by bringing Burnside's IX Corps from East Tennessee; this corps, after being recruited and refitted at Annapolis during April, was now stretched along the railway from Rappahannock Station to Manassas Junction. Grant's forces were well equipped, amply supplied, and high in morale.⁴

Lee's army, considerably smaller in size and much less well equipped, lay behind the Rapidan, with some entrenched zones, on a twenty-mile front from Bartlett's Ford to Morton's Ford. There were two main sectors for defense: Ewell's on the southeast, and A. P. Hill's on the left or upper side. The line followed generally the higher ground from the junction of Mine Run with the Rappahannock to Antioch Church. The bulk of Lee's forces were held back on fairly good roads, with Ewell's corps between Old Verdiersville and Rapidan Station and A. P. Hill centered around Orange Courthouse. Army headquarters were just east of Orange Courthouse on the turnpike. Longstreet, with his corps, had not as yet joined the Confederate forces.

The movement of Longstreet's command from East Tennessee was dictated partly by strategic considerations but largely by the difficulty of keeping it properly supplied. As late as April 2, 1864, Lee had expressed the hope that Longstreet could join Joseph E. Johnston and initiate offensive operations in East Tennessee. This letter was written, however, before Lee had received Longstreet's confirmation of the report that Burnside's IX Corps had withdrawn from his front; according to the rumor, Burnside was heading east. Any lingering belief that the next main offensive against Richmond would come from the West now left Lee's mind. He saw at once that the great battle would be fought in the East. He accordingly demanded Longstreet's return.⁵

Longstreet's troops marched to Bristol, where they entrained for Charlottes-

⁴In regard to morale, see the report of J. J. Ingalls (chief quartermaster general, Army of the Potomac), in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 290.

⁵Lee to Davis, April 2, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 736-37; Longstreet to Lee, April 2, 1864, *ibid.*, 737; Grant to Burnside, March 14, 1864, *ibid.*, 67. See also *id.* to *id.*, March 14, 1864, *ibid.*, 74; Longstreet to Cooper, April 5, 1864, *ibid.*, 749.

ville; meanwhile the wagons and artillery teams took the roads, but moved slowly as the weakened animals could not make full marches. The lack of cars and the run-down condition of the railroad made it necessary to shuttle the trains back and forth between Bristol and Charlottesville, and a quick turn-around of trains was not possible. Fifteen hundred men a day was the best that could be accomplished, and it was not until April 21 that the greatly weakened First Corps was assembled in Virginia. Reorganization and recruiting were pressed and supplies were hurried so that Longstreet would be ready when the time came. How close was the margin of safety can be seen from the fact that Longstreet reported his command as re-equipped and ready only on May 2.⁶

Longstreet's men were in a deplorable state. The eighteen thousand men that he had had on March 31 had dwindled to half that number.⁷ And they had left the valleys of eastern Tennessee with the protests of indignant citizens ringing in their ears for taking food and forage away from the country people. For rest, ease of supply, and adequate grazing for the animals, the First Corps was moved to the vicinity of Mechanicsville.⁸ The artillery was sent far afield: F. K. Huger's battalion into Albemarle County to recruit both men and animals; John C. Haskell to Cobham's Depot in Albemarle County; and H. C. Cabell to the Rapidan for picket duty near Morton's Ford.⁹

Prior to the arrival of the First Corps at Charlottesville, Longstreet received a communication urging him to visit his family in Petersburg. The nature of the emergency is not known, but it must have been very serious to have caused Longstreet to request of Lee the authority to leave his command. Whether he actually went to Petersburg is not known, but Lee was generous enough to approve Longstreet's request for leave without asking any questions.¹⁰

⁶ Longstreet's report, March 23, 1865, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1054-55; Lee to Bragg, April 11, 1864, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 855; Longstreet to Lee, May 1, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 940.

⁷ Longstreet's strength on March 31, 1864, was as follows: infantry, 12,972; cavalry, 4,264; artillery, 1,151 and 55 guns; total, 18,387. *Ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 721. Longstreet's strength as of April 20 was 9,158 of all arms and 54 guns. Report of W. N. Pendleton (chief of artillery, Army of Northern Virginia), February 28, 1865, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1038. See also the complaint from the committee representing Blount County, Tennessee, to Longstreet, April 4, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXII, Pt. III, 850-51.

⁸ This Mechanicsville, not shown on present-day maps, was a village located about six miles south of Gordonsville and is to be distinguished from Mechanicsville, near Richmond, previously mentioned in connection with the Seven Days' battles, and the present-day village of Mechanicsburg, Virginia, located near Bristol.

⁹ Report of W. N. Pendleton, February 28, 1865, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1036, 1038. It should be remembered that Pickett's division was absent along the Blackwater (*ibid.*, 1054) and that M. D. Corse's brigade had recently gone to Kingston, North Carolina (*ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 859).

¹⁰ Longstreet to Lee, April 16 [18?], 1864, *ibid.*, XXXIII, 1286; Lee to Longstreet, April 20, 1864, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 869.

In the Charlottesville-Gordonsville-Mechanicsville area Longstreet was strategically well located to protect Richmond from the West and could be moved rapidly either to cover one of Lee's flanks in event of an enemy turning movement or to block an advance up the James. One potential source of trouble to the Confederate high command had been the Union cavalry leader W. W. Averell, who had moved up the Shenandoah toward Staunton. On April 23 he was lost to view, and it was not until the twenty-seventh that he was rediscovered near New Creek—greatly to the relief of official Richmond. The scare had been so real that part of Longstreet's command had been alerted and marched to block this troublesome Federal cavalry leader.

Lee came down to inspect his rebuilt First Corps on April 29. When the tired leader came on the field, a tremendous wave of sentiment swept the command. A participant later described the scene as follows:

Lee honored our return to his command with a review. It was the only one ever held, after the one in the Shenandoah Valley, in Oct. 1862. . . . It took place in a cleared valley with broad pastures, in which our two divisions of infantry with my old battalion of artillery, could be deployed. . . . It is now over 40 years, but in imagination I can see to-day the large square gate-posts, without gate or fence . . . marking where a country road led out of a tall oak wood upon an open knoll in front of the center of our long double lines. And as the well-remembered figure of Lee on Traveller, at the head of his staff, rides between the posts and comes out upon the ground, the bugle sounds a signal, the guns thunder out a salute, Lee reins up Traveller and bares his good gray head and looks at us, and we give the "rebel yell" and shout and cry and wave our flags and look at him once more. For a wave of sentiment—something like what came a year later at Appomattox when he rode back from his meeting with Grant—seemed to sweep the field. All felt the bond which held them together. There was no speaking, but the effect was as of a military sacrament. Dr. Boggs, a S[outh] C[arolina] Chaplain riding with the staff, said to Colonel [C.S.] Venable, Lee's aide, "Does it not make the General proud to see how these men love him?" Venable answered, "Not proud. It awes him."¹¹

On the day following Lee's inspection, the indications that the enemy would move in force around the Confederate left were so strong that orders were dispatched to Longstreet to send a division north of Gordonsville to block any hostile advance from Liberty Mills. In acknowledging these instructions, Longstreet advised on May 1 that he would send Field's division "this afternoon or early tomorrow morning." At the same time, he asked that Pickett be returned to him. Field moved north, and on May 2 he was west of Orange Courthouse in the vicinity of Liberty Mills.¹²

¹¹ Lee to Longstreet (advising Longstreet that the enemy is ready to advance), April 20, 1864, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 869; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 494.

¹² Longstreet to Venable, May 1, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 940.

Reports reached Longstreet that the Union cavalry, with a pontoon train attached, had moved south of the Rappahannock. Other reports said that the Union reserves had been gathered and moved up.¹³ The great day was dawning; the final struggle was about to begin. There was no longer time for preparation; the 63,000 Confederates must take the field and front the Union Army of the Potomac with its 116,000 or more men. With odds against him of almost two to one, what could Lee do? Would Grant prove another Pope, as Longstreet had intimated? Or would the faith of the Northern President be justified?

Lee had a slight advantage of position. Ewell was on the Rapidan above Mine Run; A. P. Hill, somewhat in the rear, extended Ewell's left; and Longstreet was well to the rear, massed near Gordonsville and Mechanicsville, in what might be called general reserve. Lee had so disposed his forces that he could bring two columns to bear on the flank of any perpendicular movement against him, while he still had Longstreet with his handful of veterans to hurl at either hostile flank or to send to the support of either A. P. Hill or Ewell. Lee had judged correctly that Grant would attempt to pass his right flank, since a frontal attack against his defensive position would be too costly even for Grant to attempt, and a movement toward the other flank (Grant's right) would put the Union right in danger unless a strong covering force should be in possession of the Shenandoah Valley. But was Lee's army or Richmond the main objective? Lee was uncertain as to that. His role had to be a defensive one until he could be certain where Grant would strike.¹⁴

Grant later stated that he decided against a movement to the James by water because he feared that Lee would delay him on the Peninsula with part of his force while the remainder struck directly at Washington. He said further that he elected to march against Lee's right—in spite of the parallel rivers which crossed his path at right angles—because this would prevent Lee from utilizing the advantage of interior lines. If continued pressure could be maintained against the Confederate right, it would force Lee to retire on Richmond and would at the same time narrow the gap between Meade's army and the force under Butler.¹⁵

¹³ Lee to Seddon, April 30, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXIII, 1331.

¹⁴ *Id.* to Davis, May 3, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 942. Lee stated in this letter that he was convinced that the Union operations would be directed against Richmond and not against forces farther to the South. This letter is predicated, doubtless, on his conclusions of May 2 at Clark's Mountain. See also *id.* to Longstreet, April 20, 1864, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 869.

¹⁵ Ulysses S. Grant, "Preparing for the Campaigns of '64," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 107-10. See also Grant to B. F. Butler, April 2, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 15; Grant's report, June 5, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 17-18; A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865* (New York, 1883), 12.

The scene of the coming battle was aptly termed the Wilderness. A dense thicket of second-growth trees ranged some fifteen miles in length and ten miles in depth along the south bank of the Rapidan, with its easterly borders close to the town of Fredericksburg. Grant's proposed route by the left was bound to lead his columns into this unfavorable terrain. Such a place was almost impenetrable by troops in line of battle, and little maneuvering could be done. General A. A. Humphreys said that the undergrowth was so thick that one could hardly see more than one hundred paces in any direction. The movements of the enemy were obscured, and it was only when the two forces met that their presence was ascertained.¹⁰

Two main roads crossed the area running generally east and west: the Orange Turnpike or the "Pike" on the north, four miles south of and generally paralleling the Rapidan; and the Orange Plank Road some three miles farther south. There was only one other road worthy of the name; this ran southeast from Germanna Ford and crossed the Pike five miles southeast of the ford at Wilderness Tavern. The other roads were but trails and often not passable to either foot troops or transportation. It will be noted that the road net favored Lee's parallel advance and concentration, while Grant was restricted to one main axial road until he could clear Wilderness Tavern, so his troop movements were substantially slowed.

Briefly, Grant's general plan of campaign involved three major objectives, as follows: (1) the Army of Northern Virginia, go where it might, was hereafter to be the responsibility of the Army of the Potomac; (2) the task of taking Richmond was assigned to the Army of the James; (3) Washington was to be protected. Specifically, Grant planned to move against Lee's right flank in the hope of forcing him out of his positions along the Rapidan River and into battle. He divided his army into two main columns to cross the Rapidan at designated points and march southward to Chancellorsville and Spotsylvania.

Shortly after midnight on the morning of May 4, Grant commenced crossing his army over the pontoon bridges laid at Germanna Ford and Ely's Ford and an old wooden bridge at Culpeper Mine Ford. Sheridan, already over with two cavalry divisions, had brushed aside the Confederate pickets and was well posted to cover the movement of the infantry. The front of the advance was about seven miles between extreme limits. W. S. Hancock, with the II Corps, crossed at Ely's Ford and moved south at once over the trails which led through the forest about two miles east of Wilderness Tavern toward Chancellorsville. General G. K. Warren with the V Corps, followed

¹⁰ Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 10 ff.; Steele, *American Campaigns*, I, 473.

by General John Sedgwick and the VI Corps, took the route by way of Germanna Ford to Wilderness Tavern.¹⁷

The long Union train which had been assembled at Richardsville was closed upon the troops and followed each column without distance. It was not until the afternoon of the fifth that the sixty-five miles of wagons had cleared the Rapidan. From May 4 to 5 the crossings of the river were filled with wagons, and the woods resounded to the crack of the drivers' whips. It was the slowness of the wagon train that held Meade's army at Chancellorsville and Wilderness Tavern until the morning of the fifth. Grant's crossing was unopposed, and by noon on May 4 the Army of the Potomac was disposed somewhat as follows: J. H. Wilson's cavalry was in bivouac near Parker's Store, with patrols out toward Locust Grove; the V Corps was in bivouac near Wilderness Tavern, with one division one and one-half miles out on the Orange Turnpike toward Locust Grove; the VI Corps was in bivouac south and west of Germanna Ford, in a line facing west with General G. W. Getty on the left, George Wright in the middle, and J. B. Ricketts next to the river; David M. Gregg's cavalry was in bivouac south of Chancellorsville toward Piney Branch Church; the II Corps and reserve artillery were in bivouac south of Chancellorsville; Burnside was marching up to Germanna Ford from Rappahannock Station. Grant's troops had moved into the fatal silence and obscurity of the Wilderness, and a message was sent to Washington that the army had crossed.¹⁸

At 6 P.M. on the fourth, Grant issued orders for the army to resume its march on the following morning. Under cover of the cavalry, Hancock's II Corps was to march via Todd's Tavern on Shady Grove Church; the V Corps under Warren was to march on Parker's Store; and Sedgwick, with the VI Corps, was to march to Wilderness Tavern. The VI Corps was also charged with covering Germanna Ford with a division until Burnside could come up from Brandy Station and relieve it. Provision was made for contact on the right and left of the columns and the necessary security detachments.

To return to Lee: On the morning of May 2, he met with his three corps commanders at the signal station on Clark's Mountain. From this commanding position south of the Rapidan, the four men studied the terrain and the enemy positions carefully and noted the masses of troops in Culpeper County. Although many demonstrations had been made against the upper fords of the Rapidan, Lee announced to his companions that the movement would be against his right, with the place of crossing probably

¹⁷ *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 277. See also Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, II, 104.

¹⁸ Alexander S. Webb, "Through the Wilderness," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 153. See also Grant to Halleck, May 4, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1.

at either Germanna or Ely's Ford. He was convinced now that his army was to be the principal objective of the Union offensive. In the short space of two days, events proved that Lee's estimate had been correct.

If Lee was convinced on May 2 that Grant's main army was to swing around his right, why did he not gather his forces to meet the threat? The question is a natural one to ask. His troops were badly dispersed, and a quick concentration for a co-ordinated blow was not to be expected from the men and animals in their weakened physical condition. A. P. Hill was around Orange Courthouse—some twenty-eight miles from Wilderness Tavern. Ewell's troops were nearer by about ten miles but were scattered between Rapidan Station and Old Verdierville and along the Rapidan as far down as Mine Run. Longstreet was at a considerable distance—in the area between Charlottesville, Gordonsville, and Mechanicsville, with one division north and west of Gordonsville. The road distance from Wilderness Tavern to the center of Longstreet's area was some forty-two miles.¹⁹

The answer seems to be that Lee still feared for his left rear, and he hesitated to draw Longstreet nearer until he could be certain of Grant's intentions. However, he could have made a preliminary concentration by gathering Longstreet at Louisa Courthouse and closing A. P. Hill up on Rodes at New Verdierville on the Orange Plank Road. His plan was to fasten Ewell and Hill against Grant's flank when the Union army was fully committed to the Wilderness, and to throw Longstreet in a wide envelopment to strike hard and decisively against the Union left. The road web favored such a maneuver, and Longstreet was strategically well located to play his part without detection. Once Grant was forced to face west to beat off Ewell and A. P. Hill, his left flank would become exposed to Longstreet's almost perpendicular advance. Lee's plan was brilliant; but his holding attack was not strong enough, and his army was too widely dispersed for him to be certain that all would work out as planned.²⁰

Lee knew at 9 A.M. on May 4 that Grant was well started toward his right. He notified his corps commanders to be ready to move. At eleven o'clock he ordered the advance, and the army was put in motion. It was noon on the fourth when Ewell's advance moved out on the Orange Turnpike; and by nightfall he was in bivouac at Locust Grove, some five miles west of Wilderness Tavern, the center of Grant's concentration. He might have

¹⁹ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 498.

²⁰ Longstreet's march objectives, which were undoubtedly based on Lee's instructions, indicate most clearly that Lee planned a concentration on the battle field with Longstreet striking the fatal blow against Grant's left rear from the direction of Spotsylvania. Sorrel to Field, May 4, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 947-48.

pushed on, but Lee had instructed him to delay until A. P. Hill could get abreast of him. Hill's extra ten miles of marching on the Orange Plank Road delayed his arrival and when night came he was still some three miles behind Ewell's column and at least twelve miles from Wilderness Tavern.²¹

As soon as Lee had cared for his own immediate tactical needs, he advised the War Department that the enemy was advancing and asked that Pickett's division be sent to Spotsylvania Courthouse. The President responded at once and gave Lee complete charge over operations in western Virginia; he also advised Lee that troops had been sent forward as reinforcements to Hanover Junction.²²

Meanwhile Longstreet was not idle. He had deliberated on the situation ever since May 2; and on the morning of May 4—possibly before receiving Lee's orders to join him—he wrote Lee that he feared that the enemy was endeavoring to draw Lee toward Fredericksburg, which, because of the exposed flank toward West Point, would not be a good place to try to oppose the Union advance. "We should," wrote Longstreet, "keep away from there"—unless arrangements could be made for a force to block any movement from the lower Rappahannock. As an alternative, he suggested that an offensive be launched to threaten Grant's rear.²³ Somewhat earlier, reports had been received that the enemy was on the move; and warning orders had been sent to the division commanders, as well as to the artillery commander, to gather their forces and be ready to move at once. About 11 A.M., either orders from Lee had been received or Longstreet had anticipated them correctly, as instructions were sent to Field and Kershaw to move—that afternoon, if practicable—and to direct their march on Richard's Shop. Field, who was north of Gordonsville, was advised that his best route seemed to lie by way of Forest Hill, Brock's Bridge and the Old Fredericksburg Road.²⁴

There does not appear to be any record of Lee's orders to Longstreet. Their import is clear, however, as Longstreet's reply, written after his troops had started, stated that they would camp the night of May 4-5 between Foust's Bridge and Brock's Bridge, and that he hoped that they would reach Richard's Shop by noon on the fifth. He advised Lee that the War Department had

²¹ Longstreet to Lee, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 947; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 499.

²² *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. I, 1054-58. See also Davis to Beauregard, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, II, Pt. II, 888; *id.* to Lee, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, 887; and Lee to Davis, May 4, 1864, in Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches*, 169 ff.

²³ Longstreet to Lee, May 4, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 947.

²⁴ Sorrel to Alexander, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, 947; *id.* to Field, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*; and *id.* to Kershaw, May 4, 1864, *ibid.* Many dispatches appear to be missing from the records, and this fact leaves one uncertain as to how much of Longstreet's action was on his own initiative and how much was in response to Lee's instructions.

intervened and detained the trains of one of his divisions, and he asked to be permitted to use that of General R. F. Hoke.²⁵

From Longstreet's report it would seem that his entire corps was in motion toward Brock's Bridge—some sixteen miles from the northern exits of Mechanicsville. His report says that the corps had "started," but the contemporary evidence seems to show that the movement was initiated prior to that time and should by then have been well under way. Why should there have been any delay? Here again is where the many critics have neglected the logistics. Longstreet's headquarters were at Mechanicsville—some six miles south of Gordonsville. From Mechanicsville to where Field was located was approximately twelve miles. With the horses in the condition that reports indicate, it is doubtful whether a courier from Longstreet could have reached Field in less than one and one-half hours. An estimate of two hours—or a speed of six miles per hour—seems much more reasonable. Field would have received Longstreet's message, therefore, at approximately 12:45 P.M. All military men know that it takes time—entirely too much time!—for orders to be prepared and dispatched to the lower echelons of command. And in those stirring days there were no telephones or fast-moving motorcycle dispatch riders. Even the telegraph was not in general use below the level of army or corps headquarters.

Field probably was at his noon meal when the dispatch reached him. It would have required approximately fifteen minutes for him to read the message and assemble his staff. Now what of Field's situation? He had been sent out to cover the approaches from Liberty Mills. He must have had at least a regiment on outpost, with outguards well to the front. It can safely be assumed that an hour was necessary to gather these security forces and assemble them. Since these men were in camp and not in bivouac, there were tents to strike, camp equipment to pack, and rations, forage, and ammunition to issue—all of which takes time. At best, it would have been well on toward 3 P.M. before the head of Field's column could start. The exact number of Field's men and wagons is not known. But he must have been reasonably strong on May 1 when he went off on strategic security duty. It can be assumed that he had a minimum of five thousand men, with a train of one wagon per hundred men, and an attached artillery of some eighteen guns (one third of the First

²⁵ Longstreet to Lee, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, LI, Pt. II, 887. Did Lee urge Longstreet to make a forced march? The implied direction—assuming that Longstreet marched on the place Lee ordered—was such as to turn Grant's left and not such as to support the attack on the Plank Road. See Davis to Lee, May 4, 1864, *ibid.*, 886. Bushrod Johnson's brigade was to come from Hanover Junction; Eppa Hunton's brigade was to be at Hanover Junction on May 5; and the remainder of Pickett's division, under R. F. Hoke, was to arrive in four days. A subsequent letter, written on the same date, held all troops at Hanover Junction.

Corps artillery). Based on distances of one-half yard per man and twenty-five yards per wagon, gun, and caisson, the column depth for Field must have been some ten thousand yards. Translating this distance into time at the rate of 2.5 miles per hour of marching, one finds that Field would have required, in round numbers, some 160 minutes to clear any point, even with excellent march discipline. If Longstreet's command started at 4 P.M., there may have been a delay of approximately an hour—which delay, if any, may have been fully justifiable for some reason not now known. If, however, his command was all *in motion* at 4 P.M., the work of preparation had been done with unusual dispatch and efficiency.

Ewell was the first of Lee's generals to gain contact with the enemy. As he advanced down the Orange Turnpike from the west on the morning of the fifth, Edward Johnson's division was in the van, followed by Rodes and Early. When Johnson reached a slight rise about two miles west from the Germanna Road, he halted to permit Hill's leading division—still some three miles to the rear—to come up with him. He sent out a brigade as a strong left flank guard. Just before halting, his scouts saw the Union troops crossing the Orange Turnpike on the Germanna Road. These were part of Warren's corps. Moving forward briskly, Ewell formed line of battle and engaged at once. He sent word to Lee—who was with A. P. Hill on the Plank Road—that he had gained contact with the main enemy forces. Lee instructed Ewell to regulate his movements on Hill, and to avoid bringing on a general engagement until Longstreet could arrive. Ewell's position, however, was close against the Union flank, and battle could not be avoided.²⁶

Warren was present with his corps when it met Ewell. He sent back word of the situation and soon received orders from Meade to halt his corps, form line of battle to the right front, and attack the enemy approaching on the Orange Turnpike. It seems that Meade was under the impression at this time that Lee had left a containing force to delay him while the main Confederate army was moved to the North Anna to take up a defensive position. Meade did not, and indeed could not, believe that Lee was concentrating against him in the Wilderness. The battle was thus joined, and a piecemeal development followed. Hancock, who had marched well to the east of Warren and whose leading elements had already passed through Chancellorsville, was ordered to halt at Todd's Tavern—about eight miles southeast of Wilderness Tavern—and await further developments. Sedgwick, who was following Warren, was turned off the Germanna Road and directed to move in on

²⁶ Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 22-24; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 279-80; E. M. Law, "From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 121.

Warren's right, facing west. Grant joined Meade, and the Union headquarters were established at the Lacy farm southwest of Wilderness Tavern.²⁷

About 10 A.M., Meade learned of A. P. Hill's approach on the Plank Road. He ordered Hancock to move his corps up the Brock Road to the Plank Road and be prepared to strike quickly at Hill. Meanwhile, Getty's division of Sedgwick's corps had been marched to Wilderness Tavern in general reserve. Hill's advance was threatening; and before Hancock could come up, Getty was ordered to attack in the direction of Parker's Store. When he arrived at the crossing of the Brock and Plank roads about 11 A.M., he found the Union cavalry being driven back before Heth's skirmishers, who had launched an attack from the vicinity of Parker's Store. Discovering a large hostile force coming up on the Plank Road, Getty wisely halted on the Brock Road, threw up hasty entrenchments, and waited for Hancock.

A. P. Hill's orders had been similar to those given Ewell. When Heth encountered Getty, he followed the instructions given him by Hill and avoided bringing on a general battle. He deployed and awaited further instructions. His position was good: his main line occupied high ground, with both flanks resting on marshes. Wilcox soon came up on Heth's left and extended toward Ewell; and the lines formed by Heth, Wilcox, and Ewell became merged into one long line of battle with difficult or impassable ground filling the intervals between the corps.

Just before 3 P.M., Getty received orders to attack at once and was informed that Hancock—who had not arrived—would support him. He moved out smartly against Heth but found the Confederate line too stiff to penetrate. Hancock sent forward reinforcements, and the fighting soon became fierce and desperate, continuing until darkness hid the field. About 5 P.M., Wilcox, who had been sent by Hill to connect Heth and Ewell, was recalled to the immediate support of Heth, who was hard pressed and in danger of being driven back. When Wilcox withdrew to go to the aid of Heth, he was forced to leave a wide gap between Heth and Ewell, somewhat similar to the fatal gap in Rosecrans' line which Longstreet had so ably exploited at Chickamauga. This risk had to be taken, however, as Heth was in no condition to stand much pressure. This unoccupied section of the field between Ewell and Heth was to be the scene of a vicious and almost successful Union counter-thrust on the next day.²⁸ When the fire slackened, the result was a drawn

²⁷ Freeman, *Lee*, III, 281. See also the discussion in Steele, *American Campaigns*, I, 475; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 24.

²⁸ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 501; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 30. In regard to the fatal gap in the line at Chickamauga, which was exploited so successfully by Longstreet, see also page 210, *supra*. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, III, 278-94; C. M. Wilcox, "Lee and Grant in the Wilderness," in *Annals of the War*, 492-93.

battle, although the odds were decidedly against Heth. Alexander, in commenting on the situation at the close of the day, remarked that it was fortunate that the woods hid the sight of the powerful forces arrayed against the Confederates; else Hill's men might have become demoralized by the sight, just as Bragg's troops had been in the battle of Chattanooga. Indeed, things did look dark for Hill: his ammunition was low, and he had learned the extent of the enemy forces and their position and strength.

The battle on the Confederate left may be classed as an entirely separate battle. Things fared better there, as Ewell's fight with Warren was a stand-off. During the course of the struggle, when Wilcox was recalled to the close support of Heth, Warren saw the gap between Hill and Ewell and prepared for a damaging thrust. Advised of the situation, Grant ordered up Burnside, whose IX Corps had been delayed at Germanna Ford by the trains, and made arrangements to send his twenty-four thousand men into the gap to take both Hill and Ewell in reverse. To make the situation more critical for Lee, the drift of the fighting and the almost hopeless confusion caused by the dense thickets were such that his staff was apparently unable to co-ordinate the action of the two corps.

When darkness fell on the fifth, Hill was in great danger. Hancock's entire corps was in his front and opposite his left; and J. S. Wadsworth, who had been sent by Warren to reinforce Hancock's right, was in position and ready to strike Hill's left rear. Wadsworth bivouacked on the field in line of skirmishers, ready to jump at Hill's left with the first streak of dawn.

Similarly, Ewell was faced by Warren's corps with Sedgwick feeling around his left. Closely hemmed in, Ewell could do little to stop Burnside, who was moving to interpose between him and Hill. Unless Longstreet could get up, it was almost certain that Lee's army would be split and defeated in detail. The time had come for Lee to give up any plans which he may have had to throw Longstreet at Grant's left rear. He had fastened his holding attack against the Union flank, but this powerful Union army was too much for his weakened force. Longstreet must join at once and aid both Hill and Ewell in beating off Grant's counterstrokes. Longstreet's tired soldiers were forced to halt and rest after twenty-eight hours of continuous marching. The leading troops of the First Corps went into bivouac at Craig's Meeting House on the Carthapin Road. At sundown on the fifth they had marched thirty-six miles. They were eight miles short of their destination—Todd's Tavern—and fifteen miles from Wilderness Tavern. Orders were issued that the march would be resumed at 1 A.M. on the sixth. While the men were snatching a few hours of rest, a messenger arrived from Lee tell-

ing of the situation and bearing instructions for Longstreet to cross over to the Orange Plank Road and move with all haste on Parker's Store.

Meanwhile, from his headquarters on the field of battle Lee was planning an attack to crush the enemy left around the Wilderness Tavern ridge. There was definite indication that the enemy was easing toward Lee's right. Ewell had held his lines easily, and Heth seemed to have thrown back the forces that had pressed him so closely that afternoon. Instructions were sent at 6 P.M. for Ewell to make ready to attack early, as Longstreet and R. H. Anderson would be up the next morning. One hour later these same instructions were repeated, even though the fighting still continued against Hill.²⁹

With the coming of darkness the drive against Hill slackened, but during the night the noises of the Union preparations to carry on the attack filtered through the darkness and brought apprehension to Hill's men as they clung to their positions. Although warned by these noises, Hill did nothing to strengthen the trench system or the fieldworks, nor did he prepare to meet the coming attack. His men fully expected to be relieved by Longstreet's corps before morning; hence they lay on their arms and failed to do anything to make Longstreet's task easier when he should come up. This was inexcusable; yet it was not fatal in its consequences because Grant was misled into weakening Hancock during the night.³⁰


Grant's curious blunder was occasioned by the false information that Pickett had arrived and was even then in position to advance at daylight up the Brock Road. F. C. Barlow's division was pulled out and marched to the vicinity of an unfinished railroad which crossed the Wilderness on a line generally parallel to that of the Plank Road. His troops moved in near where this artificial grade crossed the Brock Road and deployed into position facing generally south. Because of indecision or through lack of proper reconnaissance, Barlow failed to appreciate the tactical advantage of his new position as a basis for making a flank movement against the Confederate forces engaged on the Plank Road. He also failed to realize the defensive worth of the unfinished railroad embankment should the enemy move against the Union left flank. Fortunately, as Alexander later wrote, this opportunity was left for Longstreet to discover and exploit.³¹

At 5 A.M. of the sixth, Warren and Sedgwick combined in an assault on Ewell while Hancock, supported by both Wadsworth and Getty, smashed

²⁹ Marshall to Ewell, May 5, 1864 (6 P.M.), in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 952. See also *id.* to *id.*, May 5, 1864 (7 P.M.), *ibid.*, 953.

³⁰ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 502. Humphreys said that Hill was at least partially entrenched. Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 37.

³¹ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 502; Hancock's report, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 322 ff.



into Hill. The attacks on Ewell, although made with great suddenness and fierceness, were all repulsed. For six hours the battle raged; then the offensive spirit waned. After about 11 A.M., both sides were content to lie behind their breastworks and take pot shots at each other.

The attack on Hill, however, seemed to succeed from the start. Heth and Wilcox were able to hold their own against the frontal assaults of three Union divisions; but when Hancock hit them in the right flank just as Wadsworth struck their left, both Confederate flanks commenced to give way and were soon rolled up against the center, which was astride the Plank Road. The Southern line was crumbling and beset on three sides. As the attack progressed, the troops on the flanks tumbled back about a mile to the Plank Road and soon came pouring down the road in full retreat. The backward rush passed Lee, who was standing in a small copse of pine. He saw Samuel McGowan striving to stop his men, but they would not heed. General Lee was alarmed. "My God, General McGowan!" he exclaimed. "Is this splendid brigade of yours running like a flock of geese?"³²

It was at this critical moment that Longstreet made his dramatic entry on the scene. Promptly at one o'clock on the morning of the sixth, his columns had formed and struck out across country, bound for the Plank Road and Parker's Store. The trail, Longstreet later wrote, was

overgrown by the bushes, except the side tracks made by the draft animals and the ruts of wheels which marked occasional lines in its course. After a time the wood became less dense, and the unused road was more difficult to follow, and presently the guide found that there was no road under him; but no time was lost, as by ordering the lines of the divisions doubled, they were ready when the trail was found, and the march continued in double line. At daylight we entered the Plank road, and filed down toward the field of strife of the afternoon of the 5th and daylight of the 6th.³³

The incident of the doubling of Longstreet's columns is of more than passing interest. It will be seen shortly that the First Corps deployed promptly, and in an unusually short period of time it was in battle formation. This accidental doubling of the columns became, in fact, a partial development for battle, permitting Longstreet to seize the opportunity that came to him. He was enabled to throw both of his divisions into the fight at once and turn what promised to be a Union victory into what almost became a Union disaster. The goddess of fortune was doing her best to make amends for the Confederate dispersion of May 4. Had Longstreet been in single column, the time consumed by deployment would have been doubled; and only his leading division would have been able to participate in the battle of the

³² Alexander, *Memoirs*, 503; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 286-87.

³³ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 559; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 498.

forenoon. It is also possible that a single division would not have been strong enough to check the Union advance.

The head of Longstreet's double column reached Parker's Store about 5 A.M. on May 6. Less than five miles separated Longstreet from the front-line assault of the battle against Hill. Longstreet was marching with his staff at the head of the column. What now followed will come best from the pen of one who was there:

As we drew near the Tabb house, we met what seemed to be an orderly body of troops marching in the opposite direction, who parted, taking the woods on each side and giving us the road. Presently an excited staff-officer appeared, trying to stop them, who, being asked why, answered,—“They are running, damn them.” Soon bullets began to whistle down the road, and Longstreet ordered the leading brigades forward into line on each side. [John] Gregg, [H. L.] Benning, and [E. M.] Law, under Field, took the left. [J. D.] Kennedy, [B. G.] Humphreys, and [Goode] Bryan, under Kershaw, took the right. Some of the bullets were coming across the road from the right, their direction showing that the enemy was about to pass around our flank.⁸⁴

All was confusion for the moment. As Gregg's brigade of Texans passed at a quickstep, Lee rushed out and placed himself at their head, to lead them into battle. At once a cry ran along the column: “Go back! General Lee to the rear!”—and a major stepped out of ranks and caught Lee's horse, Traveller, by the bridle and stopped him. The Texans refused to go on unless the great leader would agree to go back. At this moment Colonel Venable appeared and pointed out to Lee that Longstreet had come up and was resting on the side of the road. Lee turned aside and joined Longstreet.⁸⁵

The sudden appearance of Longstreet's corps filing from the road in battle formation was a distinct surprise to the advancing Federals. They were caught disorganized, unprepared, and badly extended; and the sudden drive of fresh troops not only stopped their advance but drove it back some distance. Both sides now fought without artificial protection, skirmishing among the trees somewhat after the fashion of Indian fighting. The losses cannot be stated for this isolated part of the battle, but they must have been large. Both John Gregg and Benning (on the left) suffered heavily, as a most stubborn resistance met their men. After a short and intensive fight, victory crowned the Confederate arms.⁸⁶

The news that Longstreet had arrived on the field was not long in reaching Grant. He immediately made dispositions to meet this new danger. Re-

⁸⁴ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 503.

⁸⁵ Law, “From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor,” in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 124–25. Cf. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 503; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 287.

⁸⁶ Longstreet's first attack was begun about 7:30 A.M. and probably was completed by 9:30 A.M., if not earlier. His troops had moved forward again by about 11:30 A.M. Longstreet was wounded about 2 P.M., if not sooner.

inforcements were hurried forward to block Longstreet, whose counterattack stopped through loss of momentum. It was while the assault was in progress, and before it commenced to slow, that one of Lee's engineers (General M. L. Smith) made a reconnaissance around the Union left and came upon the unfinished railroad embankment, which was but a few hundred yards south of the Plank Road. Following the embankment to where it crossed the Brock Road, he saw that Barlow had failed to occupy it. By 10 A.M., he had returned to Longstreet's side and imparted the information.

Quick to see the tactical advantage, Longstreet organized four brigades as a flanking force and directed that they move at once to positions behind the embankment and attack. Too busy with his own immediate problem to lead this assault in person, he delegated the matter of co-ordination to his operations officer, Colonel Sorrel. The brigade commanders selected were G. B. Anderson, W. T. Wofford, William Mahone and W. G. M. Davis; the plan provided for each to move by the flank and make a concerted drive against the Federal left. In co-operation with this movement against the enemy left rear, Longstreet planned to advance all his troops in direct attack just as soon as Sorrel reported an initial success.

The march directed by Sorrel started promptly and proceeded under cover. In less than an hour the brigades were in position in mass formation, facing the Federal left flank. The assault was launched about 11:30 A.M., the men jumping forward to the accompaniment of the wild rebel yell. The success of the maneuver was startling in its completeness. The Union left crumpled as if it were paper; brigade after brigade was rolled up and completely disorganized. Hancock tried in vain to rally his troops; but the line broke, sadly harassed men fleeing in all directions—all rushing madly to the entrenchments along the Brock Road nearly two miles in rear, the scene of the first day's fighting. And Hancock's corps was not alone in the panic. The fever spread to other troops across the Plank Road, where Wadsworth had been killed and his men were lost without their leader. "This was Longstreet's great opportunity," as Alexander has said; and he availed himself of it. The Union advance was stopped and pushed back. Two full corps were put to rout by four small brigades. It was the surprise that did the work. The denseness of the thickets hid the small force, and the noise and confusion were such as to give the impression of a much larger force. The Union soldiers were stampeded by their own fears. The suddenness of the attack, combined with its timing and direction, produced immediate results which were probably without equal in the war. It was an excellent example of the value of surprise as a cardinal principle of tactics. As Hancock said to Longstreet years after this fateful day: "You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours

before I could reorganize for battle." One contemporary historian of the war wrote that the Federal army faced irretrievable disaster.⁸⁷

Longstreet still had five fresh brigades with which to follow up this initial success, and he prepared to move at once by a concealed road in order to thrust deep into the Union left rear. About 1 P.M., while his troops were being made ready, he rode down the Plank Road in company with General Smith. Closely following were Kershaw, Field, Jenkins, and a rather large staff. Sorrel came dashing up just then to report the fullness of the success, and the news of victory spread like wildfire through the eager ranks. Faces were alight with the fire of victory; the men strained at the leash like dogs who had caught the scent. The Twelfth Virginia led off under Mahone and crossed the Plank Road in pursuit of Wadsworth's fugitives. The brigade moved up rapidly and soon was somewhat in advance. It turned and was started back so as to align with the main attack. The confusion was great. As the men at the head of another advancing column saw this line of troops filtering through the trees, they thought it the Union reserves coming up and opened a heavy fire. Just as the first volley splintered the underbrush, Longstreet and his party rode into the field of fire. It was too late to turn back; they were caught. Jenkins had just remarked to Longstreet on his great joy in the victory and his newborn faith in the ultimate success of the cause when he was struck by fire from the Confederate troops. He fell, mortally wounded.

As Jenkins fell writhing to the ground, another and greater man, the great spreading oak of the Southern army, fell crashing beside him. A large caliber ball had struck Longstreet, passing through his throat and shoulder, and as he reeled and half leaped from the saddle, a bloody foam spurted from his lips. He was lowered to the ground, and his staff gathered around him. His voice was all but stilled, but with effort he directed that General Field be brought to him. In a moment Field was at his side and struggled, in strained attention, to catch the words which his commander was trying to speak. Longstreet directed him to assume command and to press the pursuit both by direct attack and by continuing the flanking movement which had already been started. Before he had finished, R. H. Anderson (of A. P. Hill's corps), having learned that Longstreet was wounded, came up; and again Longstreet went over the plans in detail, for fear that his former explanation might have been misunderstood.

Lee was soon at Longstreet's side and learned of the instructions given to Anderson and Field. He directed that Anderson assume command of

⁸⁷ Sorrel, *Recollections*, 236 ff.; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 505; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 293; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 568; Special Orders No. 134, Army of the Potomac, May 3, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 355; Hancock to Meade, May 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 489; *id.* to *id.*, May 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 493; William Swinton, *Decisive Battles of the War* (New York, 1867), 378.

Longstreet's corps and continue the attack as planned. But these instructions did not hold for long: as Longstreet was moved slowly to the rear, Lee surveyed the situation and changed the plans.³⁸

In spite of the fact that the pursuit was organized, the troops were ready, and information had been brought by Lee's chief of engineers that a concealed route had been found which would turn Hancock's left, Lee stopped the pursuit. It seems that he was affected by the disorganized appearance of the troops nearby. Whatever the cause, he saw fit to change Longstreet's tactical plan of an enveloping pursuit to a direct attack all along the line. To make the changes in troop dispositions necessitated by the newer plan consumed much valuable time, and the resulting delay gave the Federal commanders opportunity to rally their forces and meet the Confederate attack on more even terms. There was now no chance to catch the Union divisions in a rout. They had become sensible and disciplined soldiers again. Confusion had reigned just long enough to destroy the Confederate opportunity. Longstreet's great stroke could not be exploited.

There is no doubt that Longstreet's corps had saved the day. Not only had Grant's attack been stopped, but the attack against Hill had been changed into a Union disaster. Grant's left was crumpled when the four fresh brigades hit, and at the moment when Longstreet fell the indications were that another Chancellorsville had come to destroy the morale of the Union army. Lincoln could hardly have risen above another such catastrophe. Had Longstreet's plan been carried out immediately and with vigor, the entire Federal army might have been driven from the field in disorder and large numbers of prisoners taken. Grant's plan for an overland campaign might well have been blocked and the Confederate desire for a stalemate realized.

In no other battle of the war, save perhaps that at Chickamauga, was Longstreet's almost intuitive ability to select the correct move so clearly demonstrated. A series of accidents gave him an opportunity which he translated into a potentially great tactical success, although he was forced to make his decision and outline his tactical plans with very little information of the enemy. He seemed to sense Grant's predicament and the fatal weakness of the Union left. He seemed also to sense the tactical formation that was needed to bring about the collapse of the Federal wing. Something of his tremendous will power and dogged devotion to duty may be grasped from the fact that he went over the detailed plans for extending the movement—not once but twice—when he was suffering from wounds that must have

³⁸ The oral instructions were confirmed in writing on May 7, on which date Major General R. H. Anderson officially assumed command of the First Corps. Par. 1, Special Orders No. 122, Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. II, 967. See also Lee to Seddon, May 6, 1864, *ibid.*, 960.

taken all of his strength and courage to bear. Even when the conference was over and Sorrel had ridden back to remain at the side of his wounded chief, Longstreet urged him to return to Lee and insist that the attack go on as Longstreet had planned it. Longstreet saw clearly—through his fog of pain and weariness—that the advantage must be pressed before Grant had time to rally the Union troops. His actions were a remarkable exhibition of sheer grit.

Colonel Walter H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant general and a severe critic of Longstreet's role at Gettysburg, has expressed the opinion that had Longstreet been spared through the 1864 battle of the Wilderness, he would have rolled back the Union left wing and hit Grant so hard a blow as to cause a Federal withdrawal across the Rapidan. He has said of the catastrophe: "A strange fatality attended us! Jackson killed in the zenith of his successful career; Longstreet wounded when in the act of striking a blow that would have rivaled Jackson at Chancellorsville in its results; and in each case the fire was from our own men! A blunder! Call it so; the old deacon would say that God willed it thus."⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns*, 236.

With Lee's Left Wing

AS THE TIDE OF THE CONFLICT AT THE WILDERNESS SWEEPED ONWARD, LONGSTREET was carried to the rear. His personal physician, Dr. J. S. D. Cullen, was at his side; and three other doctors, sent by Lee, were waiting at Parker's Store. A detailed examination of the wound showed that the ball had entered between the shoulder and neck, severing the nerves leading to the arm and tearing open the side of the throat. Blood from the torn arteries filled Longstreet's throat and poured forth with each gasping breath. After dressings were applied, the bleeding soon stopped; and shortly thereafter a note was sent to Lee telling him that "nothing could be announced to General Longstreet's staff that could give them more pleasure" than that Longstreet's wound was not necessarily fatal.¹

From Parker's Store, Longstreet was taken to "Meadow Farm," the home of his friend Erasmus Taylor, where he was taken care of by Mrs. Taylor until he could be moved to the Taliaferro Hospital in Lynchburg, at which he arrived within a week after receiving the shot that nearly killed him. Here he gradually regained his strength while his wounds healed. A visiting nurse at the hospital wrote that he was "very nervous and feeble and suffers much from his wound. He sheds tears on the slightest provocation and apologizes for it. He says he does not see why a bullet going through a man's shoulder should make a baby of him."²

As soon as he was well enough to leave the hospital, Longstreet was moved to the Lynchburg home of his wife's kinsman Maurice Hamner Garland, whose only son, General Samuel Garland, had been killed at the battle of South Mountain, Maryland, in September of 1862. He stayed with his wife until Hunter's operations in the area made it advisable to move him into the country. He then went to "Lotus Grove," the home of his friend Colonel John D. Alexander, near Campbell Courthouse, some twelve miles east of Lynchburg. But peaceful convalescence was denied him. On June thirteenth,

¹ Andrew Dunne (aide-de-camp to Longstreet) wrote Lee on May 6, 1864, that the wound had been examined by Drs. Cullen, Barksdale, Wood, and Guild. He added: "It will afford our dear general great pleasure to know what he inaugurated has been successful—that is, the entire repulse of the hated enemy." *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 893.

² Mrs. C. M. Blatchford to her husband, May 12, 1864, and *id.* to *id.*, May 18, 1864, quoted in C. M. Blatchford, III (ed.), *Letters from Lee's Army* (New York, 1947), 261–62.

a Union raiding party, after burning the railroad depot at Concord, several miles from Lynchburg, set off "in the direction of Campbell Court House to capture [him]." Fortunately, friends were able to get him out of the village and back to Lynchburg, from where he went first to the home of relatives, the Sibleys, in Augusta, Georgia, and subsequently to the Hart home near Union Point, in northern Georgia, about thirty miles south of Athens. During this period Longstreet's possible capture was an object striven for by the Union commanders in the Lynchburg area. Even as late as July 23, 1864, General George Crook, commanding one of Hunter's divisions, reported from Winchester: "There are rumors that apparently have foundation that General Longstreet 'may be here' in the Valley."³

Longstreet remained in Georgia until mid-October, 1864, when, though "crippled," he reported in person to Lee for assignment to duty. He requested that he might be sent either to the Army of Northern Virginia or, failing that, to any point where he might be of service. His wife and his aide, Captain T. J. Goree, were his constant companions during his convalescence, both of them accompanying him on the return journey from Georgia to Richmond.

While Longstreet was recovering from his wound and tasting the less bitter side of life, the Army of Northern Virginia was slowly retiring southward before Grant's greatly superior force. After the fruitless resistance in the Wilderness, it seemed as if the pressing tide of Union troops which felt its way around Lee's right could not be stemmed. From Spotsylvania and its "Bloody Angle," Lee withdrew to the North Anna, where, from the twenty-fourth to the twenty-seventh of May, Grant fumed and fretted as he hurled his troops across the stream only to have his center blocked and his army split into three disjointed parts. Lee held; Grant was forced to turn aside rather than risk disaster in the face of his opponent's masterly handling of the river-crossing defense. Grant swung far around Lee's right only to be met by a skillful Confederate defense drawn up at Cold Harbor.

The overland campaign against Richmond may be said to have ended with the repulse at Cold Harbor on June 3. In this engagement, Grant sacrificed thousands of his troops in the few brief hours when he tried by repeated assaults to drive the Southern line from its entrenched position. This mass slaughter was needless and frightful. After Cold Harbor, Grant did not attempt direct assaults. He relied on maneuver and began to pass his army to the south side of the James so that he could approach Richmond over ground which he hoped would be less stubbornly defended. In this change of base and area of operations, Grant succeeded for the first time in deceiving Lee as

³ H. D. Bird to Braxton Bragg, June 14, 1864, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 1017; D. H. Hunter to Stanton, July 24, 1864, *ibid.*, XXXVII, Pt. II, 428; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 572.

to his real intentions. From June 13 to 17, Lee anxiously prodded official Richmond to find out what the Union general was about—not daring, it seems, to shift the bulk of his army from the north bank of the river until after the Federal operation had been completed. His indecision, and his failure to penetrate Grant's defensive screen, allowed Grant to make his movements with deliberation and ease.⁴

Between Grant and Richmond—after the crossing—was the weak garrison at Petersburg under Beauregard. Although the Union commander is entitled to much credit for the excellence of his river-crossing maneuver, he failed to exploit it fully by his delay in attacking Petersburg. Lee's three days of hesitation and uncertainty north of the James might have had more fatal consequences to the South than the three days at Gettysburg. Although he might not have been able to stop the crossing, he could have made it costly.

What must have been Longstreet's thoughts as the intelligence came that the army was falling back! Even the news that Butler had been turned from the gates of Richmond was no compensation for Lee's continued retirement. Other disasters came in the loss of able men. Jeb Stuart was one to fall; and Longstreet paid tribute to his worth when he said that his loss was of greater import "even than that of the swift-moving General 'Stonewall' Jackson. Through all the vicissitudes of war he held his troopers beside him peerless in prowess and discipline. After his fall their decline came swifter than their upbuilding had been accomplished by his magic hand."⁵

The only recompense—if any—for Lee's failure to hold was Grant's appalling losses. In the five weeks from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, some fifty-five thousand Union soldiers were killed or wounded; and of these, a large proportion lost their lives at Cold Harbor. This terrible sequence of battles also thinned the ranks of Lee's army. How many of these sad details reached Longstreet is not known; but at least some of the news came to his notice, and with it must have come the feeling that the game was nearly up.

While July brought returning health and vigor to Longstreet, it also brought further disturbing news. General Joseph E. Johnston had been relieved, and General John B. Hood had been placed in command of the army in Georgia. Johnston had been Longstreet's first commander and was

⁴ Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches*, 231. Cf. Beauregard to Bragg, May 7, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXVI, Pt. III, 878; D. H. Hill to Beauregard, June 11, 1864, *ibid.*, 896. See also Alexander, *Memoirs*, 546-52; and J. M. Hanson, "A Stolen March: Cold Harbor to Petersburg," in *Journal of American Military Foundation* (Washington), I (Winter, 1937-38), 139-51. Major Justus Scheibert's lectures, based on his observations of Lee's army and published after the war in *Der Bürgerkriege in dem Nordamerikanischen Staaten* (Berlin, Germany, 1874) contain a critical paragraph on the weakness and lack of skill in handling the cavalry.

⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 573.

high in his esteem. His loyal nature must have rebelled at the idea of Johnston's being deprived of his command, especially if he knew—as rumor had it—that Johnston's relief was forced at the instigation of the Georgia politicians and the anti-Johnston faction in Richmond. President Davis offered to Longstreet the vacancy created by the transfer of Hood, but Longstreet replied that when he was able to do full duty he would obey orders.⁶ There was no joy for Longstreet in the thought of capitalizing on Hood's surprising ascent. The First Corps was Longstreet's child, the creature of his strength and determination. Where else would he wish to go when recovered except to command the men who had long since learned to love him and to follow him blindly? Longstreet naturally preferred to serve with Lee. Another probability is that Longstreet would not have cared to serve under a man who had once been his subordinate. Hood had commanded a division under Longstreet until the battle of Chickamauga.

These conflicting and disturbing reports of what was going on elsewhere served to increase Longstreet's restlessness. Quiet and inaction were not for him. But it was not until September that he was able to mount his favorite horse, Fly-By-Night, which Lee had sent to him; and it was a month later before he was able to ride for some distance without undue fatigue. About this time, Longstreet moved with his family to Richmond, where he found temporary quarters in the Randolph house. Except for a useless right arm, he seemed as fit as ever. It was early in October when he visited Lee. The browning meadows betokened the coming of winter, and the meagerness of the harvest could be seen from the scanty shocks of grain. The meeting with Lee was touching. While Longstreet had benefited by his rest, Lee showed the strain of the great burden he was carrying. Longstreet was distressed, and no doubt he cautioned his good friend to conserve his health and let others take over part of the load. With some bitterness, he remarked that Lee had to feed the army as well as fight it.⁷

Contact with his old commander was all that was needed to stir Longstreet to ask for active service. In his plea for reassignment, he set forth his physical disabilities frankly and added that if he could not be assigned to a position on the Virginia front without displacing an officer, he would gladly accept with equal cheerfulness a post in the Trans-Mississippi Department.⁸

Longstreet's application for assignment to active duty was sent to Lee's

⁶ *Ibid.*, 572. For an account of Johnston's supersession by Hood, see Thomas Robson Hay, "The Davis-Hood-Johnston Controversy of 1864," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), XI (June, 1924), 54-84.

⁷ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 574; Jones, *Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, II, *passim*.

⁸ For Longstreet's offer to accept a post in the Trans-Mississippi Department, see Longstreet to Lee, October 7, 1864, in *Official Records*, XLII, Pt. III, 1140. See also *id.* to W. H. Taylor, October 7, 1864, *ibid.*

adjutant general on October 7. Ten days later formal orders were issued by the War Department reassigning him to the command of the First Corps.⁹ We have here a very strong indication that General Pendleton was mistaken in his assertion that Lee wished to be rid of Longstreet for certain alleged failures at Gettysburg. It is, of course, entirely possible that Lee may have wished to be free of Longstreet in July, 1863, and yet may have overcome this feeling by October, 1864. But such a hypothesis is hardly acceptable in view of the cordial relations which continued to exist between the two men—as is evidenced in their official letters and reports. In his application for active duty, Longstreet gave Lee two grounds on which to raise objection to his reassignment to the Army of Northern Virginia. The first was that of physical incapacity: Longstreet had a useless right arm. The second was Longstreet's offer to accept a post in the Trans-Mississippi Department. It is significant that Lee waived both; and in spite of the fact that R. H. Anderson was doing good work as commander of Longstreet's old corps, Lee endorsed Longstreet's application with a wish that he could be returned to him as the leader of the First Corps. It took but ten days for Longstreet's letter to reach Lee's headquarters, pass through the official red tape of Richmond, receive the personal approval of the President, and be published in orders. It is quite apparent that no one questioned Longstreet's right to his old command, and it is equally certain that Lee had no thought of losing his old war horse.

Longstreet reported for duty on October 19 and was at once assigned to command Lee's left wing with the mission of guarding the approaches to Richmond from the north and the east. He found his command disposed in somewhat the same positions as when Johnston opposed McClellan in the spring of 1862. South of the James, Pickett's division covered a front of three miles from the river to Swift Creek. North of the James the forces extended from the Chickahominy to a point near New Bridge, thence across White Oak Swamp to Fort Gilmer, and from there down the James to Chaffin's Bluff. Hoke and Field with their infantry divisions held the left center of this line to include Fort Gilmer, while the bulk of General M. W. Gary's cavalry covered the Nine Mile Road. The works at Chaffin's Bluff and at Drewry's Bluff were manned by naval detachments and local militia. The total strength of the left wing was not over twenty thousand men.¹⁰

⁹ Longstreet was ordered to resume command of his corps on October 17, 1864. *Ibid.*, Pt. I, 2. He reported for duty and assumed command on October 19, 1864. See Longstreet's report, n.d., *ibid.*, 871. Cf. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 574. Longstreet was in error in his memoirs. The date which he cited as that of his application for active duty was subsequent to that of his assignment by War Department orders.

¹⁰ See Longstreet to Colonel Charles Marshall, October 31, 1864, in *Official Records*, XLII, Pt. III, 1185.

The right wing was under Lee's personal command. Occupying a series of forts connected by trench systems at distances of from one to three miles from the city of Petersburg, the army extended in a semicircle from the Appomattox River on the northeast to Hatcher's Run at a point near Claiborne's Road, some nine miles southwest of the city. Lee's army could hardly have exceeded sixty thousand officers and men present for duty.¹¹

Longstreet's task was burdensome from the outset. The pressure of the Union armies had forced the Confederates into a line of defense along a wide arc which ran from north of Richmond across the James to include the city of Petersburg. Longstreet's men were not the veterans of the earlier campaigns, as many of these had fallen and their places had been filled by young recruits and transfers from other units that had been broken up. Fighting was incessant—not, however, great battles, which had to be worked out with rare tactical skill, but harassing small attacks, actually little more than raids, which sapped the strength in a war of nerves. Only a few days before Longstreet rejoined his command, a Union thrust had succeeded in taking Fort Gilmer and in partially dislodging the Confederate right from the James. Desperate efforts were made to regain the ground lost, and Lee came in person to organize and lead the counterattack. But the drive fell short of success. Encouraged by his progress on the right, Grant next turned his attention to the south side of the defensive zone and reached out strongly toward Lee's extreme right, Meade being ordered to seize the South Side Railroad. He marched on October 26; but as Lee, moving on interior lines, paralleled him by moving a flanking column to the threatened points, the stiffened resistance was enough to stop Meade some six miles short of his objective.¹²

Grant's pressure on the north side was not halted. As Meade crept along Lee's right flank, a strong Union diversion was planned to hold troops in position so that they could not assist the threatened right. Part of Butler's Army of the James was directed against Longstreet's exposed position between White Oak Swamp and the James. If this salient could be widened, the Union army could march into Richmond with little opposition. Information of the proposed attack had reached Longstreet early on October 25; later on the same day, he had intelligence that the XVIII Corps, under General Godfrey Weitzel, was crossing the river from the south side. By 1 P.M. on the twenty-sixth, the Union advance had reached the eastern exits of the old battlefield of Seven Pines. Behind the XVIII Corps came A. H. Terry with

¹¹ Abstract of field returns, Army of Northern Virginia, November 10, 1864, giving the strength of Longstreet's corps as 19,408, and the total present in Lee's army as 61,227. *Ibid.*, 1209.

¹² Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 288-303; Ulysses S. Grant, "General Grant on the Siege of Petersburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 578.

the X Corps, which was still in the process of crossing the James when darkness fell on the twenty-sixth.

The Federal plan was for Weitzel to launch a strong attack up the Williamsburg Road north of White Oak Swamp while the X Corps pushed hard up the Charles City and Darbytown roads so as to deepen the wedge between Longstreet's troops and the river. Weitzel had as a limited objective the old system of trenches on the Williamsburg Road which connected it with the Nine Mile Road. If he should succeed in taking the position, he would be in a position to drive in between Field's division and the remnants of the Confederate cavalry and broaden the avenue of advance into Richmond from the east. It was a strong hostile program and one that loomed large as a danger on Longstreet's front.

Skirmishing commenced early on the twenty-seventh. Although Terry's attack up the Charles City Road was strong, it was soon recognized as a feint intended to mask the more serious movement of Weitzel. The other point of danger at the moment was the convergence of lines behind White Oak Swamp on the Williamsburg Road, where the XVIII Corps was advancing. Leaving but a skeleton force to oppose Terry, Longstreet hurried Field's division over to the other danger spot. The march was made just in the nick of time. When Longstreet led Field's skirmishers out on the Williamsburg road, the enemy was deploying and had already pushed the advance pickets halfway from the cover of the woods across the open ground to the loosely held trenches. A small grove of pines concealed Field's deployment, and when the Federal line arrived within a few paces of the Confederate trenches, it was met with a withering fire. The surprise was complete. Instead of a handful of frightened Southern troops, Weitzel met the best of Longstreet's marksmen, who had learned how to make each shot count. No doubt the little group of Confederate cavalymen, who had fully expected to be overwhelmed, breathed a sigh of relief.

Weitzel's assaulting wave was stunned. Sensing the completeness of the surprise, Longstreet sent hurried word to Gary, who was covering the left with his cavalry, to close in and surround the Union force on the Williamsburg Road. But before the message could reach Gary, a sudden dash by the Union cavalry unexpectedly struck at his left flank, surprised it, and drove it off; meanwhile the enemy horse continued the attempt to get in Longstreet's rear. Gary was forced to turn and meet this threat. He hurried to Longstreet's left rear, dismounted his troopers, and advanced his line against the flank of the hostile cavalry; the Federal cavalry was driven off in some confusion with a loss of about six hundred prisoners. But although Longstreet's left rear was thus protected, he was not able to take advantage of

the surprise attack on Weitzel; and the latter was enabled to withdraw without further interference. Longstreet had held the line, but it was his tactical skill rather than real strength that made it possible for him to do so.

This decisive check to Grant on the north side was the last serious engagement of the year for Longstreet's wing. But Longstreet saw the coming danger. Expecting that strong attacks would be launched coincident with the elections in the North early in November, he asked that a labor force of Negroes be sent to him for work on the trenches and set his own forces to the task of blocking the passages through White Oak Swamp and making the roads impassable.¹³

Early in November Kershaw's division returned to the First Corps from the Shenandoah Valley, where it had served with General Jubal A. Early's army. It had suffered severely during the battles of October 19, when Early's force was shattered; but the dispirited troops soon regained their morale as they worked to strengthen the positions in front of Richmond. Subsoil plows dredged the roads, and brushwork was installed in the trenches to make them more bulletproof. It was a busy time for all, and no effort was spared to make the northern part of the defensive zone impregnable. On November 4 the command was reorganized, and to General Longstreet were assigned Major John W. Fairfax as chief of staff and Major Osman Latrobe as adjutant general. Captain Goree remained as aide-de-camp.¹⁴

Grant now commenced siege operations in earnest. The local attacks continued, but the larger assaults were halted—probably because they were too costly in men, and the North still was grumbling about the losses at Cold Harbor. The encroachments of the Northern army were so methodical and so persistent that an atmosphere of fatalistic acceptance grew among the Southern troops. Grant would bite here and there; and even though Lee had the advantage of interior lines, the drain on his resources was constant. His troops were hungry and poorly clothed; they suffered from cold and lack of sleep. Many deserted, but the majority held on doggedly, well knowing that the day was fast approaching when the line would be too weak to withstand a sudden assault from Grant's increasing numbers. Lee was penned in and was rapidly being beaten down into immobility.¹⁵

While the great octopus of a hostile army stretched forth to encircle him,

¹³ Longstreet to Lee, October 29, 1864, in *Official Records*, XLII, Pt. III, 1182.

¹⁴ Special Order No. 263, November 4, 1864, *ibid.*, 1199.

¹⁵ As an example of the number of desertions, during the ten-day period from March 8 to March 18 there were a total of 1,061 desertions in Lee's army, of which 678 were from Longstreet's corps (not wing). These were distributed as follows: Kershaw's division, 41; Field's division, 125; Pickett's division, 512. O. Latrobe to W. H. Taylor, March 21, 1865; *ibid.*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1332. In contrast, the total for the First Corps during the period from February 28 to March 8 was only 185.

and his defense problem became more difficult, Lee was forced to take on an increasing burden of administration. The Confederate War Department—indeed, the entire administration—was disintegrating, and Lee was called on much too frequently for decisions on matters that really were the concern of others. During this period Longstreet rose splendidly to the occasion and became a real help to his chief. His optimism, apparently not forced, was superb; his suggestions were frequent and pertinent.

Having placed the northern side of the James in good shape for a defense, Longstreet found time to assist Lee in solving some of his problems—aiding him in the supply situation, preparing plans of defense, managing troop movements to the outlying areas when danger threatened, and, in general, acting as a trusted lieutenant with full confidence in himself and in the decisions of his superior. It was a bigger Longstreet—one who challenged the respect as well as the admiration of all—who dangled his right arm while he struck out valiantly with his left. East Tennessee and his wounds had humbled him, and he had regained confidence in himself. The burden of the tactical defense fell on him, and there appeared a new note in his letters to Lee—consciousness of his own strength and ability. Had these two but had an army and a system of reliable supply, what great things they could have done! ¹⁶

In spite of disaster Longstreet's optimism ran high. He urged the offensive—always the offensive—and offered suggestions as to how best the Confederates could seize the initiative. He insisted, however, on a concerted offensive and spoke strongly against the sacrifice of men in small attacks which could not possibly hurt Grant. He accepted the defensive only because Grant's crowding masses had forced the Confederates into it. Longstreet's views had changed; he had been forced to acknowledge—as had many others—that Grant was not the same man that he had been as a lieutenant. Longstreet wrote to Lee on December 19: "It may be necessary, too, to be more prompt in our movements to meet those of General Grant, than we have been heretofore." ¹⁷

Christmas was anything but a season of joy for the Confederate high command. In mid-December Hood had tried his chances with Thomas at Nashville, but his army had been shattered. It was one of the most destructive defeats of the war. The West was now lost irretrievably. In the deep South, Sherman was making his way leisurely toward Savannah, destroying economic resources that were encountered in his line of march on a sixty-mile front. In the Shenandoah Valley, Sheridan had built a wall of hatred be-

¹⁶ The series of dispatches and letters which reflect the Confederate concern over the increasing Union pressure are contained in *ibid.*, 1315 ff.

¹⁷ Longstreet to Lee, December 19, 1864, *ibid.*, 1280.

tween his troopers and the anxious people by his wholesale destruction of homes, barns, and crops.

The year ended, and with the dawn of a new one there came no bright hope to inspire either James Longstreet or his tired chief. Week followed week, and each succeeding fortnight saw the lines driven a little closer and the threats grown more numerous. Longstreet's earlier wish for operations on interior lines was now forced on the South as Lee fought with his dwindling army within the ever-narrowing circle around Richmond and Petersburg. And throughout the last few months, Longstreet was at Lee's side with an ever-present helpfulness, an unfailing cheerfulness, and an abundant loyalty. He moved swiftly from one end of his sector to the other. Here he blocked a cavalry dash on Richmond from Gordonsville; there he stopped an infantry infiltration down the railroad from the north; again he had to meet pressure from the northwest. Each threat was met boldly and skillfully. Never was Longstreet better as a tactician; never was he of more help to Lee.¹⁸

The new year brought other burdens to Lee. Faced with the failure of the War Department to employ the troops to best advantage, Congress authorized the President to raise Lee to a position of supreme military control. The appointment was tendered on February 6, and Lee reluctantly accepted it on the ninth. At best it was but an empty honor; its only practical effect was to increase Lee's burden and force him to leave the conduct of field operations more and more in Longstreet's hands. Although Lee was now empowered to exercise complete control over all Confederate operations, he wisely left local problems to the local commanders, and he continued to submit larger questions to the President, just as he had done since he first assumed command of the army. Thus, the new appointment gave him little power beyond that which he already had, while the increased responsibility for administering the military department of the government took from him that intimate contact with field operations which a commander should have.

The persistent pressure of the Union army irritated Longstreet. Although he had advised Lee in December that it would be too hazardous to attempt to crash through the Union lines, when February came he was willing to chance it if a weak point could be found and a concerted drive made before the scattered Union defense could be brought together. Longstreet sug-

¹⁸ The series of dispatches contained in Vol. XLVI, Pt. II, of the *Official Records* are silent but convincing testimony of the gradual decline of an effective Confederate defense—due to Union pressure and dwindling forces—and the lower morale and real suffering in Petersburg and Richmond. Longstreet led an attack toward Hanover Junction in person with Pickett's division and a handful of cavalry as troops. See correspondence regarding movements of Pickett's division, March 13, 1865, *ibid.*, 1308–11.

gested that all the forces in the eastern theater be concentrated around Richmond. This drew from Lee the whimsical reply that although he might not favor the plan because of the difficulties of supply, the enemy was already carrying it out by driving the Confederate forces in the Carolinas in their direction.¹⁹

Not only was Grant pressing the Confederate forces in an attempt to pin them down to decisive battle, but his repeated efforts to interpose Meade's army between Lee and the deep South had convinced Lee that the location of this final effort would be made by an extension of the Union left toward the Danville Road. Lee advised Longstreet that his most vital mission was to watch closely for any withdrawals from the line in his front and, should they be made, to advise him at once. The encircling Federal forces had now maneuvered Lee so far to the southwest that the section of the army north of the James was an independent unit.²⁰

February was also a month of apprehensive reports from nonmilitary leaders. The threat against Richmond was so convincing that Secretary of War Breckinridge wrote to Lee on February 24 to ask if he should prepare to evacuate the city. When he was assured that it had not come to that as yet, he advised Lee that he would at least evacuate the stores. Ewell was ordered to remove or destroy all of the cotton and tobacco in the warehouses in Richmond, even though there was expressed objection on the part of a group of congressmen and Virginia warehousemen.²¹

If the Union pressure broke his weakening lines, Lee planned to move his army swiftly toward a concentration area near Burkeville; and he discussed this plan at length with Longstreet. He advised Breckinridge to be prepared to leave Richmond; this message, although secret, soon got abroad and caused considerable alarm. The President, fearing a panic, sent post-haste for Lee to confer with him. And as is usually the case when disintegration of a civil population is under way, rumors of an extraordinary character commenced to fly, riots started, food shops were looted, and the men in the ranks began to think longingly of their home folks.²²

¹⁹ Longstreet to Lee, February 14, 1865, *ibid.*, 1233; Lee to Longstreet, February 22, 1865, *ibid.*, 1251.

²⁰ See Longstreet to Lee, March 23, 1865, *ibid.*, Pt. III, 1337-38. Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, gives a detailed and substantially correct account of the Federal movements all through the Overland campaign and in the operations around Petersburg in the early spring of 1865.

²¹ Breckinridge to Lee, February 24, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. II, 1254. J. A. Campbell to Breckinridge, February 23, 1865, regarding plan for removal of government if necessary, *ibid.*, 1252; Davis to Lee (on the same subject), February 25, 1865, *ibid.*, 1256; Breckinridge to *id.*, February 25, 1865, *ibid.*, 1257; and Venable to Ewell, February 25, 1865, *ibid.*, 1260.

²² Lee to Longstreet, February 22, 1865, *ibid.*, 1251; Davis to Lee, February 25, 1865, *ibid.*, 1256; Longstreet to *id.*, March 7, 1865, *ibid.*, 1289; Martin and Avery (eds.), *Diary from Dixie*, 376.

During all these depressing scenes, it was apparent to Longstreet that affairs would end badly for the South unless some armistice could be arranged. In a most extraordinary way he played diplomat and became a person of much consequence for a few days. In a conference between General E. O. C. Ord of the Union army and Longstreet to arrange for the exchange of certain prisoners and to settle the problem of fraternizing, one or the other suggested that a military convention be arranged between Grant and Lee to decide on the terms of peace. The scheme was ingenious. Grant and Lee were to be brought into conference on some pretext and a truce arranged while the two leaders conferred. During the period when hostilities were held in abeyance, Mrs. Longstreet, who was an old friend of Mrs. Grant, should next appear on the scene and call on Mrs. Grant. The call would be returned with due formality, and in the resulting resumption of the pleasant social relations that had been terminated so abruptly by the war, it was expected that the fighting would be ended.²³

Alas for the scheme! Although Davis had seized upon it with eagerness when it was presented to him by Lee, and Lee had been given full power to treat with Grant and gain at least a temporary suspension of hostilities, word from Grant on March 4 stated coldly that he had no authority to accede to Lee's "proposition for a conference on the subject proposed," as such authority was "vested in the President of the United States alone." Grant's reply was based upon a directive from Lincoln. He had submitted the matter to the President, who had replied forbidding any general to negotiate peace terms.²⁴

Toward the end of February Lee saw that Richmond could be held no longer. It had long been a millstone around his neck. He now recommended that all departments of the government evacuate the city. This message, together with the numerous rumors in the city, induced Secretary of War

²³ Longstreet to Lee, March 1, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. II, 1275. This letter indicates that Longstreet fathered the scheme. Cf. Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 583 ff., where Longstreet spoke of the plan as having originated with General Ord. General Ord's papers, in the possession of Mrs. Lucy Ord Mason, of Washington, D.C., make full reference to the two conferences with Longstreet and the incident mentioned but fail to state who originated the idea of a conference between Lee and Grant for the purpose stated. In this connection, see Davis to Lee (approving the plan and giving Lee wide authority to treat with Grant), February 28, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. II, 1264. Longstreet and Lee conferred with the President on the last Sunday in February. Longstreet to *id.* (regarding conference with Ord), March 1, 1865, *ibid.*, 1275. The first meeting was held on the New Market Road at noon, February 25, 1865. *Ibid.*, 1259. The second meeting was held on February 28. *Id.* to *id.*, February 28, 1865, *ibid.*, 1275.

²⁴ Grant to Lee, March 4, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. II, 824-25. See also Lee to Grant (two letters), March 2, 1865, *ibid.*, 824; Longstreet to Lee (quoting Ord), March 1, 1865, *ibid.*, 1276. Grant's only worry about the meeting seemed to be the disposition of "political prisoners." For Lincoln's directive, see Stanton to Grant, March 3, 1865, in John G. Nicolay and John Hay (eds.), *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln* (12 vols.; New York, 1905), XI, 43.

Breckinridge to demand of Lee on March 8 an estimate of the situation. He feared that it was full of peril for the entire South. Lee did not mince his words. He not only stated that conditions were bad; he foretold further that they would soon grow worse. He blamed the system of supply. "Unless men and animals can be subsisted," he wrote, "the army cannot be kept together, and our present lines must be abandoned." His view of the military situation was only slightly more hopeful: "While the military situation is not favorable, it is not worse than the superior numbers and the resources of the enemy justified us in expecting from the beginning. Indeed, the legitimate military consequences of that superiority have been postponed longer than we had reason to anticipate." The significance of Lee's words lies in the revelation that perhaps he never had great faith that the South could maintain her position by force of arms. It bears out and confirms the remark which he is said to have made after viewing the disaster at Sailor's Creek: that he always knew it would end that way—in a military defeat.²⁵

Lee called on President Davis on March 24 to have the governor of Virginia provide Negro soldiers, the drafting of whom had been authorized by Congress.²⁶ He could no longer furnish white men for the trenches north and east of Richmond. The struggle in the Petersburg area was growing in intensity, and he must spend his strength there even if Richmond fell. He determined, however, to make one more desperate attempt to break Grant's lines. If he could retake some of the works on the section of Grant's front near the Appomattox River, Grant might abandon his flanking operations and thus facilitate an increase in the transport of supplies over the railroads from southwestern Virginia and western North Carolina. Fort Stedman was selected as the main objective. The opposing picket lines at this point were nearest together; only a scant two hundred yards separated the main trenches. General Gordon was designated to head the sortie; and for troops, he had the Second Corps and part of A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's corps. The assault was planned for the night of March 24. For this desperate effort, Lee had to take sadly needed troops from the north side of the James. Longstreet gave them up willingly; he even offered to come and lead the attack

²⁵ Breckinridge to Lee, March 8, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. II, 1292; Lee to Breckinridge, March 8, 1865, *ibid.*, 1295; statement attributed to Lee by Wise, in John S. Wise, *The End of an Era* (Boston, 1899), 429. Longstreet anticipated on March 20 that the real blow would be against Lee's right and the Danville Railroad and wrote: "It would be well if we begin at once to make our arrangements to meet it." Longstreet to Lee, March 20, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1329. Longstreet advised holding an infantry division in reserve; its place in the lines, he said, could be taken by dismounted cavalry.

²⁶ Lee to Davis, March 24, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1339. The joint resolution of the Virginia legislature of March 6, 1865, which provided for the employment of free Negroes and slaves as soldiers, is quoted *ibid.*, 1315. See also Thomas Robson Hay, "The Question of Arming the Slaves," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, VI (June, 1919), 34-73.

in person. He called on Richmond for transportation for eight thousand men at the Petersburg station, and in a short while Pickett was on his way. Longstreet on his part turned over the immediate control of the defense of the works east of Richmond to Ewell so as to be free to move to Lee's side. This assignment had been suggested by Lee.²⁷

With Pickett going away, it was necessary to redistribute the troops. Fitzhugh Lee was directed to take over the defense of White Oak Swamp, and John Echols, with the remnants of his division, moved toward Lynchburg to cover all routes from the west. The Confederate intelligence service had reported that Grant was preparing another grand offensive, and it behooved Lee to move promptly if he hoped for success in a break-through maneuver. Longstreet expected and feared this rumored Union attack. To meet it on his front, he moved the main body of his troops well to the rear while he covered his front with thin lines so as to let the assault fall on a small number, who could retire and offer some delay, thus shielding his main forces from the risk of disaster. He held the latter as a reserve, ready to move to any threatened part of the line. His tactics here resembled those which he had employed at Blackburn's Ford, where he had massed his reserve on good roads while cutting down the front-line defense to a thin line of little more than outposts. Work on the trenches was emphasized. Once the enemy was committed to the attack, Longstreet planned to launch a strong counter-attack with his main body and strive to smash down the Federal offensive. These plans were made with care and the troops moved into proper alert positions. Longstreet then turned his eyes southward and waited anxiously for word from Lee.²⁸

He reviewed Pickett's small division before it entrained. The ceremony was held on the Williamsburg Road. Only a shadow of the former grandeur of that division remained; hardly more than thirty-five hundred men were in the ranks. The splendid division which had made the charge against Meade's center on July 3, 1863, was almost a memory. No doubt mixed emotions gripped Longstreet as he sat his horse and watched the last of this gallant division file by. His heart must have thrilled with mingled pride and compassion as the dusty veterans, in tattered uniforms and shoes tied

²⁷ Longstreet to Lee, March 24, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1341. It is interesting to note here that Longstreet ordered that all gun emplacements be camouflaged. Latrobe to E. P. Alexander, March 30, 1865, *ibid.*, 1368.

²⁸ John Echols, of Early's division, was ordered to Lynchburg on March 21 to block an advance that Lee expected from Knoxville. Latrobe to Ewell, March 21, 1865, *ibid.*, 1332. Echols had never been put under Longstreet's command, but Longstreet used Lee's name. Since early in March, Echols had been near Dublin's Depot. See Longstreet to Lee, March 21, 1865, *ibid.*, 1331; *id.* to Ewell (directing Echols to Lynchburg), March 21, 1865, *ibid.*, 1332. For a description of the details for improving the trenches, see Longstreet to Lee, March 28, 1865, *ibid.*, 1360.

with string, marched by with heads erect and shoulders stiffened to the feel of their muskets.

Although Longstreet knew that Lee had taken a big risk in withdrawing troops from the north, he raised no strong protest. He wired that Pickett was on his way and would arrive about noon on the twenty-fifth, and that he would follow with the remainder of his corps when Lee called for it. Notwithstanding that the arrangements had been made promptly and that Pickett got away in good season, by the time he arrived at Petersburg, Gordon's attack on Fort Stedman had been made and had been repulsed. Nearly four thousand men were lost when Gordon tried to cut his way back from an unsuccessful attempt to hold the Union works which he had taken so easily on the morning of March 25.

Even this disaster does not seem to have convinced Longstreet that Lee could risk no more attacks on the thickening Union lines. He urged again that the offensive be taken. Longstreet's idea was that Grant would not chance any more assaults but would content himself with slowly eating away Lee's defenses until he could strike deep across the Confederate line of communications. But it was now too late to follow Longstreet's advice, even had Lee been disposed to do so; the pressure against the Confederate forces prevented maneuver. Lee's reply to Longstreet was a demand that all of Longstreet's corps should join him at once, and shortly after midnight on the morning of April 2 the last of the First Corps quit the north side of the James and marched to Petersburg.²⁹

"The blackness of night spread over us when we crossed the James River by the pontoon bridge," wrote General Longstreet later, "and screaming shells came through the freighted night to light our ride, and signal rockets gave momentary illumination. Our noble beasts peered through the loaded air and sniffed the coming battle; night birds fluttered from their startled cover, and the solid pounding upon Mahone's defensive walls drove the foxes from their lairs." Longstreet and his staff were riding to join Lee.³⁰

²⁹ Lee to Breckinridge, April 2, 1865 (received 7 P.M.), *ibid.*, 1378-79. See also *id.* to *id.*, April 2, 1865 (received 10:40 A.M.), *ibid.*, 1378; *id.* to Davis, April 2, 1865, *ibid.*; and Davis to Lee, April 2, 1865, *ibid.*

³⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 603.

The Last March

ENCOURAGED BY THE CONFEDERATE DISASTER AT FORT STEDMAN, GRANT PREPARED to cut in behind Lee's right and block any retirement into the mountains. On the night of March 27, General E. O. C. Ord, leading the Army of the James, marched from Bermuda Hundred to the extreme left of the Union line, assembling in rear of the II Corps. Next morning, Sheridan started his raid through Dinwiddie Courthouse to the South Side Railroad, where he hoped to dislocate Lee's extreme right flank. It was the beginning of a maneuver designed to bottle up the Confederate army.¹

The danger involved in this movement of the Union army was not lost on Lee. Although he had no definite information of the detailed Federal plan, he paralleled the Union flank march on March 29 by sending Pickett to Five Forks. This hamlet at the intersection of five roads lay about four miles southwest of the Confederate trenches on Hatcher's Run. Pickett, who had arrived too late to participate in the Fort Stedman affair, was reinforced by two brigades of Bushrod Johnson's division and was ordered, under cover of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, to seize Five Forks, act as a strategic right flank guard, and attack Sheridan. Meanwhile Lee, with Samuel McGowan, Y. M. Moody, Eppa Hunton, and Henry A. Wise, prepared to meet the Union V Corps, which was creeping up on the right between Five Forks and Hatcher's Run.

Rain fell all day on the thirtieth, and it was not until sundown that Pickett reached his destination. His men had marched all day over roads deep with mud. Early the next morning, they moved out of the trenches against Sheridan, who was supported by R. B. Ayres's division of Warren's V Corps. Sheridan was pushed back to Dinwiddie Courthouse, and Ayres retreated in disorder. Thomas C. Devin's brigade of Union cavalry also suffered heavily, and it seemed for a while that Sheridan would be decisively whipped because the soft ground bogged the horses, while the in-

¹ There is no really good secondary account of these operations. Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, is a brief but good general account—sufficient to acquaint the reader with the sequence of the different Union operations. Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 1 ff., gives a good comprehensive account of what befell Lee's army during these trying ten days. At this time Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac; A. A. Humphreys, the II Corps; G. K. Warren, the V Corps; and H. G. Wright, the VI Corps. E. O. C. Ord led the Army of the James; and P. H. Sheridan, the cavalry corps.

fantry could move with comparative ease. Having gained this considerable success by late afternoon, Pickett rested his men in preparation for continuing the attack at daybreak the next morning.

But on the next day Meade's old division, heavily reinforced, opened first and drove in between Lee's right and Five Forks; and Sheridan launched a furious assault at Pickett. Pickett fell back slowly, disputing the way, and the men re-entered the entrenchments about 9 A.M. About midafternoon Warren's corps came up and struck at Pickett's left, but it halted when it came into close range. Weight and numbers seemed to be of no avail against the deadly marksmanship of Pickett's men. The Union charge was broken; the men scrambled to cover. A pause followed. Then over a hidden route which had been left unguarded, Warren's reserves led the way around the left rear of the Confederate position.

M. W. Ransom changed front, but his one brigade was arrayed against three. He gave ground, and the way was opened to Pickett's rear. The Confederate cavalry, which was guarding the White Oak Road on Pickett's left, was crushed by R. S. Mackenzie's heavy cavalry division. A gap of four miles existed between Pickett and Lee, and Pickett was being rolled away from his supports. Soon men broke away in groups as the news rushed along the line that the Yanks had gained the rear. The Union pressure increased; the Confederate center collapsed, and then the right gave way. Pickett dashed madly on the field in a vain effort to rally his men, but he was too late. Colonel W. J. Pegram of the artillery was dead; Ransom had been dismounted. Only one gun was left in action, and soon that too was disabled. The Confederate lines fought back to back as the viselike grip of the Union attack closed in on them. Night came, and under its blessed cover the Confederates crept away toward Exeter Mills, where a rallying point had been designated.²

Though Pickett had lost most of his division, he had saved the right of Lee's army. This one day's respite was all that Lee needed to retire his advanced elements from the eastern flank and to evacuate his wagons to parks near the Appomattox River. No more gallant a sacrifice was ever made than that of Pickett's men at Five Forks. Longstreet later complained that the position taken was not chosen by Pickett but dictated by specific orders. Although this is true, no other position on Lee's right would have been the strategic place from which to stop Sheridan when he attempted to cut in behind Lee's army. Pickett was overwhelmed by numbers; his interior flank was too weakly held.³

While scattered groups of fugitives from the engagement at Five Forks

² For Lee's report of the battle of Five Forks, see Lee to Breckinridge, April 1, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1371.

³ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 600; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 335.

were seeking to escape Sheridan's clutches, a small group of horsemen clattered through the streets of Petersburg. It was Longstreet and his staff, who had left Richmond after seeing the last of the First Corps entrained. Although the first train had left about 9 P.M. the night before, none had arrived at Petersburg before Longstreet's coming. A staff officer was left at the railroad station as a guide for the first elements of Longstreet's command when they should arrive. Longstreet set out at once for Lee's headquarters, which had been moved to a farmhouse on the western edge of the city. It was still dark when Longstreet reached the house, but he was admitted at once to Lee's room. Lee was in bed, and Longstreet sat beside him and listened to his sober recital of Pickett's sacrifice and the hopelessness of the situation.⁴

In the stillness of the early morning on this second day of April, Grant's huge army was in position and poised for its final spring at Lee. Along the semicircle running from the Appomattox River around south of Petersburg to the South Side Railroad, an immense force, numbering some 110,000 soldiers—most of them veterans, and many armed with the new repeating rifles—had outflanked Lee's less than 40,000 of all arms. With odds of nearly three to one, Lee could hold out no longer. Sheer weight was to do what skill alone had been unable to accomplish.

Grant's final assault began at 5:15 A.M. on April 2, and it was successful from the start. Wright charged and overran the works near Fort Welch and drove both Heth and Wilcox back into the open. Soon an excited staff officer reported to Lee that the lines had been broken. Drawing his wrapper about his thin shoulders, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, looked out into the morning dimness. Before their eyes in every direction, a line of dusky figures moved silently toward them. Lee turned to Longstreet and appealed to him to stop the Federal advance. But, as Longstreet explained with a pathetic undertone, "not a man of my command was there, nor had we notice that any of them had reached the station at Petersburg."⁵ The railroad from Richmond had proved a slower means of travel than the horse!

Staff officers were summoned and sent in all directions to gather together the elements of the divisions which had been forced aside. As these officers set out at a gallop, the retiring skirmishers seemed to stiffen and then to hold. A. P. Hill, who had heard the alarm and found his men breaking, dashed off furiously to rally his battalions. Instead of finding his Third Corps, he ran into a detachment of Union scouts. He turned to flee but was too late; a quick shot brought him down. The fallen Hill received this

⁴ Longstreet received Lee's instructions to join at about 7 P.M. and entrained the remaining troops in about two hours. He acknowledged Lee's orders at once (Longstreet to Lee, April 4, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1372) and pushed preparations vigorously.

⁵ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 605.

tribute from James Longstreet, who once had been bitter toward the living Hill: "The Southern service lost a sword made bright by brave work upon many heavy fields." Heth and Wilcox drifted toward the right and left, collecting their scattered men. "Not venturing to hope," says Longstreet, "I looked toward Petersburg and saw General Benning, with his Rock brigade, winding in rapid march around the near hill. He had but six hundred of his men." This was the leading unit of Longstreet's corps, which had left Richmond the night before. Quickly it was maneuvered into position to defend the slopes between Fort Whitworth and the canal near the river! But of what avail were Benning's six hundred against the thousands poised a bullet's reach away from them! ⁶

Hemmed in, Lee watched for some desperate chance. The Federal columns leaped to the charge only to fall back before the accurate fire of the thin lines which fought with such fury. A handful of Mahone's men—three hundred, it is said—were all that were left to hold Fort Gregg; and when it fell after repeated attacks by two of John Gibbon's divisions, fifty-five men were dead, and the remainder—most of them wounded—met the oncoming enemy with empty muskets. At Fort Whitworth the Union general, John W. Turner, sent his masses against Wilcox only to have them repulsed with each assault. When Turner was reinforced, Wilcox withdrew; and although he had lost heavily, many of his men escaped.

Now came Longstreet's turn. When A. P. Hill was killed, the officers of his staff and what troops could be gathered were absorbed by Longstreet's command. But just as the attack shifted against Longstreet's front, Grant saw indications that Lee was about to retire. As his troops were not properly disposed for an immediate pursuit and he consequently feared that Lee might still escape with the bulk of the Confederate forces, Grant ordered the assaults stopped and directed that the troops re-form and prepare to follow Lee's army.

Earlier in the day, Lee had telegraphed the War Department that he could hold the lines no longer. He advised that Richmond be abandoned that night and then issued orders for the withdrawal of the army from the entrenched zone of Petersburg. Mahone was pulled out first (from the left of the line near Fort Stedman) and started on the road to Chesterfield Courthouse, where he was to cover the crossings of the Appomattox. Ewell, who was commanding the forces north of the James (including Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps), was ordered to cross the James at Richmond, go over the bridges below the city, retire through Manchester, and assemble on Amelia Courthouse. His special mission was to guard the escape of

⁶ *Ibid.*, 606.

President Davis and other officials of the government, who had left for the West over the Danville Railroad. Before Kershaw could clear Richmond, someone fired the bridge, and his men had to double time through the flames in order to reach the south bank before the bridge crashed.⁷

Promptly at 8 P.M. that night, Longstreet moved Field, with what remained of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, across the pontoon bridge at Battersea Factory and—followed by part of the Second Corps—took the road up the north side of the Appomattox River. Meanwhile part of the men in the First Corps, including E. P. Alexander's artillery, abandoned the railroad trains on which they were riding to Petersburg and struck off across country. It was a skillful withdrawal, made under almost insurmountable difficulties. The staff work was probably the best executed of the entire war. Only disciplined and veteran troops could have withdrawn with so little confusion. Lee extricated his army, and by 3 A.M. of April 3 all the trenches and the city had been abandoned to the enemy. With his staff, Lee then moved to Hebron Church (some six miles from Goode's Bridge), where he set up a temporary headquarters, remaining there until late that night, when he started toward Farmville.

Of the three parallel columns, Longstreet led the southern—the one nearest the enemy. He intended to cross the Appomattox again at Bevell's Bridge; but finding it in bad condition, he moved on to Goode's Bridge, where he arrived before daybreak on April 3. Here he rested for a few hours. The march was then resumed for Amelia Courthouse—the point of concentration—with the enemy cavalry active on both flanks. Gordon covered the rear on the Goode's Bridge Road.⁸

Lee had planned to have rations waiting at Amelia Courthouse, but there was no sign of the supply train when the troops arrived. It seems that the officer in charge had blundered: instead of unloading the food and forage there, he had taken carloads of needed supplies to the capital, where they were consumed in the fire which destroyed part of the city. The haversacks were empty and the men hungry; much delay ensued as the troops broke ranks and searched the neighboring farms for food. When the march was resumed late on the fifth, the point of concentration had been changed to Burkeville, some twenty miles south on the Danville Railroad. From Burkeville, Lee hoped to shake off the pursuit and move directly to join Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. But when the advance guard approached

⁷ See Lee to Breckinridge, April 2, 1865 (received at 10:40 A.M.), in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1378; Davis to Lee, April 2, 1865, *ibid.* See also Lee to Breckinridge, April 2, 1865 (received at 7 P.M.), *ibid.*; and Lee's order of April 2, 1865 (signed by W. H. Taylor), *ibid.*, 1379.

⁸ Gordon was at Scott's Shop on the Goode's Bridge Road during the night of April 4–5, covering the rear. Lee to Ewell, April 4, 1865, *ibid.*, 1385. For Lee's general plan, see Lee to Breckinridge, April 1, 1865, *ibid.*, 1378; and *id.* to Davis, April 1, 1865, *ibid.*

Jetersville (about midway to Burkeville) just before sundown, Sheridan's cavalry was found entrenched squarely across the path. Lee could no longer hope to move south along the rail line to Danville. He changed his plan and turned his columns west toward Lynchburg, to which place he had already ordered his trains.⁹

When Lee changed the direction of the retreat, Longstreet, as soon as darkness fell, wheeled his column to the right and, followed by R. H. Anderson and Ewell, crossed Flat Creek at Amelia Springs; from there he marched on Farmville, moving with all vigor. The remainder of the army turned west at Amelia Courthouse on the Paineville Road, with Gordon still forming the rear guard. Longstreet arrived at Rice's Station about sunrise on the sixth, with R. H. Anderson two hours' march behind him. Ewell reached Amelia Springs at 8 P.M. The Army of Northern Virginia was now marching in two columns—generally parallel—while a third column was composed of the combined trains. Gordon covered the center and rear, while Longstreet was on the exposed flank. All were headed west, with Meade close up against the southern and eastern flanks.¹⁰

Meade commenced his advance on Amelia Courthouse on the morning of the sixth; but after marching some four miles, his men observed some Confederate troops north of Flat Creek, moving west. It was the tail of Lee's rear guard. The fact of Lee's change of direction soon was confirmed, and a more rapid pursuit was launched. A. A. Humphreys with the II Corps soon struck the Confederate rear and commenced to rebuild the bridges before the fires which had destroyed them were cold. A message was sent to Ord advising him that the march was headed his way and directing him to intercept Lee by sending a flying column to destroy the High Bridge. Meanwhile, the V Corps, now commanded by General Charles Griffin, moved out in direct pursuit on the Paineville Road, and Wright's VI Corps came up on Humphrey's left.

When the II Corps gained contact with Gordon, a running fight was started, lasting for nearly fourteen miles. The terrain was ideal for rear-guard action—open fields alternating with swamps and with many groves of thick woods; and although the skirmish lines were almost continually in action during the day's march, the good order and speed of the Confederate withdrawals by echelon gave Humphreys no opportunity to strike the main Confederate body. Repeated dashes from the Union cavalry caused the loss of some of Lee's wagons, the most valuable of which were those of Lee's headquarters. Fitz-

⁹ Latrobe to Wilcox, April 6, 1865, *ibid.*, 1386; Davis' proclamation to the people, April 4, 1865, *ibid.*, 1382-83; Lee to Davis, April 6, 1865, *ibid.*, 1386.

¹⁰ Longstreet's orders to Wilcox, April 6, 1865, *ibid.*, 1386; Lee to Gordon, April 6, 1865, *ibid.*, 1387.

hugh Lee's wagons were also lost, with a similar destruction of valuable records resulting.¹¹

The next fighting took place at Sailor's Creek. Here, where the road leading to the High Bridge crossing of the Appomattox met the road which led through Rice's Station to Farmville, Longstreet swung his column free from the road in order to meet Ord's infantry, which was reported to be coming down from Rice's Station. Longstreet had been given the task of clearing the way for the main body and trains, and in turning to meet the Union advance, he took the one chance which he had to accomplish his mission. He closed in on Ord with his infantry while he sent all the cavalry to seize and hold the High Bridge. This was the vital point; should it be lost, Lee was lost. It is to Longstreet's credit that he chose to increase his own risk of defeat by sending off all his mounted force in the hope of guaranteeing Lee's escape; meanwhile he prepared to sacrifice his infantry—if it became necessary—in a last desperate attempt to block Grant.

Lee could have made his escape over the High Bridge with the bulk of his army, but the sound of Longstreet's action at Rice's Station brought him to the rescue. Only short skirmishes had taken place up to this time, as Ord's main column was still well to the south. The real attack could not take place before morning. As the tide of battle rose, others came to Longstreet's aid. R. H. Anderson, who still was leading the remnants of Bushrod Johnson's and Pickett's divisions, had already crossed Sailor's Creek on the direct road to the High Bridge. He gave up his chance of escape and turned south toward Rice's Station—*noblesse oblige!* Ewell, with Kershaw's divisions, followed Anderson closely and likewise came to Longstreet's side. Meanwhile, Gordon, with the rear guard, attempted to deploy along Sailor's Creek to hold the crossing. But Humphreys pushed him too hard; the Confederate covering force was driven back toward the High Bridge, thus uncovering Ewell's rear.¹²

R. H. Anderson had no sooner started toward Longstreet than he ran into a Union cavalry division which was posted across his path. Both he and Ewell were now hemmed in and isolated. There was but one chance of escape: to turn by the flank and move north toward the High Bridge in rear of Ord's forces. They chose to stay with Longstreet and fight.

While Humphreys waited for Wright to come up, Ewell deployed with Kershaw on the right hand and G. W. C. Lee on the left. He had no artillery. Without considering Humphreys' attack on Ewell, Anderson smashed hard against Wesley Merritt's cavalry division. At first it seemed that he would be successful, and it appeared that Ewell was also holding his own

¹¹ Lee's report, *ibid.*, Pt. I, 1265.

¹² Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign*, 376.

with ease. But the situation soon changed. The Federal artillery came up and unlimbered for action, and in a short space of time Ewell's corps was cut to fragments. He was forced to surrender the remnants of his command. Some of his men broke through the trap, but Ewell himself—that gallant old fighter—was taken prisoner.

R. H. Anderson, however, was able to cut through the cavalry and escape with most of Bushrod Johnson's division. Those of Pickett's men who had survived Five Forks were cut off and captured. Once Ewell was crushed, Humphreys followed Gordon, who had been slowly forced to the west. The result of this chase was marked by tents, camp equipage, baggage, battery forges, limbers, and wagons strewn along the road.

Gordon tried to make a stand at Perkinson's Mills; but the Union pressure was so great that he was driven back from the high ground before his men could deploy, and his subsequent retirement became a mad race for the High Bridge. Darkness stopped the pursuit, as the Federal column was without guides. Late that night the Confederate soldiers staggered through the woods and managed to reach the bridge.¹³

Longstreet paid high tribute to Anderson and Ewell for their brave attempt to come to his aid: he said that "their stand and fight on the trying march were among the most soldier-like of the many noble deeds of the war."¹⁴ Of the ten thousand Confederates engaged, nearly seven thousand had been killed, wounded, or captured. Lee's right column was destroyed. It was a magnificent but hopeless venture.

Lee was with Mahone in Longstreet's rear when Colonel Venable rode up with the news of Ewell's disaster at Sailor's Creek. Without waiting for Longstreet's return from the front or to notify him of the critical situation, Lee ordered Mahone to follow with his division and then moved off rapidly through the woods to the banks of Sailor's Creek in hope that he could at least cover the escape of the fugitives. Colonel Venable as guide led the party. When it reached the crest of a small rise overlooking the scene of the combat, the full import of the catastrophe became known. The troops were in the wildest confusion; there was an indescribable milling around of horses, mules, wagons, and men. The scene brought forth a cry of anguish from Lee: "My God! Has the army dissolved?"

It was near dusk; and Lee wanted above all else to escape with the remnants of his once splendid army. He appealed to Mahone to suggest some means of accomplishing this seemingly impossible task. Mahone offered to cover the escape of Gordon and the trains with Gordon's division

¹³ McHenry Howard, "Closing Scenes of the War about Richmond," in *Papers of the Southern Historical Society*, XXXI (1903), 129-45; Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign*, 385.

¹⁴ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 614.

and then take his chances of escape by cutting through the woods to the High Bridge, where he could cross the Appomattox. He suggested that Longstreet should be ordered to move without delay along the River Road through Farmville and thence directly to the foothills near Lynchburg. Lee did not hesitate. Mahone's offer was accepted, and the troops filed into position. For some hours Mahone held off the Federal pursuit; and only when he was certain that Gordon was safely out of the way—at about 11 P.M. that night—did he withdraw his command through the dense thickets. By daylight the next morning Mahone was safely across the river. Lee accompanied him; and the morning of the seventh found them somewhere between the High Bridge and Farmville, north of the Appomattox.¹⁵


While the fighting raged in his rear at Sailor's Creek, Longstreet momentarily was expecting battle with Ord. No serious engagement occurred; and as soon as darkness fell to mask the movement, he marched his command by the right flank, eluded Ord, and reached Farmville about sunrise.¹⁶ There fortune smiled on the hungry soldiers, for they discovered a considerable store of food—enough for two days' rations. The retreat was halted, the wagons came to a stop, the fires were lighted, and the first hot meal in days was prepared. But before the food could be divided, Lee rode up and informed Longstreet of the full extent of the disaster. Further distressing news, which was credited by Lee, was that a large part of the army had been cut off and captured. The mess equipment was hastily thrown back into the wagons, and the men started off munching only raw bacon for breakfast.

The news of Sailor's Creek spread along the column, and fear took possession of the teamsters. The panic grew as some of the wagons tried to pass more rapidly over the road. A cry rose that the enemy cavalry was at hand, and the scattered shots of patrols were magnified in imagination into bursts of artillery fire. Many abandoned their wagons and dashed off into the woods. Next came a report that the Confederate cavalry was in a desperate hand-to-hand fight at Farmville. The quick step changed to the double time, and Lee led the column in person as it hurried down the road.

When the rushing men burst upon Mahone at Cumberland Church, it appeared at first glance as though another Sailor's Creek had come to overwhelm the last remnants of the Army of Northern Virginia. Part of Humphreys' II Corps and David M. Gregg's cavalry were charging furiously, though

¹⁵ Lee to Davis, April 6, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. III, 1386; Breckinridge to Davis, April 8, 1865, *ibid.*, 1389.

¹⁶ The march was first ordered for shortly after dusk but was later ordered to start at midnight. Latrobe to Wilcox, April 7, 1865, *ibid.*, 1389. No reason for the change is given in the *Official Records*, but rest and the need for information were both imperative.



carelessly, at Mahone's line; but with skill born of desperation, the Confederates repulsed each assault. Longstreet led his men toward Mahone's right, covering the Lynchburg Road, and prepared to fight from the crest of a long, sloping hill. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry guarded the flank on the Farmville Road.

Meanwhile Humphreys had sent word to Meade that he had brought Lee to bay and had asked that the main Federal pursuit should cross at Farmville and attack Lee's right. Unknown to Humphreys, however, Longstreet had destroyed the bridges; and as the Appomattox was not fordable at Farmville, neither Meade nor Barlow could cross to take part in the fight. Misled by scattered fire on his left, Humphreys thought that Meade was over and sent his troops against the front of Mahone's position. Mahone was ready; and when Nelson A. Miles' strong Union division rushed forward, it crashed and went to pieces before the Confederate defense. A movement against the Southern left fared no better, and Humphreys was severely punished for his premature attack. He lost nearly six hundred officers and men, while the Union cavalry met a sharp defeat at the hands of Fitzhugh Lee's stubborn troopers. This ended the fighting for the day.

When darkness fell on the seventh, Lee's army was well together and had held its own against repeated attacks. Stretched along the road to Cumberland Courthouse and astride the Lynchburg Road some five miles north of Farmville, it was well covered by Mahone's skirmishers, who were within a few hundred yards of Humphreys' advance. About 8 P.M. a letter was received at II Corps headquarters from Grant with a request that it be sent across the line to Lee. This was Grant's first demand for the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. At the time, a staff officer from Mahone's division was present under a white flag arranging for the removal of the Confederate wounded. One hour's cessation of hostilities was granted, and with this formal reply Humphreys gave Grant's letter to the Confederate courier for delivery to Lee. Before nine o'clock that night, the letter was in Lee's hands.¹⁷

At the time of this demand for the surrender of Lee's army, the Confederate force had been reduced to not more than twenty-five thousand of all arms. On March 31, Lee had had nearly forty thousand defending a line some thirty miles in length. At Five Forks he had lost seven thousand; in other engagements since the last of March another six thousand had gone. When he quit Petersburg, Lee had about twenty-five thousand infantry. The cavalry had suffered heavily, and on the night of the seventh hardly five thousand were

¹⁷ Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign*, 391.

available for the arduous duty of protecting the flanks and rear. In contrast, Grant had nearly three times Lee's strength on March 31, and although he had suffered equally during the pursuit, the ratio remained the same.¹⁸

Lee was in conference with his generals when the messenger arrived with Grant's letter. Colonel Charles Marshall, who was among those present, reported that "there was some difference of opinion among the general officers as to the nature of the reply to be made . . . some thinking it was yet possible to save the remnant of the army."¹⁹ Lee did not entertain the idea that all was lost—nor did Longstreet. But Meade had reached further around the Confederate army than Lee realized. The II and the VI Corps were now directly east of the Confederate army; and Ord, with the V and XXIV Corps, was near Prince Edward Courthouse, en route to cut behind Lee at Appomattox Courthouse. When last heard from, Sheridan was reaching out to seize Lee's train of rations reported to be on the siding at Appomattox. Lee was almost surrounded.

This was not the first intimation which Lee had that surrender was advisable. Believing further resistance to be hopeless, a "number of the principal officers from a feeling of affection and sympathy for the commander in chief and with a wish to lighten his responsibility and soften the pain of defeat," had conferred and concluded that the time had come when one of their number should approach Lee and urge him to open negotiations for the surrender of the army. General Pendleton was chosen. He first sought out Longstreet and confided to him the result of the conference; he then suggested that Longstreet be the one to carry the matter to the commander in chief. Longstreet was dumbfounded. He turned on Pendleton in anger and refused point-blank to have anything to do with such a program. He said: "If General Lee doesn't know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know."²⁰

Pendleton, undeterred by Longstreet's rebuff, then assumed the mission himself. He later wrote that he found Lee lying on the ground and talked with him alone: "He received my communication with the reply, 'Oh no, I trust it has not come to that;' and added, 'General, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys still do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal commander he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make the condition of demanding unconditional surrender—a proposal to which I will never listen.'"²¹

Nevertheless, Lee directed Colonel Marshall to prepare a reply to Grant's

¹⁸ Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*, 186.

¹⁹ Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 254.

²⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 620.

²¹ A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*. . . (New York, 1886), 417.

letter in which he reciprocated the desire to stop the useless shedding of blood and asked what terms Grant would offer as a condition of surrender. Many present were satisfied that it was the end. The army had dwindled; it was on the verge of starvation; the animals were dropping for lack of forage; deserters were quitting the ranks by groups. Lee must have known that it was only a matter of hours; yet he was willing to fight on, should Grant offer terms incompatible with the interests of the South.²²

Regardless of the demand for surrender, Lee gathered his forces. He put Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry in place of Mahone's tired skirmishers and resumed the march toward Lynchburg before midnight. This time Longstreet covered the rear while Gordon led the advance. The rumor of Grant's demand had filtered through the Southern ranks; but instead of resulting in collapse, it engendered instant resentment. Longstreet's men were particularly indignant—most of the men of the First Corps still had plenty of fight in them.²³

A second note from Grant was received by Fitzhugh Lee during the morning of the eighth and was immediately sent on to headquarters. This was a reply to Lee's letter of the night before and contained, in brief, an expression of Grant's desire that peace should come. The terms offered were that the officers and men should lay down their arms and be disqualified for further service against the United States until properly exchanged. Although this letter was forwarded promptly, it did not reach Lee until the middle of the afternoon. He answered it at once from the roadside.

In his second reply to Grant, Lee disclaimed the idea of surrendering the Army of Northern Virginia alone; he offered to meet Grant at ten o'clock the next morning on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines to discuss a proposal for the surrender of *all* the Confederate armed forces. As Alexander has suggested, this would have brought instant peace everywhere, had Grant been willing to treat.

This letter reached Humphreys' headquarters at dusk. The main column of the II Corps had now reached a point about two miles beyond New Store on the road to Appomattox Courthouse, after a march of some twenty miles. Meanwhile, Grant had changed his headquarters to Curdsville—about ten miles east of New Store. It was almost midnight when Lee's second letter was handed to him.

By dark on the eighth, the rear of Lee's army had arrived at a road fork about five miles northeast of Appomattox. Here Longstreet halted. After a three-hour rest, Humphreys put his corps in motion in order to close in on Longstreet by daylight; but finding his men dropping out of ranks from ex-

²² Colonel Marshall, quoted in Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 254. This account seems to be the best covering the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse.

²³ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 604.

haustion, owing to want of food and to fatigue, he halted after marching about six miles. It was now midnight, and the head of Humphreys' corps was within three miles of Longstreet's outpost.²⁴

The head of Lee's column, under Gordon, had experienced a more exciting day. Sheridan, who had been forging ahead on Lee's left, reached the siding at Appomattox early on the evening of the eighth, and General G. A. Custer's division captured and destroyed three trains loaded with food. Merritt, with his division, pushed on to Appomattox Courthouse; and when night came, he was deployed astride the Lynchburg Road with his center at Appomattox Courthouse. As Gordon approached the road junction some two miles east of Appomattox, his advance cavalry collided with Merritt's pickets. A running fight began which passed through Appomattox and only terminated when Merritt was reinforced by the remainder of Sheridan's corps. Gordon now faced Sheridan in close contact. The Confederates were exhausted. As General Merritt said in his report: "Tired, dispirited, and starving they lay at our feet . . . and the night of despair fell with the night of the eighth of April darkly and terribly on the Army of Northern Virginia."²⁵

²⁴ Humphreys, *Virginia Campaign*, 392.

²⁵ Wesley Merritt's report in *Official Records*, XLVI, Pt. I, 1121.

Appomattox

ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 8, GENERAL LEE CALLED HIS LAST COUNCIL OF WAR. In addition to his staff, Generals Longstreet, Gordon, Pendleton, and Fitzhugh Lee were present with their respective staffs. They met in the woods near Lee's headquarters in the light of a campfire. There were no chairs nor stools; saddles resting against the trunks of trees were the seats at this council table. Hushed and expectant, the men sat around their leader while he produced the correspondence between Grant and himself. A discussion was started as to what Fate had in store for the Southern people in the event of surrender.

E. P. Alexander, who had joined the group, favored cutting a path through the Federal lines. He offered his artillerymen—all comparatively fresh and all men who were indignant at the thought of surrender. They would fight till the last man should drop. He suggested that these troops be thrown into the fight in one last effort to reach the mountains. Lee demurred. He had but two divisions of sufficient strength to risk the attempt—Field's and Mahone's—and Longstreet could ill afford to lose them from his corps, which was pressed so closely by Humphreys and Wright. Furthermore, the combined strength of Field and Mahone was only eight thousand—far too weak a force to make the operations a success.¹

Nevertheless, when the question was put, the council decided that at daybreak Gordon, supported by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and A. L. Long's artillery, should make the attempt to cut through Sheridan's cavalry. Should infantry be met behind Sheridan, Lee was to be notified at once. Longstreet was given the task of holding Grant back until Gordon had opened the way to Lynchburg; then, if he could extricate his command, he was to close up on Gordon's rear. All felt that the army could cut its way out of the encircling Union forces, reach the mountains, and continue a desultory warfare until the North should weary of the struggle and be content to grant the peace for which the South longed.

After the night had thickened, the pickets were drawn in closer and all was made ready for the dash at daybreak. On the east front, Longstreet's men relieved Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry in time for their assembly at Appomattox

¹ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 603.

Courthouse at dawn. The utmost quiet prevailed. Gordon was already in position with the infantry astride the road to Lynchburg; and well before the hour set for the attack, the cavalry—some twenty-four hundred strong—filed in silently on his right.

Dawn came. With a crash of musketry, Gordon's men leaped to the assault. They swept over the breastworks which Sheridan had thrown up during the night. Fitzhugh Lee charged around Sheridan's left as the infantry drove forward in front. The line of breastworks was carried; the advance moved on. The Union troopers were driven from that part of the field, and two pieces of artillery were captured. The way was opened! Pausing to re-form, Gordon's men cheered their battle flags, which waved in triumph from the Union parapet. But off in the distance beyond Sheridan's right rear, a heavy column of infantry loomed up in the morning mist. It was Ord with his XXIV Corps, which came up and formed for battle on the line from which Crook's regiments of cavalry had just been driven. Shortly after, Warren appeared with the entire V Corps, which deployed in rear of Ord.

It was Ord who trapped Lee. Marching twenty-nine miles with but three hours' rest, he deployed his corps across Lee's front just as Gordon pushed Sheridan's cavalry out of the way. Ord moved forward; Gordon stopped. The Confederate line was slowly forced back while Sheridan rallied and attacked the Southern left. The last effort had failed. Lee was surrounded.

On the east front, Longstreet was in close grips with Humphreys, who seemed determined to force him back on Gordon's rear. The two wings of the Confederate army were now fighting back to back with the village of Appomattox Courthouse between them. Hurried messages came to Longstreet to send some aid to Gordon. He could not spare a man. In spite of all he could do, his own thin line was being pushed back by Humphreys' furious drives. The giant jaws of Grant's huge army were crunching the last remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ord's reserves came on steadily and spread along Gordon's front. As the increasing sound of musketry swept over the field, Venable rode up and asked how things were going. He could see for himself that the effort was failing. When asked if he had any message for the commander in chief, Gordon replied: "I have fought my corps to a frazzle, and I fear I can do nothing unless I am heavily reinforced by Longstreet's corps."²

Lee was standing with his staff on a small knoll near the courthouse when Venable returned. When he had been acquainted with Gordon's situation, Lee did not hesitate. Turning to his staff, he said quietly, "There is noth-

² Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 437. Cf. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 603.

ing left for me to do but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths." Cries of protest came from those who had crowded around him. One said: "Oh! General! What will history say of the surrender of the army in the field?" General Lee stilled the clamor with a soft rebuke: "Yes, I know they will say hard things of us. They will not understand how we were overwhelmed by numbers. But that is not the question, Colonel. The question is, Is it right to surrender this army? If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility."³

Alexander would not give in so easily. He was ready with another plan: the men should be told to scatter out through the brush and continue the war under the leadership of their respective commanders. Furthermore, he continued, ". . . we have a right to ask of you to spare us the mortification of having you ask Grant for terms and have him answer that he has no terms to offer. That it is 'U. S., Unconditional Surrender.' . . . General, spare us the mortification of asking terms and getting that reply." Lee was silent. When he spoke, he questioned Alexander as to how he would execute his plan. He saw much evil in it—how the men would be without food and shelter, and how they would be forced to rob and steal in order to live. He saw a red wave of anarchy creeping across his beloved Southland, and that would not do. But he added this grain of comfort: ". . . Grant will not demand an unconditional surrender. He will give us as good terms as this army has a right to demand. . . ."⁴

As this last appeal was being made and silenced, Longstreet was passing among his men and exhorting them to stand firm and hold back the crowding Union soldiers. It was just before 10 A.M. when he saw Lee coming along the road from the courthouse, dressed in a new uniform, with sword and sash, new boots, and gold spurs. Lee beckoned to Longstreet, and the two drew off to one side. There Lee told Longstreet that the trains at the Appomattox siding had been lost, that there was now no food for the army, and that the drive to open the way to the mountains had failed. He told him of Gordon's demand for reinforcements that could not be furnished, and of the Union reserves that were pressing in on Gordon's flank. He asked him for his advice. Faced with the direct question, Longstreet asked first whether the sacrifice of his command could help the others to escape or aid the cause in other quarters. When Lee replied that such sacrifice would gain nothing, Longstreet threw up his head and said: "Your situation speaks for itself." Lee turned away. Noticing Mahone in the offing, he called him over and re-

³ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 603. There is some question as to whether Alexander was present at this particular time. See also Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 256 ff.; Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 119-21.

⁴ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 605.

peated his statements. Mahone announced frankly that it was time for Lee to see Grant. The situation offered no alternative.⁵

Lee was profoundly distressed as he turned to join Colonel Charles Marshall, who had been standing at one side while these conversations took place. Together they rode down the road and passed through Longstreet's pickets on the way to meet Grant at the hour designated.

Instead of meeting Grant between the lines as he had expected, Lee found a courier waiting with a note from the Union commander declining the interview on the grounds that he had no power to deal with the subject of peace; all he could discuss would be the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee must give up his army or watch it melt away under the annihilating assaults of the Northern fighters. He was forced to bow his will to the power that held him fast in its grip. He capitulated. Calling to Marshall, he directed that a letter be sent in reply asking a meeting for the purpose of arranging terms for the surrender of the forces under his immediate control. A courier was waiting—Colonel Charles A. Whittier of Humphreys' staff—and a one-hour truce was agreed upon in order that the message might speed on its way and stop further shedding of blood.

Before the note was finished, the sound of a galloping horse disturbed the quiet. Its rider was Colonel John C. Haskell, of Longstreet's artillery, who came with a message from Longstreet that a way had been found for Lee to escape with some of the army and reach the mountains. Longstreet urged that this opportunity be seized. But Lee had already decided what course he should pursue and was satisfied that he had chosen wisely. Further effort was useless. Should the fighting continue and the war be prolonged, it would only end in disaster and the loss of many more lives. He signed the letter and handed it to Whittier.

During the truce, a scant half mile separated Longstreet from the leading elements of the II Corps. Field's command, nearest the enemy and astride the road, commenced to entrench as if to make a stand. Humphreys, in accordance with Grant's instructions that the exchange of letters should not interrupt operations, used the time in making active preparations to resume the pursuit the moment the truce was ended. Lee remained between the lines until nearly 11 A.M., when he received a note from Humphreys stating that the time was about up and requesting that Lee withdraw within his lines. Marshall was then sent to Humphreys to inform him that the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia had been tendered and to request that the fighting stop in the interest of humanity. Although this simple request was made

⁵ Alexander mistakenly said 8:30. Alexander, *Memoirs*, 606. Cf. Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 121-22. See also Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 624-25.

twice by Marshall, Humphreys refused to halt his advance. Lee withdrew reluctantly only when the leading Union soldiers were within one hundred yards of him and ready to open fire. The Federal advance came on slowly—halting frequently—and it was almost noon when it reached Field's entrenchments. The Federals prepared to attack at once.⁶

Meanwhile Longstreet had assumed active charge of the entire defense. He was with Gordon, where he faced Ord's parallel lines of infantry drawn up in battle formation and ready to assault. Longstreet directed Alexander to assemble all available troops at once and be prepared for a last stand on the high ground back of the north fork of the Appomattox River. No provision having been made for a cessation of hostilities on Gordon's front, Longstreet sent one of his staff, Captain R. M. Simms, to ask him to inform Custer, the nearest Union leader, that Lee had gone to see Grant about a surrender. A truce was proposed until the surrender negotiations could be arranged.

Not understanding the message, Custer accompanied Simms back through the line of pickets to where Longstreet was standing. The two riders came in at a fast gallop; and without dismounting, Custer called out in a brusque and excited voice: "I demand the unconditional surrender of this army." Accounts differ as to Longstreet's reply. Alexander wrote that Longstreet "rebuffed him . . . very roughly, far more so than appears in Longstreet's account of the interview." Longstreet's recollection is that he reminded Custer that he was not in command of the army; that he was the superior officer present and that Custer was within the lines of the enemy without authority; that such actions were in great disrespect to both Grant and himself; and that if he were in command of the army, he would not receive such a message even from Sheridan. These quiet words served to cool Custer's ardor; and as he appeared more reasonable, Longstreet informed him that Lee had gone to meet Grant for the purpose of surrendering the army and suggested that a cessation of hostilities be arranged between them and respected until final word should be received from the meeting of the two leaders. "He was satisfied," according to Longstreet, "and rode back to his command."⁷

By far the most detailed (and probably the most accurate) statement of this interview with Custer is quoted in an early biography of General Sheridan. In this dramatic account, the story is given as follows:

It was then that the flag of truce was raised by agreement with Sheridan and Gordon. Presently a Federal cavalry officer was observed coming down the road . . . upon approaching the General he dismounted and said: "General Longstreet, in the name of General Sheridan and myself I demand the surrender of this army. I am General Custer." . . . General Longstreet replied: "I am not

⁶ Humphreys, *Virginia Campaigns*, 394.

⁷ Alexander, *Memoirs*, 608; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 627.

in command of this army. General Lee is, and he has gone back to meet General Grant in regard to a surrender."

"Well," said Custer, "no matter about General Grant; we demand the surrender to be made to us. If you do not do so, we will renew hostilities, and any bloodshed will be upon your head." . . . "Oh, well," said Longstreet, "if you do that I will do my best to meet you." Then turning to his staff, he said: "Colonel Manning, please order General Johnston [Johnson] to move his division to the front, to the right of General Gordon. General Latrobe, please order General Pickett forward to General Gordon's left. Do it at once!" Custer listened with surprise depicted upon his countenance; he had not thought so many . . . troops were at hand with Longstreet. He, cooling off immediately, said: "General, probably we had best wait until we hear from Grant and Lee. I will speak to General Sheridan about it; don't move your troops yet!" . . . As he passed out of hearing, Longstreet said quietly, with that peculiar chuckle of his: "Ha! ha! That young man has never learned to play the game of 'brag.'" ⁸

After a truce had been arranged on both fronts, Lee returned to Gordon's corps and joined Longstreet while he waited for Grant's reply. The cause of the delay was that Grant had left Curdsville early that morning and had ridden around the left flank to confer with Sheridan. As a consequence, Lee's letter did not reach him until late—at about 11:30 A.M., in fact. He replied to Lee's latest communication by stating that he was pushing forward to meet Lee as requested, but he said nothing to indicate the terms which he would offer. Lee expressed to Longstreet some apprehension that Grant might be harsh, since his first demand had been met with a refusal. But Longstreet reassured him and said that he "knew General Grant well enough to say that the terms would be such as [Lee] would demand under similar circumstances." When Lee continued to feel worried as to Grant's probable attitude, Longstreet called out to him: "General, unless he offers us honorable terms, come back and let us fight it out." This seemed to stiffen the distressed leader, and he soon rode off with Colonel Marshall to meet Grant. History has recorded Grant's magnanimity. The war was over; the great cause was lost.⁹

⁸ Frank A. Burr and Richard J. Hinton, *The Life and Campaigns of General Philip H. Sheridan* (Providence, 1888), 297. Other accounts of this incident exist, but they run more to fancy than to fact. It is probable that Longstreet told the most reliable story, although he may have been more "rough," as Alexander has said, than his tale indicates.

⁹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 627-28; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 609; Maurice, *Aide-de-camp*, 262 ff.; Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 124 ff.

Critical Essay on Authorities

The account of Longstreet's Civil War career is based almost entirely on printed sources, the most important of which are *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, 1880-1901); Longstreet's memoirs, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (2d ed.; Philadelphia, 1908); and his articles in Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers*, 4 vols. (New York, 1887-88). Occasional references have been made to Longstreet's critics whose articles appeared in various issues of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, particularly from 1876 to 1886.

Other publications used include *Campaigns of the Civil War*, 13 vols. (New York, 1881-83); John Codman Ropes and William Roscoe Livermore, *The Story of the Civil War; A Concise Account of the War in the United States of America Between 1861 and 1865*, 3 parts in 4 vols. (New York, 1902-13); John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, 8 vols. (New York, 1890); Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleans, Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, ed. John P. Nicholson, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1875-88); Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avery (eds.), *A Diary from Dixie, as Written by Mary Boykin Chesnut . . .* (New York, 1906); John B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1866); Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 vols. (New York, 1934-35); D. S. Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches* (New York, 1915); John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies* (New Orleans, 1880); John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York, 1903); E. P. Alexander, *The Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York, 1907); Cecil Battine, *The Crisis of the Confederacy* (New York, 1905); G. Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (New York, 1905); Walter H. Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee . . .* (New York, 1877); A. J. L. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States* (London, 1863); J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* (New York, 1874); and G. W. Smith, *Confederate War Papers* (New York, 1884).

In addition to the foregoing, the following publications have been used for general background: F. E. Chadwick, *The Causes of the Civil War* (New York, 1906); J. W. Thomason, *Jeb Stuart* (New York, 1930); John Formby, *The American Civil War* (New York, 1910); Justus Scheibert, *Sieben Monate in den Rebellen-Staaten Während des Nordamerikanischen Krieges, 1863* (Stettin, Germany, 1868); Heros von Borck, *Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence* (New York, 1938); W. H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* (New York, 1863); Thomas Robson Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign* (New York,

1929); and H. B. McClellan, *The Life and Campaigns of Major General J. E. B. Stuart* (Boston, 1885).

William Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862* (Boston, 1892); G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1906); A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and 1865* (New York, 1883); R. M. Johnston, *Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics* (Boston, 1913); Donald Jordan and Edwin S. Pratt, *Europe and the American Civil War* (Boston, 1931); Thomas L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-65* (Boston, 1901); Sir Frederick Maurice, *An Aide-de-camp to Lee* (Boston, 1927); Edward Mayes, *Genealogy of the Family of Longstreet* (Jackson, Miss., 1893 [?]); M. F. Steele, *American Campaigns*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1909); Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction* (New York, 1879); A. S. Webb, *The Peninsula* (New York, 1881); *Annals of the War, Written by Leading Participants North and South* (Philadelphia, 1879).

II. Politician, Officeholder, and Writer

Introduction

WHEN GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET RODE SOUTHWARD FROM LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA, in the summer of 1865 to look for a place to begin life anew, he could little foresee where his journey might lead him and what the future held. He was even uncertain as to his destination—whether it would be New Orleans or Texas or somewhere else in the Southwest.

Much has been written of Longstreet the soldier, but little of Longstreet the officeholder, politician, and writer. It is with this second career of Longstreet's—with what came after the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse—that Part II of this biography is concerned.

The writer has not attempted to question or to differ with Colonel Sanger's judgment on Longstreet's military career; that is his contribution, the result of many years of careful study. Similarly, what follows concerning General Longstreet's post-bellum career is entirely the present writer's and is told as fully as available materials permit.

This story of "What Came After" is based almost altogether on unpublished letters and newspapers, with occasional reference to published materials, particularly congressional reports of various investigations in Louisiana during the Reconstruction era. One such source of especial importance was the Springer Report of the 1880's, an extended investigation of the conduct of United States marshals in a number of states, notably those of the South and the West.

In this account, no attempt has been made to go into the details of Reconstruction in Louisiana, but only into Longstreet's part in it. To have done otherwise would have extended this narrative unduly with no compensating advantages. The account of the Reconstruction period in Louisiana has been told many times in all its varied aspects; but Longstreet's part in it, so far as is known, has never been told except in a very general and usually inaccurate manner.

The writer's thanks are particularly due to V. L. Bedsole, Head of the Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, for his assistance in locating material in the Louisiana State University manuscript collections and for transcriptions of the Goree Papers, obtained through the interest

and co-operation of Ben Ames Williams, a grandnephew of General Longstreet's who also was helpful in other ways.

Thanks are also due to General Longstreet's youngest son, F. R. Longstreet, of Gainesville, Georgia, for assistance in working out the Garland relationship of the first Mrs. Longstreet (in Part I) and for allowing the use of family photographs; to various members of the staff of the National Archives, who gave valuable help in locating manuscript material in various departmental repositories, particularly in relation to General Longstreet's career as a Federal officeholder in Georgia; to Mr. Watt P. Marchman, Director of Research, the Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio, for several valuable letters written by General Longstreet; to Colonel Thomas Spencer, Atlanta, Georgia, for the loan of some of Longstreet's letters regarding Gettysburg and for other valuable material; to the Pennsylvania Historical Society for assistance in developing certain information concerning General Longstreet's articles in the *Philadelphia Times*; to Sylvester Vigilante and Ivor Avellino, both of the New York Public Library, for their unfailing interest and courtesy and their many valuable suggestions regarding the location of helpful materials; and to Mrs. Brenda Richards Gieseke, Librarian, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri, and Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Morton, Librarian, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, for patience in supplying information on obscure points. My thanks are also due many others not specifically mentioned who were helpful in suggestions and in the supply of material not known or readily available.

THOMAS ROBSON HAY

Locust Valley, New York

April 15, 1949

A Soldier Turns to Peaceful Ways

ON APRIL 12, 1865, THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA WAS DRAWN UP FOR its last assembly, this time to lay down its arms forever. General James Longstreet, commanding the First Corps, was one of the Confederate signators of the parole papers. Marching to the field in front of Appomattox Courthouse, "by divisions and parts of divisions," the Army of Northern Virginia "deployed into line, stacked arms, folded the colors and the officers and men walked away empty handed to find their distant, blighted homes."¹

General Longstreet, accompanied by his young Texan aide, Captain T. J. Goree, set off for Lynchburg, Virginia, where Longstreet expected to find his wife and family. The pair passed the night at Campbell Courthouse and the next day rode into Lynchburg, where Longstreet also expected to find two of his horses which had been sent off the night before the surrender. They were important to him, for he would need them as transport when he left Lynchburg. The horses were not to be found, as they had been led on southward by Maurice, one of the soldiers of his command; but about a month later Longstreet learned that they were at his brother William's in northern Georgia. However, a more immediate and important expectancy held the general in Lynchburg. Mrs. Longstreet was expecting the birth of another child. She had come to Lynchburg from Richmond with her family, escorted by her oldest son Garland, then a youth of fifteen, who, after the closing of the Virginia Military Institute (temporarily located in Richmond), at which he was a student, had served briefly as his father's volunteer aide. About the middle of May, General Longstreet thought that it would be necessary for him to visit Washington, presumably to seek a pardon; but after the necessary permit had been secured, he received word "not to come North, but to remain in Lynchburg for the time being." On June 1, 1865, the expected child was born and was called James Longstreet, Jr., the second child to be given the name, the first having died in Richmond in 1862.

Urged by Captain Goree, who lived at Huntsville, Texas, to the north of

¹ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 631.

Houston, Longstreet had decided to go to Texas and there begin life anew. Like many others, as he rode away from Appomattox, Longstreet was faced with the problem of what to do. He wanted to be independent—on his own. His entire career had been given to soldiering; now that this vocation was no longer open to him, his problem was how best to use his talents, abilities, and experience as a leader of men. Why not make a new start in the great and growing state of Texas, where he would have opportunities and friends, urged Goree. Though Longstreet had had no experience in business beyond that of an army paymaster, Texas seemed to offer him an opportunity to make a new start under favorable conditions. He would leave Mrs. Longstreet and the children in Lynchburg with her kinsfolk until he could come back and take them to their new home, wherever it might be.

It was while Longstreet was in Lynchburg, preparing for the journey southward, that he learned of his indictment, along with General Lee and others, for treason against the United States in charges filed in Richmond and heard by a Federal grand jury sitting in Norfolk, Virginia, on June 7, 1865. General Grant had insisted that the paroles given at Appomattox be respected and was dismayed when he heard of the court's action. He offered to endorse Lee's application for pardon if he would make it; later he made Longstreet the same offer. It was not until February 15, 1869, that these indictments were nol-prossed; but long before that time, Longstreet, at least, had been pardoned.²

On June 26, 1865, General Longstreet parted with family and friends in Lynchburg and went down to Campbell Courthouse. Two days later, he was off at last on the journey southward to New Orleans and Texas. With him were his son Garland, Captain Goree, and Jim, a Negro servant going to Shreveport, Louisiana. The General and Jim rode in a mule-drawn ambulance; Garland and Captain Goree, on horseback. The latter recorded in his diary of the journey: "I constituted the advance guard."³

The first day the party traveled thirty miles. Goree noted that they found the "roads quite rough. Mules jaded. Ambulance too heavily loaded." They stopped that night at Chalk Level, where they were hospitably entertained; Captain Goree, then twenty-four years of age, was especially attracted by several very pretty and agreeable daughters of their host. The next day, however, they were on their way by early morning; and that night they were entertained by a wealthy old gentleman, who "brot out his porter," which the General and Goree enjoyed while eating a splendid dinner that included

² Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 202, 381; *New York Times*, January 8, 1937.

³ Transcript of manuscript diary of Captain T. J. Goree, June 28–August 6, 1865, in the Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La. Hereinafter cited as *Goree Diary*.

roasting ears. The next day the party crossed into North Carolina after a twenty-nine-mile journey, but the accommodations for the night were very indifferent. Goree noted that there was no corn for the horses. And so it went through North Carolina into South Carolina. As the party neared Lincolnton, North Carolina, the General's roll of bedding dropped out of the ambulance, and a search failed to find it. At Lincolnton the travelers were entertained by General R. F. Hoke, who had commanded one of the divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia.

When the members of the party were not put up for the night by some farmer or town dweller, they had to "lie out" along the roadside, the horses and mules being turned out to graze. Occasionally they passed Yankee patrols. On July 8 they went through Spartanburg, South Carolina, but did not stop. The next day Greenville, South Carolina, was reached and passed through. On July 10, the party was at "Fort Hill," the home of John C. Calhoun. Before they left, "Mrs. Calhoun filled [their] provision box with nice bread, ham, pickles, butter, peaches, cantelopes [*sic*], besides putting in the ambulance two fine water melons." On the twelfth of July the party reached Clarksville, in northern Georgia; there they stopped at the house of a relative of General Longstreet's, and though there was no one at home, the travelers took possession. The next day they went on to Cleveland, some fifteen miles to the south, and then to the home of General Longstreet's brother, William. Here they found the two horses which General Longstreet had sent off to Lynchburg the night before the surrender at Appomattox. The travelers remained for two weeks, resting and traveling about the countryside. One day they made an excursion to the top of Mount Yonah, said to be the highest mountain in Georgia. On the thirty-first of July, the journey was resumed, the party being increased "by Maurice and the Genl's two horses and Mr. William Longstreet who is going to Mississippi." The next day they passed through Gainesville, Georgia. It rained, and the mosquitoes were troublesome. They soon came to Marietta, where a Yankee garrison was stationed; on August third the party rode through the New Hope Church battleground. "The country . . . had been made almost a complete waste. The fencing all destroyed and all the best houses burned."

As the party moved southwestward into Alabama, "General Longstreet who was behind in the ambulance was accosted by a drunken man who wished him to drink with him and wanted also to trade his horse for a mule. On General Longstreet's refusal he rode off, but before a great while he overtook the ambulance again and with a cocked pistol in his hand ordered the driver of the ambulance to stop. He then put his pistol inside as

if endeavoring to shoot the Genl when the Genl seized the pistol & wrenched it from him. Whereupon the man put spurs to his horse and made away as fast as possible. The Genl will report the circumstances to the Yankees and try & have them arrest him." The journey was continued without further incident. The next day in Oxford, Alabama, General Longstreet "stopped and reported the man who assaulted him. The Yankee officers promised to send and have him arrested." The night of August 6 the party camped near Talladega, Alabama. And here Captain Goree's diary ends.

The journey was resumed the next day, and within two weeks the party passed through Eutaw, Alabama, en route to Canton, Mississippi, in Noxubee County, where General Longstreet's sister, Mrs. Ames, lived. Here the party rested.⁴

Early in September General Longstreet was in Mobile.⁵ Whether he had gone on alone from Mississippi is not known. In any case, by the end of the month he was in New Orleans, where he found many of his former comrades-in-arms, including Generals John B. Hood, Simon B. Buckner, P. G. T. Beauregard, D. H. Maury, and others. Many other former Confederate leaders had gone to Mexico, including Generals Edmund Kirby-Smith, John B. Magruder, C. M. Wilcox, and Henry W. Allen. Longstreet, however, seems never to have taken any interest in the Mexican colonization schemes that for a time were attractive to so many former Confederates. Most of those who went to Mexico eventually came to feel as did one who wrote: "Whenever I can scrape enough money together to leave this d—d country, I'm going home. . . ." ⁶

Just when and why General Longstreet changed his mind about going to Texas to live and decided to remain in New Orleans is not known. Probably when he saw how many of his former comrades and associates had settled in New Orleans and apparently were enjoying varying degrees of success and comfort—and probably also on account of the fact that his wound received at the Wilderness had unfitted him for physical labor—he began to reconsider his first decision to go to Texas. In any case, among those in New Orleans were the Owen brothers, Edward and William Miller, former members of his command, who were already engaged in the cotton brokerage business and planning to organize their own firm. They urged General Longstreet to remain in New Orleans and become a member of their firm. The Owen brothers were New Orleans men who had good war records and good local connections. The addition of Longstreet to their business would

⁴ *New York Herald*, September 9, 1865; *Washington National Intelligencer*, September 11, 1865.

⁵ *New York Herald*, September 18, 1865.

⁶ Statement of General N. B. Forrest, in *New York Times*, February 3, 1866.

tend to give it both distinction and prestige. If Longstreet could secure a pardon from the Johnson administration, he would have more freedom from restrictions to engage actively in the business. It is interesting to speculate, however, on what would have been Longstreet's post-bellum career and reputation had he followed Captain Goree's urging and settled in Texas.

It was probably in the hope of securing a pardon, and also to gather his family and bring them to New Orleans, that in mid-November Longstreet returned north to Washington, D.C. For part of the way, at least, he had General Hood as a traveling companion. Longstreet, however, went by way of St. Louis, while Hood went up the Ohio Valley to his parents' home in Owingsville, Kentucky.⁷ Presumably Longstreet stopped briefly in Lynchburg. In any case, he was in Washington, stopping at the Metropole Hotel, early in November.⁸

Several days after his arrival Longstreet made his first visit to the War Department, where he spent several hours in friendly conversation with some of the old army officers whom he had formerly known. Among those who greeted him was his wife's brother-in-law, General W. A. Nichols, then on staff duty at the War Department. Nichols later called on Longstreet at his hotel to invite him to stay with the Nichols family while in Washington. Longstreet demurred, saying "that the war-feeling was too warm for an officer of the army to entertain a prominent Confederate"; but when Nichols insisted, Longstreet consented.⁹

As Longstreet had come to Washington for the express purpose of getting pardoned, he immediately sought an interview with President Andrew Johnson. Before seeing the President, however, he went with General Nichols to make an official call on General Grant. As Longstreet and Nichols prepared to leave, General Grant asked Longstreet "if [he] cared to have [a] pardon." When Longstreet replied in the affirmative, Grant asked him to call at his office the next day; in the meantime, he said, he would see Secretary of War Stanton and the President in regard to the matter. Several days later Longstreet saw the President and presented an appeal from General Grant for executive clemency, Grant wrote:

Knowing that General Longstreet, late of the army which was in rebellion against the authority of the United States, is in the city, and presuming that he intends asking executive clemency before leaving, I beg to say a word in his favor.

General Longstreet comes under the third, fifth and eighth exceptions made in your proclamation of the 29th of May, 1865. I believe I can safely say that

⁷ *New York Herald*, October 27, 1865.

⁸ *Ibid.*, November 2, 1865; *Washington National Intelligencer*, November 2, 1865.

⁹ *New York Herald*, November 4, 1865; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 632.

there is nowhere among the exceptions a more honorable class of men than those embraced in the fifth and eighth of these, nor a class that will more faithfully observe any obligation which they may take upon themselves. General Longstreet, in my opinion, stands high among this class. I have known him well for more than twenty-six years, first as a cadet at West Point and afterwards as an officer of the army. For five years from my graduation we served together, a portion of the time in the same regiment. I speak of him, therefore, from actual personal acquaintance.

In the late rebellion, I think, not one single charge was ever brought against General Longstreet for persecution of prisoners of war or of persons for their political opinions. If such charges were ever made, I never heard them. I have no hesitation, therefore, in recommending General Longstreet to your Excellency for pardon. I will further state that my opinion of him is such that I shall feel it as a personal favor to myself if this pardon is granted.¹⁰

President Johnson did not immediately give any reply to this generous endorsement of Grant's, but he asked Longstreet to call the first of the following week. On Monday, November 13, Longstreet called, but again the President was unprepared to give a definite answer. He did, however, tell Longstreet, "There are three persons of the South who can never receive amnesty: Mr. Davis, General Lee and yourself. You have given the Union cause too much trouble." Johnson's final reply was that it was not his present intention to pardon any more civil and military leaders of the rebellion. It was to be over a year before Longstreet received a pardon and more than two years before his political disabilities were removed.¹¹

While in Washington, Longstreet was entertained as a person of distinction. It was probably at this time also that he was interviewed by William Swinton, a former war correspondent, who was gathering material for his *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*. Longstreet was also the guest of honor at a dinner in Washington given by Dr. Thomas Miller, who desired "The fete . . . to be not so much a compliment to Longstreet as a man as an expression of admiration for persons who took a prominent part in the late rebellion."¹²

The purpose of Longstreet's visit to Washington—to obtain a pardon—not being possible of accomplishment at the time, he went over to Lynchburg. After a brief visit there, he started south to New Orleans, accompanied by his wife and children. The party was in New Orleans on December 11, 1865.¹³

As soon as he had settled his family, Longstreet set about completing arrangements, effective January 1, 1866, to enter the cotton-brokerage business

¹⁰ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 633.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 633-34; *New York Herald*, November 14, 1865; *Washington National Intelligencer*, November 15, 1865.

¹² *New York Herald*, November 7, 1865.

¹³ *Ibid.*, December 13, 1865.

with the Owen brothers; the resulting concern was known as "Longstreet, Owen & Company." Longstreet then hastened to write his old commander, General Robert E. Lee, of his new arrangements, enclosing his business card and also advising Lee of the progress in the healing of the grievous arm wound which he had received nearly two years previous in the Wilderness.¹⁴

At this time there were in New Orleans a number of former, high-ranking Confederate officers who were endeavoring to make a new start in life, among them being Generals Beauregard, Hood, Buckner, Bragg, Richard Taylor, A. P. Stewart, Harry T. Hays, D. H. Maury, M. Jeff Thompson, and others. The newspaper correspondent who interviewed the former Confederates noted that Longstreet "used his left hand in writing and shaking hands, his right hand hanging helplessly by his side." The son of one of Longstreet's partners later wrote: "When I was a boy I had sheets of fools-cap paper covered with [Longstreet's] signature, when he practised writing with his left hand," a practice which he followed the rest of his life.¹⁵

At this time many former Confederates were going to Mexico and Brazil, particularly to Mexico. The renowned Captain Matthew F. Maury, General Henry W. Allen (previously governor of Louisiana), and Generals John B. Magruder, Sterling Price, and others thought to begin life there anew. Their agents were constantly in New Orleans raising funds and urging emigration. Longstreet does not appear to have at any time considered leaving the United States. He had what promised to be a satisfactory business connection, and he had a family to support. Having no bitterness, he preferred to hold what he had, feeling—as did Lee and others—that his future lay with his people, helping in the rehabilitation of his country and section.

On March 1, 1866, the "Great Southern & Western Life & Accident Insurance Company of New Orleans" was organized with a capital stock of three hundred thousand dollars, all of which was taken. Longstreet was elected president; and he at once wrote General Lee that he had taken the liberty to have his name inserted as one of the nonresident Board of Directors. Longstreet thought the insurance company "a fine institution . . . well endorsed."¹⁶ Longstreet now had two places of business: a cotton brokerage office at 37 Union Street, and an insurance office at 21 Carondelet Street. Fortunately, he would not need to relinquish his cotton brokerage business; his two enterprises could be managed concurrently. Also at this time, Gov-

¹⁴ Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 634; Lee to Longstreet (acknowledging Longstreet to Lee, December 26, 1865, and sending regards "to Mrs. Longstreet and the children"), January 19, 1866, *ibid.*, 634.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, February 4, March 25, 1866; Allison Owen (son of William Miller Owen, of New Orleans) to the writer, April 1, 1948.

¹⁶ Longstreet to Lee, March 3, 1866, in Washington and Lee University Library, Lexington, Va.

ernor B. G. Humphreys of Mississippi wrote Longstreet proposing that he be a candidate for the presidency of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company. But Longstreet declined the invitation, as he felt his business interests in New Orleans to be such that he could not abandon them. He recommended Generals Stephen D. Lee and D. H. Maury as suitable for the position, characterizing them both as very superior men.¹⁷

Longstreet and his family were doing well for beginners as far as earning a living was concerned; but to keep this desirable situation, it was necessary to establish and maintain contact with possible suppliers of raw cotton. The General wrote his former aide, Captain Gorce, at Huntsville, Texas:

Our trade is almost entirely in Western produce. If this will keep up so as to feed us for a time I hope that we may get some cotton when the next crop comes in. I would enjoy a trip through Texas very much, but am too poor to indulge in that luxury. I shall make a trip through that part of it which is tributary to N.O. however on business. . . . If there was a chance of my getting enough of trade to warrant me in making the trip [to Huntsville] I should do so this summer and fall. But the present indications would not warrant it. If you can send us any cotton we will share with you the commission. That is let you in for one fourth commission on all that you can influence to our house. . . . The commission now is about four dollars to a good bale. . . .¹⁸

In accordance with his plan of going out to look for and buy cotton, Longstreet was at Natchitoches, Louisiana, in mid-June of 1866; there he was entertained by the Philharmonic Society, which was meeting in the local hotel. "After some artistic and delicious music and a speech of welcome," Longstreet addressed the meeting, characterizing himself as "an humble citizen—in fact, only a prisoner of war on parole—and . . . my voice must restrain itself until such time as when we will once more enjoy those rights and privileges as of yore. . . ." ¹⁹ Longstreet's stay was limited to a few days. From Natchitoches he went to Shreveport, Mansfield, and other places in northern Louisiana. By the last week in August he was at Oxford, Mississippi, using the home of his uncle, Judge Augustus B. Longstreet, as his headquarters while canvassing the state to secure consignments of cotton.²⁰ A month later he was still in Mississippi—at Coffeyville—but en route to New Orleans, where he arrived on the night of October 11, having left his "wife and children in the interior [of Mississippi, at Oxford or Canton] . . . till the health of [New Orleans] is more reliable." He still hoped that General Lee would come south to live and wrote Lee that he would undertake to

¹⁷ Longstreet to B. G. Humphreys, February 23, 1866, in Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss.

¹⁸ Longstreet to Gorce, March 15, 1866, in Gorce Papers.

¹⁹ For an account of this meeting in Natchitoches, La., see *New York Times*, June 20, 1866.

²⁰ Statement in Longstreet, Owen & Co. to Lee, August 28, 1866, in Washington and Lee University Library.

secure for him any position that he might like.²¹ After a brief stay in New Orleans, Longstreet was off again—this time to Alabama. He passed through Montgomery early in December on his way to New Orleans, presumably having been up in the black belt of the state with perhaps a side trip to visit his family, who were still in Mississippi.²²

By mid-December Longstreet was back in New Orleans, from where—as president of the Southern Hospital Association—he wrote his friend, Governor Humphreys of Mississippi, inviting Mrs. Humphreys “to take charge of the table for Mississippi” at a grand bazaar. As an inducement, Longstreet wrote: “I have two pretty nieces at Macon, Mississippi, and a cousin (Miss Garland) near Jackson whom I will offer as assistants, and if my own services will avail her she can command me in any way. . . .”²³ Shortly after this event, Longstreet probably called on General W. T. Sherman, who had just arrived in New Orleans from an official visit to Mexico as the personal representative of President Johnson.²⁴ A month later he performed a less pleasant duty when he served as one of the honorary pallbearers at the ceremonies attendant on the removal of the remains of General Albert Sidney Johnston from St. Louis Cemetery in New Orleans to Austin, Texas, for reinterment. Other honorary pallbearers included Generals Beauregard, Bragg, Buckner, Hood, and Richard Taylor, all at that time resident in New Orleans. None of them accompanied the body, which was taken to Galveston by boat and thence to Houston and Austin. There was “no music by bands, ringing or tolling of bells . . . or [other] demonstration,” as General Philip H. Sheridan, then commanding the Department of the Gulf, refused to permit Confederate demonstrations over the remains of anyone who had attempted to destroy the Federal government.²⁵

Longstreet was active in promoting his insurance and cotton-brokerage interests, but it is not known with what success. He wrote Captain Goree:

As to sending your cotton to this market, you should consult your own judgment. I believe that you will realize more by selling here than you can at Galveston. You can see the quotations for yourself. My judgment is based upon the fact that persons often buy in Galveston, and sell in this market. As long as this can be done it seems to me quite evident that those who make the

²¹ Longstreet to General Fitz John Porter, September 23, 1866, in *Senate Executive Documents*, 46 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 37, Pt. I, 471; *id.* to Lee, October 12, 1866, in Washington and Lee University Library.

²² New York *Herald*, December 6, 1866.

²³ Longstreet to B. G. Humphreys, December 19, 1866, in Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss.

²⁴ New York *Herald*, December 21, 1866.

²⁵ William Preston Johnston, *The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, Embracing His Services in the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States* (New York, 1878), 700–14; New Orleans *Picayune*, January 24, 1867, and New Orleans *Crescent*, January 27, 1867, *ibid.*, 700, 710; New York *Times*, January 24, 28, 29, 1867.

cotton can do better with it by sending to this market. This is unquestionably the cotton market of the country, and when people start to send their cotton to market they ought to send it all the way to market instead of stopping on the way to sell.

Longstreet's insurance company had by now been incorporated in the state of Georgia as well as in Louisiana, and Longstreet wrote to Governor Humphreys in the hope of securing his assistance in getting the legislature of Mississippi to take the same favorable action.²⁶

At this time also, Longstreet was engaged in promoting a railroad route from New Orleans via Houston and Ringgold Barracks, Texas, to Monterey, Durango, and Mazatlan, Mexico, which he characterized as "the subject of *great interest* between Col. [James F.] Casey and myself." He wrote his friend General Grant, who was Casey's brother-in-law, "to ask if you may permit us to use your name as one of the patrons of this route." Longstreet proposed to use the names of Grant and Sheridan in association with his own, Beauregard's, and those of two prominent citizens from New Orleans and two from the South—eight in all—"for the purpose of inaugurating the Scheme." It is not known what Grant's reply was or what developed from the proposal, but apparently it was just another promotion idea.²⁷

While Longstreet had been endeavoring—with varying degrees of success—to establish himself in business in New Orleans, political and social conditions incident to Reconstruction there and throughout Louisiana were anything but smooth. On May 29, 1865, General Sheridan had arrived in New Orleans and assumed command of the Military Division of the Southwest, later styled the Department of the Gulf. Young, successful, inclined to be arrogant and boastful, and possessed of few scruples when treating with those who stood in his way or opposed his policies, Sheridan was quick to employ or approve any methods, brutal or otherwise, to accomplish his purposes or to carry out his interpretation of orders. His first concern was the Mexican border situation created by the conflict between Maximilian and his supporters, and the native Mexicans. Sheridan went at once to the Texas border to learn the exact situation and to issue needed orders and assign officers of his own choice to command at critical points. His appraisal of the situation was accurate. He wrote a former subordinate commander:

²⁶ Longstreet to Goree, March 9, 1867, and *id.* to *id.*, March 28, 1867, in Goree Papers; *id.* to B. G. Humphreys, January 22, 1867, in Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Miss.

²⁷ *Id.* to Grant, April 10, 1867, in Library of the Chicago Historical Society. Cf. also *De Bow's Review* (New Orleans), V (January, 1868), 99-100. This promotion scheme may have been the forerunner of the Mexican transcontinental promotion scheme of Longstreet's friend General W. S. Rosecrans, who was United States Minister to Mexico, 1868-1869. See David M. Pletcher, "General W. S. Rosecrans and the Mexican Transcontinental Railroad Project," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXVIII (March, 1952), 657-58.

"Old Max has had some attention from us and might as well purchase his winding sheet, for he has but few hopes left—the Liberals are fully alive to their interests and will never give up—and look to our country with hope for assistance and salvation. . . ." ²⁸ Eighteen months later, on June 19, 1867, Maximilian was executed.

When Sheridan reached New Orleans and took over command of the city and district, he found civil affairs there to be much mixed up. Factional quarrels between the Southern Radicals and Conservatives kept affairs in the city in constant turmoil. Governor J. M. Wells—though he pretended impartiality—leaned toward the Radicals, who could hardly wait to force the removal of the "unrepentant if pardoned rebels" who were averred to hold nine tenths of the seats in the Louisiana legislature and many of the important state offices. To correct this situation, Governor Wells and his supporters proposed to reconvene the state convention of 1864 in order to accomplish the following: first, to reinstate Wells and his supporters in office; second, to disfranchise all persons who had taken part in the rebellion against the United States; third, to render null and void all elections since the adjournment of the convention of 1864; fourth, to enfranchise the Negroes; and fifth, to forestall the next legislature if it should attempt to impeach or legislate the incumbents out of office. The leaders, fearing trouble, sought military protection. The dispute was a factional one. Louisiana was being peaceably governed by officers elected by pardoned Confederates; the small Radical minority, who claimed to be the only loyal men in the state and who opposed Johnson's policy, wished to regain power, using the Negro and his vote to attain their objective. ²⁹

Trouble was not long in coming. Lack of agreement with the city officials, absence of definite orders from Washington, and uncertainty as to what to do reduced the Federal military (commanded by General Absalom Baird in the absence of General Sheridan in Texas) first to futility and then to restoring order after the bloody and unnecessary riot which took place on July 30, 1866, in the center of New Orleans. Whoever was to blame, the net result was a great advantage gained by the Radicals, not the least important aspect of which was the support of General Sheridan himself, who reported: "The immediate cause of this terrible [riot] was the assemblage of

²⁸ General Orders No. 118 (announcing assignment of military division and department commanders), June 27, 1865, in *Official Records*, XLVIII, Pt. II, 1004; Sheridan to W. H. Emory, November 21, 1865, in W. H. Emory Papers, in custody of the writer.

²⁹ Sheridan's report, November 4, 1866, in *Official Records*, XLVIII, Pt. II, 1005; Gordon Granger to E. Cooper, June 11, 1866, in Andrew Johnson Papers, XCVI, in Library of Congress, quoted in Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (New York, 1930), 345-46.

[the] Conservatives. The remote cause was the bitter and antagonistic feeling . . . in this community. . . ."³⁰

General Sheridan had supported President Johnson in November, 1865. Commenting on a critical report by General Carl Schurz, he wrote: "We can well afford to be lenient to this last annoyance, impotent ill feeling. . . . It is so hard by any species of legislation to correct this feeling, magnanimity is the safest and most manly course. . . . I have the most abiding faith in the solution of the question of a restored Union, if we can only wait and trust to a little time and the working of natural causes." Johnson's first annual message, delivered a week later, won instant praise for the President throughout the United States and Europe. But the July 30 riot changed all this. Sheridan hurried back to New Orleans and, after a brief investigation, telegraphed President Johnson, placing blame for the riot on both Conservatives and Radicals; several days later, however, he changed his position and went over completely to the Radicals, fastening entire responsibility for the riot on the Conservatives and urging removal from office of both Governor J. M. Wells and Mayor John T. Monroe of New Orleans. Before the riot, on July 29, General Baird had telegraphed Secretary of War Stanton for instructions and authority in case of trouble; but this dispatch was suppressed, and President Johnson did not learn of it until ten days later, though he himself had telegraphed the civil authorities in New Orleans on July 28 that "The military will be expected to sustain and not to obstruct or interfere with the proceedings of the court" in its business of controlling affairs in New Orleans as it deemed best in order to prevent trouble.³¹

The probable outcome of the struggle for power between President Johnson and the Radical Republicans was mirrored in the votes in the election of 1866, which gave the Radicals both the authority and the opportunity to put an end to Johnson's plan of Reconstruction and to substitute one of their own. Johnson's swing around the circle, the New Orleans riots, and the blandishments of the Radical Republican politicians had drawn General Sheridan into the Radical ranks. He gave his wholehearted support to the Reconstruction Acts, an artificial system for the South that had for its object the creation of class government subject to, and supported by, the military. These acts were designed not only to secure and maintain (with the help of the Negro vote) political control by the Radicals, but also to cripple and handicap Southern

³⁰ Beale, *Critical Year*, 352-53.

³¹ Sheridan to Andrew Johnson, November 26, 1865, in Andrew Johnson Papers, LXXXI, quoted in Beale, *Critical Year*, 50; George F. Milton, *The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals* (New York, 1930), 273, 347-48.

business and industry to such a degree as to eliminate them as effective competitors of Northern business.³²

Sheridan was placed in command of the Fifth Military District, embracing Louisiana and Texas with headquarters in New Orleans. He lacked nearly every quality—tact, discretion, restraint, firmness—needed to fill such an assignment successfully. Moreover, many believed that he harbored presidential aspirations. New Orleans would have been a difficult post for the most discreet commander. With Sheridan trouble began almost at once. It was the kind of trouble which the Radicals welcomed and on which they thrived. Sheridan had been in his new assignment only eight days when he arrogated to himself the authority to remove from office Judge Edwin Abell, of the Criminal Court of New Orleans; A. S. Herron, the attorney general of Louisiana; and John T. Monroe, mayor of the city. He thereby set an example in procedure which was followed by military governors throughout the South. Three months later Sheridan arbitrarily dismissed the state legislature and removed Governor J. M. Wells from office for alleged irregular expenditure of a levee-repair appropriation. "Little Phil" was merely doing what he had been sent to New Orleans to do—military commanders were expected, if need be, to be stern dictators, who recognized no opposition to their decrees, however unreasonable or biased they might be.

General Longstreet stepped into the midst of this scrambled and uncertain situation with all the assurance which he had shown on the field of battle. As early as mid-June, 1866, he was on the fence politically. He said: "If I approve Mr. [Andrew] Johnson I am called a traitor; if toward the Radicals, I am called a rebel; therefore, I must be content to remain on the fence."³³

He was not in New Orleans at the time of the July 30 riot, but even before it he seems to have been slowly changing his position. The editor of the Brownsville (Texas) *Ranchero* reported from New Orleans that he had had interviews with Generals Hood and Longstreet. He wrote: "Both of these great generals urge moderation, forbearance and submission. Longstreet more than Hood . . . [each] urged that the duty and safety of the South demanded submission on the part of the Southern people." He concluded: "We cannot afford to be made the objective point of Northern fanaticism. . . ." ³⁴

The enactment into law over President Johnson's veto of the first of the

³² For a study of the economic background of this struggle, see Beale, *Critical Year*, *passim*; and Howard K. Beale, "The Tariff and Reconstruction," in *American Historical Review* (New York and London), XXXV (January, 1930), 276-95.

³³ Speech at Natchitoches, La., reported in *New York Times*, June 20, 1866.

³⁴ *New York Herald*, November 30, 1866.

Military Reconstruction Acts on March 2, 1867, and General Sheridan's arbitrary acts were the signal for renewed consideration of the situation confronting the Southern people. The editor of the *New Orleans Times*, W. H. C. King, counseled "prudence, circumspection and the most careful and wise deliberation on the part of that class of our citizens whose views and opinions have a large weight and influence in controlling and directing public sentiment." Several days later, on March 17, King followed this advice with another editorial, in which the "Views of Prominent Men [were] Solicited." Longstreet, Beauregard, Hood, and other former Confederate leaders were called on to express their opinions on the grave questions which were perplexing the minds of the people. To support this plea, the next day the *Times* published a letter (written in Washington, D.C., on March 3, 1867) from former Confederate General James R. Chalmers of Mississippi to Reverdy Johnson, commenting on the powerlessness of President Johnson in his relations with Congress and counseling acceptance of the terms offered by Congress, though they were, in Chalmers' opinion, unconstitutional. At the same time Chalmers urged that Southern representatives in Congress work toward a position in which they could hold the balance of power between the East and the West—which would enable the Southerners to demand favors for their support.⁸⁵

The first prominent man in New Orleans to answer this call was General Longstreet. In the same issue of the *Times* as that in which General Chalmers' letter was printed, there appeared a letter from Longstreet. The General responded "without hesitation," to editor King's call, characterizing himself as one who had "never applied [himself] to politics" but rather could "speak only the plain honest convictions of the soldier." He thought that much of the public discussion was not pertinent to the question at issue. "The striking feature," he said, "the one that people should keep in view, is that we are a conquered people. . . . Recognizing this fact, fairly and squarely, there is but one course left for wise men to pursue, and that is to accept the terms that are now offered by the conquerors." The only way, he thought, "that the constitutional government shall be re-established . . . is to comply with the requirements of the recent Congressional legislation." He brushed aside the fear expressed "by some that Congress will not receive us even after we have complied with their conditions." He could not "admit that the representative men of a great nation could make such a pledge in bad faith." He concluded: "Let us accept the terms as we are in duty bound to do, and if there is a lack of good faith, let it be upon others."⁸⁶ The *New Orleans*

⁸⁵ *New Orleans Times*, March 11, 17, 18, 1867.

⁸⁶ *New Orleans Times*, March 18, 1867, in *New York Herald*, March 25, 1867.

Times of March 19, commenting editorially on Longstreet's statement, said: "The opinion and advice of such a man will and ought to have a large and controlling influence over the sentiments of those of our fellow citizens, who may feel some hesitation in adopting the course he recommends, from an apprehension that it may have an aspect of abandonment and compromise of those who have held positions of prominence and incurred disfranchisement in the late war." In order to clarify the issues, the New York *Herald* on March 27 proposed a debate between Senators Henry Wilson and Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts and General Robert Schenck on one side, and Generals Wade Hampton and Longstreet and ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia on the other. In this connection it should be noted that in addition to Longstreet, General Wade Hampton of South Carolina, ex-Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, General Robert E. Lee in Virginia, Governor Robert M. Patton of Alabama, and others counseled acceptance of the harsh congressional terms.

The New Orleans *Times* on March 23 urged concerted action and proposed that "the prominent men of the South meet together in council, with a view of exchanging opinions, and agreeing on some definite line of action." Longstreet was joined by J. Q. A. Fellows, a lawyer in New Orleans, and General P. G. T. Beauregard, both of whom felt that "A futile resistance would only cause our rivets to be driven closer." Beauregard remarked: "Our people should understand that the radicals can remain in power only so long as public excitement is kept up." He thought that the choice was "between submission and affiliation with the voting Freedmen as the best means of future conduct."⁸⁷

On April 6, 1867, Longstreet, emboldened by the reception of his first letter, again addressed the editor of the New Orleans *Times* with the "bluntness of a soldier." After discussing the need for candor and for facing the reality of the situation in which the Southern people found themselves, he wrote: "Our duty resolves itself into two very simple propositions, viz.: to relieve ourselves from our present embarrassments by returning to our allegiance, in good faith, to the General Government the process laid down by Congress, or seek protection under some foreign government. Those who determine to remain should speed the work of reconstruction, and put our people in condition to make their own laws and choose their own officers for their execution." Longstreet enclosed a letter from John A. Campbell, a prominent lawyer in New Orleans who had served on the United States Supreme Court and then resigned to serve the Southern Confederacy. Camp-

⁸⁷ J. Q. A. Fellows to editor of New Orleans *Times*, March 20, 1867, in New Orleans *Times*, March 21, 1867; and Beauregard to *id.*, March 23, 1867, *ibid.*, March 26, 1867.

bell felt that the conditions of the military bills were harsh and rigorous but that with large exceptions, they afforded the means of restoring the supremacy of civil order and terminating the domination of military rule. He too urged submission, but he emphasized that the Southerners should not "surrender as those without hope." Christian Roselius, another prominent lawyer in New Orleans and reputedly a firm friend of the Union, also counseled submission to the will of Congress. However, he continued, "we have the consolation of knowing that the Commanding General who has been assigned to this District [Sheridan] is distinguished for his achievements in the field, but also for his desire and determination of protecting our rights so far as law and orders under which he acts will permit him to do. . . ." ³⁸

The local Republican politicians, most of them carpetbaggers, saw in Longstreet a powerful recruit—if he could be induced to affiliate publicly and actively with the party. Longstreet, on his part, had formed interesting connections with some of the more prominent of these Republicans. One of them, James F. Casey, was his friend. Another, John M. G. Parker, had come to New Orleans with General Butler, whose brother-in-law he was, and had been appointed postmaster; he held this position until he was removed in the spring of 1865 and replaced by J. G. Taliaferro (a Virginian resident in New Orleans, a Union supporter, and—later—a judge in the local courts). Still another was young H. C. Warmoth, formerly an officer in the Union army and since the close of the war a local leader of the Republican party in New Orleans.

On May 16, 1867, Parker, now a New Orleans businessman aspiring to public office, wrote Longstreet complimenting him on his letter of April 6 to the *New Orleans Times* and inviting him to attend a mass meeting in New Orleans to hear an address by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts. Parker closed his letter with a request for Longstreet's views on public affairs.³⁹ Longstreet was "much pleased to have the opportunity to hear Senator Wilson," who was on a tour "in order to examine conditions of the South, encourage the colored people and defend the policy of his party." After several weeks of consideration, Longstreet reaffirmed, in a letter to Parker, the political position which he had previously taken. He wrote:

The military bill and amendments are peace offerings. We should accept them as such, and place ourselves upon them as the starting point from which to meet future political issues as they arise. Like other Southern men, I naturally sought alliance with the Democratic party, merely because it was

³⁸ Longstreet to *id.*, April 6, 1867, *ibid.*, April 7, 1867; John A. Campbell to Longstreet, April 5, 1867, *ibid.*; Christian Roselius to Messrs. Clapp Brothers and Company, R. H. Morse, and others, April 6, 1867, *ibid.*

³⁹ J. M. G. Parker to Longstreet, May 16, 1867, in *New York Times*, June 11, 1867.

opposed to the Republican party. But as far as I can judge, there is nothing tangible about it except the issues that were staked upon the war and there lost. Finding nothing to take hold of except prejudice, which cannot be worked into good for any one, it is proper and right that I should seek some stand-point from which good may be done.

If I appreciate the principles of the Democratic party, its prominent features oppose the enfranchisement of the colored man, and deny the right to legislate upon the subject of suffrage, except by the States, individually. These two features have a tendency to exclude Southern men from that party; for the colored man is already enfranchised here, and we cannot seek alliance with a party that would restrict his rights. The exclusive right of the States to legislate upon suffrage will make the enfranchisement of the blacks, whether for better or for worse, a fixture amongst us. It appears, therefore, that those who cry loudest against this new order of things as a public calamity are those whose principles would fix it upon us without a remedy. Hence it becomes us to insist that suffrage should be extended in all of the States, and fully tested. The people of the North should adopt what they have forced upon us; and if it be proved to be a mistake, they should remove it by the remedy under republican principles of uniform laws upon suffrage. . . .⁴⁰

In answer to criticism of his letter to Parker, Longstreet wrote that he was "well satisfied that order cannot be organized out of confusion as long as the conflicting interests of two parties are to be subserved. The war was made upon Republican issues, and it seems to me fair and just that the settlement should be made accordingly. . . ." Longstreet continued: "The course that I advise will be sure to meet this view and do justice to all. In times of great ease and comfort I should not presume to interfere with politics, no matter what technicalities or special pleadings might be adopted by parties. But these are unusual times and call for practical advice. . . ."⁴¹

Longstreet's letter and his later statement caused considerable comment, favorable and unfavorable. He was welcomed by the Republican politicians, but as the *New Orleans Times* commented editorially: "As a party chief and leader in the party struggles for political power and patronage we fear the laurels he has so worthily won [as a soldier] are exposed to peril." It was Longstreet's apparent quest for Republican party preference and position, rather than his counsel of submission, that created the storm of bitter criticism from his former comrades-in-arms, supporters, and friends. Commenting editorially, the *New Orleans Times* said: "A portion of the Republican party seem to claim full right and title to General Longstreet . . . ;

⁴⁰ Elias Nason and Thomas Russell, *Life of Henry Wilson* (Boston, 1874), 384. For an account of this meeting and a summary of Senator Wilson's speech, see *New Orleans Times*, May 17, 1867; and Longstreet to Parker, June 3, 1867, *ibid.*, June 8, 1867. The version of the June 3, 1867, letter which was published by Longstreet, in *Manassas to Appomattox*, 636, differs considerably from the one which was printed in the *New Orleans Times*, the changes being largely a watering down of the statements as printed at the time.

⁴¹ Longstreet to editor of *New Orleans Times*, June 7, 1867, in *New Orleans Times*, June 8, 1867.

the more enthusiastic have, on several occasions, spoken of him as a very suitable candidate for the position of United States Senator, and there seems little doubt among them that full pardon and amnesty will be granted him by Congress. . . . The wishes of the General [however] do not seem to have been consulted." Longstreet, the ex-soldier, had essayed a most difficult role in politics; and though he was without experience, he was confident of his competence to counsel the Southern people on political matters of great import. In this connection it is interesting to note that before releasing his letter (dated June 3, 1867) to Parker, Longstreet went up to Oxford, Mississippi, to seek the advice of his uncle, Judge Longstreet, who was living there in retirement. The old gentleman read Longstreet's proposed letter "and thought there was much wisdom in it, but believed its expressions too direct, perhaps, certainly too direct for the time. 'It will ruin you, son, if you publish it. We are not ready yet to hear such hard counseling.' And then the General went away and published it anyhow raising such a storm of censure over his head as men do not often live through." Judge L. Q. C. Lamar, Judge Longstreet's son-in-law, wrote of Longstreet that "of the friends who had aligned themselves with the oppressors of the South, . . . [the General] had gone over bag and baggage to the conquerors. . . ." ⁴²

The New Orleans *Picayune* on June 9 devoted several columns to a criticism of Longstreet's action. On June 11 the New Orleans *Times* printed a long letter of criticism from Pat O'Brien, an ex-Confederate; and on June 15 the *Times* published a similar letter, captioned "Stick to the Faith of the Fathers," by "B.J.S." The New Orleans *Republican*, a recently organized Radical journal, fully approved of Longstreet's course and hoped that "not a week will have passed after the opening of Congress without restoring to General Longstreet the full rights of citizenship and without his being cordially recognized as a valued leader of the Republican party." ⁴³

The *Army and Navy Journal* on June 29, 1867, approved General Longstreet's action, remarking that "while some political journalists of the North are vilifying General Longstreet for having 'gone over to the enemy,' that is, to the cause of the Union, brother Confederate officers of all grades throughout the South are endorsing his position, and are ranging themselves shoulder to shoulder with him in the noble front rank of Southern soldiers who seek henceforth 'to keep step to the music of the Union.'" The Albany (New York) *Argus* was reported to have accused Longstreet of wanting to be elected to the United States Senate, but the Augusta (Georgia) *Chronicle*

⁴² *Ibid.*; John Donald Wade, *Augustus Baldwin Longstreet: A Study of the Development of Culture in the South* (New York, 1924), 355; Wirt Armistead Cate, *Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Secession and Reunion* (Chapel Hill, 1935), 30, 178.

⁴³ New Orleans *Republican*, June 8, 1867, in New York *Tribune*, June 10, 1867.

and *Sentinel* of July 11 was indignant at the General's action. The Galveston (Texas) *News*, however, approved of his course, while the Charlottesville (Virginia) *Chronicle* was neutral in the controversy. The Lowell (Massachusetts) *Daily Courier* of July 19, 1867, published a letter from John M. G. Parker (then visiting in Lowell) defending Longstreet's course; but Longstreet's friend General D. H. Hill, editor of the *Land We Love*, in Charlotte, North Carolina, considered that Longstreet's act was merely "a burnt offering" rather than "a peace offering." On the other hand, General M. Jeff Thompson, then in the commission business in New Orleans and a man of prominence in the Mississippi Valley, agreed "heartily in the sentiments of General Longstreet."⁴⁴ And so it went throughout the country, Republican and Radical papers generally approving and Democratic papers disapproving.

Some years later Longstreet "exploded a story . . . circulated for years, as an explanation of his connection with the Republican party. The common report has been that Longstreet made up his mind on this subject at a conference with several other well-known Confederate Generals soon after the close of the war; that they all agreed to indorse the policy of reconstruction; that Longstreet wrote a letter following out that idea and that in consequence of the abuse which this action brought upon Longstreet, the other Confederate Generals who had agreed to go into the movement with him 'backed out.'" When Longstreet was asked about this story, he had a different version, saying: "That is not a true statement of the facts. There never was such a meeting held in my office. . . ." After the above-mentioned call of the New Orleans *Times* for a statement from leading Confederates, Gen-

⁴⁴ Albany *Argus*, in *Harper's Weekly* (New York), XI (July 13, 1867), 435; Augusta *Chronicle and Sentinel*, in *New York Times*, July 15, 1867; Galveston *News*, *ibid.*, July 30, 1867; Charlottesville *Chronicle* (comments from New Orleans *Republican* on views expressed in Charlottesville *Chronicle*), in Lowell (Mass.) *Daily Courier*, July 19, 1867; editorial, in *Land We Love*, III (August, 1867), 55-56; Thompson to George D. Prentice, editor of *Louisville Journal*, June 16, 1867, in *New York Times*, June 24, 1867.

The sincerity of Longstreet's attitude at this time can hardly be questioned, whatever his actions were. On June 26, 1867, he wrote his sister Sarah, then the wife of Judge Charles B. Ames of Macon, Miss.: ". . . for months I have prayed to God to guide me, and help me, to devise honorable means by which our people might be saved from the extremity of distress. The letters that are published are the result of my meditations, and His divine aid. They were written because I thought it a duty that I owed to our people, and if I had failed to discharge it I should have been troubled with the neglect of so important a duty upon my death bed. If the people accept my counsel God will bless and prosper them. If they reject it I tremble at the contemplation of our future. I am relieved in any event, as it cannot be charged upon me that I failed to counsel them in their hour of need." A week later, on July 8, 1867, he again wrote: "I have never had any doubt as to the final course of our people, but must confess that I was disappointed somewhat at the extreme harshness of some of our people toward me. I believe now as Gen. Hood says: 'They would crucify you!' but I think this number small and I am a little suspicious that he is one of them. My only trust is in God and sometimes when I begin to think that I might have remained quiet and had the admiration of none I am reminded of the duty that I felt that I owed to God above all others." (These two letters are used by courtesy of Longstreet's grandnephew, Ben Ames Williams.)

eral Hood met with Longstreet, according to the latter, and the two men discussed the editorial call. "That evening," Longstreet said, "I wrote my letter on reconstruction to the [New Orleans] *Times*. . . ." Longstreet said further that he did not consult General Joseph Wheeler in the matter: "If I did tread the wine press alone, I did so on my own motion. . . ." ⁴⁵

Longstreet's memory may have been at fault in his failure to recollect the alleged meeting nearly twenty-five years later; or he may have preferred after the event to claim entire credit for an act, in the consequences of which he was the sole sufferer. In any case there are other clear accounts of the alleged meeting which seem to indicate that not one, but two, such meetings were held and that Generals Wheeler, Beauregard, Hood, Buckner, and Longstreet were present. One of the accounts says: "Longstreet was selected to write and publish a letter. He did it. There was a howl of protest from ill-informed people. The men who advised Longstreet to do this did not face this opposition, avoided this martyr, let him bear the odium alone. . . ." ⁴⁶

In this connection it should be noted that the subsequent criticism and alleged, if not real, ostracism of General Longstreet were the result of his joining actively with, and accepting office from, the Republican Party rather than of his advice to Southerners to submit to the arbitrary acts of the Radical Republican Congress. It is true that in later years other ex-Confederates accepted office from the Republicans; but Longstreet was among the first to do so, and he was also the most prominent. In addition, he had the misfortune to be identified with the unsavory phases of Reconstruction as an officeholder of the party and the factions which were lining their own pockets at the expense of the disfranchised citizens in the community and state.

In order to secure authoritative support for his action, General Longstreet wrote a number of letters to prominent ex-Confederates, in each case enclosing "slips of paper containing my letters [that is, newspaper clippings of them]." The most prominent of those from whom he sought personal endorsement was his old commander, General Robert E. Lee. Longstreet wrote:

⁴⁵ Account of an interview of Longstreet with a reporter of the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* on June 2, 1890, in St. Louis, Mo., in Macon (Ga.) *Telegraph*, June 5, 1890, in *New York Times*, June 8, 1890.

⁴⁶ Account by Colonel James M. Kennard, in Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 244-45; and account by General Samuel H. Moore, in *Chattanooga Times*, in *ibid.*, 257-58. Still a third account is that by General Dabney H. Maury in a letter to the editor of the *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, dated July 11, 1893, which was reprinted, under the title "General Longstreet," in William Buckner McGroarty, "Maury on Longstreet," in *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine* (Richmond, Va.), XVIII (July, 1936), 5-7. In this letter Maury said that Longstreet arranged for a meeting in his office and that "Out of 17 generals of the Confederacy then in New Orleans, only four were present. . . . Nothing was decided," but another meeting was called. In the meantime, Longstreet released his letter of April 6, 1867. "Then the vials of wrath of the whole Southern press and people were poured out upon him and he was generally tabooed."

"I send my letters to ask that you will give the subject your careful consideration and if consistent with your ideas, give me your personal endorsement. Your opinion in support of my views will satisfy the people in position in six months more. . . . If you can come to approve my views, please write me or publish a letter to that effect. . . ." ⁴⁷

Because Longstreet had concluded his letter by saying, "I expect to go to Mexico next week and shall not be back under fifty or sixty days [as] I have special business there which requires . . . the trip," Lee did not hasten his reply. He was preparing for an extended visit to White Sulphur Springs for the benefit of Mrs. Lee's health; and as he could not write such a letter as Longstreet desired, he decided to defer his reply until his return to Lexington. When Lee did write, his letter was of no help to Longstreet. He commented:

I have avoided all discussion of political questions since the cessation of hostilities. And have in my own conduct and in my recommendations to others, endeavored to conform to existing circumstances. I consider this the part of wisdom as well as of duty. But while I think we should act under the law and according to the law imposed upon us, I cannot think the course pursued by the dominant political party the best for the interests of the country, and therefore cannot say so, or give them any approval. This is the reason why I could not comply with the request in your letter. . . . ⁴⁸

This letter, so far as is known, terminated Longstreet's correspondence with Lee.

In connection with the apparent calm with which Longstreet's first letter of March 18, 1867, was received and the storm raised by his letter of June 3, 1867, and his subsequent comment of June 7, 1867, it should be noted that the situation in New Orleans had been substantially altered by the actions of the commander of the Fifth Military District, who had the authority to enforce military control of New Orleans and other places in his district. Much of the support accorded General Sheridan when he first arrived in New Orleans in June, 1865, was predicated on a belief that he would be fair and honorable in the exercise of his authority. The first blow to this belief was Sheridan's absence from New Orleans in the summer of 1866, when the July 30 riot occurred. Some placed entire responsibility for the riot on Sheridan. One editor wrote: "Had General Sheridan remained at his post . . . or had even his second in command, General Baird, acting in his absence, brought his troops into the city as he agreed, before the meeting of the Convention, there would have been no riot to make the subject of a voluminous one-sided Congressional report, and a pretext for the Reconstruction Acts of the Fed-

⁴⁷ Longstreet to Lee, June 8, 1867, in Duke University Library, Durham, N.C.

⁴⁸ Lee to Longstreet, October 29, 1867, in John William Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee, Soldier and Man* (New York and Washington, 1906), 394.

eral Government. . . ." ⁴⁹ So far as the later attitude toward Longstreet is concerned, it should be noted that he not only acquiesced in the Military Reconstruction Acts (as, perforce, did many others), but by his subsequent conduct seemed to give his approval to them.

On the last day of January, 1867, General Sheridan and his staff left New Orleans for Washington. Sheridan went to the Federal capital to report on the situation in New Orleans and along the Mexican border; to testify before a congressional committee which was investigating the riot of July 30, 1866; and to furnish support for, and testimony favoring the enactment of, the Military Government Act, then being debated in Congress. He was back in New Orleans by the end of February, coached by the Radicals in Congress as to how to enforce the Military Government Act and primed and ready to clean out all "soldiers or actors and abettors in the rebellion . . . elected on Confederate grounds and [holding office] solely . . . to destroy the General Government." Absurd as this charge was, it served Sheridan as justification for his subsequent brutal, unreasonable, and biased conduct in his remodeling of the governments of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana.⁵⁰

Sheridan did not waste any time before going into action. In the same week that the New Orleans *Times* published its appeal for the "Views of Prominent Men" as to how the situation posed by the Military Government Act and Sheridan's enforcement of it could best be met, Governor Wells was impeached and later removed from office. This was followed by the removal of both Attorney-General A. S. Herron and Mayor of New Orleans John T. Monroe. Next came the announcement: "Elections [to replace these officials] will *not* be held."⁵¹ The men had been removed to punish them "for impeding" Reconstruction, Sheridan later declared. It was soon abundantly clear to Southerners that this charge of impeding Reconstruction could be made an excuse for removing any officeholder whose speeches or actions displeased Sheridan and the Radicals. Sheridan alone, without benefit of legal advice or court order, made the removals.

These acts created a clamor for Sheridan's removal. The New York *Times* of May 24, 1867, remarked: "The king-bee of Louisiana conservative radicalism, a well known politician, is studiously working for this change"; but rumors such as this were hardly fleabites on Sheridan's thick skin. The peace offerings, as Longstreet had termed the Military Bill and amendments, were

⁴⁹ New Orleans *Picayune*, March 5, 1871, in Fayette Copeland, "The New Orleans Press and the Reconstruction," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* (New Orleans), XXX (January, 1947), 254 n.

⁵⁰ New York *Times*, February 1, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 1867; report of General P. H. Sheridan, commanding Fifth Military District, November 21, 1867, in New York *Times*, December 18, 1867.

⁵¹ New York *Herald*, March 19, 1867.

rapidly changing to flails with which to humiliate and control the people of New Orleans and Louisiana. Sheridan, who hardly a year previous, before he had been inoculated with the views of Radicalism, had counseled restraint and urged that the North "only wait and trust to a little time and the working of natural causes," now was charged "with being tyrannical and partisan."⁵²

But these charges did not dissuade Sheridan in his determination to rid the city and state governments of any trace of rebel sympathizers. On August 1 he removed the members of the New Orleans Board of Aldermen from office for alleged inefficiency, and on August 13 he removed the New Orleans city treasurer for the same reason. By this time Sheridan's rule in New Orleans had generated so much ill feeling and clamor that on August 27, 1867, an order was issued for his removal, effective September 5, 1867, and he was recalled to Washington. He later attempted to justify his conduct, asserting that he had only been carrying out his orders in the face of opposition from nearly every civil officer within his command. Without embarrassment, he asserted: "In all my dealings . . . I was governed by honor, justice and truth; no political influence or interests were allowed to control my actions. I carried out the law with satisfaction to all except those whom it disfranchised and a set of dishonest political tricksters whom I had previously denounced and who sought to make use of the law to obtain place and position. . . ." ⁵³ This statement was sent to Sheridan's friend, General Grant, who had already been designated to succeed Andrew Johnson as president. Sheridan presumably anticipated that his report would be valuable ammunition for the Radicals in their campaign to dispose of Johnson and place Grant in the presidential mansion.

In any consideration of the aftereffects on Longstreet of his action not only in counseling submission but also in throwing his lot with the Republican party, the acts of Sheridan, who at first had been thought by most Southerners to be a fair and reasonable man, must be kept in mind. Longstreet undoubtedly was sincere in his motives; but as events transpired, his adhesion to, and support of, the Republican party looked like treachery—if not like actual bribery. Longstreet had deliberately parted with his friends and business associates; and he was to pay for his apparent apostasy, with interest, over a long period of years. Unfortunately, during these years he did nothing to regain the position of confidence and respect which he had held before he had the temerity to enter a political ring filled with the worst assortment of politicians ever assembled in American history. Deceit, corruption, brutal and unscrupulous methods, and—when necessary—murder were among the

⁵² Beale, *Critical Year*, 50.

⁵³ Sheridan's report, in *New York Times*, December 18, 1867.

tools which they used to accomplish their ends. Regardless of Longstreet's own scrupulous conduct and honest performance, he was known by the company he kept; and more than once he was called on to execute orders and support crooked politicians to his own ultimate disadvantage and loss of reputation and popular respect.

Apparently because of the public furor created by Sheridan's acts and Longstreet's association with the factions and forces supporting Sheridan, the General decided to take his family and himself out of New Orleans—at least for a time. Additional impetus was afforded by the fact that the yellow fever and cholera seasons were approaching. By early September yellow fever was raging in New Orleans, but by that time Longstreet had left the city. On June 19, 1867, before departing, not for Mexico, as he had written General Lee, but for the North, he had been granted a pardon "upon written and personal applications of many prominent officers of the army including General Grant and Senators and Representatives."⁵⁴ The *Washington National Intelligencer* of June 22, 1867, commented: "This, we believe, is about the first case of the exercise of the pardoning prerogative where the party left the United States Army to enter that of the Confederacy." Whatever Longstreet might say to the contrary, the fact that his pardon came so soon after his announcement of his determination not only to accept the Military Government Act but also to cast his lot with the Radicals made it look as if his pardon was his reward for his action.

By midsummer Longstreet, with his family, was in Lynchburg. On the last day of August he was reported to be in Hartford, Connecticut, on his way to northern New England. Undoubtedly he was in and out of Washington during this period. His new political associate, William P. Kellogg, the collector of customs in New Orleans, who was "said to be involved in bank frauds" in New Orleans, was at this time in Washington on a leave of absence; John M. G. Parker, another New Orleans political associate, to whom Longstreet had addressed his fateful letter of June 3, 1867, was in Lowell, Massachusetts; and General M. Jeff Thompson, another Longstreet political associate and supporter, was in Boston during this summer of 1867. It is reasonable to suppose that Longstreet met these various friends and newly chosen co-workers during this period. Parker wrote a strong defense of Longstreet's course, which was printed in the *Lowell Daily Courier* of July 19 and widely reprinted in Northern newspapers.⁵⁵

Undoubtedly Longstreet called on Grant and on Sheridan, who reached Washington by September 20, 1867, after a two weeks' journey from New

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, June 20, 21, 1867.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, June 19, September 5, 12, 1867; *Lowell Daily Courier*, July 19, 1867.

Orleans, which was marked en route by constant ovations and speeches of approval. By December Longstreet was back in New Orleans, but he remained there only long enough to close out his cotton-brokerage business of "Longstreet, Owen & Co." and to transfer his insurance interests to his friend General Hood. Longstreet was not poor during this period; in fact, a year later he was reported as "being in no need of the receipts of office, his circumstances being easy."⁵⁶

Early in January, 1868, as Longstreet "was passing Knoxville on the cars . . . two police officers came into the car to serve on him a warrant of arrest for treason. As they had the name wrong, [Longstreet] denied that he was the man called for and while they went out to correct it, the train moved off. We had supposed that the General had proved his loyalty so fully by his reconstruction letter that he was in no danger of annoyance." A week later Longstreet was in Lynchburg. He settled his family there, and during the next several years the town served him as a base of operations.⁵⁷

Presumably, in the months that followed, Longstreet was back and forth between Lynchburg and Washington, developing interest in, and support of, his efforts to secure a removal of his political disabilities, which would make it possible for him to accept public office should an opportunity to do so present itself. On February 20, 1868, William Bingham, congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill designed to grant amnesty to a number of prominent Confederate leaders, including General Longstreet, Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, Judge J. L. Orr of South Carolina, and others. The bill (H.R. 778) was read and ordered to lie on the table; but a month later, on March 17, 1868, it was taken up and discussed. Opposition to the inclusion of General Longstreet among those to be benefited was based on the claim that nothing had been presented by General Longstreet himself or by his advocates to show that the General had repented of the part which he had taken in the late civil conflict. General John A. Logan, congressman from Illinois, said that Longstreet was to be relieved of his political disabilities "because he wrote a letter accepting the situation." Logan wanted (as did others) better evidence of Longstreet's repentance; he insisted that "every rebel general would write [a letter] to be relieved from disability under the law" if Longstreet should be so favored. After more debate of like nature, the bill was recommitted on March 17, 1868, by a vote of 65 to 41.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Cf. *New York Times*, September 7-21, 1867, *passim*; *New York World*, n.d., quoted in Richmond (Va.) *Daily Enquirer and Examiner*, March 16, 1869.

⁵⁷ Charlottesville (Va.) *Chronicle*, January 7, 1868, in *New York Times*, January 11, 1868; Longstreet to E. P. Alexander, January 19, 1868, in Duke University Library.

⁵⁸ *Congressional Globe* (Washington, 1834-73), 40 Cong., 2 Sess., 1906, 1927, 1930, 1933-34.

Three months later, in mid-June, 1868, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by General John F. Farnsworth of Illinois "to relieve from disabilities certain persons in States [North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia] lately in Rebellion." Longstreet's name was included in a long list of beneficiaries, his residence being given as Alabama, the state from which he had been appointed to West Point. This bill was debated in both House and Senate. Longstreet had strong supporters, including General Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts; and on June 24, 1868, the bill passed and became an act of the Congress—H.R. 1059. Longstreet was now free from any political disabilities; he could vote and hold both Federal and state offices.⁵⁹ Longstreet's staunchest advocate and sponsor had been his friend Grant. The ex-Confederate was now able to move about freely and to seek public office with the assurance that there were no legal obstacles to his confirmation and installation.

Longstreet does not appear to have returned to New Orleans immediately. In mid-August he was reported to have left Washington with his friend and classmate General W. S. Rosecrans for White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, where General Lee and other prominent ex-Confederates were gathering. Rosecrans was promoting a plan to procure from leading Southerners and ex-Confederates "a statement of their acceptance of the results of the war and of their willingness to deal justly with the negroes" which could be used to promote the candidacy of Horatio Seymour and his running mate, Frank P. Blair, in the forthcoming presidential campaign. Such a letter was written, but Longstreet was not one of the signators. There is no evidence that he was present, though it was reported that General Lee had "summoned General Longstreet [and others] to White Sulphur Springs to join with him in proclaiming the terms upon which the South would return to the Union."⁶⁰

Instead of going to White Sulphur Springs, General Longstreet went first to visit his former staff officer and his later associate in Louisiana, John W. Fairfax, at his home, "Oak Hill," the former residence of President James Monroe, near Leesburg, Virginia. A correspondent wrote the *New York Tribune* on August 20, 1868, that "General Longstreet . . . was in [Leesburg] on Tuesday [August 18]. . . . While General Longstreet was at the hotel, no one called on him, although many of his old command live here, for the simple reason, as we suppose, that Congress has seen fit to remove his political disabilities, and because he was patriotic enough to prefer the Republican party to the Democratic." After a brief visit with Colonel Fairfax, Longstreet went to New York City, where on August 24, 1868, at the New

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 3306-3307, 3366-67, 3444; *The Statutes at Large of the United States of America* (Boston and Washington, 1845—), XV, 356.

⁶⁰ *New York Tribune*, August 19, 22, 24, 26, 1868; *Freeman, Lee*, IV, 372-79.

Lexington Ma; 21 Oct 1868

1st Sir

Gen Longstreet I understand has closed his business in New Orleans & I do not know his present address. When I last heard of him he was in New York.

I have always entertained a high opinion of Gen Longstreet's character for uprightness integrity & honesty & should rejoice at any good that may befall him.

I do not know whether the position you refer to would be agreeable to him or not.

Very respectfully

I concur with you

in this estimate of the character of Gen Longstreet.

Very respectfully
Wm. B. Ransom

Wm. B. Ransom

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR LONGSTREET FROM LEE ENDORSED IN 1883 OR 1884 BY GRANT

The original is in the New York Public Library. This letter is believed to be the only paper bearing the signatures of both Lee and Grant except for the surrender documents.

York Hotel, he was interviewed by a reporter from the *Tribune*, who had called to get his views on the forthcoming presidential campaign and affairs in the Southern states.

With respect to the presidency, Longstreet remarked that prior to the nominations, which went to Grant and Seymour, S. P. Chase had been his choice. Longstreet thought that if Chase had been nominated, he could have been elected. But as Chase was not nominated and Longstreet did not feel that he could vote for Seymour, Grant was, as he said, "my man. I believe he is a fair man."⁶¹

Longstreet also expressed decided opinions on the prospects for the South. He thought that there were better days ahead, since the cotton crop was very large. The Negro could be relied on, he felt, because "he keeps his contracts in regard to labor," although generally ignorant on intricate matters of business. It was Longstreet's opinion that the Negroes "like to have a white man come out in the field and tell them what to do." There was, however, "always a class of lazy men who would sit in their houses and give their orders. These men deserve to have trouble." Though Longstreet had advised his friends to accept the Reconstruction Acts and come into the Union and "try to bring about peace and prosperity," he thought "it silly to think of" Negro supremacy, as "that can never be."⁶²

While Longstreet was in New York City, he apparently called on several prominent businessmen with whom he hoped he might become associated in one way or another. One of them, William Barclay Parsons, an engineer, apparently thought well of Longstreet and his qualifications and may have had some thought of offering him employment, as he later wrote General Lee inquiring for Longstreet's address. Lee replied that he was unable to furnish the address: "When I last heard of him he was in New York." Lee did, however, write: "I have always entertained a high opinion of Genl Longstreet's character . . . & should rejoice at any good that may befall him. I do not know whether the position you refer to would be agreeable to him or not."⁶³

Apparently Longstreet went from New York back to New Orleans, as on September 16, 1868, he visited the Louisiana legislature and "was invited to a seat inside the bar. A recess was taken to receive him." It is probable that in his speech of response he took advantage of the opportunity to speak in favor of the presidential candidacy of his friend General Grant. He did not

⁶¹ *New York Tribune*, June 12, 1868, and *Philadelphia Evening Star*, June 15, 1868, in Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868; the Democratic Effort to Regain Control* (New York, 1933), 132; interview in *New York Tribune*, August 24, 1868.

⁶² *New York Tribune*, August 24, 1868.

⁶³ Lee to Parsons, October 21, 1868, in *New York Public Library*.

remain long in New Orleans, probably having gone there only to check on the local political situation. On October 26 he was back in Washington, where he called on General Grant; from Washington he went to Lynchburg to be with his wife and family during the Christmas holiday and probably also to vote. Lynchburg was not too far from Washington should it be desirable or necessary for him to go to the capital relative to an appointment under the incoming President and his Republican administration.⁶⁴

On November 24, 1868, Longstreet wrote a long letter to his kinsman John H. Dent, a resident of Cane Springs, Georgia, setting forth his estimate of General Grant and his plan for Reconstruction and urging Southern support of the laws of Congress. Longstreet characterized Grant as "a natural man" whose "administration will be applied to [a] complete and prosperous restoration" of the Union. "Laws must encourage and protect [the labor] essential to make wealth available" and to restore the wealth of the South. "The politicians of the old school," he said, "who urge the importance of rejecting all propositions coming from the Republican party" must be replaced.⁶⁵

Longstreet was now all but a Republican officeholder. The soldier, having turned to politics, was to remain in the political arena either as an officeholder or as an aspirant to office for the remainder of his life.

⁶⁴ *New York Times*, September 18, October 27, 1868.

⁶⁵ This letter, originally published in the Atlanta *New Era* of December 24, 1868, was widely reprinted. The *New York Herald* of December 28 described it as from "the war horse of Lee's army . . . [a] renowned and much abused gentleman."

Louisiana Radical

GENERAL LONGSTREET APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IN AND OUT OF WASHINGTON, especially during January and February of 1869; and presumably he was present at General Grant's inauguration as President of the United States on March 4, 1869. Six days later, on March 10, President Grant sent to the United States Senate Longstreet's nomination to the post of surveyor of the port of New Orleans at a salary of six thousand dollars per annum plus other benefits.¹ There does not seem to have been anything accidental or impulsive about this act. Rather, all signs indicate that it was deliberately planned. Under the circumstances, Longstreet could stay in New Orleans only if he had both position and income; by appointing Longstreet surveyor, Grant was placing both a friend and a political ally and supporter in an important spot.

The nomination raised a storm of criticism and disapproval. Some, however, thought that the nomination would do a great deal of good in the South in helping to restore peace and order. The nomination was characterized as an experiment; but it was opposed both by Southern Unionists, who had suffered social degradation and ostracism during the war, and by adventurers in politics from the North, who planned to keep "the class eligible to office . . . as conveniently small as possible." A writer to the *New York Tribune* asked if Longstreet's nomination was "the reward for having been a traitor," but the *Tribune* in reply stated that the nomination was "an indication that men are not to be forever excluded from office because they were engaged in the late Rebellion."² The *New York Times* of March 12 called the nomination an attempt to allay resentment and restore peace in the South; but the *Richmond Enquirer and Examiner* of the same date commented: "So Ho! . . . and that's the maining of 'loilty' of one of Lee's lieutenants, is it?" The editor of the *Brooklyn Eagle* remarked: "To poverty and immortality [Longstreet] has preferred ostracism and wealth, and there is not a genuine man of either party but despises his swift recantation and swifter search for spoils." Longstreet's former friend and classmate General D. H. Hill editorially commented: "Our scalawag is the local leper of the community. Unlike the carpet bagger, he is a

¹ *Richmond Enquirer and Examiner*, March 12, 16, 1869.

² *New York Tribune*, March 12, 15, 1869; *Brooklyn Eagle*, March 12, 1869.

native, which is so much the worse. . . ." Speaking generally, the *Augusta Daily Constitutionalist* of August 15, 1867, remarked that Southerners preferred in office "the blackest man that can be found to the whitest renegades of the South . . . those who have dishonored the dignity of the white blood, and are traitors alike to principle and race."³ The clamor and criticism rose to such a pitch that Longstreet contemplated making "a peremptory declination" of the office to which he had been nominated. He gave as his reason not an unwillingness to serve in the position but rather a reluctance to "compromise or reflect upon a too affectionate kindness of his illustrious kinsman and late antagonist, the President of the United States."⁴ However, he either changed his mind about declining the office himself or was induced to do so by his friends.

There was considerable discussion both in and out of Congress concerning Longstreet's confirmation, and opposition to the nomination developed rapidly. It was considered at one or more meetings of the Senate Committee on Nominations and was then reported back for the action of the Senate without any recommendation. The nomination was taken up in executive session on April 1, at which time Senator W. G. Brownlow of Tennessee "made a terrible onslaught on [Longstreet], reciting his services to the rebellion and his course toward Union men in Tennessee and maintaining that his confirmation for so important and lucrative a position would be an insult to the dead and an insult to the living." Senators Simon Cameron and T. A. Scott of Pennsylvania opposed confirmation because of Longstreet's "alleged cruel and heartless conduct while marching through Pennsylvania to Gettysburg. . . ." On Saturday, April 3, 1869, after nine hours of debate on the nomination, the Senate confirmed the appointment by a vote of 25 to 10.⁵ It was rumored by General Longstreet's friends that he would remain in New Orleans for only a short time, as it was expected that General D. E. Sickles would decline the Mexican mission and Longstreet would be nominated. Such was not to be the case, however. The next day General Longstreet paid his respects to President Grant and called at the Treasury and War Departments. He had already called on General Sheridan, who was hoping for restoration to the command in New Orleans from which he had been so unceremoniously relieved in the early fall of 1867. However, the new President was not ready to make this gesture of defiance to public opinion in New Orleans. Perhaps

³ *Greensboro Herald*, April 15, 1869, cited in E. Merton Coulter, *The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877*, in *A History of the South*, VIII (Baton Rouge, 1947), 125; *Land We Love*, VI (November, 1868), 87.

⁴ Correspondence of *New York World*, quoted in *New York Tribune*, March 15, 1869.

⁵ *New York Times*, March 20, April 1, 1869; *New York Tribune*, April 2, 5, 1869; E. Merton Coulter, *William G. Brownlow, Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands* (Chapel Hill, 1937), 389.

he felt that he had gone as far as he could, in appointing General Longstreet to an important Federal position in New Orleans.⁶

On Thursday, April 8, 1869, Longstreet was reported planning to leave Washington; presumably he went via Lynchburg and was joined there by his family.⁷ He was back in Louisiana by the middle of April to take up his new duties as surveyor of customs of the port of New Orleans. The collector of customs arrived in the city about the same time. General Longstreet, now officially recognized as a Republican, at once associated himself with the group of political adventurers who, for the next eight years, were to make of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana a political cesspool, notorious in American political history. Longstreet was the only ex-Confederate of prominence in the newly organized government, though there were others of lesser rank and prominence who went along with the Republicans in order to help reconstruct the state in the interests of its citizens so far as that should be possible and at the same time to derive an income that would enable them to live in comfort. Longstreet's more prominent co-workers and associates were H. C. Warmoth, the recently elected governor of Louisiana; James F. Casey; C. W. Lowell, the postmaster of New Orleans and subsequently the speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives; S. B. Packard, the United States marshal; William P. Kellogg, a recently elected United States senator; Hugh J. Campbell, a district judge and later a general officer in the state militia; and General M. Jeff Thompson, the state engineer. There were others, carpetbaggers and political adventurers, who were prominent for varying periods of time in the political Reconstruction history of the state. But the above-named were Longstreet's principal associates, to whom he looked for support and preferment. Throughout this period of Longstreet's stay in Louisiana, his activity was entirely political, as he supported first Warmoth and then Kellogg as the head of the party and state political machine. Longstreet does not appear to have engaged extensively in any business activity, except in his role as a politician; and while at a later date he spoke of his interests in Louisiana as requiring his attention, no evidence has been found to indicate that these interests were of any business consequence.

Longstreet, as well as Hugh J. Campbell, displayed an interest in the schools and in the development of educational facilities for the young men of the state. In consequence of this interest, he was invited to attend the commencement exercises at the Louisiana State Seminary at Alexandria on June 30, 1869. He declined the invitation with regret on account of the press of other duties.⁸

⁶ *New York Tribune*, April 5, 6, 1869; *New York Herald*, March 15, 1869.

⁷ *Richmond Enquirer and Examiner*, April 6, 1869.

⁸ Longstreet to David F. Boyd, June 3, 1869, in David F. Boyd MSS., Department of Archives, Louisiana State University. Hugh J. Campbell was born near Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, in 1833

Just what these duties were is not apparent, though it is likely that Longstreet expected to be in Virginia at commencementtime. He was in New Orleans on June 28, but he apparently went north soon afterwards. A son, Fitz Randolph Longstreet, was born to Mrs. Longstreet, who was then with relatives in Lynchburg, on July 1; and on the next day Longstreet's oldest son, John Garland Longstreet, was graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, where he had been in attendance since early in 1866. No mention of the General's attendance at the commencement exercises has been found, and it is possible that he was not able to be present. On July 30, 1869, however, he was reported as at Saratoga Springs, New York, where he may have gone with Mrs. Longstreet. His stay there presumably was brief; and it may be assumed that he returned to Lynchburg and from there went south with his family to New Orleans, where he took up his new duties in the customs office in earnest.⁹

It is not clear what part, if any, General Longstreet played in the political affairs of the city and the state during the latter half of 1869. Governor Warmoth, who had been in office for nearly a year, later wrote that during those months he "had gotten [his] government into fairly good shape and the people had begun to settle down and accept the situation"; but about the end of 1869, Warmoth discovered that he had a serious factional controversy on his hands.¹⁰ During this period Longstreet seems to have attended diligently to his duties as surveyor of customs of the port of New Orleans, at the same time lending what support he could to Governor Warmoth and his administration. No record of Longstreet's active participation in the developing factional quarrels has been found; nor has any record been found of his participation in the business and social life of New Orleans other than that incident to fulfilling the duties of his office.

Longstreet's loyalty to Governor Warmoth soon began to reap its reward. Early in Warmoth's administration the Louisiana legislature, with the Governor's approval, began granting subsidies to railroads, most of which were

or 1834 and as a young man moved to Muscatine, Iowa. At the outbreak of the Civil War he enlisted in the First Iowa Volunteer Infantry and was wounded at the battle of Wilson's Creek. After his recovery and discharge, he was commissioned a major in the Eighteenth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, rising to command of the regiment. Most of his service was in the Trans-Mississippi Department. After the close of the war he was mustered out in New Orleans, remaining there to engage in law practice and in politics, in which latter occupation he rose rapidly. He sponsored the Louisiana Lottery, served as judge of the Fourth Judicial District, engaged in railroad speculations and promotions, and attained the rank of major general in the Louisiana state militia. After the close of Reconstruction he was appointed United States judge in Dakota Territory, where he served until 1885; after his retirement from the bench, he lived and practiced law in Yankton, South Dakota, where he died on April 18, 1898.

⁹ Longstreet to former President Andrew Johnson, June 28, 1869, in Andrew Johnson Papers; New York *Herald*, August 1, 1869.

¹⁰ Henry C. Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction: Stormy Days in Louisiana* (New York, 1930), 88.

only in the promotional stage. By the end of Warmoth's term in office, a total of nearly twenty million dollars of contingent debt had been accumulated by the state. In the process, several questionable transactions had been negotiated, notably the sale of the stock of the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad, held by the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana, to Henry S. McComb of Wilmington, Delaware. The stock was bought for about one eighth of its book value and was immediately resold by McComb to the Illinois Central Railroad for a substantial profit. (This right of way now constitutes the main line of the Illinois Central from Jackson, Mississippi, to New Orleans.)¹¹

While the McComb negotiations were in progress, the Louisiana legislature approved on March 16, 1870, an act extending a previous charter granted October 14, 1868, and guaranteeing bonds issued by the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad, which was to be built from New Orleans to Meridian, Mississippi, a distance of nearly two hundred miles. (This right of way is now used for the main line of the Southern Railway System into New Orleans.) At the first meeting of the stockholders on April 2, 1870, General Longstreet was elected a director of the company; on April 7, he was elected vice president; and on June 8, he was elected president. It is probable that he was elected both to represent the interests of the state of Louisiana and to give authority to, and create confidence in the honesty of, the undertaking by having at its head a man of reputation and known honesty. Nothing has been found to indicate Longstreet's participation in the activities of the railroad beyond the fact that he was chairman of a committee appointed to prepare a set of bylaws for the new company.¹²

On April 5, 1870, Governor Warmoth approved the Militia Bill, passed at his behest, and thus added another link to the chain of his control of the state. Before long the Governor controlled the metropolitan police of New Orleans, the state militia, the appointment of all election officials (through a device known as the Returning Board), and the most powerful court of Orleans Parish, known as the Eighth District Court. Longstreet was appointed adjutant general of the state of Louisiana on May 13, 1870, and in this capacity he controlled—subject to the governor's orders—the military forces of the state. He set about his work of organization without delay; and on June 14, 1870, he was ordered to proceed at once to Washington, D.C., presumably to secure from the Federal government, either by gift, loan, or purchase, arms with

¹¹ Francis Byers Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth, Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXX (April, 1947), 580-81.

¹² Letter and memorandum from Henry L. Walker (assistant general solicitor, New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company) to the writer, August 3, 1948; *Charter, Prospective Report and By-Laws (of the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company)* (New Orleans, 1871), 7.

which to equip the newly authorized state militia.¹⁸ Longstreet thus had come to be a man of more than passing importance. He held a Federal position as surveyor of customs of the port of New Orleans at a salary of six thousand dollars per annum, plus fees of varying but indeterminate amounts; he was president of a railroad company, presumably with some sort of a salary, although how much is not known; he was the ranking officer in authority in the military organization of the state at a salary of three thousand dollars per annum. His total income was probably, at a minimum, somewhere between ten and fifteen thousand dollars per annum.

Governor Warmoth was attempting to bind his supporters and associates to him with more than party loyalty. Position, power, and assured income all could be powerful incentives to personal loyalty and support, and such attachments were becoming daily more necessary. Hardly a year after Warmoth's inauguration as governor and less than twelve months after Grant's inauguration, rifts began to appear in the harmony of New Orleans Republicanism. One of the powerful incentives to the presence of Northern carpetbaggers and Southern supporters in New Orleans was the expectation of opportunities to feed at the public trough in Federal, state, and municipal offices. It was expected that all Democrats or nonsupporters of the party in power would be replaced in office by "true Republicans." In many cases this was done, but in the customs service less than 25 per cent of those holding office in January, 1870, were Republicans; all the others were either holdovers or newly appointed Democrats—and this in spite of the fact that the newly appointed collector of customs, James F. Casey, was both a brother-in-law and an appointee of the Republican President, Grant. The United States senators and congressmen from Louisiana wanted these offices—and, in fact, *all* offices—made available to them for the appointment of friends and supporters. Late in 1869 a concentrated effort was made to get Casey out of his office of collector of customs. Petitions written and sponsored by the Republican senators and congressmen and demanding Casey's removal began to find their way to Washington. It was reported that he had taken no part in the Civil War, claiming to be a neutral Kentuckian who could not take sides; that he had "shown himself utterly incompetent for the proper discharge of the duties of his high and responsible office" (a charge based largely on his policy of continuing Democrats in office instead of replacing them with Republicans); and that he had ignored all suggestions and requests that he mend his ways.

Though he took no part in the movement against Casey but rather supported

¹⁸ Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth," *loc. cit.*, 600-603; *Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana . . . Second Session of the Second Legislature . . . 1872* (New Orleans, 1872), 6, 28. Hereinafter cited as *Acts . . . Louisiana . . .* (with appropriate year).

him, Longstreet came in for a full share of criticism, largely from former Federal soldiers and businessmen who resented his appointment. The former soldiers prepared a circular in which they said: "General Longstreet, the surveyor of the port, like all other new converts, is over zealous and would serve the party if he could; but not only does he lack capacity for efficient political influence, but such is the utter contempt in which he is held by both federals and confederates, that they consider there is 'no soundness in him'. . . ." ¹⁴

Both Casey and Longstreet, however, had the support of Governor Warmoth, whose feuding with Federal, state and city officials was already getting under way. The dissenters, in their presentation of the case to President Grant, claimed to have the Governor's support—not knowing that Warmoth had written the President in Casey's behalf. When the senators and congressmen made their final visit to the President, confident of bringing about Casey's removal, they were confronted with Warmoth's letter. They left the President without Casey's scalp but with "blood in their eyes for Governor Warmoth." The leaders, particularly Lieutenant-Governor O. J. Dunn and United States Marshal S. B. Packard, never forgave the Governor. Undoubtedly had Casey been removed, Longstreet's dismissal could not have been long delayed. ¹⁵

Governor Warmoth gave further cause for offense by his disapproval of various get-rich-quick schemes attempted by Marshal Packard, speaker of the Louisiana House C. W. Lowell, Louisiana secretary of state George E. Bovee, and others. The dissension came to a head in the summer of 1870, when the Republican state convention met to nominate candidates for office who would be voted on in the fall elections. The so-called "Custom House faction," which was to take so prominent a part in the political history of the state during the next five or six years, was beginning to take shape.

General Longstreet does not appear to have been particularly active during much of the spring and summer of 1870. Colonel D. F. Boyd, superintendent of the Louisiana State Seminary (soon to be the Louisiana State University), wrote him on several occasions regarding the procurement of "muskets for the use of the students of our State military school" and also urged Longstreet to visit the school, which was then getting settled in its new quarters at Baton Rouge. Longstreet, however, was unable either to procure the muskets from the Federal government by loan or purchase, or to visit the school, as he was "quite unwell and unable to be at the office." ¹⁶ His old Wilderness wound troubled him for many years, and the summer of 1870 was no exception. At first the muskets were delayed because those for issue to colleges were still un-

¹⁴ *Senate Executive Documents*, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1407, p. 9. Most of the petitions were dated in the spring of 1870.

¹⁵ Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 90-91.

¹⁶ Longstreet to Boyd, August 4, 1870, in Boyd MSS.

finished, and later they were withheld because no United States army officer had been detailed for duty at the school. The state of Louisiana had an accumulated credit "due . . . under the law for arming the militia" of \$955.41, and both Longstreet and Boyd were hopeful that they could secure an issue of muskets to the school at least to the value of this credit. It was not until the middle of 1873 that some of the needed muskets were finally obtained.¹⁷

In the elections of the fall of 1870, the Warmoth group retained control of the state government. Longstreet wrote his friend President Grant after the election "that a change in the officers of Marshall and Postmaster would be of great advantage to the party" and recommended suitable replacements. Longstreet urged this action because, as he said: "The gentlemen who are objected to [Packard and Lowell] seem somewhat inclined to create dissension, and serious apprehensions are felt that they may succeed in making a division in the party that may prove fatal." Longstreet added: "The result of our late election must satisfy you of the political character of the State." He commended Governor Warmoth to Grant's approval, saying: "Governor Warmoth is your staunch friend and feels the importance of the change [which Longstreet had suggested]. With the change he has great confidence in permanent success." Warmoth himself went to Washington about this time, and General Grant congratulated him on the results of the elections and approved his policies.¹⁸

Trouble that was to continue for the next two years of Warmoth's term of office as governor began in January, 1871, when the Louisiana state legislature met. One of the first acts of the legislature was to elect Joseph R. West, a former officer in the Union army, to a six-year term (beginning in March of 1871), in the United States Senate, in place of John S. Harris. Collector of Customs Casey, supported openly by the colored lieutenant-governor, O. J. Dunn, aspired to the position—largely on the basis of his relationship to General Grant. If the President should express a desire for Casey's elevation to the Senate, Warmoth "would do what [he] could to bring it about, although [he] doubted very much that even [his] support" could elect Casey. But Grant said nothing, Warmoth forgot all about it, and West was elected. Dunn and Casey never forgave Warmoth. They joined with Packard and Lowell, and the inter-party war was on—a war which grew constantly more bitter.¹⁹

In mid-January, 1871, soon after the election of Senator West, Longstreet again went to Washington—apparently as Governor Warmoth's personal

¹⁷ See correspondence between Longstreet and General A. B. Dyer (chief of ordnance, United States army, Washington), in April, May, and June, 1871, in *The National Archives*; Walter L. Fleming, *Louisiana State University: 1860-1896* (Baton Rouge, 1936), 169.

¹⁸ Longstreet to Grant, November 18, 1870, in Henry C. Warmoth Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, N.C.; Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 102.

¹⁹ Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 107-108.

representative—to explain the political situation to President Grant. Longstreet arrived on January 18 and saw Grant the next day. He “explained [Warmoth’s] views as to the political prospects of L^a and [his] apprehension that designing parties might have misrepresented” Warmoth to the President. The Governor only needed Grant’s confidence and support to ensure satisfactory results in the future. Apparently Longstreet at this time was also associated with Warmoth in the sugar business, as he wrote of his plan to start back to New Orleans as soon as he could arrange his and Warmoth’s “business in the sugar engines. . . .”²⁰

The next few months were busy ones. In the middle of May, 1871, Horace Greeley, a candidate for the presidency, was in New Orleans en route to speak at the Texas State Agricultural Fair at Houston, Texas. On May 18 Greeley was the guest of honor at the American Union Club (composed of “ex-officers, soldiers and sailors of the United States army”) in New Orleans, and probably it was at this time that Longstreet met and talked with him. After his return to New York, Greeley published “Letters from Texas and the Lower Mississippi” in pamphlet form and sent a copy to Longstreet, who acknowledged it favorably, saying: “I thank you for your kind consideration, and for your many noble deeds of magnanimity to myself and to others in whom I am much interested. . . .” It is not certain that Longstreet and Greeley had ever met before, though they may have done so in the summer of 1868, when Longstreet was in New York and was interviewed by a New York *Tribune* reporter. In 1869, when Longstreet was nominated by President Grant for a Federal position, Greeley was wholehearted in his support.²¹

A month later Longstreet found himself invited to attend an educational, rather than a political, meeting: the first commencement exercises of the Louisiana State University, to be held at Baton Rouge on June 28, 1871. He felt compelled to decline, however, and wrote Colonel Boyd: “Other and previous appointments [in New Orleans] compel me to forego the pleasure of a visit to your Institution to [until] some other opportunity. . . .”²² The “other and previous appointments” undoubtedly had to do with the political situation in New Orleans.

All through the summer of 1871, the Custom House gang was laying plans to dispose of Governor Warmoth in some effective way. The movement was aided on March 8, 1871, by an accident which maimed the Governor’s foot and nearly caused his death. On June 24, Warmoth left New Orleans to spend

²⁰ Longstreet to Warmoth, January 19, 1871, in Warmoth Papers.

²¹ *Id.* to Greeley, July 20, 1871, in Horace Greeley Papers, New York Public Library. In an interview published in the *Philadelphia Times* on July 27, 1879, Longstreet spoke of “once dining with Greeley”; he probably did so at the time of Greeley’s visit to New Orleans.

²² Longstreet to Boyd, June 25, 1871, in Boyd MSS.

a period of rest and recuperation at Pass Christian, Mississippi, on the Gulf of Mexico. Here he watched the forming of the combination against him, meanwhile keeping in touch with the situation through frequent personal conferences with his associates in the state government. Longstreet was one of his callers.²³

After one of his visits to see Governor Warmoth, Longstreet, in early July of 1871, wrote President Grant a long letter, perhaps at Warmoth's suggestion, commenting on the "unsettled and unsatisfactory" condition of political affairs in Louisiana and stating that Warmoth was earnest and sincere in his support of the national administration. Longstreet wrote, of the Governor's complaint,

some disaffected parties have mislead [*sic*] Collector Casey to such an extent as to induce him to take part against [Grant] . . . and his administration. . . . There is no doubt, but the Collector is as anxious and earnest in his wishes for your entire success, as any one in the country; but it is my judgment that in giving up the certainty of the State—with the party united—for the problematic chance of a disaffected party—with antagonistic elements—he has made a mistake. And it is singular, that in this alliance he has given his confidence to those who were most prominent in their opposition to him [when he hoped to go to the United States Senate], and at least lukewarm in their support of yourself.

Anxious to preserve party harmony in the state, Longstreet was writing to give President Grant "an insight into the condition of our affairs" in the hope that the "prestige of the Presidential office might be turned to Louisiana in the interests of uniting under the continued leadership of Governor Warmoth." With reference to Warmoth's attitude toward Grant and his administration, Longstreet wrote:

[Warmoth] gives me now the assurances he has often repeated, "that he will to the utmost of his ability and power, encourage and support the present National Administration, and that he will, in the State Convention, to meet next month, introduce resolutions himself declaring the same and pledging the party of the State to continued support, and to your renomination in the convention of next year." So earnest and sincere is he in this that he is ready to give written assurances to this effect in any shape that any one can wish. But aside from these assurances, it is patent to any one, who will exercise unprejudiced judgment, that all of his political interests and aspirations if he understands and appreciates them, compel him to the course that he indicates; even if feelings did not: which of itself should be a sufficient guarantee of his good faith. So that to my mind he is more certainly bound to you and your administration than are the prominent persons who are now seeking to make an open rupture in the ranks of the party. . . .²⁴

Preliminary to the state convention—while Warmoth was absent from New Orleans and the Negro lieutenant-governor, O. J. Dunn, was occupying the

²³ Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth," *loc. cit.*, 612; *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 308.

²⁴ Longstreet to Grant, July 8, 1871, in Warmoth Papers.

gubernatorial chair—a Republican convention was called to meet in the city on July 12 for the avowed purpose of ousting the Governor's appointees and preparing the way for the possible impeachment and removal of the Governor himself. But Warmoth, on being informed of what was going on, unexpectedly arrived in New Orleans on the morning of July 18 and went at once to the State House, where the acting governor, Dunn, "contemplating the time when he should be Governor," had no more thought of a visit from the Governor himself "than from the man in the moon." For the time being at least, Warmoth was again in control. The two wings of the Republican party, each chosen by devious and strong-arm methods, appeared in the state convention held in New Orleans on August 9, 1871.²⁵ The two factions sought to outwit each other to gain control of the proceedings. The Packard-led group, realizing that they might be outnumbered by the Warmoth supporters, announced that the convention would be held in the Custom House, where Packard, as United States marshal, could control affairs by force if necessary. Warmoth's group arrived to find their opponents in session; they therefore adjourned to nearby Turners' Hall, there to organize a separate convention. In two days of speechmaking, each faction accused the other of a wide variety of crimes, and each appealed to President Grant for his recognition and support. Warmoth was read out of the party in a resolution adopted by the Custom House faction. In the midst of many threats to Governor Warmoth's personal security in his office, Lieutenant-Governor Dunn died suddenly, on November 22, 1871, under circumstances which seemed mysterious. Governor Warmoth at once issued a proclamation convening the Louisiana Senate in extra session on December 6 to fill the vacancy by electing a president of the Senate. Under the state constitution, the president of the Senate was, *ex officio*, lieutenant-governor of the state and thus would become governor if the impeachment threats against Warmoth should be successfully carried into effect. These threats made the question of a successor a vital matter. If a Warmoth man should be chosen, the Custom House faction would have little to gain by a temporary suspension of the governor. On the other hand, if the Custom House people could vote impeachment before a president of the Senate could be elected, Speaker of the House George W. Carter, who was identified with the Custom House faction, would become governor. The Senate met as called and in a two-day session elected a colored senator, P. B. S. Pinchback, to the office of lieutenant-governor. In spite of the Pinchback election, the Custom House faction still hoped to secure a change in the status of the speaker of the House so as to make him eligible to become governor on the removal or sus-

²⁵ Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth," *loc. cit.*, 613-14; Ella Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868* (Baltimore, 1924), 97.

pension of the incumbent of that office. And so matters stood, each side maneuvering for position, when the legislature met on January 1, 1872.²⁶

In anticipation of trouble and a possible need for a display of force, Governor Warmoth "deemed it judicious to organize the young men of the city into the militia, and to arm them, notwithstanding the fact they were soldiers in the Confederate army, and we have now [February 1, 1872], 2500 Confederates in the volunteer militia of the State, as well as 2500 colored men, all under the command of General Longstreet, late of the Confederate army. . . ." ²⁷ During the next week, while the political maneuvering continued, between Warmoth and his supporters on the one hand and the members of the Custom House faction on the other, Longstreet, as Warmoth's personal representative and also as commander of the military forces of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana, supported the Governor and his associates and was in daily conference with General W. H. Emory, commander of the United States troops stationed in the area.

On January 8, 1872, Warmoth commissioned Longstreet as a major general of the Louisiana state militia and assigned him "to the immediate command and supervision of the entire militia, police, and all civil forces of the State of Louisiana within the City of New Orleans." General Longstreet was directed "to confer immediately with Major General Emory, commanding United States troops at [New Orleans], and to act in concert and harmony with him in taking all necessary precautions to preserve the peace and subdue any spirit of turbulence or riot that may arise." Longstreet, meantime, also retained his commission as adjutant general of the state of Louisiana. His new assignment was made both because of his support of Governor Warmoth and to replace General Hugh J. Campbell (previously major general commanding the state militia), who had been defective in his attitude toward Warmoth. Longstreet worked closely and harmoniously with General Emory, who later, in reply to the question "which side did General Longstreet represent?" declared, "I cannot say that he represented either." As a result of the support which Warmoth received from Longstreet's firm direction of the military forces of the state and from the cordial co-operation of Emory, the Governor was able to retain his office. For about a week after the first efforts of Carter, Packard, and their Custom House associates to gain control of the state government, everything was quiet.²⁸

In the meantime the Warmoth forces were back in the State House, and a

²⁶ Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 104-106, 110-11; Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth," *loc. cit.*, 625-27.

²⁷ Warmoth's statement, February 5, 1872, in *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 295.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 62, 64, 81, 95.

force of metropolitan police under Longstreet's direction prevented Carter and his supporters from entering. Carter notified the Governor that he would go elsewhere; and he and his supporters, calling themselves the legal House of Representatives, met in a room over the Gem Saloon. Meanwhile Warmoth's supporters, guarded by the metropolitan police and the state militia, continued to meet in the Mechanic's Institute, which was then serving as the State House. On January 10, Governor Warmoth directed Longstreet to take forcible possession of the Gem Saloon, and thereafter—until January 24—the Carter forces met in a room on Canal Street. By the middle of January, negotiations had begun between Warmoth and the Custom House faction for the return of the Carter forces to the Mechanic's Institute. The members of the state legislature, whom Collector Casey had permitted to take refuge on a government boat (the *Wilderness*) in the Mississippi River (at the orders of the secretary of the treasury, George S. Boutwell), were landed in New Orleans and on January 20 returned to the State House.²⁹

On the same day, Carter, in a gesture of defiance, issued a proclamation declaring his intention to assail the State House at noon on Monday, January 22. In this last act Speaker Carter overplayed his hand in encouraging violence among the colored people of the city. Warmoth directed Longstreet to hold his troops in readiness for any eventuality and at the same time appealed to President Grant in Washington for United States army troops to guard the State House and help the militia and police repel any assault which might be made.³⁰

General Emory, on orders from Grant, informed Carter of his instructions from Washington to prevent all armed aggression and conflict, at the same time placing on him full responsibility for any rioting or destruction of property. This show of administration support for Warmoth had the desired effect. On advice from Carter, the groups that had gathered to do his bidding dispersed, and gradually the members of the Gem Saloon rump legislature returned to the State House. Warmoth had won his last victory as a member of the carpetbag Reconstruction Republican party in Louisiana.³¹ While negotiations between the two factions were in progress, Emory advised Washington: "It looks as though the legislative question would be solved by buying up members." Ten days later, after a peace which was rather more of a truce had been reached, Emory commented: "On the one side was the Governor and his party . . . on the other the Custom House Clique . . . so blinded by

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 25-26, 312; *The American [Appletons'] Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events*, Ser. I, 1861-75 (New York, 1862-76), XII (1872), 472.

³⁰ *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, pp. 62, 95.

³¹ *New Orleans Picayune*, January 23, 1872, in Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth," *loc. cit.*, 632; Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 125 ff.; *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, XII (1872), 473.

passion and revenge as to be willing at any moment to sink General Grant and his administration, to gain an insignificant point. Behind both factions stood the great democratic party in Louisiana. . . . The officers who were lately in arms agst us . . . and the negroes . . . were the only people as a class that stood aloof. . . ." ³²

The legislature resumed its session the last week in January and sat until February 29, 1872. It then adjourned with little to show for its much-interrupted deliberations.

Longstreet's actions during the weeks that followed are a measure of his political understanding. In 1868, prior to Grant's nomination, he had supported Salmon P. Chase for president; four years later, disgusted with the activities of the Custom House faction of the Republican party in Louisiana and with the support given it by the Republican administration, Longstreet again gave thought to the advisability of throwing his support to the opposition.

To dramatize his feelings, Longstreet resigned his post as surveyor of customs at New Orleans, on March 5, 1872, stating that he found it "inconsistent with my views of sound Republican philosophy to approve the efforts of prominent Federal officers in this city to displace by violence the civil authority of the State." Continuing he remarked: "As I cannot identify myself with such adventurers, it seems fitting that I withdraw from this office as soon as you may be pleased to appoint a successor." The resignation was promptly accepted, and John M. G. Parker (to whom Longstreet had addressed his letter announcing his support of the Radical Republicans and their Reconstruction Acts) was named as his successor. The New York *Tribune* characterized Parker as a member of the Casey ring that had so disgraced Louisiana and degraded the administration. The opposition to Parker was so strong that the nomination was withdrawn. A Negro state senator, James H. Ingraham, who had been conspicuous in his co-operation with the Custom House faction, was appointed to the vacancy. Grant thus seemed to approve of, and to ally himself openly with, Casey, Packard, and their associates. The New York *Tribune* reprehended Grant for having accepted Longstreet's "head . . . as a vicarious sacrifice" to Casey and Packard. ³³

In an interview with a New York *Tribune* reporter in New York City on March 13, 1872, Warmoth stated it as his opinion that Longstreet, disgusted with Grant's support of the Custom House faction would oppose the Presi-

³² W. H. Emory to General E. D. Townsend (adjutant general, United States Army), January 16, 1872, in Emory Papers; *id.* to *id.*, January 27, 1872, *ibid.*

³³ Longstreet to Secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell (letter of resignation), March 5, 1872, quoted in Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 149; New York *Tribune*, March 12, 13, 20, 1872; *Nation* (New York), XIV (March 21, 1872), 177.

dent actively in the coming fall elections. He predicted that Longstreet would act as a leader of the newly constituted Liberal Republican party, which was made up of almost all the colored people of the state and all the active white Republicans except those holding Federal offices. Warmoth considered Longstreet by far the strongest man of his class supporting the President in the South and felt that his defection would be "very prejudicial to Grant's interest."⁸⁴

A week after his resignation as surveyor of customs at New Orleans, Longstreet also had resigned the presidency of the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad. The company's minutes do not disclose the reason for Longstreet's action but merely record that at the meeting of the board of directors in New Orleans on March 12, 1872, "Two letters were read by the Secretary from General Longstreet giving notice of his withdrawal from all connections with the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company, which withdrawal was concurred in."⁸⁵

On April 19, 1872, Longstreet likewise resigned his office as adjutant general of the state of Louisiana, the resignation to take effect the end of April. He wrote Governor Warmoth: "I have no especial [reason] for withdrawing from the office, except my wish to be untrammelled in the approaching political canvas." Warmoth acknowledged Longstreet's letter with the remark that if his desire to be untrammelled was his "only reason, I beg that you will reconsider your resignation, for I assure you that no attempt will be made to control or influence your political course. Whatever it may be you will as an officer have my confidence and support. Your services to the State are too important to be lost simply because you may not agree with the Executive in his political views." Longstreet's reply to Warmoth's appeal has not been located. Perhaps the question was discussed at a private conference. Longstreet, however, retained his commission as a major general in the Louisiana state militia.⁸⁶

Several weeks after resigning his Federal post in the Custom Service, Longstreet wrote Kellogg, the senior Louisiana Senator in Washington: "The great question in this quarter is the problem of reconstruction, and I am inclined to think that it is the most important national question. It is hardly worth our time, at this late day, to ask whether the Reconstruction laws are the wisest that could have been devised. They are laws, and have been sufficiently tested to convince us that their faithful administration will lead to the

⁸⁴ New York *Tribune*, March 14, 1872.

⁸⁵ Henry L. Walker (assistant general solicitor, New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company) to the writer, August 3, 1948; *id.* to *id.*, September 10, 1948.

⁸⁶ Longstreet to Warmoth, April 19, 1872, in Warmoth Papers; Warmoth to Longstreet (penciled notation on reverse side), n.d. (probably April 19, 1872), *ibid.*

results anticipated, by those who were instrumental in their enactment. I think it better, therefore, to adhere to the original plan than to start off upon some other theory, that may lead us into new difficulties, and possibly to disastrous confusion. . . . I have said before that we have reason to hope that we shall have a successful reconstruction. I believe that this is due to the firm hand of the present Administration. Will it not be better then, *to forego* the exercise of our good privilege of a *quadrennial change of administration*, when we see, and feel, and almost realize that our future will not be left in doubt?"⁸⁷

The spring and summer of 1872 were to be taken up with negotiations and deals looking to a realignment of parties and factions. On April 18, the Democratic state committee met in New Orleans and before adjourning bitterly denounced both Governor Warmoth and President Grant. The Republican party was badly divided. One faction led by General Hugh J. Campbell, with whom was associated Lieutenant-Governor Pinchback and his numerous Negro supporters, opposed the Radical Custom House or Grant Republicans who were led by Kellogg, Packard, Casey, and other Federal officeholders. A third group, who styled themselves Liberal Republicans, affiliated with a movement which, in convention in Cincinnati in May, 1872, nominated Horace Greeley of New York for president and B. Gratz Brown of Missouri for vice-president. On June 6, while the Democratic state convention was in session, the Liberal Republicans, also convening in New Orleans, addressed to it a proposal, to which Longstreet was one of the signers, that the Democratic and Reform Convention approve and accept the platform principles adopted at Cincinnati on May 4, 1872, by the Liberal Republican Convention and endorse the Greeley-Brown ticket. This apparent coalition against the Custom House faction, however, was short-lived. By mid-August it was apparent that no fusion of the kind proposed could be effected.⁸⁸

When the Liberal Republican convention adjourned on August 9, 1872, there were five state tickets in the field: (1) the Last Ditch Democrats, who had nominated John McEnery for governor; (2) the Custom House-Grant Republicans, who had nominated W. P. Kellogg; (3) the Pinchback Republican ticket, headed by P. B. S. Pinchback; (4) the Liberal Republican ticket, supporting Greeley and Brown and headed by D. B. Penn; and (5) the Reform party ticket, headed by George Williams of Shreveport. No one of

⁸⁷ Longstreet to Kellogg, March 23, 1872, in *New York Times*, April 1, 1872. The italics have been added by the present writer.

⁸⁸ Longstreet's defection and disgust had gone so far as to cause him to support the Reform movement and, as a member of the Liberal Republican state convention, he signed the appeal. See Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 166 ff., 175-76, 188.

these tickets was sufficiently strong or united to offer much hope for an effective government. No sooner had the Liberal Republican convention adjourned than the various factions began conferring with a view to presenting united fronts that could give effective support to the Democratic and Republican presidential tickets. After a series of meetings, the Democrats offered a fusion ticket headed by John McEnery and D. B. Penn as candidates for governor and lieutenant-governor respectively. The party supporting this ticket was made up of Last Ditch Democrats and elements of the Reform Democrat and Liberal Republican parties. The Kellogg-Custom House faction united with the Pinchback Republicans and those from the Liberal Republican party who could not support the Democratic ticket, to present a ticket headed by W. P. Kellogg as candidate for governor. The acceptance of McEnery, who was recognized as a Last Ditch Democrat, caused a stampeding of many former supporters of the Liberal Republican ticket (especially of the colored voters but also of "not a few" whites) to the Kellogg-Pinchback Republican ticket. The effort at fusion was pronounced a fizzle by Hugh J. Campbell, "who left the Convention followed by all the office-holders amid hisses and jeers." The Democratic fusion ticket also lost the support of Longstreet, who up to that time had been an earnest backer of the Liberal Republican movement.³⁹ Longstreet's views of these compromises and realignments are set forth in a letter dated October 15, 1872, and addressed to Hugh J. Campbell. Rather naively, under the circumstances, Longstreet wrote:

When I was inclined to embark on this move I was under the impression that I was at liberty to do so as a Republican; but we have been drawn on, step by step, until we find ourselves not only out of the Republican party, but about to enter the Democratic party as recruits. The last is a step that I cannot take. I may, by lending countenance to the Liberal move, have compromised myself to such an extent as to forfeit the privilege of voting, but I do not think that I have gone so far as to give the Democratic party just claim to my undivided vote and political assistance.

I am not a Democrat, nor have I been a member of that party. On the contrary, I have been a Republican and have constantly so announced myself. Now, the events of the last six months clearly indicate to my mind, that there is more liberality in the Republican Party than has been developed by the move that has been called the Liberal movement. I cannot, therefore, find reason in logic or sentiment, for passing the line between the Democratic Party and myself. As previously stated, I may be so compromised as to have forfeited my privilege of voting the entire Republican ticket, but I must not go so far as to forbid my return to the party when the present canvas is closed. I must ask you, therefore, to withdraw my name from your Committee. . . .⁴⁰

³⁹ Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States since the Civil War* (New York, 1926), III, 230-31; Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 163 n.; Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*, 199-200.

⁴⁰ *New Orleans Republican*, n.d., quoted in *New York Times*, October 20, 1872.

The election campaign that followed was relatively quiet and orderly, but the lull in activity proved to be only the quiet before the storm. Lack of pre-election disorder was made up for by election and vote frauds of every conceivable variety, in which both Republicans and Democrats participated. The count, which showed the McEnery ticket the winner by ten thousand votes, provoked all the charges and countercharges which had been lacking during the election campaign. Each side accused the other of fraud; but the Democrats, who held a substantial majority and were confident that Governor Warmoth would ensure a fair count, felt reasonably safe. The decision on the question of any charge of fraud was a matter for the state Returning Board, composed of the governor, the lieutenant-governor, and two state senators.⁴¹

On November 12, two weeks after the election, the Returning Board, headed by Governor Warmoth, met in his office, Senator T. C. Anderson being absent. The board elected Governor Warmoth president and Judge John Lynch secretary. Governor Warmoth moved that both Lieutenant-Governor Pinchback and Senator Anderson be declared ineligible because they were candidates for office. There was opposition to this move of the Governor's, as it was evident that he had no authority to control the board. However, he was able to secure an adjournment of the board until the next day.

When the board met on November 13, the chief justice of the state was present to administer the oaths of office. Pinchback retired when the justice ruled that he was ineligible; Senator Anderson was still absent. One opponent of the Governor, Pinchback, was thus disposed of. A second was eliminated by the abrupt removal of the secretary of state, F. J. Herron, on various questionable charges, and the appointment of Jack Wharton, a Warmoth partisan, in his place. Herron proposed that General Longstreet and Judge Jacob Hawkins be appointed to the vacant positions. Warmoth refused to hear Herron, stating that he had no right to act, and nominated instead two of his own partisans, F. M. Hatch and Durant DaPonte. Neither Lynch nor Herron agreed, but even though their dissent resulted in a tie vote, the Governor declared his candidates elected. Lynch and Herron then withdrew, Lynch tak-

⁴¹ The *Picayune*, Tuesday, November 5, 1872, commenting on the election, remarked that no votes had been counted on the previous election night. When the polls closed all ballot boxes were taken to the Mechanics Institute. B. T. Blanchard, general supervisor of registration, ordered the counting of the votes to begin, but General Longstreet, as United States supervisor of the election, forbade this, saying the United States supervisors did not have the proper stationery to follow the count. The *Picayune* suspected the real reason was to delay evidence of the conservative triumph in order not to affect the national election held November 5. A week later, on November 12, Longstreet and Blanchard had an argument over which had the authority in some parts of the court, and Longstreet called on United States troops to back him up. U.S. District Attorney Beckwith overruled him, saying he was mistaken about the law. The *Picayune* blamed Longstreet for the delay.



National Archives

JAMES LONGSTREET, ABOUT 1872

ing the minutes of the previous meeting with him as evidence that he and Herron were members of the legal board. They went to the office of the chief justice to be sworn in, claiming that they—together with General Longstreet, Judge Hawkins, and the absent Senator Anderson—constituted the legal board as reconstituted. Herron, on account of alleged limitations on his term, soon found himself out of office, George E. Bovee replacing him as secretary of state. Jack Wharton, however, as Warmoth's appointee, still claimed the office. In the ensuing struggle in the courts, Bovee was sustained; he took office on December 2, 1872.⁴²

In the meantime, on November 14, the so-called Lynch Board met. When Governor Warmoth failed to appear, Judge Lynch was made president; and he at once instituted legal proceedings to stop the Warmoth Board from counting the ballots. On November 15, General Longstreet, as spokesman for the Lynch Board, demanded of Governor Warmoth the election returns in his possession; but the request was refused. Warmoth himself brought suit on November 16 to restrain the Lynch Board from counting the ballots and promulgating any returns.

On November 19, Judge H. C. Dibble, of the Eighth District Court, heard both injunction pleas and ordered the injunction in favor of the Lynch Board to issue. He held that "Herron is still Secretary of State; that his vote of the 13th of November determined the election of Longstreet and Hawkins to the board; and that he was the Secretary of State *de facto*." But Warmoth did not give up hope. On November 20 he produced and signed the election bill passed in the preceding session of the legislature, the second section of which provided for a Returning Board of five persons to be elected by the Senate. On the strength of this bill, Warmoth, on December 5, 1872, appointed the so-called De Feriet Returning Board. By another process of suits and counter-suits, Warmoth hoped to dispose of the Lynch Board and to secure legal recognition of his own De Feriet Board. On January 23, 1873, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared in favor of the Lynch Board, consisting of Warmoth (as governor), Herron, Lynch, Longstreet, and Hawkins.⁴³

On the evening of December 5, 1872, Judge E. H. Durell of the United States Circuit Court of Louisiana (acting, in the interest of Kellogg and his

⁴² *House Executive Documents*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 70 ff.; *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, pp. 142 ff.

⁴³ *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, p. 863; *House Executive Documents*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 150-52; *Annual Reports of the Louisiana Supreme Court* (New Orleans, 1848-73), XXV, 14, in Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 190 n.; *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, p. 30. For suit by "The State of Louisiana *ex rel* H. C. Warmoth, Governor, versus James Longstreet, et als., Dec. 2, 1872," seeking to restrain the Lynch Board, see Circuit Court of the United States for the Fifth Circuit and District of Louisiana, Dockets 6844, 6849, 6850, New Orleans, La.

friends, to offset Warmoth's bill of December 5) issued an order to the United States marshal "to take possession . . . of the Mechanics Institute occupied as the State house for the assembling of the legislature." The marshal called for a detachment of United States army troops to act as a *posse comitatus* and with it seized the State House in the early morning hours of December 6. The judge granted an injunction to restrain Warmoth from canvassing the election returns, declared the Warmoth Returning Board illegal, and ordered the delivery of the returns to the "legal [Lynch] board." A few minutes after Judge Durell's decision Longstreet, together with Bovee, made a second demand for the returns in the possession of the Warmoth faction; but again he was refused. In the evening of December 6, however, the Lynch Board made public the returns for the legislature according to its own canvass. Congressional, parish, and city office returns were promulgated at various times between December 9 and December 27, 1872. As one authority has written, the "methods of the Lynch Board were as fraudulent as the frauds they were trying to establish."⁴⁴

The legislature met on December 9, 1872. General Hugh J. Campbell was elected president of the Senate, and John Conway Moncure, speaker of the House. A message from Governor Warmoth was also read to both houses. On December 13, the legislature adjourned, to meet again the first Monday in January, 1873. By a process of recognition and nonrecognition, as suited the need, Pinchback, as presiding officer of the Senate (with the aid of the Custom House faction led by Postmaster C. W. Lowell) secured a vote of impeachment against Governor Warmoth on a variety of charges; and Lieutenant-Governor Pinchback became the acting governor. The Lynch Board returns had shown Kellogg to have been elected governor, and he was expected to take office in January of 1873. The Warmoth and McEnery forces immediately moved to prevent Pinchback from taking office as acting governor, in anticipation of his holding the office for Kellogg to take over in January.

To ensure the seating of Pinchback, Kellogg and Pinchback joined in an appeal to President Grant for Federal aid and recognition of the Pinchback group as the lawful government. This support was forthcoming: on December 12 the President recognized the Pinchback forces as the lawful government, to which he would extend all necessary assistance "to prevent disaster and bloodshed."⁴⁵ On December 12 Pinchback had appointed Longstreet to the command of the Louisiana militia. Subsequently Longstreet had repeatedly demanded that the state armory turn over the arms and ammunition of

⁴⁴ *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, p. 251; Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 201.

⁴⁵ Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 215.

the state, but each time his demand had been refused. The state militia refused to seize the arms by force, and the metropolitan police force had, on December 13, been unable to take over the building. The militia, however, agreed to surrender to any authorized Federal officer. As soon as General Emory (who was still commanding the United States forces in the New Orleans area) received orders from Washington to recognize the Pinchback government, he sent an officer to the armory to ask the peaceable evacuation of the place. This request was promptly complied with, and on the morning of December 14 the arsenal was delivered to General Longstreet, who served as the representative of acting Governor Pinchback.⁴⁶

Soon after Governor Kellogg's inauguration, the rival Returning Boards were called to Washington to appear before a congressional committee appointed to investigate the election-returns controversy. Senator O. P. Morton of Indiana was the chairman of the Senate committee. Longstreet testified briefly on January 27, 1873. The inquiry was continued until the morning of February 28. Though there was much sentiment in favor of holding a new election, many thought that such a procedure would only make a bad matter worse. Congress adjourned without taking any action, and President Grant likewise refused to take any action. Kellogg was safely in office. In the sequel, each member of the Lynch Returning Board was well rewarded. Longstreet came off well, receiving an appointment for a four-year term as levee commissioner at a salary of six thousand dollars a year.⁴⁷

In the midst of the strife in the previous December, as has been noted, Longstreet was restored to the state payroll as major general in command of the state militia, his reappointment dating from January 8, 1872. Whether he received accumulated back pay for this office from January 8, 1872, is not certain, nor is it clear why the commission was dated back. In any case, at Kellogg's inauguration Longstreet sat with the mighty.

Two rival factions claimed the right to rule the state: the so-called *de facto* Kellogg government; and the McEnery government, which claimed the *de jure* right. From December 9, 1872, to January 13, 1873, Warmoth and Pinchback struggled for control of the state government. Pinchback sought to keep control of the state governmental machinery to turn it over to Kellogg on January 12, the day set for the inauguration; Warmoth sought to prepare for the installation of the rival McEnery administration. On the appointed day Kellogg took the oath of office in the State House; McEnery, with his sup-

⁴⁶ *House Executive Documents*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91, pp. 25-26.

⁴⁷ See *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457, *passim*, for testimony; *Nation*, XVI (January 23, March 20, 1873), 58, 190; *House Reports*, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 261, Pts. II, III, *passim*; James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 . . .* (reprint, New York, 1902-20), VII, 111 ff.

porters, met in the Odd Fellows Hall, where he took the oath of office. While these rival governments were being installed in Louisiana, the Federal Congress in Washington discussed the question of what to do. An attempt to set aside the election of 1872 and order a new one was defeated. In view of the failure of Congress to take any action, President Grant issued a statement on February 25, 1873, saying that unless Congress acted, he would recognize the Kellogg government.⁴⁸

Each of the rival governments legislated in its own interest. The most important action of this period dealt with the militia commanded by General Longstreet. By Act 37, approved March 5, 1873, the metropolitan police of New Orleans, largely composed of Negroes, became a part of the state militia and could be increased in numbers and mustered with the militia of the state as a metropolitan brigade. This action secured to Kellogg the complete control of the armed forces of the city of New Orleans and of the state of Louisiana, all of whom were acting under the orders of General Longstreet. Such a situation could lead only to trouble. On the evening of March 5, 1873, the opposing groups came to blows in the so-called "Battle of the Cabildo." The metropolitan police, directed by Longstreet and supported by Federal troops, were able to prevent the McEnery supporters from gaining possession of the police station. Using this action as a pretext, an armed force of the metropolitan police, under orders from General Longstreet, took possession of the Odd Fellows Hall, the headquarters of the McEnery legislature, the following day and placed those found in the building under arrest and marched them to jail. The next day Kellogg, realizing that he had probably gone too far, ordered the release of the prisoners. This action, however, did not put an end to the strife. Riots occurred constantly and resulted in much bloodshed. In the meantime, the Federal Congress stood by passively, doing nothing except to support Kellogg in office by the threatened or actual use of Federal troops. Longstreet was in the middle of things. Early in May, an attempt was made on the life of Governor Kellogg. By proclamation on May 23, President Grant publicly recognized the Kellogg regime.⁴⁹

On June 1, 1873, Longstreet received his reward for his support of Kellogg and the Custom House faction. He was appointed by the Governor to the Levee Commission of Engineers, serving as its president. The appointment was for four years at a salary of six thousand dollars per annum.⁵⁰ Once again

⁴⁸ James Daniel Richardson (comp.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902* (10 vols.; Washington, 1896-99), VII, 212-13.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 223-24.

⁵⁰ See *Report, Levee Commission of Engineers to Governor of Louisiana* (New Orleans, 1875), 3, 16. The commission consisted of three members, one appointed by the Louisiana Levee Company, one by the Governor of Louisiana, and one by the Federal government.

Longstreet was drawing at least two salaries: that just mentioned and that as major general of the Louisiana state militia, probably totaling ten thousand dollars per annum. He may also have received a salary as a member of the Returning Board, to which he had been appointed in the previous year.

With his immediate future as to place and income assured, Longstreet, presumably with his wife and children, went to Lynchburg, Virginia, to spend the summer with Mrs. Longstreet's relatives and to be out of New Orleans during the yellow fever season. In the previous summer, while Longstreet was engaged in political campaigning, Mrs. Longstreet had gone to Flint, Michigan, to visit her aunt, Mrs. C. S. Paine, and there on July 29, 1872, had given birth to Maria Louisa, the youngest of the Longstreet children.

While in Lynchburg Longstreet became involved in a controversy with his former friend Colonel Robert E. Withers, who, speaking on August 25, 1873, at Warrenton, Virginia for the candidacy of General James L. Kemper for the office of governor of Virginia, stated that General Longstreet "not only accepted the [Radical Republican plan of Reconstruction], but went over for money." Longstreet reacted violently to this unjust and unsupported accusation; in a letter to the *Richmond State Journal*, owned and edited by Robert W. Hughes, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, he wrote:

The charge of Col. Withers, as stated, is so vague and indefinite that I can find nothing in reply, except a general denial, and the record of my motives as announced by me from time to time. There has been no room at any time for doubt as to my motives and wishes in regard to our politics. When they were first announced in the Spring of 1862, I stated expressly that I could see no other way by which the Southern people could re-instate themselves in proper sympathy and relations with the general Government and thus save themselves greater losses and humiliation. There commenced and ended all my reasons and motives in connection with this matter, and my letters have so plainly expressed my views that no one can misconstrue them, except they do so through malice. If Col. Withers knows the record and he virtually claims to know it when he makes grave allegations as matters of fact, he knew that when he made his charge it was not true. If he made them in ignorance, or reckless disregard of facts, he is equally culpable.

In order, however, to place the matter beyond question or doubt, I propose that Col. Withers give the names of the parties to the transaction, and the time and place of its occurrence so as to give me something tangible. I think I can safely promise him, as soon as he puts his charge in such shape as to enable me to take hold of it, that I will prove that there is not a word of truth in his allegations against me, nor even a reason for them except malice. . . .⁵¹

No reply from Colonel Withers has been found, nor did Longstreet mention the subject again. It is presumed that Longstreet's challenge to Withers to produce his evidence and the latter's failure to do so ended the matter.

⁵¹ Longstreet to editor of *Richmond State Journal*, September 3, 1873, quoted in *New York Times*, September 7, 1873.

By the end of the year 1873, Longstreet and his family were back in New Orleans, where Longstreet took up his duties as president of the Levee Commission of Engineers. As soon as the weather permitted, he was out along the Mississippi River on an inspection tour, planning—along with General M. Jeff Thompson, the state engineer—for reinforcement of existing levees and the construction of new ones. On June 2, 1874, at the direction of Governor Kellogg, Longstreet and Thompson left New Orleans for Washington, D.C., to present to Congress the needs for levee construction and to secure the necessary funds. By the first of July, they were back in New Orleans; and on July 23, Longstreet, Thompson, and G. W. R. Bayley, who constituted the Levee Commission of Engineers started on an inspection trip that took them all along the Mississippi River within the limits of the state of Louisiana. It was early in September before they returned.⁵²

Several years later, after he had left Louisiana for good, Longstreet, in an interview with a reporter of the *New York Times*, stated: "I was appointed Commissioner of Engineers for the State of Louisiana [by Governor Kellogg] and served four years in the swamps doing the hardest work man ever did. Professor Bailey [G. W. R. Bayley], Governor [P. O.] Hebert and General M. Jeff Thompson, my comrades in the work, all died of it and I was seriously injured. I came to Georgia and got my health back. The State of Louisiana repudiated my salary and refused to pay me for two years and four months. . . ." ⁵³ Just what General Longstreet meant in his charge of repudiation is not clear. Probably he was referring to the fact that he had been appointed for a period of four years from June 1, 1873, but had not been paid for the last two years and four months of this term. On the other hand, there is no record that he performed any duties in the position for at least the last two years of the four-year term, either because he was incapacitated by ill health from a variety of causes or because he was absent from Louisiana for long periods of time during the latter part of his term. Practically the entire responsibility for the performance of the duties of Longstreet's position on the Levee Commission of Engineers was carried by the state engineer, General Thompson, who died in the fall of 1876.

In the autumn of 1873, if not earlier, a scheme called "unification," which had for its object a fusion of the better element of the Republican with the Democratic party, was proposed, and efforts were made to bring it about. Many looked on it as "dangerous in the extreme—as the scheme of a few well

⁵² *Acts . . . Louisiana . . . 1875*, 18, 19, 24.

⁵³ *New York Times*, July 28, 1884. Longstreet's statement about his "comrades" is an exaggeration. Bayley had been in ill health for some years, and Hebert died of cancer on August 29, 1880; but Thompson died in September, 1876, probably from overwork. Longstreet did not specify how he was seriously injured, and this is his only extant mention of any injuries attributable to his work on the Levee Commission of Engineers.

meaning dreamers [among the Democrats] and a large number of unprincipled politicians [among the Republicans] who were ready to sacrifice anything in the hope of office." The movement was opposed by leading Democrats, who saw in it an attempt on the part of the politicians to secure unopposed control of the state government. One observer later wrote: ". . . all of our people who had been deceived by the unification trick, except General Longstreet, saw the error of their ways and returned to the fold of pure Democracy. . . . General Longstreet, bull headed soldier that he was, having gone into the unification movement with great enthusiasm, honestly thinking, with his limited intellect, that it was for the best, did not see how to turn back, and soon finding himself entirely deserted by respectable followers, kept on, finally landing in the camp of the enemy. . . ." ⁵⁴

The situation caused by the so-called unification movement and by political happenings in the state during the summer of 1874 presaged trouble and in the end involved Longstreet in events that ended his career in Louisiana and for many years made his name anathema to the people of the state and to many all over the South. Tension was increasing as a result of the arbitrary acts of the Kellogg government—acts which had the approval and support of the Grant administration in Washington. Particularly was this the case in the New Orleans area.

The execution of six Republican officeholders at Coushatta on August 30, 1874, allegedly at the hands of White Leaguers, caused Kellogg to repeat a previous call for more Federal troops. On September 3, 1874, Kellogg declared martial law in the area; and the next day President Grant directed that "Federal troops will be stationed at different and convenient points in your district for the purpose of giving you all needful aid in discharge of your official duties. You understand, of course, that no interference whatever is hereby intended with any political or party action not in violation of the law." ⁵⁵ It was to such a hostile situation that a tired and none-too-well Longstreet returned. Things were anything but reassuring; the outlook for a peaceful settlement was dark. A tightened control by troops, both state and Federal, did not help to ease the tension. The seizure of arms, probably intended for members of the Crescent City White League, was the spark which set the fire in New Orleans. ⁵⁶

⁵⁴ H. A. Vaught to John R. Ficklen, May 8, 1894, in John R. Ficklen Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University; also quoted in Walter Prichard (ed.), "The Origin and Activities of the 'White League' in New Orleans (Reminiscences of a Participant in the Movement)," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIII (April, 1940), 531.

⁵⁵ *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, XIV (1874), 478-79; *New Orleans Republican*, September 4, 1874.

⁵⁶ *New Orleans Picayune*, September 9, 10, 11, 12, 1874, cited in John Edmond Gonzales, "William Pitt Kellogg, Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana, 1873-1877," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIX (April, 1946), 432.

In protest against this action by Kellogg, a mass meeting was called for Monday, September 14, 1874, at 11 A.M. on Canal Street at the Clay statue. There was a series of speeches, asserting the election on November 4, 1872, of John McEnery as governor and D. B. Penn as lieutenant-governor, and criticizing the methods of Kellogg, who had seized the state government and kept himself in power with the support of United States troops and by fraud, violence, and "false and infamous representation." A series of resolutions setting forth these contentions was adopted, reaffirming similar resolutions adopted by the convention at Baton Rouge on August 24, 1874. A committee of five was authorized to call on Kellogg to demand his immediate abdication.⁵⁷

Kellogg refused to see the callers, saying that he had information that the committee was ready to use force to overthrow the government. The committee denied the charge, but their answer was unacceptable to Kellogg and his advisers. The committee reported back to the mass meeting its failure to see Kellogg, and at once the assembly resolved to drive the Kellogg government from power by force of arms. Penn, as acting governor in the absence of McEnery, issued a proclamation to all citizens to arm and assemble. General Frederick N. Ogden was placed in command of the mustering White Leaguers and McEnery militia. Streets leading into Canal Street were barricaded. The Kellogg forces, consisting of colored militia and the metropolitan police, were commanded by General Longstreet and General A. S. Badger. At about 4 P.M. on September 14, 1874, some five hundred metropolitan police, led by Longstreet and Badger, moved up to Canal Street in the neighborhood of the Custom House, where Kellogg and his advisers had taken refuge.⁵⁸

General Longstreet found himself in an unenviable situation—a direct result of his support of his friend President Grant and of Kellogg, the carpetbag governor of Louisiana. He had entered upon a course from which he could not turn back. As a soldier who must obey the call to duty and as a politician who had received many lucrative favors at the hands of carpetbag governments, he could but continue to serve in what must have come to be a most unwelcome and embarrassing position. As commander of the Kellogg forces, he led the advance to meet the insurgent forces.

According to one account, General Longstreet rode out to meet the leaders and commanded them in the name of the state of Louisiana to keep the peace and go home. Instead of obeying Longstreet's demand, the insurgents seized the General, pulled him from his horse, and made him prisoner. Then the fighting commenced. Longstreet was wounded by a spent bullet, taken to the rear, and held prisoner in the State House until the next day, when he was

⁵⁷ *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, XIV (1874), 479–80.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 480.

released. According to another account, Longstreet was shot from his horse as he attempted to escape the fire of the insurgents and was taken prisoner.⁵⁹

Whatever the details of Longstreet's participation, the metropolitan police, demoralized by the fire of the insurgents and the consequent loss of forty or more men, retreated to the Custom House. General Badger was severely wounded, and Longstreet was a prisoner. The insurgent White Leaguers demanded that the city administration surrender. Pickets were posted along Canal Street, and detachments of the White League bivouacked in the street. The next day the metropolitan police and the colored militia surrendered; Kellogg took refuge in the Custom House while all state and city property was seized by the insurgents. All Kellogg officials were displaced by McEnery supporters, who claimed to have been elected in November of 1872. The victors were unrestrained in their joy, short-lived though it was to be.

Kellogg and Packard both appealed to President Grant for aid. Acting Governor Penn of the White Leaguers, on his part, requested the President to withhold Federal interference; but on September 15, Grant issued a proclamation calling on all "turbulent and disorderly persons" to submit to the constituted authorities and co-operate in upholding the law and preserving the public peace. Under this pressure and in the presence of Federal troops, the insurgent government gave way. On September 18, General W. H. Emory, the commander of the government troops, notified Kellogg of the surrender of McEnery and Penn. "A little before 10 A.M. on Saturday September 19, 1874, General Longstreet and his military staff left the Custom House unarmed and on foot and proceeded to the State House, where a *Times* reporter found them occupying the room of the Governor. General Longstreet met and talked with Col [John R.] Brooke [commanding the United States troops in the city of New Orleans] until Governor Kellogg arrived and soon after the State House was transferred by Brooke to Kellogg." Kellogg was again the *de facto* governor of Louisiana, but only by the grace of Federal armed power.⁶⁰

In an interview with a *Picayune* reporter, Kellogg expressed regret that blood had been shed but attempted to place the responsibility for it on Longstreet rather than admit his own culpability.⁶¹ In a subsequent interview, Kellogg attempted to justify his conduct in leaving the State House to hide in the Custom House. The net of the situation showed that the Kellogg government could not maintain itself in office without the support of Federal armed

⁵⁹ F. R. Longstreet to Ben Ames Williams, February 6, 1943, and *id.* to *id.*, May 31, 1944, in possession of Ben Ames Williams, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.

⁶⁰ *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, XIV (1874), 481; *New Orleans Times*, September 20, 1874.

⁶¹ *New Orleans Picayune*, September 17, 1874.

forces. Subsequent events only confirmed the fact that the Kellogg government could not stand by its own power.

Longstreet's participation in the events of September 14 was brief and inglorious. Whether he ordered the metropolitan police attack on his own initiative or at Kellogg's direction or suggestion is not clear. It is not likely, however, that Longstreet would have ordered the attack without Kellogg's approval. The *Picayune* reported that "there has been a coolness existing between [General Longstreet] and Kellogg since the fight of September 14, growing out of orders given upon that day concerning the fight. General Longstreet, we have heard it said, contends that Kellogg was responsible for the advance and rout of the Metropolitans on that day, while Kellogg resents the charges and asserts that Longstreet was the bungler."⁶² Longstreet was a soldier, who would not have acted in such a situation without orders; Kellogg was a politician, struggling to hold on to an office and the power that went with it in any way that he could. He had few or no scruples as to what he did or said, and it is not likely that he would have been any more honest with a loyal subordinate than he was with his opponents when he could by dishonesty escape responsibility for a decision that turned out disastrously.

After the Kellogg government had been restored to office and while it was being kept there by Federal bayonets, Longstreet resumed his work on the Levee Commission of Engineers, meantime retaining his commission as major general of the state militia and his membership on the Returning Board. He suffered much from rheumatism, which he later said had been aggravated by his work in the swamps and bayous of the Mississippi. His health was not helped any by the torrent of criticism to which he was subjected as a result of his actions in the battle of September 14. Governor T. E. Bramlette of Kentucky called him "a stench in the nostrils everywhere," but the *Louisville Commercial* called this charge "grossly unjust and logically absurd," saying that Longstreet had only done his duty as the head of the legal police force of New Orleans in attempting to disperse an armed force which was moving to overthrow the government. According to the *Commercial*, the great majority of the people of the country held Longstreet in high esteem, but he was being denounced and persecuted "by rebels and their sympathizers, because when the cause for which he had fought was overthrown, he . . . took the course which he and many others of his comrades thought best for the good of his people and section, but which he only had the moral courage to adhere to and make public."⁶³

The Louisiana state elections of November 2, 1874, passed off quietly. All

⁶² *Ibid.*, December 30, 1874, quoted in *New York Times*, January 4, 1875.

⁶³ Editorial in *Louisville Commercial*, in *New Orleans Republican*, September 22, 1874.

signs indicated a Democratic success. The canvassing and counting of the votes was, by law, in the hands of the Returning Board, of which Longstreet had been a member since December, 1872. On November 14, the board met, all members being present except General Longstreet. A communication from Governor Kellogg was received and read; this recommended a reconstruction of the board so as to give the Democratic party representation upon it—presumably in compliance with a law passed after the election of 1872 providing that the board should consist of five persons elected by the state Senate from all political parties. Apparently General Longstreet, because of his differences with Kellogg over the responsibility for the fighting on September 14 and because of his health, was asked to create a vacancy to which a Democrat could be appointed. In any case, ex-Governor J. M. Wells, president of the Returning Board, read the following letter of resignation from General Longstreet: "Finding myself in such condition that I am physically unable to attend the meetings of your board I must ask you to accept my resignation and designate some other person to act in my place." Longstreet's health was admittedly bad—so bad, in fact, as to cause ex-Governor Wells to "express the belief that General Longstreet is so low that he will not live twenty days." However, the New Orleans *Bulletin* remarked, somewhat facetiously: "[Longstreet's] illness must be sudden as on Wednesday [November 13] he participated in a hop given by Colonel [De Lancey] Floyd-Jones and the officers [of the Third Infantry] of Jackson Barracks."⁶⁴

The Returning Board did not publish the results of the November election until December 24, 1874. General dissatisfaction greeted the board's report, which was characterized as more infamous than the report of the November, 1872, election. There was a general air of tension throughout the state as January 4, 1875, the day set for the convening of the legislature, approached. General Sheridan, then stationed in Chicago in command of the Department of the Missouri, was sent by President Grant on a tour of certain Southern states with orders "to assume command of the Military Division of the South or any portion of that division, should you see proper to do so." Thus the situation seemed likely to be further complicated by the presence in New Orleans of Sheridan as the official representative of the President with full authority to act as he saw fit. The city and state had already experienced more than enough of Sheridan's irresponsible and vindictive actions. His expected presence presaged anything but fairness and evenhanded justice in case of a dispute.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ *American Annual Cyclopaedia*, XIV (1874), 489; *Acts . . . Louisiana . . . 1872*, 15-28; *New Orleans Republican*, November 15, 1874; *New Orleans Bulletin*, November 13, 1874, in *New York Herald*, November 15, 1874.

⁶⁵ *House Reports*, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 101, p. 297.

Longstreet's part in the events that took place in New Orleans in early January, 1875, was essentially that of a spectator. Soon after the battle of September 14, he was relieved from active duty with the militia; and on December 1, 1874, General Hugh J. Campbell was assigned to active duty and placed in command of the first division of the state militia as well as of the troops in the State House, Longstreet's former command. General Longstreet, however, was present in the State House on January 4, 1875, when the alleged insurgents were prevented from interfering with the organization of the legislature by the Kellogg forces. The Governor stated that General Campbell had been placed in command, under General Longstreet, of the State House and of the militia outside. In the proceedings that followed, Longstreet, who was still in poor health, did not appear actively; General Campbell apparently exercised direct control of the troops and the police, issuing orders (which had probably been approved by Longstreet) for the control and direction of the military forces.⁶⁶

This was almost the last of Longstreet's participation in the political affairs of Louisiana. He continued to serve as head of the Levee Commission of Engineers but was less and less in New Orleans and more elsewhere seeking health and relief from the excitement and responsibilities of active public office. The handwriting on the wall indicated to all who would read that carpetbag control of Louisiana was nearing its end. Since January of 1873, the Kellogg government had held on to its offices only through the active support of armed Federal authority. This support could not be expected to continue indefinitely. All over the country, as well as in the states of the former Southern Confederacy, there was a rising tide of disgust and opposition to the Radical Republicans in general and to the Grant administration in particular because of its corruption and its use of force whenever necessary to cover up the unethical, unscrupulous, and frequently crooked acts of its supporters, acting either as individuals or as a party. The majorities given the Democratic candidates in the election of 1872 were increased in 1874 and could be expected to be still further increased in the forthcoming elections of 1876. The majority in the nation as well as in the state of Louisiana might become so great as to force the Republicans out of office. With a rival administration in power in Washington, there would be no armed support for a Republican-controlled state government in Louisiana, regardless of the vote. All these portents or present practices were evident to, or known by, Longstreet as well as others. In Louisiana, at least, Longstreet must sink or

⁶⁶ "Report, Adjutant General, 1875," in *Acts . . . Louisiana . . . 1875*, 59, 62. New Orleans *Picayune*, December 31, 1874, in *New York Times*, January 4, 1875; testimony of Kellogg in New Orleans, January 5, 1875, in Gonzales, "William Pitt Kellogg," *loc. cit.*, 443-44; Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana*, 293-99.

swim with the Republicans, no matter how corrupt or unscrupulous they were. He could not go over to the Democratic party because it would not have him; and apparently he despaired of his ability to support himself and his family in the rough and tumble of private business, handicapped as he would be by both ill health and his record of political apostasy. In addition, there is little evidence that he was either particularly adept in the ways of business or skillful in the handling of money.

It is probable, although not of record, that Longstreet thought that he might be able to regain his social and business position and attain something of political recognition and advancement in his adopted state of Georgia, of which only an accident had kept him from being a native. His brother William, who was living in northern Georgia near Gainesville, urged him to settle there. Once Longstreet had made his decision to leave Louisiana—both for his health and for reasons of expediency—it was only natural that he should seek to settle in an area where he would be welcome, where he could expect to achieve some measure of health, and where he could start life anew without too many handicaps. His Confederate record was untarnished, though it had been somewhat obscured by his Louisiana career. It was probably with some such thoughts in mind that he set about finding a suitable place to buy in or near Gainesville, in the upland region of northern Georgia.

Diplomat and Georgia Politician

SOON AFTER COMPARATIVE QUIET HAD REPLACED THE DISTURBANCES GROWING OUT of the forcible seating of the Kellogg-dominated legislature, General Longstreet went to Hot Springs, Arkansas, to try the effect of the waters on his crippled arm and shoulder. He wrote his friend and former aide, Captain T. J. Goree, at Huntsville, Texas: "I have worked myself completely down since I went to New Orleans and now have been laid up for the last six or eight months. . . . I expect to return to New Orleans about the first of June, and after a week or two there I hope to go to the mountains of Ga. for the summer. . . ." On May 21, Longstreet, in replying to a letter from Goree, said:

I presume that the difference in our politics is not so great as appear [*sic*], if sifted to the bottom. The end that we seek I know is the same.—The restoration of the Southern people to their natural and proper influence.—The best and speediest means of arriving at this end has [led] . . . only to diffusion. And in Louisiana, particularly in New Orleans, the most violent Democrats now admit that mine would have been the best policy for that state. It is too late though now, and affairs will have to drag along in that state.¹

Longstreet left Hot Springs for New Orleans on May 26; and after a brief stay there he departed for the North, where he attended the commencement exercises at West Point on June 17. His stay at West Point seems to have been uneventful; he probably went from there to New York City and perhaps on to Lynchburg, Virginia, his wife's home. In any case, he was in Washington, D.C., on July 15 and while there sought access to the Confederate archives deposited with the Treasury Department in order to make transcripts of certain documents relating to the battle of Gettysburg. He went south from Washington, stopping in Charlotte, North Carolina, on July 30 to see General D. H. Hill concerning points in his account of the battle of Gettysburg which Longstreet wanted to clear up. At this time Longstreet was described as "a very gallant soldier" whose "course since the war has shown anything else but devotion to the cause for which he fought so well." His "beard is now grey. Soldiers who knew him during the war say that it

¹ Longstreet to Goree, May 12, 1875, in Goree Papers; *id.* to *id.*, May 21, 1875, *ibid.*

was black and very long extending almost to his waist. He now wears the Burnside whiskers, mustache and side beard. He is said not to be so large as he was during the war and is represented as being very much changed otherwise in his present appearance." From Charlotte Longstreet probably went to his newly acquired home near Gainesville, Georgia. His decision to settle in Georgia rather than to remain in New Orleans had excited considerable adverse comment, and the editor of the Gainesville *Southron* and others were subjected to criticism because they had invited him to become a citizen of Gainesville.²

Longstreet was back in New Orleans by the end of the year, probably having settled his family in Gainesville. The results of the national and state elections of 1876, followed as they were by the complete overthrow of the carpet-bag governments in Louisiana and throughout the South and the return to power of the native whites, marked the end of any hopes which Longstreet may have had for political preference and position in Louisiana. During this period, however, he appears to have retained his position as a member of the board of directors of the New Orleans city schools and as chairman of the committee on high- and normal-school commercial purchases. Likewise, he was listed as an administrator, ex officio, of the University of Louisiana (later Tulane University), by appointment of Governor Francis T. Nicholls during 1877 and 1878. However, this assignment appears neither to have required nor received much of his time; and when the University of Louisiana was reorganized and reopened on November 14, 1878, he apparently was not retained, ex officio or otherwise.³

In mid-January, Longstreet wrote his friend retiring President Grant to explain what had happened in Louisiana in the November, 1876, election. On February 17, 1877, Longstreet wrote again as one who had a personal knowledge of what had happened and was in a position to know why the split vote, indicated in his letter, had been cast. A memorandum at the bottom of this letter reading "Call attention of President to this" suggests that Grant after reading the letter forwarded it to President-elect Rutherford B. Hayes—a theory which would account for its being in the Hayes Papers today. Longstreet reminded Grant:

I wrote you about a month ago trying to explain the solution of the political embrolio [imbroglio] in Louisiana according to my judgment. My interest in your good name, and the affairs of the country, will I trust be sufficient excuse for this further trespass upon your valuable time.

In my former letter I tried to show that the many republican votes that were

² *New York Times*, June 28, July 16, 31, 1875.

³ *Soard's City Directory of New Orleans* (52 vols.; New Orleans, 1876-1927), 1877, pp. 801, 803; *ibid.*, 1878, p. 844; Alc   Fortier, *A History of Louisiana* (Paris, 1904), IV, 402.

cast for the democratic ticket were freely given for the Nichols [*sic*] ticket, but that none of them were intentionally given to the democratic electors. That therefore whilst the Hayes electors were entitled in equity to these votes, the Nichols state ticket is also entitled to them, and that therefore the Nichols government should be recognised.

I beg leave further to state that it will be better for the republican party south, if this idea can be adopted. For if the Packard government is forced upon this State, the greater part, if not all, of the southern men who have been identified with the republican party, in the hope that some day the party might be put upon a basis that might justify their efforts, in giving it permanent organisation, will be obliged to abandon their hopes and await some more favorable opportunity.

Mr Packard is not, I think, in condition, to maintain himself and the party in such manner as to warrant any of us in attempting to maintain our identity with it, and without some stronger element in the party in this section it must fail of success here. Whilst with Gov Hayes as President the party can be so organised, as to divide the white and colored vote, not only in Louisiana but throughout the south, and make the party strong. This can be more readily accomplished under Nichols as governor, simply because the forcing of Packard upon the people as governor, will at once arouse all of the former prejudices and opposition of the whites, and render the party more objectionable with them than it has ever been.⁴

On March 17, 1877, soon after the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes as President of the United States, Longstreet, from New Orleans, wrote his friend and former army associate General Benjamin Alvord, who was paymaster general of the army and on close terms with the new administration:

It seems more than probable that the Federal offices here will be changed very soon. I beg therefore you will intercede in my behalf. I would like the appointment of Collector of Customs for this Port. The policy heretofore pursued at the South has not been successful, because Southern men (Republicans) have not had positions of importance, sufficient to draw any Southern support to them. I believe that a change of policy such as that indicated by my appointment, will soon enable us to Southernise the party and regain its lost morale and strength here. I am inclined to think that Gen. Sherman may lend you some aid in this matter. Our political status here is still confused, and likely to bring about trouble, sooner or later.

General Alvord discussed Longstreet's application with W. H. Rogers, President Hayes's private secretary, and at his request sent him a copy of General Longstreet's letter, which it was expected would be brought to the personal attention of President Hayes. Alvord accompanied Longstreet's letter by a short personal note, in which he wrote: "Since the war he has been consistently and perseveringly for the Union and the true interests of the South. As fast as possible it is doubtless wise to utilize the brains, the pluck and the honor of the old rebels, who *can* do so much for permanent re-

⁴ Longstreet to Grant, February 17, 1877, in Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio.

cuperation of their section—I sympathize warmly in the policy of the President—I have great faith in the character and reliable qualities of Gen^l Longstreet.”⁵

Nothing came of this attempt by Longstreet to remain in New Orleans on the Federal payroll. By mid-April he was back in Gainesville, from which place he wrote a letter for P. F. Lawshe, a prominent citizen of Gainesville, recommending his appointment as United States marshal for Georgia. Notwithstanding this action, a week later, on May 2, 1877, Longstreet himself made application for the same position, sending his letter to President Hayes through Attorney-General Charles Devens. The letter went first to General Alvord, by whom it was delivered to the Attorney-General, who was expected to bring it to the President's personal attention. At the same time, General Alvord wrote to the President a personal note recommending Longstreet's appointment to the position which he sought; and Longstreet also wrote directly to President Hayes, saying that he was applying for the appointment “At the earnest request of many Republican friends of [Georgia].” He justified his application in the following words:

Although but recently returned to Georgia I and my family have been more closely identified with Georgia and Georgia interests than any other state. I grew up in the State, but, from a short time prior to my going to West Point, for my military education, to the return to the State, about eighteen months ago, I have not been located any great length of the time in any State. My record as a faithful officer of government is on file at Washington. I refer you to the endorsement of friends who have urged me to this step for political views in this connection. . . .⁶

Longstreet was active in pushing his application for the United States marshalship and presented “very handsome papers” from friends in New Orleans, as well as letters of recommendation from political supporters and friends in Georgia and elsewhere, among them General Sherman. On September 23, 1877, however, Longstreet wrote President Hayes and withdrew his application, stating as his reason: “My business affairs are such as to require more or less of my time in Louisiana as my health may permit. Hence it has appeared to me that I should retain my citizenship of that State. Therefore, as I am actually a citizen of Louisiana, temporarily in Georgia, it seems not in accordance with the strictest propriety that I should be an applicant for an office [to] which none but resident citizens may lay just claim.” Another reason

⁵ *Id.* to Benjamin Alvord, March 17, 1877, and Alvord to W. H. Rogers (accompanying note), *n.d.*, *ibid.*

⁶ Longstreet to President Rutherford B. Hayes, April 26, 1877, in General Records of the Department of Justice, The National Archives; *id.* to Devens, May 2, 1877, with endorsement of May 9, 1877, by Alvord, *ibid.*; Alvord to Hayes, May 10, 1877, *ibid.*; Longstreet to Hayes, July 5, 1877, *ibid.*

for his return to New Orleans at this time was to carry out his decision to become a member of the Roman Catholic Church.⁷

Just why Longstreet withdrew his application for the position of United States marshal of Georgia is not clear. Whatever the reason, two months later, on November 20, 1877, he renewed his effort to secure the appointment, in spite of the fact that it was reported that a Democrat had been nominated for the vacancy. He wrote President Hayes:

As there is no republican applicant before you in whom you seem to have confidence, and as the incumbent is said to require the aid of the Army in enforcing the law, I beg leave to file my application for the office, and to respectfully refer you my record of more than twenty years service as an officer of the general government. The records of the War Department will exhibit my service of nineteen years in the U.S. Army, and those of the Treasury Department will show a record of service since the war of three years.

This letter also went to General Alvord to be delivered through the proper channels to the President. Alvord sent it to Attorney-General Devens with the endorsement: "He at one time withdrew his name— But he says that his neighbors urge him to remain in Georgia and not return to New Orleans—I forward it knowing that in your hands it will have due consideration, if opportunity occurs. . . . I know nothing of the prospect of this being occasion for a new nomination. . . ." ⁸

By the time Longstreet had got around to refile his application, President Hayes had filled the vacancy by nominating O. P. Fitzsimmons, a Democrat. As is always the case in such matters, the "hungry" and their supporters felt that all nominations and appointments to desirable posts should go to Republican party members and workers rather than to Democrats, however loyal. Longstreet was no exception. He questioned the advisability of presidential appointments of Democrats when eligible and willing Republicans were available. He wrote:

Democrats in some instances claim that President Hayes is indebted to their party for his high office, inasmuch as that party held in its hands the power to prevent the Electoral count [of the contested 1876 election], and thus to prevent the inauguration. . . . The striking feature . . . of the new Administration is its conciliatory policy and this seems most needful to the country just now. It is true that this higher plane from which to move to future progress

⁷ Longstreet to Devens, July 5, 1877, *ibid.*; *id.* to Sherman, July 10, 1877, with Sherman's endorsement, July 19, 1877, *ibid.*; P. M. B. Young to Hayes, July 10, 1877, *ibid.*; Alvord to *id.*, July 14, 1877, *ibid.*; Longstreet to Sherman, July 31, 1877, *ibid.*; *id.* to Hayes, September 23, 1877, *ibid.* In a sketch of Longstreet captioned "Soldier-Convert," the statement is made that he "became a convert in New Orleans, March 7, 1877." *Catholic Encyclopedia*, 16 vols. (New York, 1934), IX, 354. This affiliation was made before Longstreet had settled in Gainesville, Georgia, and was not forced by any ostracism, social or otherwise, in that place, as has sometimes been suggested.

⁸ Longstreet to Hayes, November 20, 1877, *ibid.*; Alvord to Devens, November 25, 1877, *ibid.*

could have been more gracefully reached through judicious selections from the Republican Party, and as efficaciously, but since it has pleased the President to seek it through other channels, let us submit his plans to a fair trial. The South is in a condition to check it whenever it is thought better to do so.

President Grant, after his first inauguration, essayed a similar policy, but then neither party was ready for it, and he was forced back into party lines. Now both parties seem ready, and the question is, how best to reach it. It is interesting to witness leaders and Democrats of the line seeking office of a Republican President whose election they claim was fraudulent, while they continue to denounce those of the South who accepted office from President Grant, whose election they never questioned.⁹

In the summer of 1878, while waiting for some favorable action on his application for a Federal appointment, General Longstreet testified before the board of officers which was rehearing the charges against General Fitz John Porter for his conduct and actions at Groveton (the scene of the second battle of Manassas) on August 29, 1862. Apparently at General Porter's request, the board, meeting at West Point, sent Longstreet an invitation to testify; but Longstreet at first advised from Gainesville that "for the present, it is difficult for me to be present." However, when the invitation was renewed in such a manner as to make it quasi-public in its character, Longstreet accepted and, on July 9, 1878, testified in Porter's behalf. Longstreet's troops had faced Porter's at the second battle of Manassas, and therefore his testimony was very helpful in securing Porter's acquittal and ultimate restoration to duty.¹⁰

It is probable that Longstreet stopped in Washington both going to and returning from West Point to press his political claims for preference. That he was reasonably successful is evidenced by the fact that on September 7, 1878, he was appointed a deputy collector of internal revenue at six dollars per diem.¹¹ He held this office until his appointment as postmaster of Gainesville, Georgia, which he accepted in a letter to the Postmaster-General of December 25, 1878. He was confirmed on January 16, 1879. A reporter calling in Gainesville to interview him soon after his appointment wrote:

If you should find yourself in this little mountain town—and you could not well find yourself in a cooler place—and you were to drop in at the dingy Post

⁹ Longstreet to D. C. Henderson, October 29, 1877, published in the *Allegan (Mich.) Journal* and reprinted in the *New York Times*, November 11, 1877.

¹⁰ "Proceedings and Report of the Board of Officers . . . in the Case of Fitz John Porter," in *Senate Executive Documents*, 46 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 37, Pt. I, 57-58; *ibid.*, Pt. II, 114-29. Longstreet, writing from Atlanta to ex-President U. S. Grant at New York on December 30, 1882, enthusiastically approved of Grant's article in the *North American Review* of December, 1882, in which Grant endorsed Fitz John Porter and urged his restoration to the rolls of the U.S. Army. *Army and Navy Journal*, XX (January 13, 1883), 542.

¹¹ The National Archives to the writer (transmitting abstract of information contained in the Records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department, Washington), December 22, 1947.

Office—and you could not well drop in at a dingier one—you would in all probability, meet with a surprise when you asked for your letters. Instead of the horrified, pert and inquisitive apparition that pops up at the call-hole of the average country Post Office when a strange voice is heard, you would be confronted with a deliberate and noble face. Through the little window you would see a large well-shaped head, a pair of brave, frank eyes, a strong, expressive mouth, massive jaws, silken mustache, and whiskers almost white, and worn as Burnside's, the whole face in tone and fibre, aristocratic in every detail, and carrying a singular expression of power and dignity; you would then be looking into the eyes of the most accomplished soldier on the Southern side of the late war, the man that led the Southern troops in the first real battle of that gigantic struggle, Lee's most trusted and best-loved lieutenant, the "bull-dog" of the Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. James Longstreet. You would watch him with interest, remark his striking likeness to King William of Prussia, thank him for his courteous reply to your inquiries and then step out and inquire about him.¹²

Longstreet's decision to settle in Gainesville included an intention to engage actively as a Republican in Georgia state politics. The slowness of Federal recognition of his Louisiana record as a Republican irked him; and though minor appointments (first in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Treasury Department and then as postmaster in Gainesville) did not measure up to his idea of what was his due, they placed him in a position from which he could plan and work for a more satisfactory appointment. He thought that there was "a loose screw somewhere in the [Hayes] administration's patronage policy, in its policy of appointing Democrats as well as Republicans to important and lucrative posts," though he admitted that such a conciliatory policy was most needful to the country. Of his former political associates in Louisiana (whom he considered no more deserving than himself), W. P. Kellogg had gone to Washington as a United States senator, former United States marshal S. B. Packard had been appointed consul general at Liverpool, England, and General Hugh J. Campbell had been appointed United States attorney in Dakota Territory. Casey, the former collector of customs in New Orleans, had just disappeared. And so it went with other Louisiana politicians, most of whom had reaped a harvest of plenty while the Reconstruction government remained in power. General Longstreet, who had sacrificed much in taking his stand with the Republicans and approving, tacitly or otherwise, the things which they did, was always considered "an honest man," even by those without ethics or scruples. And yet the best reward which he had until now received was hardly more than that which an inconspicuous party worker could expect.¹³

¹² *Id.* to *id.*, October 3, 1947; *New York Times*, July 29, 1879.

¹³ Longstreet to D. S. Henderson, October 29, 1877, quoted in *New York Times*, November 11, 1879; Packard's testimony before "Select Committee" of Congress, meeting in New Orleans in February, 1872, in *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211, p. 138.

For several years prior to his leaving New Orleans for good, Longstreet had been in Georgia frequently and presumably had conferred often with Georgia Republican politicians. Chief among these was A. E. Buck, a former officer in the Union army, who after several years of political activity in Alabama, including a term in the national House of Representatives, had been appointed clerk of the United States Circuit and District Courts of Georgia and who had at his disposal a large and important volume of Federal patronage. Another was John E. Bryant, also a former Union army officer, who had served consecutively with the Freedmen's Bureau, as a Republican newspaper editor, as postmaster at Augusta, Georgia, and as a member of the Georgia state assembly. He was known as "an unexampled manipulator of the black elements [in Georgia, who] had played a highly colored part in all of the shifty episodes of reconstruction." One observer of Bryant's methods and actions wrote of him: "No man has ever joined to the deftest and glibbest tongue in presenting the humanitarian aspects of reconstruction, a keener clutch of the more practical instrumentalities that govern the untutored colored intelligence. He has been both a subtle and a bold leader of the dark element of suffrage."¹⁴

For the next twenty years Longstreet was to be in constant contest with Buck and Bryant for Republican leadership and position. Always he opposed his sincerity, honesty, and not too much capability as a manipulator to their unscrupulous boldness and skillful manipulation of men and votes. Longstreet's policy was to build a strong Republican party of white voters in Georgia with such colored helpers as cared to follow and support him; Buck and Bryant and their associates preferred to put the colored voters first, the white voters following or not as they chose. Longstreet's plan was more creative and constructive. His opponents looked only for temporary success; as they could see that their opportunities for political preferment would in time cease, and they would then have either to be satisfied with political crumbs or to return to their Northern homes to resume their former activities. This necessity would, however, be made easier by their gains from their political careers in reconstructing the state.

On the day after Christmas of 1878, Longstreet wrote his former associate Senator Kellogg, who was in Washington. Proposing a coalition between the Independents in Georgia and the Republicans, he remarked:

It has always been my theory that the republican party to become practical and successful in this section must adopt some plan by which we may secure cooperation from a large part of the best citizens of this section. The Independent move offers an opportunity which I think should not be overlooked. . . . I believe

¹⁴ *Biographical Dictionary of Congress* (Washington, 1928), 754; I. W. Avery, *The History of the State of Georgia from 1850 to 1881* . . . (New York, 1881), 396.

that we may elect our legislature next fall of Independents and Republicans, if our affairs are handled with this view. . . . [I do not] know that the Administration cares to have success in that way, but it is the only way of making the republican party successful here—and the only way in my judgment of electing a republican President other than Grant. . . .¹⁵

Longstreet's activities for political preferment continued; and in the spring of 1880, two years after the Hayes administration took office, his efforts were rewarded—in a measure at least—by his appointment as United States minister to Turkey. Just why Longstreet should have been chosen for this post is not apparent, except that the Hayes administration probably felt that he deserved some worthwhile recognition for his active and unremitting support of the Republican party, first in Louisiana and then in Georgia. Longstreet replaced Horace Maynard of Tennessee, who had joined the Radicals late in the Johnson administration and had been sent to Turkey by President Grant.

Longstreet's nomination on May 19, 1880, which was followed by Senate confirmation on June 14, 1880, aroused considerable comment, both favorable and adverse. The St. Louis *Republican* thought the nomination "a good one, though more or less unpopular in both sections of the country. In the North, because he is an ex-rebel, in the South, because being an ex-rebel, he has for some years acted with the Republican party."¹⁶ A number of G.A.R. posts adopted resolutions opposing the appointment and criticizing the Senate because "in confirming the rebel General Longstreet . . . [it] honored the General, dishonored itself and insulted the Loyal soldiers of the Nation."¹⁷ The London *Telegraph*, which was puzzled at President Hayes's choice of Longstreet, characterized him as "a man of no intellectual brightness and wholly devoid of book learning . . . stolid of demeanor [and] slow and guarded of speech," yet concluded that his military reputation was a guarantee of his ability to fill the position satisfactorily.¹⁸

Longstreet did not hurry to his new post; Georgia politics delayed him. On May 14, 1880, General John Brown Gordon, the senior United States Senator from Georgia, resigned. This unexpected act enlivened the political campaign in Georgia, having "something like the effect that the explosion of a powder magazine would have in a fortification. . . . It shook the state

¹⁵ Longstreet to Kellogg, December 26, 1878, in Hayes Memorial Library.

¹⁶ St. Louis *Republican*, May 22, 1880, quoted in New York *Times*, May 28, 1880.

¹⁷ See, for example, Resolutions, Ford Post, G.A.R., East Toledo, Ohio, June 17, 1880, in Hayes Memorial Library.

¹⁸ "An English Opinion of General Longstreet," in London *Telegraph*, quoted in New York *Times*, June 15, 1880. Longstreet is reported to have made a formal presentation of his credentials to the Sultan of Turkey at an audience following a reception at Constantinople tendered Longstreet and other American diplomatic officials and the officers of the U.S.S. *Nipsic*, December 14, 1880. See account from the Levant *Herald*, December 15, 1880, quoted in *Army and Navy Journal*, XVII (January 15, 1881), 479-80.

from center to circumference. Things [had been] comparatively quiet. The swift storm that followed was blinding and ferocious." General Gordon, whom the *New York Times* had characterized as the ablest man from the South in either House of Congress, was replaced by ex-Governor Joseph E. Brown, whose gyrations in Georgia politics had become famous. During the Reconstruction period in Georgia, Brown had done as Longstreet had done in Louisiana, counseling acceptance of the Radical program and actively allying himself with the carpetbag administration in the state. Now he was back in the Democratic party as a member in good standing. His appointment further confused an already confused political situation in Georgia. The opposition to Brown and to the governor, A. H. Colquitt, was not united. Dr. William H. Felton, the leader of the Independents in the state (including disgruntled Democrats and white Republicans), felt obligated to make the race for re-election to his seat in Congress and therefore did not feel that he could do much to oppose Brown and Colquitt. Longstreet, as one of the leaders of the white Republicans in Georgia, was active in his support of Felton and also in work for the presidential ticket. He had publicly favored General Grant for the presidential nomination; but when James A. Garfield was chosen, he supported him.¹⁹

In the campaign that followed, those Democrats who had so cruelly persecuted Longstreet for joining the Republicans were themselves criticized for "throwing up their hats for Hancock, the Union General [and Democratic presidential nominee] who is willing to lend his name to the followers of the cause for which Longstreet fought and bled."²⁰ Felton was defeated, but Garfield and Chester A. Arthur were elected. The campaign over, Longstreet left his family in Gainesville and went to Washington to renew his application for the position as United States marshal of Georgia. Before long he was en route to his new post in Turkey, to which he went with the expectation that his stay there would be brief and that before long he would be able to return to Georgia to be with his family and in a position to exert his influence both in behalf of his party and for his own welfare.

General Longstreet arrived at Constantinople on December 13, 1880, and presented his credentials the next day. Though he found the climate delightful and Constantinople a pleasant place to live in, he did not remain there long. His responsibilities and duties were routine and apparently were largely carried on by the permanent legion staff. On April 22, 1881, he applied for

¹⁹ Avery, *History of the State of Georgia*, 558-59; Louise Biles Hill, *Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1939), 108 n., 318; Rebecca Latimer Felton, *My Memoirs of Georgia Politics* (Atlanta, 1911), 289 ff.; "Longstreet on Grant," in Gainesville (Ga.) correspondence of *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, in *New York Times*, February 22, 1880.

²⁰ *Staunton Valley Virginian*, August 5, 1880, in *New York Times*, August 7, 1880.

a sixty-day leave of absence; and a week later he left for a tour of western Europe, after which—instead of returning to his post at Constantinople—he returned to the United States and resigned his diplomatic position to accept the appointment for which he had been waiting, that of United States marshal for the District of Georgia. His nomination to this post had been made on April 19 and confirmed by the Senate on May 11, 1881. Longstreet's successor as minister to Turkey was General Lew Wallace, who had just completed his famous novel, *Ben Hur*.²¹

According to Longstreet's account, his appointment as United States marshal for Georgia had been arranged with President-elect Garfield before he left for Constantinople. He was characterized as "one of the most steadfast Republicans, . . . a power in Georgia . . . and one of its most respected citizens." One of Longstreet's colored supporters looked on his appointment "as the most important move yet made to build up a Republican party in Georgia." Continuing, the writer remarked: "We want a man that has our confidence and respect. No more polished bummers. We recognize in General Longstreet an ardent, true and unselfish Republican."²²

Later there was some controversy between Longstreet and Emory Speer, the congressman from Longstreet's district (the Ninth), as to who was responsible for this appointment. Speer said that he had had Longstreet "appointed Marshall of Georgia," but Longstreet stated that before he left for Turkey he had an understanding with President-elect Garfield that as soon as a vacancy occurred in the office he would be appointed. In fact, according to Longstreet, the appointment was made before Speer ever spoke to President Garfield. Speer, however, retorted: "I am mainly responsible, I think, for Mr. Longstreet's appointment. . . . I went to work for Mr. Longstreet and I believe contributed more to his appointment as Marshal than any other person. . . ." Speer also reminded Longstreet that he had appointed his son as a cadet to West Point and that when Longstreet had written him "from Constantinople thanking me for his son's appointment [he] expressed a wish to be United States Marshal. . . ."²³

It is probable that both Speer and Longstreet were right about the marshalship. Longstreet undoubtedly had a verbal understanding with Garfield before he left for Constantinople that he would be appointed as soon as a

²¹ The dates given for Longstreet's nomination and confirmation have been derived from a letter to the writer from the Department of State of August 29, 1947, and are based on government records.

²² C. W. Arnold to President James A. Garfield, April 10, 1881, in General Records of the Department of Justice, The National Archives; Ishmael Lonon to *id.*, April 15, 1881, *ibid.*

²³ See testimony taken by the Committee on Expenditures of the Department of Justice, William Springer, chairman, in *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 48 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 38, Pt. I, 267, 567. This document is hereinafter cited as Springer Report.

vacancy occurred. But politicians have short memories, and they are usually fickle opportunists. Speer's activity in keeping Longstreet's claim before Garfield after his inauguration probably helped to ensure that Garfield would not change his mind, and to that extent it was a service to Longstreet. The vacancy did occur in Longstreet's absence, when O. P. Fitzsimmons, the incumbent marshal, resigned. As to whether Speer was responsible for the appointment of Longstreet's son to West Point, there can be no question. Robert Lee Longstreet was tendered the appointment from the Ninth Congressional District of Georgia, represented in Congress by Speer, to enter the Military Academy in June, 1881; but the appointment was declined.²⁴

General Longstreet reached the United States early in June of 1881 and was interviewed at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City on June 11. He talked of conditions in Europe in general and Turkey in particular. He said that he did not think well of the harems and that he felt no regret at leaving Turkey, although his stay there had been very agreeable. After a brief visit in New York City and a stopover in Washington he went to Gainesville to take up the duties of his new assignment. On July 1, 1881, he gave his bonds, took the oath of office, and "assumed charge" at his new headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.²⁵

When Longstreet returned to Georgia in the summer of 1881, he found himself in the midst of a strenuous campaign on the part of Dr. William H. Felton and his associates to organize the Independents of Georgia in an attempt to overthrow the so-called Bourbon government of the state, which was led by Gordon, Brown, and Colquitt. This was a difficult task in any event, but it was made doubly so by the factionalism in the Bourbon opposition. In preparation for the campaign of 1882, Dr. Felton and some of his associates in the Independent movement met in conference at the Markham House in Atlanta in December, 1881, to talk over the situation. General Longstreet was among those who at this time called on Dr. Felton in his quarters at the Markham House, though he does not seem to have been a party to the resolutions prepared at this December conference, which announced the conviction of the gathering "that neither the Republican party nor the Democratic party as at present organized . . . can subserve the vital interests of the people." A mass meeting was called—to be held in Atlanta on January 1, 1882—"to consider what is the best policy for the people to pursue in order to purge the State of personalism and corruption. . . ." ²⁶

²⁴ Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Morton (librarian, United States Military Academy) to the writer, October 25, 1948.

²⁵ New York *Tribune*, June 12, 1881; Longstreet to Wayne McVeagh (telegram), July 1, 1881, in General Records of the Department of Justice, The National Archives.

²⁶ Felton, *Georgia Politics*, 339-41, 450-51.

The opposition immediately attacked the meeting and its resolution as an attempt to form a coalition or bargain to gain control of Georgia.²⁷ Felton promptly set out to present the case of the Independents to the people; and this the *New York Tribune* of January 11, 1882, called a "revolutionary move which means that Mr. Felton has taken it upon himself to fight the Bourbon Democratic party to the death. . . . Let the people get a chance to govern themselves and Bourbonism will soon be buried forever. . . ." The *New York Times*, on February 6, commented:

There is an element of the Republican Party with which Speer has long been scheming that may turn up as an important factor in the campaign. This element centers in General James Longstreet, who is now U.S. Marshal in Georgia, and was at one time prominently mentioned for a place in President Arthur's cabinet. General Longstreet has been a consistent Republican since the war, was a Grant man in 1880 and since then has been working effectively in Washington through General [William] Mahone, whose division was in Longstreet's corps in the late war. Longstreet is trustworthy, popular and strong and seems to have arranged very satisfactorily with the President for the encouragement of the Independent movement in Georgia. The better class of Republicans in Georgia . . . attended the Markham House conference in Atlanta last month with a few Democrats endorsing Dr. Felton's views. . . .

Several months later, on April 12, 1882, the *New York Tribune* remarked: "The anti-Bourbon movement in Georgia seems to be gaining ground steadily and surely. Its leaders do not make much noise, but they keep quietly at work and succeed in attracting the attention of the people. . . . The Bourbons with their intolerance, tissue ballots, rifle clubs and red shirts must be overthrown and a firm stand taken by the people of the State on the side of old-fashioned honesty in all things. Then a new day will dawn upon the South."

As the campaign got under way, it became apparent that the alleged coalition of Independents, made up of Democrats opposed to the so-called Bourbon rule and the warring Republican factions, were not united either in their policies or in their choice of candidates to oppose the united forces of "Colquitt, Joe Brown and all the Expediency men." On February 6, 1882, the *New York Times*, viewing the situation in detachment from a distance, commented editorially that the Independents were "associated—how intimately and on what terms does not appear—with General Longstreet, who is reported to represent the Federal Administration, from which substantial aid is expected. We have already called attention to the fact that the opponents of the Bourbon leaders have not yet discovered any adequate issue on which to make their stand. It remains to be seen how far the cooperation of General Longstreet, either with or without the backing of the Administration, will supply them with the very essential condition of political growth and

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 432, 434, 441, 451, 458-60.

prosperity." As the campaign progressed, one observer commented: "Longstreet's attempts to radicalize the State by the distribution of a few two and a half cent post offices has proved a ridiculous failure. . . ." ²⁸

The lack of unity in the Republican party was made plain to all when contesting delegations from the counties met in convention in Atlanta in the first week in August, 1882. The representatives "were divided into three factions—the Syndicate, composed principally of native white office-holders; the Stalwarts, mostly Northern men; and the colored delegates, who are somewhat dissatisfied with their political treatment." The breach between the factions was widened by an attempt of the colored members of the party to break into a "Syndicate [meeting], headed by General Longstreet, in caucus with closed doors." Longstreet, as presiding officer, called the police; and the colored leaders "were arrested and carried to the guard house, where they were kept until sureties could be found." This act greatly embittered the colored delegates against the leaders of the Syndicate, and as a result it was reported that "The Syndicate is weakening." However, the next day a surprised reporter wrote: "The Syndicate holds its own," and though "all efforts at compromise [had] failed" the Syndicate showed "no falling off in its membership." ²⁹

Both factions endorsed General L. J. Gartrell for governor to run against Alexander H. Stephens, the Bourbon candidate. The Syndicate nominated Longstreet for congressman-at-large, while the other faction nominated R. D. Locke. In the Ninth District, the Bourbon candidate was A. D. Candler, who was opposed by Emory Speer. In the Seventh District Dr. Felton ran against the incumbent, J. C. Clements. On August 16, U.S. Senator B. H. Hill died somewhat unexpectedly. At the meeting of the Georgia legislature several weeks later, Governor A. H. Colquitt was elected in Hill's place. "The six Republican members of the legislature gave General Longstreet a complimentary vote [for the office of senator] and then voted solidly for Colquitt." In the ensuing election in November, Stephens was elected governor and Candler was elected to Congress. Longstreet's vote for congressman-at-large was so small that it was not published. So far as is known, these were the only times in Longstreet's political career that he was a candidate for elective office, and both of these times he was defeated. ³⁰

As a result of the split among the Republican factions, Longstreet was reported as saying that "there is no Republican party in this State." Continuing, he added: "I don't recognize their organization and don't care anything

²⁸ William M. Browne to Jefferson Davis, July 1, 1882, quoted in Rowland (ed.), *Davis . . . Letters, Papers, and Speeches*, IX, 176.

²⁹ *New York Times*, August 2, 3, 4, 1882.

³⁰ *New York Tribune*, August 4, 1882; Felton, *Georgia Politics*, 383.

about them." Longstreet's newspaper supporter, the *Post-Appeal* of Atlanta, said: "We have the Republican party as organized in Georgia, consisting of several gentlemen, principally from the state of Maine, all carpetbaggers, so-called, and a few colored politicians."⁸¹

As the leader of the white Republicans in the state, Longstreet worked hard to hold his Syndicate together, but with decreasing effectiveness. Though he remained a powerful force in Georgia state politics, his power and influence diminished after the election of 1882. In the midst of the campaign there were many rumors that there was something wrong in his accounts as marshal. These rumors arose, primarily, from Longstreet's request that a representative of the Department of Justice be sent to examine his accounts, both to ensure that he would not be charged with the shortages of his predecessor and so that he and his deputies might be properly instructed in the correct manner of keeping the marshal's accounts and making allowances to deputies. Some suspected that the examination was prompted by his enemies, who wanted to get his job—not the least of whom was John E. Bryant. But "At the Treasury Department it was said that [while] some complaint had been made about the accounts, if there were any irregularities they were probably due to the acts of the deputies." No blame was attached to Longstreet himself, except perhaps that of carelessness and laxness in the supervision of his office and accounts and of the activities of his deputies, some of whom were charged with being dishonest, inefficient, and unscrupulous. As a result of Longstreet's request, from October 10 to 20, 1882, his accounts were in the hands of the United States Attorney Emory Speer, for examination and were not returned to Longstreet until about November 20, 1882. This inspection gave rise to many speculations as to who was endeavoring to bring about Longstreet's removal from the office to which he had been appointed for a four-year term. Longstreet's newspaper supporter, the *Post-Appeal*, however, assured Longstreet's friends and supporters that "The removal of General Longstreet is entirely improbable."⁸²

However, this publicity and speculation marked the high point of a campaign to get Longstreet out of his lucrative and influential post—a campaign that culminated two years later in his removal. Almost as soon as he had been appointed, John E. Bryant, A. E. Buck, and other Georgia supporters of James G. Blaine for the presidency started a movement to get Longstreet out of the way. Longstreet's predecessor in the office, O. P. Fitzsimmons, had left under a cloud of suspicion; and within a year of Longstreet's appointment, Department of Justice investigators were in Atlanta, looking into alleged

⁸¹ Interview with Longstreet in Atlanta, in *New York Times*, December 19, 1882.

⁸² *New York Times*, November 1, December 19, 1882; *Springer Report*, 371.

discrepancies in Fitzsimmons' accounts and checking allowances made by Longstreet to deputies. In January, 1883, Ralph Ballin, one of the Department of Justice inspectors, reported:

The marshal, Mr. James Longstreet, is an old and highly respected citizen of Georgia. He is highly esteemed throughout the State from a social point of view, and is recognized by all who know him as an absolutely honest man. It is, however, the almost universal opinion of those with whom we conversed concerning Marshal Longstreet, that, while they appreciate him socially and believe firmly in his personal integrity, still they very positively assert that he is almost entirely without those essential and necessary qualities which constitute a business man, and without which, in our opinion, the affairs of a marshal's office cannot be successfully administered. . . .³³

Bryant continued to insist that he had no designs on Longstreet's post; and when it was reported on December 19, 1882, that he sought the post, he immediately denied the accusation. He wrote the editor of the *New York Times* that the charge that a fight was being made against Longstreet in the interest of Blaine was ridiculous and untrue. Bryant stated that though the chief object of his Republican state committee was to overthrow the Bourbon Democrats, Longstreet and his supporters had given no co-operation. Bryant concluded that President Arthur would have to choose between the Republicans of Georgia who were working to overthrow the Bourbon Democrats or Longstreet and his supporters, who, by their activities, were in reality destroying the Republican party in the state.³⁴

In spite of Bryant's denials, he did not cease to urge himself as a suitable successor to Longstreet as marshal. Six months later, in a letter addressed to President Arthur, J. C. Jenkins, a Georgia lawyer and assistant United States attorney for northern Georgia, urged Bryant's appointment as marshal because he believed Longstreet to be totally inefficient for so important a position. Bryant, Jenkins asserted, was not only in every way fitted for the place, but his record as a true and tried Republican was spotless. Longstreet, on the other hand, had never recognized the Republican party in Georgia.³⁵

Longstreet's friends were not slow to defend his record. One of them, J. D. Cunningham of Atlanta, wrote President Arthur: "General Longstreet has a stronger personal influence—not only in Georgia, but in the whole South—than any republican in it, and has sacrificed more to his patriotism than any man in the South. While in office—with no fear of his removal—his friends are silent because confident, but his removal would cause such a com-

³³ Springer Report, 371.

³⁴ *New York Times*, December 25, 1882. Bryant signed this letter as "Secretary, Republican State Central Committee of Georgia."

³⁵ J. C. Jenkins to President Chester A. Arthur, July 5, 1883 (copy), in General Records of the Department of Justice, The National Archives.

motion and dissatisfaction both North and South among the friends of the administration as has seldom been seen."⁸⁶

In the midst of the struggle to hold his post as U.S. Marshal, General Longstreet received an invitation from the Association of Graduates of West Point, of which he was a member, to be present at the graduation exercises in June, 1883; but he did not feel that he could accept. However, soon after the Jenkins letter was made known, he went to Washington to place his side of the controversy before the President. While in Washington he met and consulted with General William Mahone of Virginia, a United States senator, and General James R. Chalmers of Mississippi, a congressman, who were endeavoring to do in their respective states what Longstreet himself was trying to do in Georgia. Joel Chandler Harris wrote in the *Atlanta Constitution* of April 28, 1883, that the men who had joined the Republicans, such as Mahone and Chalmers, were "typical strutters," men who "never lost an opportunity to prate about the Confederate principles and their Southern honor." Longstreet was not mentioned, though undoubtedly Harris intended to imply that he also was a "strutter." Longstreet, on his part, "believed that it was the true policy of the South to accept reconstruction and go in and control their own State Governments by acting in harmony with the Republican party, instead of being controlled by carpetbaggers and negroes, which resulted from their alliance with Democracy."⁸⁷

From Washington, Longstreet went to Chicago and on to Woodstock, Illinois, where he was the principal speaker and guest of honor at the annual fair. "The Old Soldier . . . [a] white whiskered, white haired man, dressed in black broadcloth, with a boutonniere [*sic*] in his lapel . . . [spoke] in a voice which failed to reach very far . . ." and told the "Story of his Amnesty" at the hands of General Grant. He was feeble and worn, and "as the sun was beating down on his white hair, a lady offered him her sunshade which he held above him the remainder of the meeting." From Woodstock, Longstreet returned to Chicago. He had hoped to go from there to Washington to be the guest of his friend and classmate General W. S. Rosecrans on an excursion to the battlefield at Manassas; but his health was not good, and he went directly to his home in Gainesville.⁸⁸

In the midst of his fight to retain his marshalship, Longstreet was involved as a defendant in a suit brought by a New York brokerage house for un-

⁸⁶ Cunningham to Arthur, July 13, 1883, *ibid*.

⁸⁷ Quoted in Julia Collier Harris (ed.), *Joel Chandler Harris: Editor and Essayist* . . . (Chapel Hill, 1931), 74; interview with Longstreet, in *Chicago Tribune*, September 13, 1883, in *New York Times*, September 16, 1883.

⁸⁸ Account in *Chicago Tribune*, in *New York Times*, September 25, 1883; W. S. Rosecrans to Benjamin H. Brewster, October 8, 1883, in General Records of the Department of Justice, The National Archives.

paid notes given in 1877 in New Orleans for the purchase of cotton, the price of which went down after the purchase order had been placed. The verdict went against Longstreet, and presumably he had to satisfy the account (which totaled \$4,523.37) in some acceptable manner.³⁹ About this same time, Longstreet received a letter from a real-estate promoter in New York City who was interested in investing in land in the South and reselling to prospective buyers in the Northern states who would settle permanently on the land. Longstreet wrote a long letter in reply in which he pointed out the advantages of living in northern Georgia and continued:

The political features are not so inviting I regret to say. Yet the evil of which complaint is made is very much exaggerated—The whites or democrats, for nearly all of the whites are democrats, seem to have a horror of the idea of negro rule; particularly the white women. . . . Republicanism has been so mismanaged, south, as to form a choice between white democrats as rulers and black republicans—The result is that all the whites who have any self respect, and I may say, most of the blacks vote the democratic ticket—in fact, at our last election there was no other ticket offered. . . . Social relations are not as pleasant as I would like to see them—but I don't think that politics have much to do with that—our people are too poor to indulge in making new acquaintances, or to appear in Society as has been their custom of old. . . . If you come south, and I sincerely hope that you may, I think you will be something as General [Winfield] Scott was in the early days of secession. It is said that he found it necessary to renew his oath of allegiance to the United States after each Julip—if you come South You may find it necessary to renew and fortify your political allegiance as frequently as did our old General. . . .⁴⁰

In the winter of 1883-84, the effort to bring about Longstreet's removal from office was pushed with redoubled energy; and it was rumored that if and when he was removed, he would be given a foreign mission. A Republican leader (possibly John E. Bryant or A. E. Buck), who was reported to be very close to President Arthur, in January, 1884, stated in private conversation that Longstreet's removal "had been decided on, and would be accomplished in two months . . . no one desired to see him kicked out but he was in his dotage and being unable to attend to the duties of his office, refused to employ competent men." Longstreet, however, still felt "safe."⁴¹

In February, 1884, the Springer congressional committee, which was investigating activities in various districts throughout the nation, resumed its hearings relative to Longstreet's administration in Georgia. Judge Emory Speer (now the United States district attorney for northern Georgia), who was very critical of Longstreet's conduct of the affairs of his office of marshal, testified that in his opinion, "the main trouble there proceeds from the in-

³⁹ *New York Times*, December 22, 1883. The records in this case are in the Hall of Records, New York City, filed under record numbers LJ-1883-L 17, LJ-1883-L 20, and LJ-1885-L 1.

⁴⁰ Longstreet to E. S. Marsh, April 9, 1884, in Hayes Memorial Library.

⁴¹ News item from Atlanta, January 19, 1884, in *New York Times*, January 20, 1884.

eptitude of Mr. Longstreet to manage the affairs of the Marshal's office. He is getting to be old and is very deaf. He seems to have lost the power of appreciating the importance of facts. He gives to small facts sometimes too great importance, and gives to large facts very small importance." When asked if he had any reason to doubt Longstreet's integrity, Speer replied: "I have heard it doubted. He is a man of very bitter prejudices and when he begins a certain line he is apt to carry out his prejudices to an extreme extent." The question of Longstreet's integrity in regard to financial matters, public or otherwise, was not brought into question, but only his integrity in judging his subordinates and in holding to a position, once he had taken it, regardless of logic or facts. The general consensus seemed to be that most of General Longstreet's trouble proceeded from too great trust in his son John Garland Longstreet, who was his chief deputy and who was accused both of having deceived his father about his accounts and of personal misconduct.⁴²

On April 4, 1883, Longstreet had written Brewster Cameron, general agent of the Department of Justice, that Ballin "and others had entered into a combination last fall by which it was proposed to place Mr. John E. Bryant as United States Marshal and Mr. Ballin in his office to conduct the business for him." In January, 1884, Ballin testified before the Springer committee that Longstreet had accused him of having "entered into a conspiracy with a Mr. Bryant for the purpose of removing Longstreet from office and having Bryant appointed Marshal and myself chief deputy. I have never met Mr. Bryant before the Longstreet investigation and did not cultivate his acquaintance then. . . . I entered into no conspiracy to cause the removal of Longstreet." Several months later Ballin was once again called before the committee and, on May 1, 1884, testified that Longstreet was careless in his accounting and in making allowances to his deputies. Ballin said further that he considered Longstreet lacking in capacity as a public officer.⁴³

On February 27, 28, and 29, 1884, Longstreet, in Washington, testified before the Springer committee and endeavored to explain and defend the conduct of his office. But the sands were running out. On July 21, 1884, he received the following note from S. T. Phillips, acting attorney general, Washington, D.C.: "The President directs me to say to you that he will accept your resignation as Marshal for the Northern District of Georgia, upon your forwarding [it] to him through this Department." And so Longstreet's removal was accomplished. Several days later Colonel John E. Bryant was appointed in his place.⁴⁴

⁴² Springer Report, 270, 339, 385.

⁴³ Longstreet to Cameron, April 4, 1883, *ibid.*, 389; Ballin's testimony, *ibid.*, 87, 341, 915.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 535-80. Of the 972 printed pages containing the testimony heard by the Springer Committee in its investigation of the affairs of United States marshals throughout the nation,

Bryant had led a solid Georgia delegation to the Republican presidential nominating convention in Chicago the previous month and had voted it "first, last and forever for Arthur." The President must now pay his political debt, though "he considered it best not to make the appointment until after the Convention, as otherwise it would be looked on as a political sell-out." Longstreet was reported to have "always had strong backing from General Grant. As Grant is now not so strong politically and as the convention is over, the coast seems clear for Bryant. . . . To the last [Longstreet] had faith that he would stick and he might have done so had the fortunes of Grant & Ward been less fickle. . . ." ⁴⁵

On receiving his order of decapitation, Longstreet countered by securing a designation as a Georgia elector-at-large, pledged to James G. Blaine, the Republican presidential nominee. This act, according to the *New York Times*, "it is supposed will give him a claim on the administration [if Blaine should be elected], when it may become Bryant's turn to go." As matters turned out, Grover Cleveland, the Democratic candidate, was elected President; and Bryant did not get the expected permanent appointment. ⁴⁶

General Longstreet left office with his disputed accounts still unsettled, taking the position that he would accept no settlement until he could get one which he considered fair and just. He accused the Department of Justice of a "delay [that] has every appearance of being wilful and malicious," though he had "not lost faith in the integrity of the Government," nor in the possibility of reaching an "honorable settlement." In the meantime, the Democrats made use, in the presidential campaign, of the many complaints of irregularities in the Justice Department under Republican rule, as exposed by the Springer committee; they released the whole story in a campaign document entitled "Open the Books—An Extraordinary Chapter of Republican Mismanagement of the Finances of the United States . . . A Long List of Defalcations." On pages 28 and 29 of this pamphlet was an account of the difficulties in Longstreet's district of northern Georgia. Longstreet, however, was not to be swerved in his quest for an acceptable settlement. Several months after the election, the *New York Times* reported that General Longstreet "will not go to Washington for a settlement under the present administration [Arthur's], but will trust his interests with the Democrats. General Longstreet claims there is due him a gross amount of \$20,000 or a little more. Only about \$1800 or \$1900 of this however belongs to him personally,

the investigation of affairs in Longstreet's district comprises 181 pages. Cf. "Serious Charges made by Emory Speer before Springer Committee," in *New York Tribune*, February 11, 1884. See also Phillips to Longstreet, July 21, 1884, in Instruction Book, Department of Justice, The National Archives; and *New York Times*, July 22, 24, 27, 28, 1884.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, July 21, 1884.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, July 28, 1884.

the balance being due Deputy Marshals. It is thought that of these accounts aggregating \$20,000, about \$6,000 will be disallowed and that the deputies will receive their accounts less that amount."⁴⁷

The accounts were finally settled; and the proceeds, if any, were presumably used by General Longstreet to help in the operation of the Piedmont House, which he had purchased when he settled in Gainesville. Here he stored most of his papers and other data which he used in the preparation of his book, his magazine and newspaper articles, and his lectures and speeches. Here, also, at various times he welcomed visitors to Gainesville as paying guests. Among them were said to have been a young scholar named Woodrow Wilson, who afterwards became President of the United States; General Joseph E. Johnston; Hoke Smith, a young lawyer and newspaperman and afterwards a United States senator; Henry W. Grady, distinguished as a speaker, writer, and advocate of the New South; Joel Chandler Harris, an editorial writer on the *Atlanta Constitution* and author of the "Br'er Rabbit" and other stories; General Robert F. Hoke, one of Longstreet's former Confederate army associates; and many others of lesser note. General Longstreet and his family lived in the Piedmont House during the winter months and spent their summers in his nearby cottage in the country until it was burned in the spring of 1889.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Longstreet to J. Tarbell, September 28, 1884, quoted in *New York Times*, October 12, 1884. See also the forty-page campaign pamphlet, "Open the Books—An Extraordinary Chapter of Republican Mismanagement of the Finances of the United States . . ." (Washington, 1884), in New York Public Library; *New York Times*, February 26, 1885.

⁴⁸ John B. Estes to Longstreet, January 8, 1877, in Emory University Library, Emory University, Ga.; Longstreet to Mrs. M. J. Feckner, February 10, 1877, *ibid.*; F. R. Longstreet to the writer (regarding use of the Piedmont House both as a residence and as a place to entertain "paying guests"; the building was torn down some years ago), January 19, 1948.

Marking Time

ALTHOUGH HE HELD NO OFFICE AND THUS HAD NO REGULAR SOURCE OF INCOME other than that which he could gain from his writings and from the vineyards which surrounded his home on the outskirts of Gainesville, Longstreet did not spend the time in idleness. When his health permitted, he was as active as he had ever been. For most of the preceding twenty years, his annual income from one source or another had been very good, considering the cost of living of that period. He owned his home—two homes in fact, one in the village and one nearby. In the subsequent ten years before he returned to the government payroll he was in occasional demand as a speaker. Much of his time was devoted to recording his experiences during the War Between the States—writings for which he was well paid. He traveled a great deal for a man of his age, and presumably he was able to grow much of the food needed for his family and himself. Altogether, it would seem that had he been as good a manager of his personal affairs as he was a leader of men in battle, he should have been able to live with reasonable comfort and security. Perhaps in a measure he did.

He received an aid in meeting his expenses when, early in 1887, a bill was passed by the Federal Congress making every veteran of the Mexican War, from either the North or the South, eligible for a pension.¹ Beginning on January 29, 1887, Longstreet received a disability pension of eight dollars monthly, and on January 5, 1893, this was increased to twelve dollars monthly and continued at that rate for the rest of his life. Later, in August of 1894, a bill was introduced in Congress which would have increased this pension by an additional thirty dollars monthly, but no record has been found to indicate that any action was taken on it.

In addition to his Federal pension, Longstreet also received from the state of Georgia a Confederate pension; this was said to have been twenty-five dollars a year at first, but in 1889 it was increased to fifty dollars because Longstreet's right arm had been disabled by his wound in the Wilderness in May, 1864.²

¹ *Vedette* (Washington, 1879-93), VII (January, 1887), 8-9, cited in Wallace E. Davies, "The Mexican War Veterans as an Organized Group," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXV (September, 1948), 226.

² *Atlanta Constitution*, January 15, 1888; letter to the writer from the Department of Confederate Pensions, Atlanta, November 9, 1948.

During this period Longstreet also busied himself with writing articles for the Century War Series, later published in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, as is discussed elsewhere, and in gathering materials for an account of his Confederate war service.³

In the summer of 1885, in the same week in which he lost his position as United States marshal, Longstreet's long-time friend and frequent benefactor General U. S. Grant died after a protracted illness. Longstreet, in common with many of Grant's old army associates and friends, was invited to attend the funeral, which was held in New York City on August 8, 1885. He accepted the invitation and was eager to attend, but the state of his health and conditions growing out of the loss of his marshalship prevented him from making the long journey to New York. He was likewise forced to forgo attending a Grant memorial meeting held in Atlanta as a tribute to the man who was, as Longstreet wrote, "my lifetime personal friend, kindest when I was most fiercely assaulted."⁴

On the day of Grant's death, Longstreet, in an interview with a reporter of the *New York Times*, expressed a warm tribute and an appreciation of the constant friendship which had always existed between himself and the late President. He characterized Grant as "the truest as well as the bravest man that ever lived." Of Longstreet at this period, the reporter wrote: "General Longstreet lives in a two-story house of modern style about three miles from Gainesville. . . . He was dressed in a long and many colored dressing gown; his white whiskers were trimmed after the pattern of Burnside's and he looked little like the stalwart figure which was ever in the thickest of the fight during the bloody battles of the late war. . . ."⁵

On August 16, 1882, Senator B. H. Hill of Georgia had died. He was succeeded for the long term by Governor A. H. Colquitt, who, as has been noted, was accused of a political deal which involved the resignation of General John B. Gordon as United States senator and the appointment of ex-Governor Joseph E. Brown in his place, it being understood that Colquitt, who was then governor of Georgia, would serve out his term and then go to the United States Senate at the first opportunity. Senator Hill's unexpected death created the necessary vacancy, and Colquitt was promptly chosen.

On May 1, 1886, a monument to Senator Hill was unveiled in Atlanta. Jefferson Davis was persuaded by Henry W. Grady of the *Atlanta Constitution* to come to Atlanta to unveil the monument and make a brief speech

³ *New York Times*, December 16, 1888.

⁴ James Grant Wilson, *General Grant* (New York, 1897), 362 n.; *New York Times*, August 12, 1885.

⁵ *New York Times*, July 24, 1885.

to the audience, which it was expected would contain many Confederate veterans from near and far. The Governor was present, and the orator of the day was Major J. C. C. Black, of Augusta, Georgia. After Black had concluded his speech, Grady, in an eloquent and effective address, presented ex-President Davis, "home among his people." Grady's remarks and the sight of the former president of the Southern Confederacy, old and feeble but with a show of his old fire, raised the great audience to its feet in a burst of emotional applause.

In the midst of this enthusiasm, a man on horseback could be seen riding toward the speaker's platform. It was General James Longstreet, who had come at his wife's urging, though uninvited, unexpected, and perhaps by some unwanted. Estranged from many of his own people and under the ban of obloquy because of his political apostasy, he could not have chosen a more propitious moment in which to make his unheralded appearance. Dressed in the full, though faded, gray uniform of a lieutenant general of the Confederate army, he halted, dismounted, gave the bridle reins to a nearby attendant, and deliberately walked up the steps onto the speaker's platform and straight towards Davis, who was seated under a canopy. There had never been much warmth between the two men, and because of Longstreet's political affiliation with the Republican party after Appomattox and his bitter attempts to evade responsibility for the results at Gettysburg, there was even less at this time. The audience, knowing all this, was eager to see what would happen when the two men met. It did not have long to wait. One observer wrote: "When General Longstreet was within about ten feet of the canopy where Mr. Davis sat, the old gentleman arose and hastened to meet the General. When the two came together Mr. Davis threw his arms around General Longstreet's neck and the two great leaders embraced with great emotions. The meaning of the reconciliation was clear and instantly had a profound effect upon the thousands of Confederate veterans who saw it. With a great shout they showed their joy. . . ." ⁶

Any unkind feeling toward Longstreet was for the moment forgotten. "His name was again the battle music of the victorious hour." A later account reported that the gathering was transformed into "a whirlwind of enthusiasm. . . . No one had ever seen Mr. Davis [so] moved. . . . As the two veterans, hand in hand, bowed their thanks and acknowledged the enthusiastic, cheering throng, the eyes of both men were wet." The gathering was turned into a Confederate love feast, and Grady took advantage of the

⁶ Walter G. Cooper, *The Story of Georgia* (New York, 1938), III, 308; *Atlanta Constitution*, May 1, 2, 1886.

unexpected situation to put forward the name of General John B. Gordon as a candidate for governor of Georgia in the impending campaign. He was later elected without difficulty.⁷

It is not known what Longstreet's reactions were to these events. Undoubtedly he felt pleasure and satisfaction at his meeting with Davis and his renewal of long-severed relations with many of Georgia's leading men. He stood on the platform with Davis, Gordon, and others on a basis of equality. What his feelings were at Grady's opportunistic nomination of Gordon for the governorship is uncertain. His own situation was not too good. His health was poor; his Independent party in Georgia had pretty well disappeared; the Democrats were in control in Washington as well as in Atlanta. He was in effect, politically, at least, a lone wolf and an outcast. He could only wait until the Republicans returned to power in Washington, when he could expect political preferment and position. In the meantime, he could tend his vineyard, make speeches whenever he was invited to do so and his health permitted, and take up his writings with energy and hope.

General Longstreet attended the annual reunion at the Gettysburg battlefield in July, 1888, and after his return plunged into the presidential campaign. He was active in Georgia in his support of General Benjamin Harrison and was chosen a Harrison elector from Georgia. In the hope of receiving recognition from the Republicans, who had now been returned to power, he went to Indianapolis, Harrison's home town, early in December, 1888, to present in person his claims on the president-elect. One observer later remarked: "None of the visitors are as outspoken as General Longstreet. He, I understand, would like to go into the Cabinet as Secretary of the Interior, and if his friends cannot prevail on the incoming President to give him that position, they would like to see him at the head of the Agricultural Department when it becomes distinctively a Cabinet position."⁸ Among those who were invited to express an opinion in Longstreet's favor was his old friend General Sherman. When asked for a statement, Sherman said:

. . . if he will be content to be United States Marshal of Georgia or take any United States appointment within the limits of his domicile I will endorse him strongly. I knew him as a cadet [at West Point] and in the old army and if every newspaper in the South were to charge him with anything dishonest or insincere I would resent it quick as thought. Longstreet went into the Confederate army from an impulse—honest, enthusiastic and positive—and when the war was over I know of my own knowledge that he stood up like a man to regain for his whole country the condition of law and prosperity which had

⁷ Lucian Lamar Knight, *A Standard History of Georgia* (New York, 1917), II, 942; *New York Times*, June 4, 1893.

⁸ *New York Times*, December 5, 1888.

been so foolishly jeopardized by the Civil War. General Grant, who knew Longstreet even better than I, always spoke of him with affection and respect. General Grant as President was most anxious to draw to his support the live men of the South whose manly valor he had encountered and consequently respected, but the old political element defeated his generous intention. As you report of General Longstreet the North to-day is hardly prepared to see an ex-Confederate at the head of the War Department. . . . In any and every other way I will do what is proper and possible to recognize and reward ex-Confederates of the type of General James Longstreet. . . .⁹

Longstreet was included in a list (captioned "South Miscellaneous") of men suggested for Harrison's cabinet, but he apparently received little consideration. He had stiff competition from A. E. Buck, who for years had been chairman of the state Republican committee of Georgia and who had opposed Longstreet and his Independent movement in the state in the early 1880's.

In discussing Longstreet's candidacy several years later, Buck stated that Longstreet had not received more consideration because he had torn the electoral ticket from his ballot at the election. "This," Buck said, "defeated him." Although Longstreet would not submit to interviews while he was in Indianapolis, he expressed pleasure at being entertained by several families during his stay. Before returning to Gainesville he "held an informal reception in the arcade of the New Dennison [Hotel], a number of gentlemen calling on him and in the afternoon [of December 4] a luncheon was given in his honor."¹⁰

As far as Buck's charge or explanation was concerned, Longstreet's act in tearing off the electoral ticket (if it actually was performed and became known to Harrison) probably had little effect on Longstreet's candidacy for a cabinet position. It is not likely that Harrison would at that time have appointed a prominent ex-Confederate to his cabinet, however correct that ex-Confederate's conduct and however prominent his position or effective his support in local and national politics. In any case, the accusation was probably based on suspicion or hearsay or both and was not a matter of personal knowledge. Whatever the outcome of Longstreet's effort to secure political preferment from the incoming Republican administration, he did not waver in his support of the President-elect. Early in January, 1889, in an address before the Young Men's Republican Club in Chattanooga, Tennessee, he reportedly said: "The approval of Mr. [Grover] Cleveland's policy would have been a calamity, for it would have retarded our industrial growth and

⁹ Sherman to Edward Angier, in 1888, quoted in *New York Times*, March 10, 1891. General Sherman had died on February 20, 1891.

¹⁰ *New York Times*, February 20, 1897, and December 5, 1888.

arrested the development of our material resources. . . ." Longstreet thought Cleveland's defeat a blessing to the South.¹¹

In January, 1888, the *Atlanta Constitution* had printed a story to the effect that General Longstreet was "in need of pecuniary assistance." The paper reported that Longstreet had been to Atlanta twice in the past year or two—once to the ceremonies at the unveiling of the monument to the late Senator B. H. Hill, when he met Jefferson Davis so dramatically, and again in 1887, when "Broken in health, helpless from wounds, poor, and with limping step he walked up . . . to the capitol . . . [where] writing his receipt stiffly with wounded arm, [he] drew his annual pension of \$25 a year, voted him by his state." The occasion for the comment was a letter from "an ex-Confederate living in Texas" who had served under Longstreet and who urged ex-soldiers to contribute to a fund which would ensure him freedom from want. The *Constitution* closed its comment with the statement that it would "take pleasure in receipting for and properly forwarding any subscriptions sent for this purpose to our office."¹²

As soon as Mrs. Longstreet saw the article, she indignantly wrote a denial of the assertion—which, she said, "startled and pained [her], not only for some of its incorrect statements, but as placing him before the public as an object of charity." Continuing, she wrote with fine sarcasm: "With thanks for your intended kindness in giving the use of your paper for the collection of funds to relieve this necessity, I beg you will withdraw his name at once in such a connection, and if any among his old soldiers have sent their mite to their old chief, I beg you to return the same, with many thanks for their love and devotion, which to him is worth more than gold or silver. The General though far from rich, is able, with what he owns, to live in comparative comfort, for the remainder of his life."¹³

Shortly after Longstreet's return from Indianapolis, a newspaper reporter who was visiting in Gainesville wrote an account of Longstreet and his way of life that amply confirmed Mrs. Longstreet's reproachful letter to the *Constitution*. Among other things, the reporter said:

Longstreet has been a fighter all his life. . . . He had the Southern instincts strong enough to lay down his commission in the Union armies, like Lee and [General A. R.] Lawton, to offer his sword to his State. Does the old man regret the choice he made in 1861? No one has ever heard him say so. In spite of his troubles brought on by his prompt acceptance of reconstruction and his espousal of the Republican cause, General Longstreet has preferred to remain in the South, confronting opprobrium in many cases, but enjoying the personal respect of his neighbors, and always sure of the undying love of his army comrades. Sixty-six miles from Atlanta the train on the Charlotte Road

¹¹ New York *Tribune*, January 7, 1889.

¹² *Atlanta Constitution*, January 15, 1888.

¹³ Quoted in New York *Times*, January 20, 1888.

stops at the thriving little city of Gainesville. The traveler has hardly alighted when a large, well-shaded house, with broad colonades [*sic*], stands before him. This is the Piedmont Hotel, which General Longstreet for several years has kept for Summer travelers, with little benefit to himself beyond making innumerable friends. His wife, a quiet, intelligent woman, is his helpmeet, and his sons . . . are well-dressed, smart young men. It is during these Summer months that one sees the grim old veteran at his best. He is the very embodiment of good humor. He tries to make every one comfortable, and as his hotel commands the best breezes from the Blue Ridge, he usually succeeds. He will mount three flights of steps to carry an apple to some little fellow who learns to know and love the bronzed face and white head of this Southern veteran.

If you go to Gainesville in the early Spring you will be told to secure a buggy and ride out two miles on the mountain road. Gen. Longstreet seldom comes to town at that time. Somewhere in his country place, clad in a long duster and a broad-brimmed hat, you will find him clipping his fruit trees or trailing up the vines in his grape orchard. He will show you his turkeys with pride, and, like Cincinnatus, revels in his rustic surroundings and farm duties. Then there are Winter days, when he must not be disturbed. He is 75 years old and realizes that his book about the civil war must be finished pretty soon. In it he hopes to vindicate his position at Gettysburg and account to unprejudiced posterity for his conduct in New Orleans. . . .¹⁴

In the twelve months following the above interview, fate struck Longstreet twice. On the night of April 9, 1889, he suffered

. . . the total destruction by fire . . . of his handsome residence near Gainesville. His loss is estimated at \$8,000 on which there was not a dollar of insurance. General Longstreet lost every relic that he had of the last war among them his old Confederate gray uniform which he had when he marched out of the service, and the sword which he carried for four long years during the sanguinary struggle. The sash presented to him by the gallant Jeb Stuart which he prized so highly and the spurs which he won in the Mexican war were also lost. General Longstreet is quite unwell, and this loss will weigh heavily on him.¹⁵

He had hardly recovered from the loss of his country house, which he could ill afford, when he suffered a greater and irreparable loss in the death of his wife. She died, after a severe illness, in their quarters in the Piedmont House on the evening of December 29, 1889. She and General Longstreet had been married for over forty years. Just what part Mrs. Longstreet played in the making of General Longstreet's most important decisions—his resignation from the United States army in 1861, and his decision to join and support the Republican party in Louisiana and later in Georgia—is not known. Some say that she disapproved of both. Whatever her own feelings and wishes, she supported her husband, loyally and sympathetically, through all the ups and downs of an active public career. We know of no letters that passed between them, but that she was a woman of will and fierce pride is evidenced in her

¹⁴ News item from Augusta, Ga., in *New York Times*, December 16, 1888.

¹⁵ *Baltimore Sun*, April 12, 1889, in *New York Times*, April 16, 1889.

letter to the *Atlanta Constitution*, just quoted. She was laid to rest in Alta Vista Cemetery in Gainesville, where she was joined nearly fifteen years later by her distinguished husband.¹⁶

On December 6, 1889, three weeks before Mrs. Longstreet's death, Jefferson Davis, the former President of the Southern Confederacy, died in New Orleans after a lingering illness. He was buried temporarily in New Orleans, his body being removed four years later for reburial in Richmond, Virginia. Because of his wife's illness, if for no other reason, Longstreet did not make the long journey to New Orleans to attend Davis' funeral. During the years that followed, Longstreet resumed work on his memoirs and also traveled.

On September 19, 1889, the Society of the Army of the Cumberland met at Chattanooga to plan for the conversion and marking of the battlefield of Chickamauga as a national monument. Among the honored guests was General James Longstreet, who attended as the representative of the state of Georgia and of the Army of Northern Virginia. This was the beginning of Longstreet's reassociation with the battlefields of former days. Though he was a member of the Georgia State Commission for the Chickamauga Battlefield Commission and was interested in similar sites elsewhere, either in his private capacity or as a representative of the state of Georgia, he was never a member of any national battlefield park commission.¹⁷

Longstreet was present at the unveiling of the statue of General Lee in Richmond, Virginia, in the spring of 1890. There is no evidence that he was present at the meeting of the Society of the Army of Northern Virginia on May 28, but the next day he was among the guests who rode in the parade in an open carriage and later sat on the speaker's stand. He "did not arrive until the public exercises had begun. He was escorted to the stand and so great an ovation did he receive that [the speaker] had to stop for fully two minutes." Longstreet informed his friend Goree that his invitation to Richmond was extended at the insistence of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans. He wrote:

I had been left out of the arrangements intentionally or otherwise. The Washington Artillery when they voted to go wrote to go as my escort, assuming that I was expected. Finding that I was left out, they thought that they should not go as an organization, and so intimated to the Richmond managers, when they concluded to invite me, under the impression I suppose that I would decline. When there I was assigned [a] position in the general procession intended to be with the Washington Artillery as I had requested, but my carriage attracted more attention I suppose than was expected and we were sidetracked,

¹⁶ *Atlanta Constitution*, December 13, 1889; Lucian Lamar Knight, *Land Marks, Memorials and Legends* (Atlanta, 1913-14), II, 376.

¹⁷ Letter to the writer from the National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior, Region 1, Richmond, Va., March 19, 1948.

but that only made it more unpleasant for the managers. Generals Fitz Hugh Lee, [John B.] Gordon and other grandees rode along, but little noticed by the troops in line, but as they passed our carriage they broke and crowded about us and hurried around in such crowds as to block the street, which threatened to break up the procession, and when urged on tried to take the horses from the carriage, and pull it along without them. . . .¹⁸

After a pleasant renewal of old friendships and the making of many new ones, Longstreet (at the invitation of Colonel Jerome Hill, a former member of his First Corps) went to St. Louis, Missouri, which he had last visited in 1858, over thirty years before. He had "had a glorious time in Richmond . . . where [he] was royally received and entertained by the old Confederate soldiers." In an interview with a reporter from the *St. Louis Republican*, he said: "The politicians may take the heads of the boys, but they cannot take their hearts. Men who fought shoulder to shoulder and suffered together the privations of war will never lose their affection for each other. A soldier's heart is a tender thing after it has been through a war, and there is no spot in it so soft as the one of love for comrades. . . ." In answer to an inquiry as to whether he was pleased with his reception at Richmond, he replied:

Yes indeed. They shook my hands until they made my arm ache. My right arm is sore yet. They all seemed glad to see me, but none of them cared to see me more than I did them. There was [*sic*] in the crowd about half a dozen boys that belonged to a South Carolina regiment. They had an old Confederate battle flag, carrying it around on a pole. It was shot to pieces and no one could have told what it was if the boys had not informed them. They got around a carriage in which I was seated and asked me to stand up so that they could salute me. Of course I granted their request. At another time during my stay in Richmond I was seized by a crowd of old soldiers and wrapped up completely in Confederate flags. After I was almost smothered in those flags they covered me all over with Federal flags. Just as I got out of that position, an old, blind, crippled soldier came up to me and begged me to shake hands with him. He said he would never see me again, but he wanted to grasp my hand and hear me speak again. I mention these incidents in answer to your question about my treatment at Richmond. That is the way I was entertained during my whole stay there.¹⁹

Longstreet remained in St. Louis for a pleasant, restful week, after which he returned to his home in Gainesville; there, among other activities, he resumed his literary efforts.

For some time Captain Goree, who was living in Huntsville, had been urging Longstreet to visit Texas, where he had at one time owned land. But each time that a trip was planned, something interfered to prevent it. Finally, however, in the early part of 1891, Longstreet went to Texas, arriving in San

¹⁸ "Annual Reunion of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, May 28, 1890," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XVII (1889), 85, 266 ff., 294; Longstreet to Goree, July 7, 1894, in Goree Papers.

¹⁹ *St. Louis Republican*, June 3, 1890.

Antonio in January. How long he stayed is not known. What took him there, except to visit his former aide, is not known, unless it was to sell his Mason County holdings or other land which he may still have owned. Whatever the object or the length of his visit, he was back in Gainesville by the middle of the year.²⁰

He remained quietly in Gainesville for the remainder of the year; but in the early part of 1892, learning that his friend and former antagonist at Gettysburg, General Daniel E. Sickles, was in Atlanta, he decided to go down and greet him. On St. Patrick's day, March 17, 1892, Longstreet and Sickles were the guests of honor at a banquet given by the Irish societies in Atlanta. The two old veterans entered the banquet room arm in arm and were received by some three hundred with the rebel yell. Each responded to a toast; and after the adjournment—each having had "a number of potatoes of hot Irish whiskey punch"—the two left together to find their respective lodgings.²¹

Shortly afterward Longstreet was off again, this time to New Orleans to attend the third annual meeting of the recently organized United Confederate Veterans. He had gone on an invitation sent "because the Washington Artillery insisted that it should be." He arrived in New Orleans, probably on April 7, 1892. About 10:30 A.M. the next day, while the convention was being organized, Longstreet "entered the hall and at his own request . . . made his way unannounced by the side entrance to prevent any interruption [of the speaker]. He was quietly and unobtrusively shown to a seat upon the platform with other distinguished guests and subsequently was greeted cordially by General Gordon and all present and received a grand ovation from the old veterans." Among those present and participating in the affairs of the convention, in addition to General Gordon, who was president and chairman, were Generals Edmund Kirby-Smith, Stephen D. Lee, and others. Longstreet does not seem to have been invited to participate in any of the sessions of the convention, and, in fact, his presence was due to pressure from the rank and file rather than to any formal invitation. He later wrote his friend Goree:

I was called to the night meeting . . . by the soldiers, much to the disgust of the managers. When I entered the building the soldiers and officers rose and cheered and cheered till I reached the stand and bowed acknowledgement of their good feeling. Right soon the business was interrupted by calls for opportunity to come up and shake my hand, and ended by hurrying Gordon and others of the managers from the stand in order to make room for the soldiers to come up and meet me. So you may know that I cannot be called to another reunion. . . .

I am not of the United Confederate Veteran Association. It costs something to join that organization and our little county association is poor and has not

²⁰ Longstreet to Goree, January 22, 1891, in Goree Papers.

²¹ Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 18-20.

been able to get in. Besides, the grand organization was started for political purposes, which is not altogether agreeable to our organization—and it is especially unpleasant to those who manage the United Confederate Veterans to have me amongst them. I had no notice of the reunion at Birmingham, Alabama this year and have no idea that I can have notice of the one to be at Houston next year. It is especially unpleasant to General Gordon for me to be of the reunion, even as a guest. The old soldiers when they see me forget their new leader in peace, and it tries his patience. . . .²²

Longstreet thus attended the New Orleans meeting as an invited guest of the membership and not of the management. He believed that the leaders of the United Confederate Veterans would find it unpleasant to have him with them. Then, too, he wrote, “a political organization of that kind is not a proper one.” With some exaggeration, he continued, “Everywhere except in the South, soldiers are accepted as comrades upon equal terms without regard to their political affiliations, so I have come to regard it as high compliment to be excluded from the U.C.V. as my absence becomes more conspicuous than would be my presence.”²³

After the conclusion of the meeting in New Orleans, Longstreet again returned to Gainesville to resume work on his book. He was at times glad that he was not in politics (not even to the extent of being a presidential elector on the Harrison ticket), though he seems always to have had a nostalgic hankering for the activity and conflict of the political arena.²⁴

In the spring of 1893, he was again at Gettysburg for the Memorial Day exercises. From there he went to Washington, where he joined, in a sort of advisory capacity, a party of ex-soldiers who were en route to the Antietam battlefield to determine the proper location of markers showing the position of the troops on both sides during the battle. On the return of the party to Washington, Longstreet gave several newspaper interviews. In one to the *New York Times* on June 3, he gave his version of his quarrel with Jefferson Davis; in another, to the *Washington Post*, he spoke as a critic on the Southern civic and military leaders. Davis, Jubal A. Early, and A. P. Hill were the particular objects of his scorn. He considered Davis responsible for the failure of the Southern effort, saying that “at one time or another he had exasperated and alienated most of [his] generals” while holding “to his mediocre favorites with surprising tenacity.” Of A. P. Hill, Longstreet said: “There was a good deal of ‘curled darling’ and dress parade about [him]. . . . A division was about Hill’s capacity. . . .” He said that Early’s “mental horizon was a limited

²² Longstreet to Gorce, July 7, 1894, in Gorce Papers; *Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting and Reunion of the United Confederate Veterans Held in the City of New Orleans, La., April 8th and 9th, 1892* (New Orleans, 1892), 13, 19, 47–48, 65.

²³ Longstreet to Gorce, July 7, 1894, in Gorce Papers.

²⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, September 4, 1892, *ibid.*

one, and he was utterly lost beyond a regiment. . . ." Even after such a lapse of time and notwithstanding the death of most of the objects of his criticism, Longstreet was still bitter.²⁵

Throughout most of 1893 and 1894, General Longstreet remained at home, working on his account of his Civil War experiences and tending his garden and his grape arbor. He had built an ordinary story-and-a-half farmhouse to replace the house which had burned, and there he lived with his tenant, a veteran of the Northern army. In the following year, 1895, he was invited by Captain Goree to attend the annual convention of the United Confederate Veterans at Houston, Texas; but as he received no official invitation, he did not go. He went instead to Chicago, where he attended a reunion of old Confederate and Union soldiers and was the center of lively interest. He returned to Gainesville late in June and in September was one of the speakers at the dedication of the Chickamauga National Battlefield Park. His address was "delivered in so low a tone as to be inaudible, after the first few sentences, more than a dozen feet away." He probably went from the battlefield to Atlanta to attend the Blue and Gray reunion held there on September 22, 1895. He was back in Gainesville in mid-October, but only to rest and gather his strength in preparation for another journey.²⁶

In spite of his age and the state of his health, General Longstreet, as has been shown, was frequently on the go. Always ready to do honor to the memory of his friend and former military associate General U. S. Grant, he was a guest of honor and the principal speaker at a memorial meeting held in Boston on April 27, 1896, by the Middlesex Club. His speech consisted largely of reminiscences of General Grant, which he had often told before. He was followed by Senator J. B. Foraker of Ohio. He also wrote out, in his own now somewhat feeble hand, a tribute to General Grant which was published in Boston newspapers.²⁷

In late July, 1896, Longstreet was off again, this time to Richmond to attend the annual United Confederate Veterans reunion. He went with some misgivings, as his book, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, had been published only six months previously, and he was not sure how he would be received. He need not have been concerned. His reception was most cordial and enthusiastic. In the *Richmond Times* for July 1, 1896, it was announced that General Longstreet would be among the prominent figures present at the reunion. He was loudly cheered all along the line of march and could

²⁵ *New York Times*, June 4, 1893; *Washington Post*, June 11, 1893.

²⁶ *New York Tribune*, April 27, 1897; "Christianity, The Nation's Hope: What two great generals think about God and the Bible," in *Ram's Horn* (Chicago), III (June 29, 1895), 5; *New York Times*, September 20, 1895; Knight, *History of Georgia*, II, 996.

²⁷ *New York Times*, April 28, 1896; *Boston Herald*, April 28, 1896.

have had little to complain of at his reception. He returned to his home in northern Georgia well satisfied that his services in behalf of the Lost Cause were not forgotten.²⁸

After he had returned home and had rested sufficiently, Longstreet was ready to take an active part in the presidential campaign. He worked and traveled constantly throughout Georgia and was on the McKinley electoral ticket. He spoke in Augusta on October 10 in advocacy of sound money and the election of McKinley. He urged his listeners to "follow the gallant William McKinley, the 'boy soldier,'" rather than William Jennings Bryan, "the 'Boy Orator.'" Several weeks later, on October 28, Longstreet spoke in Dahlonega and later at other places in the northern part of the state.²⁹ The success of the Republican party in the closely contested national election of 1896 was welcome to Longstreet, not only as a party victory but also as a probable opportunity for his reappointment to public office. He felt that he had earned a right to preferment, not only because of his services in the campaign but also as a reward for his long and loyal support to the party under trying and difficult circumstances. But he was not at all certain that he would be recognized, as other Republican leaders in Georgia had strong claims, were younger men, and were Republicans by birth and long habit. Feeling reasonably certain of appointment, however, and having "an ambition . . . to be the United States Minister to Mexico," Longstreet decided to go to Florida for rest and a change.

Soon after the election, while Longstreet was preparing for his vacation in Florida, he had an unexpected visitor. The editor of *McClure's Magazine* had commissioned Hamlin Garland to write a popular account of General Grant's career. What was more natural than that Garland should ask one of Grant's oldest and most trusted friends to give such information as he could. Late in November of 1896, Garland called on Longstreet, who was living alone in his little house, half of which was rented to a workman and his wife, the latter of whom was helping with the housekeeping. Garland spent several days talking pleasantly with Longstreet, whom he described as "a tall man (about 5 ft. 10 in.), slightly stooping and partly deaf, but a noble figure withal." Garland spent the time rekindling the old soldier's memory of Grant and taking notes as he talked. The fruits of the interview were useful to Garland and were incorporated in his account, which was published soon afterwards.³⁰

²⁸ *New York Times*, July 1, 2, 3, 1896; *New York Tribune*, July 1, 2, 1896.

²⁹ *New York Times*, October 11, 1896; Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 266.

³⁰ Garland's visit of November 26-27, 1896, is mentioned in Hamlin Garland, "Grant in the Mexican War," in *McClure's Magazine* (New York), VIII (February, 1897), 367. Cf. also Hamlin Garland, *Roadside Meetings* (New York, 1930), 312-13.

The Soldier's Story

IN LATE JULY OF 1863, WHILE THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA WAS ENCAMPED on the Rapidan River after its retirement from Pennsylvania, General James Longstreet, commanding the First Corps, wrote a letter to his uncle, Judge Augustus B. Longstreet, in Oxford, Mississippi, in which he stated his views of the reasons for the Confederate defeat at the battle of Gettysburg, July 1 to 3, 1863. In the letter, dated July 24, 1863, which, so far as is known, has never been published in full, Longstreet stated it as his opinion that General Lee failed because "The battle was not made as I would have made it." He cautioned his uncle not to let the letter go outside the immediate family. Even at that early date "there was a sly misrepresentation of my course," he later wrote. Only three weeks after the battle, apparently, there was an undercurrent of criticism of his conduct—else why this explanatory, even defensive, note? The letter, which was first published in part over ten years later, constituted Longstreet's contemporary statement of his case and was the basis of all his subsequent criticism.¹

Longstreet brooded over the failure at Gettysburg through the fall and winter of 1863. He had been sent to reinforce General Braxton Bragg in Tennessee and had taken a leading and victorious part in the battle of Chickamauga. He had then been sent to take and hold Knoxville but had been unable to do so. Late in December, 1863, he had gone into winter quarters near Rogersville in East Tennessee, where he remained until his return to Virginia in the spring of 1864.

Early in January of 1864, Longstreet sent his aide, Captain T. J. Goree, to Lee at Orange Courthouse with dispatches, including a letter in which, as he later wrote, he expressed doubt as to the probable outcome of the cause of the Southern Confederacy and asked to be relieved of his command. This letter has not been found, but a telegram from General Samuel Cooper to Lee of January 9, 1864, states: "General Longstreet has asked to be relieved from his present command. . . ." Lee replied the next day saying he hoped that such a step would not be necessary.² Longstreet's later excuse for having

¹ Longstreet to Augustus B. Longstreet, July 24, 1863, quoted in *Annals of the War*, 414.

² Cooper to Lee, January 9, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXXII, Pt. II, 539; Lee to Cooper, January 10, 1864, *ibid.*, 541.

offered his resignation was, as previously mentioned, that General Edmund Kirby-Smith's promotion to the rank of full general had seemed to demand his resignation because Kirby-Smith was his junior in rank and experience. Over twenty years later Longstreet wrote that as for himself, after the defeat at Gettysburg and the coincident loss of Vicksburg, he had "felt that our last hope was gone, and that it was now only a question of time with us." No letter from Lee to Longstreet regarding Kirby-Smith's promotion and Longstreet's resignation has been found. In any case, here the matter rested until after the close of the war.³

When General Longstreet was in Washington, D.C., in November, 1865, seeking a pardon, one of his numerous visitors was William Swinton of the *New York Times*, who was gathering material for his book *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*. Swinton discussed the Virginia operations, and particularly the Gettysburg campaign, at some length with Longstreet, apparently taking notes of Longstreet's remarks and comments. Presumably he had Longstreet's permission to quote him as authority for any of his statements which he might care to include in his book. Swinton's references to his conversation with Longstreet were added in footnotes to "a text already written." This account, published nearly five years before General Lee's death and known to both Lee and Longstreet, was not commented on publicly during Lee's lifetime, so far as is known, by either Longstreet or Lee, though in subsequent years Longstreet's statements, as quoted by Swinton, served as the basis for much acrimonious writing.⁴

More fuel was added to the fire by the publication of General Lee's report of the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet characterized it as "a paper prepared after both sides were known and for the special purpose of readjusting the original reports so that it might be so construed as to meet the wishes of those who have combined to throw the responsibility of its failure upon my shoulders." All available evidence indicates that Longstreet was mistaken in this assumption. Credible witnesses testified that Lee's report—which was first published in 1869, nearly a year before his death, and which he is reported on good authority to have read and found to be substantially correct—was in fact an original rough draft, retained by Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's military secretary, and by him loaned to William Swinton for publication.⁵

³ Longstreet, "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 350. See also Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 525.

⁴ Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, 310 n., 340-41 n., 358 n., 364 n.

⁵ Editorial comment, quoting Longstreet, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, VIII (April, 1880), 192. Lee's report, January, 1864, in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. II, 312-15, was widely reprinted.

General Lee's report was also published in the August, 1872, issue of the *Southern Magazine* largely on the initiative of General Jubal A. Early, who in the previous January, on the occasion of the anniversary of General Lee's birth, had delivered an address on "The Campaigns of General R. E. Lee" at Washington and Lee University "by invitation of the faculty." Early wrote that the address was prompted by the remarks in Swinton's book, made on the authority of General Longstreet. According to Early, Longstreet "had begun to muddy the stream . . . twenty days after the battle of Gettysburg." This was obviously a reference to Longstreet's letter of July 24, 1863, to his uncle; although it was at that time unpublished, Early evidently knew of its existence.⁶ Early's address was promptly reprinted in pamphlet form and had wide circulation. He followed this address by publishing his own "report" on the battle of Gettysburg in the *Southern Magazine* in the fall of 1872 and reprinting it in the *Historical Magazine* of April, 1873.⁷

These publications were supplemented by General William N. Pendleton's "Memorial Address," delivered January 19, 1873, at Washington and Lee University and reprinted in the *Southern Magazine* of December, 1874. The address was "repeated [during 1873 and 1874] at many points in the South for the benefit of the [Lee] Memorial Church" to be erected in Lexington, Virginia.⁸

In these addresses both Early and Pendleton stated the charges of slowness previously made against Longstreet, but with no particular emphasis or elaboration. Longstreet, however, smarting under the criticism made of him throughout the South for his co-operation with, and support of, the carpetbag governments in Louisiana, was stung to rejoinder. As General Early wrote that General Longstreet was exceedingly careless in his statements of his side of the argument and as one paper followed another, Longstreet became more heated and less restrained in his presentation.⁹

Longstreet apparently set about without delay to prepare a reply to the statements in Early's and Pendleton's addresses as they related to his conduct at Gettysburg. Nothing has been found to indicate that this reply was published at that time; but Longstreet appears to have begun a correspondence with H. B. Dawson, the editor and publisher of the *Historical Magazine* in New York City, concerning a rebuttal article.

Early was also corresponding with Dawson about possible publication of

⁶ Jubal A. Early, "Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg: A Review by General Early," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, IV (December, 1877), 242, 274.

⁷ See the forty-seven-page pamphlet entitled *Address—General Jubal A. Early on General R. E. Lee . . .* (2d ed.; Baltimore, 1872); and "The Gettysburg Campaign: Report of Major General J. A. Early," in *Southern Magazine*, XI (October, 1872), 385-93.

⁸ Susan P. Lee, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton*, 286-88, 463.

⁹ Early, "The Battle of Gettysburg: A Review," *loc. cit.*, 242.

his articles. On April 1, 1874, he wrote: "When you are ready to publish your next number, if you determine to incorporate the correspondence between Longstreet and myself, or rather the articles we have written against each other, I will send you the note with the statements. . . ." The statements were those of Generals A. L. Long and Wade Hampton concerning Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg.¹⁰ Due to lack of space and to irregularity in, and final discontinuance of, publication of the *Historical Magazine*, the "correspondence" referred to by Early was not published.

In spite of ill health and financial difficulties, Dawson kept up a wide correspondence. Late in 1873 or early in 1874 Dawson apparently began corresponding with Longstreet about publication of his side of the Gettysburg controversy, or rather of the controversy between Longstreet on the one hand and Early and Pendleton on the other. In reply to a letter from Dawson of October 21, 1874, Longstreet wrote him on December 3, 1874, stating that an answer had been delayed by "a severe illness of some weeks." Apparently in answer to Dawson's inquiry for a copy of his report of the battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet wrote: "I regret that I have no copy of any of my reports or papers connected with the war. I sent everything to Gen. Lee at his request in 1865." Continuing, he added that though "Friends and relatives wrote me that it was important to my record that I should relieve myself in the responsibility of the attack on the 3d day [at Gettysburg], my invariable reply was that it was better that I should bear the responsibility, than to put it upon our chief."¹¹

On November 14, 1874, Longstreet had resigned his position on the Louisiana Returning Board—as much on account of illness and inability to fulfill his duties as a member of the board as because of the political tension and criticism which his continued membership created. Though still retaining his rank of major general of the Louisiana state militia and his position on the Levee Commission of Engineers, to both of which he had been appointed by the governor of Louisiana, William P. Kellogg, he was able to relax from the pressure of their official obligations and gradually dropped out of the stream of the strenuous political life which he had been leading since he affiliated himself with the Republican carpetbag government in Louisiana in June, 1867. His new situation afforded him time not only for the recovery of his health but also for seeking statements from participants in the battle of Gettysburg—statements which he needed to defend his conduct at Gettysburg and to offer rebuttal to the accusations made against him by those who held him largely responsible for the loss of the battle.

¹⁰ Early to H. B. Dawson, April 1, 1874, in New York Historical Society.

¹¹ Longstreet to *id.*, December 3, 1874, in Library, United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

During April, 1875, he wrote to Generals Hood and Long; Colonels W. H. Taylor, Charles Marshall, and C. S. Venable; and others of less prominence, seeking authority and confirmation for statements as to the time, the place, and the manner in which his directions for the attack of July 2 had been given. All of those addressed replied at varying length, and each of them furnished Longstreet with statements which could be quoted in such a manner as to be construed to his advantage.¹²

On May 12, 1875, Longstreet wrote Captain Goree from Hot Springs, Arkansas:

. . . I am collecting all of the information that I can get of the battle of Gettysburg, and must ask you during your leisure hours [to] jot your recollections of every thing connected with the battle down, and send them to me. . . . My reason for asking so much trouble on your part, is an address published in the December [1874] number of the *Southern Magazine* by Parson Pendleton, in which he attributed the loss of Gettysburg to treachery on my part. If I can collect sufficient data I shall write and publish a complete account of Gettysburg, which *will put the matter at rest*. Mr. Pendleton delivered this address in Mississippi and thru southern states in 1873, and my friends then asked me to answer his assertions, and I determined to do so, but about that time General [Lafayette] McLaws and General [B. G.] Humphreys published accounts completely vindicating the First Corps, and myself which I thought sufficient and preferred to let the matter rest there, as an account by me would necessarily be more complete and might bring up old matters that were better left, when they are to be forgotten. His recent publication or republication has started many friends again in their old petitions that I shall fight the old battle over again. . . .¹³

Goree replied on May 17. In reference to the battle of Gettysburg he wrote:

I was present just after Pickett's repulse, when Gen Wilcox came up, and when General Lee so magnanimously took all the blame of the disaster on himself. . . .¹⁴ Another important circumstance which I distinctly remember was in the winter of 1864, when you sent me from E Tennessee to Orange C H with some dispatches to Genl Lee. Upon my arrival there, Genl Lee asked me into his tent, where he was alone, with two or three Northern newspapers on his table. He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official reports of the battle of Gettysburg, that he had become satisfied from reading those reports, that if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the 3d day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful—He said that the enemy seemed to have anticipated the attack on their centre, in consequence of which they had withdrawn the larger part of their force from their left flank, and from round top mountain, and that if

¹² Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 58-63; Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 55-59.

¹³ Longstreet to Goree, May 12, 1875, in Goree Papers. The italics have been added by the present writer.

¹⁴ This remark of Lee's apparently refers to the failure of Pickett's charge on July 3. This incident and Lee's remarks are reported in Fremantle, *Three Months*, 135 (this page number is for the Mobile, 1864, edition), and in Francis Lawley (correspondent for the London *Times*), "General Lee," in *Blackwood's Magazine* (New York), CXI (March, 1872), 362-63.

you had made your flank movement *early on the morning of the 3d day* as you desired that you would have met with little opposition— . .

Referring to Pendleton's address, Goree did not comment on Longstreet's charge of "treachery," but only on the fact that Pendleton had "presumed upon [Longstreet's] present unpopularity to make charges which he otherwise would not have dared to utter, or which if he had, would have created such a storm of indignation, as would have completely and forever overwhelmed him—

"It does seem preposterous and absurd to me, and must to any soldier of the army of Virginia, the idea of such an old *granny* as Pendleton presuming to give a lecture or *knowing anything about the battle of Gettysburg*—Altho nominally, *Chief of Artillery*, yet he was in the actual capacity of *Ordinance* officer, and I believe miles in the rear—I *know* that I did not see him on the *field* during the battle— It was a notorious fact, and general[ly] remarked that he was almost entirely ignored by Genl Lee, as Chief of Artillery, and the management of it given to the Corps Chief's of Artillery. . . ." ¹⁵

In the spring of 1875, in a brief, undated reply to General Longstreet's inquiry, Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, wrote specifically with reference to "One single statement of Gen P[endleton]'s," namely, that Lee had ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise on July 2. Venable remarked: "I can not but attribute his statement about this order at Gettysburg to an absolute loss of memory said to be brought on by frequent attacks resembling paralysis—His whole statement with regard to Gettysburg is full of mistakes & there are many other things holding connection in other parts of his address. . . . I have heard that the College faculty at Washington & Lee did not publish Genl Pendleton's address because they were aware of his condition. It is a sad pity it ever got into print." Venable advised Longstreet to write General Long, which he did; Long replied that he did "not recollect having heard of an order to attack at Sunrise or at any other designated hour." Colonel Charles Marshall thought that Pendleton "confounds the [orders and operations of] the 2nd & 3rd July probably." This confusion is present in much of Longstreet's discussion of the orders and operations of these two days. ¹⁶

On May 21, 1875, while still at Hot Springs, Longstreet acknowledged Goree's letter of May 17, saying: "Your letter covers the especial point that I wanted your evidence upon, which is the remark made by General Lee upon the occasion of your visit to the Head Quarters in the winter of 1863 & 1864. . . ." On June 2, 1875, from New Orleans, Longstreet informed Goree

¹⁵ Goree to Longstreet, May 17, 1875, in Collection of Colonel Thomas Spencer, Atlanta. All italics except those first indicated are in the original.

¹⁶ Venable to *id.*, n.d. (probably spring of 1875), in Spencer Collection; A. L. Long to *id.*, May 31, 1875, *ibid.*; Marshall to *id.*, May 7, 1875, *ibid.*

of the receipt of replies to his letters of inquiry to General A. L. Long and Colonels W. H. Taylor, Erasmus Taylor, C. S. Venable, and Charles Marshall for information and comment on statements made in Pendleton's address. Neither Longstreet nor his correspondents made any reference to General Early's statements in his address at Washington and Lee University a year previous to Pendleton's. Perhaps Longstreet felt that Pendleton was more vulnerable and that if he could refute Pendleton's charges successfully, he could ignore Early. The sequel proved otherwise.¹⁷

These letters from General Long and others heretofore believed lost or destroyed have been seen by the writer through the courtesy of their present owner, Colonel Thomas Spencer, of Atlanta, Georgia. They are the letters from which Longstreet quoted in his newspaper and Century War Series articles and in his book, *From Manassas to Appomattox*. With the exception of that from Colonel Erasmus Taylor, they are all brief and succinct replies to Longstreet's inquiry as to Lee's exact order to attack at Gettysburg either on July 2 or July 3. All the writers disclaimed knowledge of the order referred to, but none was able to say that such an order had *not* been given to Longstreet either as a suggestion or as a direct order. Obviously, if Longstreet's attack had been made early, as apparently Lee expected and intended that it would be, any attack on the third would have been made under entirely different conditions and circumstances.

Soon after dispatching his letter to Goree, Longstreet went north to attend the graduation exercises at West Point in mid-June of 1875. He may have seen Dawson in New York on his way to or from West Point. In any case, on his return trip he called on the secretary of the treasury in Washington, D.C. This official had custody of those war records which had been recovered and deposited in Washington. Longstreet expected that such "rebel archives" as he could locate and examine would help him to write his personal record of the battle of Gettysburg. En route to Gainesville, Georgia, where he planned to live, Longstreet stopped in Charlotte, North Carolina, to see General D. H. Hill concerning the battle of Gettysburg. Back in New Orleans he found—in answer to one of his many letters of inquiry—a long letter from General Hood, containing statements that Longstreet thought helpful to his case.¹⁸

Throughout the summer and fall of 1875, Longstreet worked on the preparation and writing of his view of the battle of Gettysburg. In the February, 1876, issue of *Scribner's Monthly* there was printed an article by Colonel C.

¹⁷ Longstreet to Goree, May 17, 1875, in Goree Papers; *id.* to *id.*, June 2, 1875, *ibid.* For authoritative comment on Longstreet's charges, see Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns*, 196-98, 202.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, July 31, 1875; Hood to Longstreet, June 27, 1875, quoted in full in Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 55-59.

C. Jones, Jr., of Atlanta, entitled "A Piece of Secret History" and made up of a brief account of the battle of Gettysburg as a setting in which to print General Lee's letter to President Jefferson Davis of August 8, 1863. In this letter Lee assumed full responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg and asked to be relieved of his command by a younger and abler man. Davis replied promptly that if one abler than Lee were available, he would not hesitate to avail himself of his services, but that his "sight is not sufficiently penetrating to discover such merit, if it exists."¹⁹

Though the above-mentioned letter of Lee's appeared in the February, 1876, issue of *Scribner's Monthly*, Longstreet's comment on it was published in the *New Orleans Republican* of January 25, 1876, and was reprinted in the *New York Times* of January 29, 1876. The comment, which was printed without signature but had obviously been written at Longstreet's dictation, stated:

General Longstreet was opposed to the policy of attacking the Union Army at the Cemetery [Hill] and so expressed himself to General Lee, but was overruled by his commanding officer and did the best he could to turn the mistake into success. His corps was first in readiness and first to make the attack. Other Confederate commanders were so tardy in coming into action that the day was lost. Lee saw and acknowledged his error, thus doing full justice to the survivors, though he could not restore to life the thousands of brave men slain in attempting to carry out his rash policy.

This statement, so remarkable in its premises, was followed by the partial publication—for the first time, as previously mentioned—of Longstreet's letter to his uncle, Judge Longstreet, of July 24, 1863, in which Longstreet had said: "The battle was not made as I would have had it. . . . I cannot help but think that great results would have obtained had my views been thought better of. . . ." ²⁰ This portion of Longstreet's letter was followed in the *Republican* by a quotation from a letter alleged to have been written by General Lee to General Longstreet in January of 1864. Lee was quoted as saying: "Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did how different all might have been." The article was concluded with an excerpt, previously quoted from the letter written on May 17, 1875, by Goree regarding his visit to Lee in January, 1864.²¹

This article in the *New Orleans Republican*, which General Early characterized as a bitter assault on himself and others, raised a storm of protest;

¹⁹ See Lee to Davis, August 8, 1863, in *Official Records*, LI, Pt. II, 752-53; Davis to Lee, August 11, 1863, *ibid.*, XXIX, Pt. II, 639; Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee*, 279-81; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 156-58.

²⁰ This letter is also quoted in Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 64-65, and in *Annals of the War*, 414. It is not quoted in Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, however.

²¹ *New Orleans Republican*, January 25, 1876; *New York Times*, January 29, 1876. The Goree excerpt is also quoted in Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 400, and in Goree to Longstreet, May 17, 1875, in Spencer Collection.

and numerous demands were made on Longstreet to produce the full text of the letters quoted as having been written by Lee to Longstreet in January, 1864, and by Goree to Longstreet.²² General Fitzhugh Lee among others politely asked, on February 16, 1876, that Longstreet produce Lee's letter, "of which only one short sentence has been published"; but this Longstreet never did, nor has either the full text of the letter or one even remotely resembling it ever been found. In the absence of the complete letter, one can only conclude that it was a figment of Longstreet's imagination, created in an effort to bolster the arguments which he had advanced to remove from himself any blame for the Gettysburg failure. There seems to be more substance to the assertions made in the Goree letter, though here, too, there is uncertainty as to whether Lee actually said to Goree what Goree recollected that he did when Lee took him "into his tent where he was alone." In any case, it should be noted that Lee's alleged statement refers to the operations "on the third day" and *not* to those of the second day.

In reply to Fitzhugh Lee's request for full publication of the letters, Longstreet wrote to the editor of the New Orleans *Republican* a long, quarreling letter, which was printed in that paper on February 27, 1876. He said: "If General Fitzhugh Lee had read the letter, the genuineness of which he questions, he would have learned that General Longstreet was not only willing, but prepared to abide his time till the omnipotence of truth should speak to his record. . . ." But how General Fitzhugh Lee could "read the letter, the genuineness of which he questions" if the letter was not available to be read is not explained. Longstreet went on to repeat most of the material printed in the earlier issue of the New Orleans *Republican* (that of January 25, 1876) and then, in comments on Fitzhugh Lee's request "in common with an army of Confederates . . . for all the facts in the case," wrote: "It is altogether probable that the great military critics, Parson J. William Jones, Parson Pendleton and General Early are members of the grand army, . . . but [that] even their combined authority as sage warriors . . . does not in the least shake my confidence in the ultimate triumph of truth. . . ." Longstreet continued in this vein for the rest of his long letter, concluding: "For the information of General Fitzhugh Lee, let me say, that some two years ago I set about collecting . . . 'all the facts in the case' of Gettysburg, but that my labors have been interrupted more than a year by severe illness and that I still suffer severely. I hope, however, to eventually collect all of the facts, and, of course, to publish them. . . ."

These two communications to the New Orleans *Republican* were the

²² Jubal A. Early, "Supplement to General Early's Review.—Reply to General Longstreet," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, IV (December, 1877), 288.

opening guns of General Longstreet's twenty-year effort to escape any share of the blame for the loss of the battle of Gettysburg. On March 27, 1876, he wrote H. B. Dawson, the editor and publisher of the now-defunct *Historical Magazine*: "I send enclosed article on Gettysburg in review of some of General Early's papers on the same subject. In it there are so many errors [corrections] that I fear you may find some difficulty in making the necessary corrections as indicated in my imperfect marginal notes. . . ." (This article, apparently a first draft of the article that later appeared in finished form in the *Philadelphia Times* of November 3, 1877, was later republished in *Annals of the War* under the title "Lee in Pennsylvania," and in full or in part in many newspapers throughout the country.) Continuing, Longstreet wrote:

It has been my feeling and opinion, that it would have been better to leave to the historian, and the student of future days, the records of our struggle from which this history should be made that those of us who bore prominent parts in the struggle should recognize its failure, and should submit to the responsibilities of that failure as belonging to us all in proportion to our positions and opportunities. I should have been willing to have any one, who wished to use it, appropriate any or all of my part in the war if it had been done without arraigning me before the world as the person, and the only one, responsible for the loss of the cause. Under the severest provocation I have remained silent, until the importunities have forced me to speak. . . .²³

Several weeks later, apparently before hearing from Dawson, Longstreet wrote again, accusing General Early of making "many . . . incorrect and malicious statements in connection with my name which seem to call for further reply from me. Not that there is a probability that intelligent minds may be misled, but to give facts that will quiet vulgar minds. . . ." Apparently Longstreet planned another article, whether on "The Mistakes of Gettysburg" (as subsequently published in the *Philadelphia Times* of February 24, 1878, and in *Annals of the War*) or on some other phase of the Gettysburg campaign is not clear. In any case, he concluded his letter to Dawson: "I do not know whether it will be better to defer publishing the article now in your hands until my next is ready. I should think that the two may require more space than you could well spare to one subject in a single number. And the other I wished published first because it disproves the allegations of General Early and Mr. Pendleton without involving any names not really necessary. So that I feel free now to use any other direct or circumstantial evidence that I choose. . . ." ²⁴ Longstreet was in earnest in his effort to set things right as he saw them. He had written earlier: "I hope to continue the subject not only of Gettysburg, but of some of our other battles. . . . In case

²³ Longstreet to Dawson, March 27, 1876, in New York Historical Society.

²⁴ *Id.* to *id.*, April 12, 1876, *ibid.*

I can collect the necessary notes and maps to send you, can you, or will you, be willing to publish them. . . ." ²⁵

What Dawson's reply was to these proposals of Longstreet's is not known; but whatever it was, the articles were not published by Dawson because of the cessation of publication of the *Historical Magazine*.

About the time of Longstreet's correspondence with Dawson, the Comte de Paris, who had served on General George B. McClellan's staff and who was then engaged in writing his *History of the Civil War in America*, had reached the battle of Gettysburg, which he considered "the most important, the most difficult to write, of the whole work." He wrote the Reverend J. William Jones, the secretary of the Southern Historical Society, stating five reasons that appeared to him to have been responsible for the loss of the campaign: (1) it was a mistake to invade the Northern states at all; (2) if the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent across the Potomac until the Army of the Potomac had been defeated; (3) the fight of the second of July did not show proper co-ordination; (4) after gaining some successes on July 2, the Confederates had erred disastrously in not attempting to turn the Federal position "by the South, which was its weak place"; and (5) Pickett's charge on July 3 should never have been made, especially because Longstreet "seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will." The Comte de Paris was uncertain whether it was Longstreet's unwillingness to make the attack or the fact that he deferred it so long which caused the failure on the third day at Gettysburg.

The Comte de Paris asked Jones to keep his letter "private" and to ask some of the Confederate leaders who were still alive for their comments on his five reasons for the failure at Gettysburg. He felt that "The opinion of General Early for whom I have the greatest consideration as a soldier would be especially valuable." ²⁶

This was the origin of the "Gettysburg Series," which was participated in by most of the prominent Confederate leaders still living and which made up a large part of the contents of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* in the next two or three years. The first paper, written by Colonel William Allan in response to the Comte de Paris' invitation, was printed in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for July, 1877, and was a brief reply to the questions asked. It was followed in the same issue by a number of other specific discussions, one of these being by General Early. Some of them covered all five reasons; others considered only the one or more points concerning which the

²⁵ *Id.* to *id.*, March 27, 1876, *ibid.*

²⁶ Comte de Paris to the Reverend J. William Jones, January 21, 1877, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, V (January-February, 1878), 88-89.

writer had special knowledge or interest. No personalities were involved, and Longstreet was hardly mentioned.²⁷ Presumably he was among those invited to contribute with the assurance that whatever he submitted would be printed as written, without editing. Instead he published two very full papers in the *Philadelphia Times*, giving his own version of the battle and severely criticizing Lee and certain of his own critics.²⁸

Longstreet probably preferred publication in a newspaper rather than in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for a number of reasons, the most important of which was that newspaper publication would ensure wider circulation of his own version of the battle of Gettysburg. Presumably, also, he would be paid for his contributions. Another possible reason is that he may already have promised the *Philadelphia Times* the first publication rights to anything which he might write.

Longstreet was one of the few prominent Confederate officers who was not a member of the Southern Historical Society, though it had been originally organized in New Orleans in the spring of 1869, while Longstreet was living there but just after he had accepted a position in the Grant administration as surveyor of customs of the port of New Orleans. The society was reorganized in August, 1873, at a meeting at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Longstreet at the time was nearby at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he was spending the summer.²⁹

In the spring of 1877, as discussed above, Longstreet moved permanently to Georgia. Meanwhile, the criticism of his conduct and leadership at Gettysburg had reached such proportions that he was seeking an authoritative vehicle of wide circulation in which to defend his record. At this time Henry W. Grady, then associated with the *Atlanta Constitution*, was serving as Georgia correspondent for the *Philadelphia Times*. Either Grady communicated with Longstreet or Longstreet contacted Grady relative to publication. In any case, Grady was commissioned by the *Philadelphia Times* to secure from Longstreet an article on Gettysburg. On May 11, 1877, M. P. Handy, an editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, instructed Grady: "Go ahead with the Longstreet article & let us have it as soon as possible. We will . . . pay the necessary expenses."³⁰

In connection with this assignment of Grady's, George Morgan, who had been a cub editor on the *Philadelphia Times* in 1877, wrote many years afterwards:

²⁷ William Allan, "Gen. Lee's Strength and Losses at Gettysburg," *ibid.*, IV (July, 1877), 34-41.

²⁸ Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee*, 253-54.

²⁹ "The Southern Historical Society: Its Origin and History," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XVIII (1890), 349-65.

³⁰ Telegram, in Henry W. Grady Scrapbooks, in Emory University Library.

Editor [A. K.] McClure [of the Philadelphia *Times*] dearly loved politics, poker and controversies. He knew that there was an unexploded Gettysburg shell, charged with Longstreet's animosities, and he appealed to Longstreet to write a series of articles on the Gettysburg campaign. Longstreet refused point blank. Then McClure aided by M. P. Handy set up a job on Longstreet. They enlisted Henry C. [sic] Grady, editor of the Atlanta *Constitution*, who made a special trip to Gainesville to plead with Longstreet. The obstinate worthy again refused. Lee was dead. He had great respect for his memory and great regard for the feelings of his comrades in the Army of Northern Virginia. Grady respected his feelings. Handy, who had worked on the Richmond newspapers, wrote a friend there, asking that the Virginia bitterness against Longstreet be brought to a head in one of the dailies. This was done. Longstreet was charged with the fatal loss of the battle of Gettysburg. McClure and Handy realized that the fuse of the unexploded Gettysburg sensation had at last been lit. They sent a copy of the Richmond paper to Grady; and again Grady journeyed to Gainesville to see Longstreet, who blew up and blew off. . . .³¹

This is a good story, but it is a memory recounted through the mist of over fifty years. In any case, whatever the immediate motivation, Longstreet "blew up and blew off" for a long time to come.

It is not certain what Grady's literary contribution was to the preparation and writing of the articles that finally were published in the Philadelphia *Times*; probably it was only that of an editor—in spite of the fact that in the Grady Scrapbook, in the margin beside clippings of the Longstreet articles, is the notation in Grady's handwriting: "Written by me."³² In view of Longstreet's statement in his letter to Dawson that "I fear you may find difficulty in making the necessary corrections by my imperfect marginal notes," it is evident that the article was written by Longstreet and only needed to be edited and put in readable form to be ready for publication.³³ It was Longstreet who spoke through the article and not a ghost writer in the present-day sense. Longstreet himself wrote that because of his difficulty in writing on account of the paralysis to his right arm as a result of his old wound, he had been "compelled to accept the services of a professional writer, generously tendered me by the editor of the [Philadelphia] *Times*."³⁴ Early remarked that the Philadelphia *Times* article "purporting . . . to be by General Longstreet . . . is not from General Longstreet's own pen as is apparent to those who are familiar with his style of writing, and of the fact I have the assurance from a quarter that leaves no doubt on the subject. The data and material for the article, however, were furnished by him and put in form by another.

³¹ George Morgan to editor of *New York Times*, May 30, 1933, in *New York Times*, June 4, 1933.

³² R. B. Nixon (of Emory University) to the writer, June 3, 1948. The Grady Scrapbook is in the Emory University Library.

³³ Longstreet to Dawson, March 27, 1876, in *New York Historical Society*.

³⁴ James Longstreet, "General Longstreet's Second Paper on Gettysburg," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, V (June, 1878), 259.

He is therefore responsible for its statements and utterances. . . ." In reference to Longstreet's second article, General Early repeated his belief "that the diction was not [Longstreet's] and that he had manifestly been curbed in the expression of his comments on General Lee's character as a commander." Early said that he repeated this opinion "not because I thought the article, though showing some improvement on his style, contained any better logic than his own production had shown, but to prevent the lucubrations of a newspaper writer from being taken for the criticism of a soldier of at least some experience."⁸⁵

Whatever Grady's part in the preparation of Longstreet's articles, by fall the first one was finished and ready for publication. A studied presentation of Longstreet's case by Longstreet, it appeared in the *Philadelphia Times* for November 3, 1877, and was reprinted, either wholly or in part, in many newspapers throughout the North and the South.⁸⁶

The publication of Longstreet's article immediately raised a storm of protest and rebuttal. The editor of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, although "under no obligations to reprint General Longstreet's paper, was so anxious to do him justice and to have a series of papers on Gettysburg which should embrace the views of all the leading Confederates who participated in the battle," that he copied in full Longstreet's first article from the *Philadelphia Times* of November 3, 1877, and his follow-up, or second, article, which appeared in the same publication on February 24, 1878. General Early, one of Longstreet's especial targets of criticism, replied to the first paper in a long article published in the December, 1877, number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* and in a supplemental paper which was printed in the same number of the *Papers*. Another strong rebuttal to, and criticism of, Longstreet's paper was written by General Fitzhugh Lee and published in the *Papers* for April, 1878.⁸⁷

Longstreet wrote that he had prepared his first paper—with genuine reluctance—in response to the request of the editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, A. K. McClure, and the petition of the Comte de Paris and because

It was justified, in my own mind, by the reflection that I was, perhaps, the *only* person living who could explain the *motif* of that campaign and the *true* reason of its failure. It was made necessary by the fact that our amateur his-

⁸⁵ Early, "Reply to General Longstreet," *loc. cit.*, 282; J. A. Early, "Reply to General Longstreet's Second Paper," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, V (June, 1878), 274.

⁸⁶ See *New York Times*, November 3, 1877; and *Atlanta Constitution*, November 5, 1877.

⁸⁷ Cf. Longstreet's first paper, "General James Longstreet's Account of the [Gettysburg] Campaign and Battle," in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, V (January-February, 1878), 54-86; his second paper, Longstreet, "Second Paper on Gettysburg," *loc. cit.*, 257-70; Early, "The Battle of Gettysburg: A Review," *loc. cit.*, 241-81; Early, "Reply to General Longstreet," *loc. cit.*, 282-302; and Fitzhugh Lee, "Reply to General Longstreet," *loc. cit.*, 162-94.

torians, through misapprehension or malice, had nearly all gone wrong, and utterly misconstrued the plan and purpose of that invasion, misused and misstated its facts, and dislocated its responsibilities. The Comte de Paris and the general historians had they relied upon these statements instead of finding the *true* solution of this, the great problem of the war, would have had it involved in a more profound obscurity.³⁸

It is significant, in connection with these remarks as to the "true" account of these events, to note that though the foregoing appeared as the opening statement of General Longstreet's second paper, it was omitted from the article when it was reprinted in *Annals of the War* in the following year—after the rebuttal articles by Early, Fitzhugh Lee, and others had been printed in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*. Also, it should be noted that after several years of intermittent correspondence and writing, Longstreet had gotten his first paper into rough form at least as early as the spring of 1876. In addition, the "petition of the Comte de Paris" was made, not to Longstreet but to the editor of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*. If Longstreet was invited to make a contribution, he has said nothing of it. Nearly six months later, Colonel John P. Nicholson of Philadelphia—who edited Volumes III and IV of the American edition of the Comte de Paris's *History of the Civil War in America*, published in 1883—sent Longstreet a copy of the petition from the Comte de Paris, which Longstreet acknowledged in a letter to Nicholson of July 15, 1877. Longstreet wrote to thank Nicholson for "the interesting letter of the Comte de Paris," remarking that he would "much like to meet the Count and I believe that I could clear up many little points of the 1863 campaign." Concerning his critics, Longstreet added: ". . . as for General Early's ideas and information about Gettysburg, he has written just enough to show to military minds that he not only failed in his duties on the Field of Gettysburg, but that he is not even capable of comprehending it after fourteen years of study. . . ." ³⁹ Nicholson replied on July 21, apparently suggesting that Longstreet write out his account of the battle of Gettysburg for publication. Although at the time Longstreet was, with the assistance of Grady, preparing his first paper for the *Philadelphia Times*, he did not mention the fact to Nicholson, but wrote:

My great and chief objection to undertaking Gettysburg just now is that I cannot spare the time necessary to give a . . . satisfactory account of it. Then I do not see that my account will be less important because it is late in getting out. On the contrary I shall have the benefit and advantage of all of those who write before me. And it seems to me that those most prompt in getting their

³⁸ *Philadelphia Times*, February 24, 1878. The italics have been added by the present writer.

³⁹ Longstreet to John P. Nicholson, July 15, 1877, in Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.

accounts before the public are as a rule those least qualified to give succinct accounts of military campaigning and have less comprehensive views of Strategy and Tactics. Then again, it is a great labor to me to write. My right arm and shoulder are particularly paralysed so that the cramped position in writing is a very severe and trying thing with me. I have an idea that nothing that Gen. Early or his followers can write or put before the public can make any very interesting impression on any mind of military judgment. At all events, I feel a good deal of confidence in my accounts of the battle being accepted if I were to succeed in getting it out, as *the only correct version that has been put out.*

What Colonel Nicholson wrote in reply to this letter is not known.⁴⁰

In the issue of the Philadelphia *Times* for February 24, 1878, there appeared Longstreet's second paper on Gettysburg, which he said he was "induced to prepare . . . supplementary to the [first] one that appeared . . . some weeks ago [that is, on Nov. 3, 1877], that I may correct some slight errors of transcription that occurred in that paper; that I may make some additional statements, forbidden in my first paper by reason of its length; that I may correct an apparent injustice to a very worthy officer [Colonel J. B. Walton, commanding the Artillery Reserve of the First Corps at the battle of Gettysburg]; and, last and not least, to make some allusions to the ill-natured and splenetic attacks provoked by that paper from certain wordy soldiers. . . ." As further justification for this second paper, Longstreet wrote: "I have been subjected to loud and incoherent assaults, led by certain gentlemen [Early and Fitzhugh Lee?] whose steady purpose of misrepresenting my record has become notorious, and seconded by a few others who follow through ignorance or innocence. Without proceeding directly against the essential parts of my narrative, they raise a clamor of objection and denial. One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm and made it impossible for me to write, save under great pain and constraint, I have been compelled to accept the services of a professional writer, generously tendered me by the editor of the *Times*. Upon such trifling casuals as this do my enemies propose to build their histories and amend mine. The attempt is at once pitiful and disgraceful. . . ." ⁴¹

Longstreet's second paper, as printed in the Philadelphia *Times* of February 24, 1878, was reprinted elsewhere, and appeared in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* of June, 1878. It was followed in that issue of the *Papers* by a "Reply" from General Early, who said that he wrote solely "to vindicate

⁴⁰ *Id.* to *id.*, July 29, 1877, *ibid.* The italics have been added by the present writer.

⁴¹ Longstreet, "Second Paper on Gettysburg," *loc. cit.*, 257, 259. It may be noted that the above statements by Longstreet were omitted from his second paper when it reappeared, as "The Mistakes of Gettysburg," in *Annals of the War*, 619-33.

the fame of the great commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the truth of history."⁴²

For all practical purposes, these papers ended the controversy in the pages of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* so far as contributions by Longstreet were concerned. He became so deeply involved in Georgia politics, and the need for conserving his strength was so great, that he had little time or energy for controversial writing. He could throw no new light on the subject of the argument, and he was faced by two much keener and abler writers than himself: General Early, who produced most of the arguments to controvert Longstreet's assertions and accusations, and General Fitzhugh Lee, who also was no mean antagonist.

Longstreet did, however, take one last shot at his critics in an interview with Grady, the account of which was published in the *Philadelphia Times* of July 27, 1879, and reprinted elsewhere. In this interview Longstreet barely mentioned Gettysburg and then only to extol the fighting qualities of his First Corps and to state as his opinion that the defeat there ended all hope of Southern success. The controversy with General Early and others was not mentioned. Longstreet said that the South was beaten because of too much individuality in the ranks and inefficiency at Richmond. He thought General Joseph E. Johnston, rather than General Lee, "the most accomplished and capable" of all the Southern military leaders; he considered Grant "incomparably the best" on the Northern side. Interesting comments on men and events were scattered through the interview, which—as set forth by Grady—was altogether complimentary to Longstreet.⁴³

Longstreet's part in the Gettysburg controversy did him no good. His failure to produce the full letter which he alleged that General Lee had written him in January, 1864, and that in which Captain Goree testified concerning what General Lee told him while alone with him in Lee's tent at Orange Courthouse in January, 1864, placed Longstreet's whole case under suspicion, even before the Gettysburg Series began to appear in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*. Such statements as those attributed to, or made by, Lee and Goree, when quoted out of context, may and often do convey meanings which are distorted or opposite from those intended by the writer or speaker. In addition, Longstreet later, in his *Century* article on Gettysburg, gave a different version of what Lee wrote in his letter of January, 1864.⁴⁴

⁴² Longstreet, "Second Paper on Gettysburg," *loc. cit.*, 257-70; Early, "Reply to General Longstreet's Second Paper," *loc. cit.*, 270-87.

⁴³ *New York Times*, July 29, 1879.

⁴⁴ James Longstreet, "Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania," in *Century* (New York), XXXIII (February, 1887), 622-36, reprinted as two articles, "Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania" and "Lee's

Apart from Longstreet's discussion of just what General Lee wrote him, he made three specific statements and one general statement as to the time at which he joined Lee on Seminary Ridge on July 2, 1863: (1) in a letter to Colonel W. H. Taylor on April 20, 1875, "My two divisions nor myself did not reach Gen. Lee until 8 A.M. on the 2nd."; (2) in *Annals of the War*, "I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight"; (3) in *Battles and Leaders*, "On the morning of the 2nd I joined General Lee"; and (4) in *From Manassas to Appomattox*, "The stars were shining brightly on the morning of the 2nd when I reported at General Lee's headquarters and asked for orders."⁴⁵

On February 16, 1887, the Reverend Mr. Jones, of the Southern Historical Society, wrote Jefferson Davis advising him that he was preparing a reply to General Longstreet's article in the *Century* for February, 1887, in relation to Longstreet's "attack on General Lee . . . for appointing 'Virginians' . . . over more competent men because they were not Virginians. . . ." and also to answer Longstreet's repetition of his attacks on Lee. Jones hoped to have the article published in the *North American Review*, as the *Century* "merely refuses to allow a reply." Among other things, Jones wrote Davis: "Will you allow me to use the statement you made to me at Beauvoir last summer to the effect that General Lee told you that he lost the battle of Gettysburg because of General Longstreet's disobedience of orders? I shall show that Longstreet *did* disobey orders. . . ." There is no evidence that Davis granted this permission, nor was the proposed article ever published, so far as is known.⁴⁶

In view of the private and personal letters written by Lee to Davis after the battle of Gettysburg, it is questionable whether Lee made such a statement as that attributed to him by Jones. His attitude toward the conduct of all of his subordinates at Gettysburg, including Longstreet, is epitomized in his refusal to accept General George E. Pickett's report of the battle because Pickett "condemned in such strong terms the failure to support his division" in its famous charge on July 3. Instead, Lee returned the report to Pickett and suggested that "you destroy both copy and original, substituting one confined to casualties only."⁴⁷

General Early returned to the attack when he read Longstreet's Gettysburg article in the *Century* of February, 1887. He also wrote Jefferson Davis,

Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 244-51, 339-54 (see especially p. 349).

⁴⁵ Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns*, 198; Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," in *Annals of the War*, 422; Longstreet, "Lee's Right Wing at Gettysburg," in Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, III, 340; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 362. See also Freeman, *Lee*, III, 552-54, for a more detailed discussion of these statements.

⁴⁶ Rowland (ed.), *Davis . . . Letters, Papers, and Speeches*, IX, 531.

⁴⁷ Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee*, 267; Lee to Pickett, n.d., in *Official Records*, XXVII, Pt. III, 1075.

saying that he had had two controversies with Longstreet ("One . . . in the New Orleans papers previous to 1877 and the other in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*" in 1877 and 1878), in which he had "fully demonstrated the falsehood of many of Longstreet's statements, and the absurdity of his pretensions and criticisms." Regarding the *Century* article, Early wrote that Longstreet "seems to have lost all sense of decency and propriety" and, in his various articles in the *Century*, "has demonstrated his want of sense as well as his utter disregard for the truth, as he had before shown his utter want of principle by his political course." Early enclosed in his letter to Davis his article from the *Richmond State* of May 11, 1887, entitled "The Pen is Mightier Than the Sword—General Lee's Critics," in which he refused to take further notice of Longstreet or any other critics of Lee.⁴⁸

General Richard Taylor, in his book *Destruction and Reconstruction*, published in 1879, shortly after Longstreet's articles in the *Philadelphia Times*, wrote: "A recent article in the public press signed by General Longstreet, ascribes the failure at Gettysburg to Lee's mistakes which [Longstreet] in vain pointed out and remonstrated against. That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet, and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of the two men. . . ." ⁴⁹

Though Georgia politics had put a temporary stop to Longstreet's writings on his part in the Civil War, news of the proposed *Century* War Series stirred him to take his pen in hand again. Since the summer of 1879, he had been in correspondence with his friend and classmate General D. H. Hill regarding the Maryland campaign of 1862; and on February 22, 1883, he asked his friend Goree to send him "the benefit of your reflections [on the campaign] in the minutest details."⁵⁰ Though no particular place of publication had been arranged for, he proceeded with composition whenever he was not busy with his duties as United States marshal of Georgia. But these demands ceased when, for political reasons as much as for any other, Longstreet was, on July 25, 1884, removed from office. Thus released, he again took up his writing in earnest, interrupting it only for reasons of health or to keep speaking engagements.

Even before his removal from office, Longstreet had begun corresponding with the editors of the *Century* concerning the preparation of several articles for the *Century* War Series. This series of papers, begun in the November, 1884, issue of the *Century* and extending over the next three years, was first proposed by Clarence Clough Buel, one of the assistant editors, on July 17,

⁴⁸ Rowland (ed.), *Davis . . . Letters, Papers, and Speeches*, X, 26-31.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 231.

⁵⁰ Longstreet to Goree, February 22, 1883, in Goree Papers.

1883. It was approved by the editor in chief, Richard W. Gilder, who placed the project in charge of his assistant, Robert Underwood Johnson, in association with Buel. Subsequently, most of the papers in the series, with some additions, were published in four volumes as *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.⁵¹

To assist in the preparation of the Longstreet articles, arrangements were made with Josiah Carter of the *Atlanta Constitution* to edit and transcribe the manuscripts as they were received from Longstreet and then to return them to Longstreet for his approval or to mail them directly to the editors of the *Century*. Joel Chandler Harris, also of the *Constitution*, seems to have had some part in the editing of the articles. On October 18, 1884, Longstreet wrote Gilder: "I left my manuscript [of the battle of Fredericksburg] with Mr. Carter for Harris. . . . May I enquire the part [of the payment] proposed for me [which] should go to Mr. Harris. . . ." Several months later, on December 22, 1884, Longstreet again wrote Gilder that he would meet Harris in Atlanta any day before New Year's. Longstreet expected to receive five hundred dollars for his Fredericksburg article, but he wrote Gilder that if it was "in any way lacking of your wishes, please return it. I have been offered for a single lecture the same as you now offer."⁵²

The financial arrangement between Longstreet and the *Century* provided for a fixed net payment to Longstreet plus an extra allowance to Carter for his preparation of the manuscripts for printing. During the next two years Longstreet was busy writing articles entitled "'The Seven Days,' including Frayser's Farm," "Our March Against Pope," "The Invasion of Maryland," "The Battle of Fredericksburg," and "Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania," a long article including an account of Longstreet's part in the battle of Gettysburg. All of the articles were first published in the *Century War Series* and then reprinted in *Battles and Leaders*. The substance, the point of view, and the emphasis in these articles were Longstreet's. Carter's only function seems to have been to smooth out the narrative and transcribe the finished manuscript. He was in no sense a ghost writer, but only an amanuensis. Most of Longstreet's correspondence with the *Century* which has been located pertains to payment for the articles decided on. Apparently there was no second payment for the articles used in *Battles and Leaders*, as the republication of these was provided for before the first publication in the *Century War Series*.⁵³

⁵¹ See Preface to Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, I, ix-x.

⁵² Longstreet to R. W. Gilder, October 18, 1884, in *Century War Series*, New York Public Library; *id.* to *id.*, December 22, 1884, *ibid.*

⁵³ See Preface to Johnson and Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders*, I, ix-x. Payments to Longstreet and Carter for the article on the Seven Days amount to \$300 and \$75, respectively; on Second Bull Run and the Maryland campaign, to \$900 and \$150; on Fredericksburg, to \$500 and \$115; and on Gettysburg, to \$500 and \$175.

In the Century War Series correspondence in the New York Public Library, there are memoranda of payments to Longstreet and Carter. A penciled notation on one of them, apparently in Longstreet's handwriting, indicates that General Grant was paid \$4,000.00 for 46 pages of text, or an average of \$87.00 per page. Longstreet's total compensation for 31½ pages, for himself and Josiah Carter, was \$2,715.00, or an average of \$69.88 per page for Longstreet and \$16.32 per page for Carter.

Having completed his articles for the Century War Series, Longstreet turned to his long-cherished plan to write all of his personal wartime experiences as a part of a full-length narrative of the war and also to answer his critics. Apparently he advised the *Century* editors of his plans, for he wrote that he was pleased to know that they felt "an interest in my proposed publication of personal experiences." A month later he wrote a correspondent that he had done little writing.⁵⁴ His progress was slowed, to some extent at least, by happenings and conditions beyond his control: the burning of his cottage, the death of his wife, his own poor health, his frequent trips, and his physical difficulty in writing. Of these handicaps and losses, the destruction of his cottage seems to have had the least adverse effect on his writing. Apparently no papers of importance were in the cottage, as Longstreet and his family were then living most of the time in the Piedmont House in Gainesville. No statement by Longstreet has been found which mentions, as a handicap in his writing, the loss of any papers by fire or otherwise.

Only one reference to the fire and to any loss of papers has been seen. It is included in a brief endorsement on a letter which Longstreet received from General Marcus J. Wright, one of the editors of the *Official Records*. Wright had written Longstreet, giving the record of Longstreet's commissions held in the Confederate army. Longstreet's endorsement stated: "This paper so far as I know is correctly stated. The Commissions and other data that I should have were consumed when my residence was burned in 1889."⁵⁵ Apparently most, if not all, of the correspondence which Longstreet carried on to secure the information which he required for his writings, lectures, and speeches was saved. (For example, he corresponded with General D. H. Hill from 1879 to 1888, largely in relation to the Sharpsburg and Chickamauga campaigns. Twenty-one of Hill's letters in reply to Longstreet's inquiries are now in the Duke University Library.)

However, Longstreet drew most of the material for his book, *From Ma-*

⁵⁴ Longstreet to Goree, February 18, 1885, in Goree Papers; *id.* to *id.*, July 24, 1885, *ibid.*; *id.* to editor of *Century*, January 22, 1888, in Century War Series; *id.* to J. M. Stoddard, February 29, 1888, quoted in part in *Collector* (New York), LXII (October, 1947), 131.

⁵⁵ Autograph endorsement on M. J. Wright to Longstreet, August 21, 1897, in Huntington Library.

nassas to Appomattox, from already published sources, such as newspaper interviews and magazine articles. The *Official Records*, publication of which was begun in 1880, had reached Volume XLVII by the time Longstreet's book was ready for publication. These volumes included reports and correspondence on all of the operations—the Seven Days' battles, the second Manassas campaign, the Maryland campaign, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga—concerning which Longstreet had written fully in his articles and which he included in his book. His own newspaper articles, the Century War Series, *Battles and Leaders*, and other printed information were also available to him as sources in the writing of his book.

Longstreet began work on his "memoirs," as he called them, probably in the winter of 1890-91; but the physical process of writing and the delay incident to the search for needed documents and other materials made the going slow. By the middle of 1892 he was writing in earnest, as he had been able to obtain the *Official Records*, which he needed. He had "been waiting to be sure that my narrative should be sustained by the records of the period to which it relates." Though he did not believe that the *Official Records* "would be complete as many have been lost, most points can be made manifest by parts of the correspondence and reports."⁵⁶

Longstreet had finished the account of Chickamauga by August, 1892, and he hoped to be ready for the publisher by the first of November. He was especially concerned about having accurate and proper maps and planned to go to Washington to select and arrange for those which he required. About the same time he wrote Goree for his recollections of the campaign in the fall and winter of 1863. In November he again wrote Goree, this time for his recollections of the surrender at Appomattox and particularly of the conduct of General G. A. Custer of the Federal cavalry.⁵⁷

In the spring of 1893, Longstreet was in Washington and went with the Antietam Battlefield Commission to help "definitely settle the positions of some of the General's troops during the battle of Sept. 17, 1862." Included in the party was Leslie J. Perry, one of the civilian assistants engaged in the compilation of the *Official Records*, then in process of publication. Perry, who had aided Longstreet in many ways in preparing his articles for the Century War Series, was of assistance to him also in the preparation of his book. After their return to Washington Perry wrote a long article captioned "General Longstreet as a Critic," which was published in the *Washington Post* for June 11, 1893. In this article Perry wrote that Longstreet had "long been engaged upon his autobiography, the manuscript of which is now ready

⁵⁶ Longstreet to Goree, March 20, 1892, in Goree Papers.

⁵⁷ *Id.* to *id.*, August 26, 1892, *ibid.*; *id.* to *id.*, November 4, 1892, *ibid.*; *id.* to *id.*, November 12, 1892, *ibid.*; *id.* to M. J. Wright, August 22, 1892, in Huntington Library.

for the printer. His visit North was mainly to arrange for its publication and for some map work. The book will be largely devoted to events in which he was an actor including Mexican War experiences."⁵⁸

It is not known with whom General Longstreet negotiated for the publication of his book, except that he probably submitted the manuscript to the Century Company. Presumably, like most authors, he went through a process of submitting his manuscript to whatever publisher would read it. In any case, he finally contracted on May 1, 1895, with J. B. Lippincott Company of Philadelphia and received a cash advance against royalties at the signing of the contract, later receiving additional royalties according to the provisions of the contract. No record of these payments has been found.⁵⁹ The receipt of the book was friendly, and it was reported six months after its publication date (December, 1895) that the "book sells well."⁶⁰

As early as July, 1891, the *Chicago Tribune* had reported that Longstreet, busily engaged in writing his recollections of the war, was uncertain as to what title to give his book. He had considered both "Service with the Blue and Gray" and "Under Two Flags or Memories of Three Wars,"⁶¹ but neither of these had seemed suitable. When the book was finally published, however, it bore the title *From Manassas to Appomattox*. Whether this concise and euphonious title was chosen by Longstreet's publisher or himself or was suggested by some friend is not known. In any case, it was a fortunate choice.

The book itself was not a reprint of his Century War Series articles or of the other articles which he had written but was completely an original work based on these writings and the *Official Records*. In addition, many obscure and debatable points were corrected and extended, both by reference to already published materials and by correspondence which General Longstreet carried on with leading participants on both the Union and Confederate sides. The *Official Records* are cited throughout the book. General G. W. Smith's *The Battle of Seven Pines* and Colonel W. H. Taylor's *Four Years with General Lee* are the other principal publications cited. Likewise, Longstreet depended on his own writings and those of others as they concerned the various incidents of his military career. Longstreet insisted on good maps to illustrate the narrative account of the battles; of the sixteen which were used, fourteen were full-page, colored maps, and two were small run-in, black-and-white maps. Fifteen other illustrations were used, including four photographs and a facsimile of a letter from Lee to Longstreet of January 19, 1866.

⁵⁸ L. J. Perry, in *Washington Post*, June 11, 1893.

⁵⁹ J. B. Lippincott Company to the writer, November 19, 1948.

⁶⁰ Sorrel to Goree, June 19, 1896, in Goree Papers.

⁶¹ *Chicago Tribune*, July 8, 1891, quoted in *New York Times*, July 12, 1891.



Respectfully
Your Obedient
James Longstreet

JAMES LONGSTREET, 1895

This photograph appears as the frontispiece of *From Manassas to Appomattox*, and was probably taken to illustrate the book.

Longstreet's book does not mention his letters to the New Orleans newspapers in 1876, the articles printed in the Philadelphia *Times*, or his contributions to the Century War Series. Pendleton's charges are mentioned but are not discussed in any great detail. General Early is characterized as "a picturesque figure . . . ready to champion any reports that could throw a shadow over [the] record of the First Corps, . . . but the charge most pleasing to him was that of treason on the part of its commander. . . ." Time had somewhat mellowed Longstreet's expression, if not his feelings. There are a number of important omissions in the book. There is barely a mention of the Suffolk, Virginia, campaign in the spring of 1863, Longstreet's first experience in independent command. There is hardly anything about his almost six months of convalescence (from early May to mid-October of 1864) as a consequence of the wound which he received at the Wilderness in May, 1864. His post-war experiences in Louisiana and later in Georgia as a Republican officeholder are confined to one brief paragraph.⁶²

In his interview with Leslie J. Perry prior to the publication of Perry's above-mentioned article on Longstreet in the Washington *Post*, Longstreet had commented on Southern civic and military leaders at some length, these comments being "revised by his own hand [with] few changes" before publication in the *Post*. Longstreet's remarks, as recorded by Perry and approved by Longstreet, were very critical of all the Confederate civil and military leaders except himself. Perry had thought Longstreet's treatment of General Early so harsh that he had suggested that Longstreet soften it. But this Longstreet had refused to do, adding: "It will be [thus] in my book." If he so wrote of Early in his book, however, the publisher must have blue-penciled the passage, as the published book contains no appraisal of Early which can properly be termed harsh.

No evidence has been found to indicate or suggest that Longstreet did not himself compose and write his various articles and his book. One recent authority has written that Longstreet's book "was written with literary assistance, late in life, and without consulting his earlier contributions to *Annals of the War* and to *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*." Longstreet had such "literary assistance" as any publisher extends to an author whose work he contracts to publish. He made acknowledgement "to Mr. Alfred Matthews for material aid in revising the manuscript of these memoirs," but there is no indication that the assistance was other than literary.⁶³ He had had similar help from Henry W. Grady in preparing his articles for the Philadelphia *Times* and from Josiah Carter, and perhaps Joel Chandler Harris, in preparing his

⁶² Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, 377-79, 397, 638.

⁶³ Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in Command* (New York, 1944), III, 815; Freeman, *Lee*, IV, 562; Longstreet, *Manassas to Appomattox*, vii.

contributions for the Century War Series. As for the statement that Longstreet did not consult his previously printed articles in writing his book, it is true that they are neither cited nor mentioned by Longstreet, but a comparison of these articles with the text of the book indicates both direct and indirect quotation (without citation) as well as much extended paraphrasing. In the book, Longstreet's account of the Gettysburg controversy is shorter than it was in the previously printed articles in the *Philadelphia Times*, and the accounts of the Seven Days' battles and the battles of Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg are longer than they were in the Century War Series.

A reviewer in the *Nation* wrote: "It is evident that Longstreet has not availed himself of literary help as much as in some former papers of his which have been published. His book is not as smooth in style as those papers, but it gains as a personal presentation of himself. His very mannerisms are characteristic and smack of the camp. Blunt, careless and sometimes egotistic, he 'says his say' with a kind of defiant earnestness that commands attention and sympathy. . . ." The reviewer in the *New York Times* was not any more complimentary as to the composition of the book. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson's biographer, wrote: "General Longstreet hardly writes with a facile pen. . . ." ⁶⁴

General E. Porter Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery at Gettysburg, wrote: "Longstreet's *great* mistake was not in the *war*, but in some of his awkward & apparently bitter criticisms of General Lee in his own book. . . ." ⁶⁵ The *New York Times* reviewer wrote that Longstreet had asked his friend General Daniel E. Sickles, of the Union army, for an endorsement of his book, but that Sickles had twice refused, presumably because of controversial statements and criticism of which he had no personal knowledge. The Reverend J. William Jones, of the Southern Historical Society (who claimed to be in a position to know all of the facts, both because of his war associations and experiences and because of his position as editor of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*), took exception to Longstreet's criticism of Lee. ⁶⁶

The most authoritative criticism came from Colonel Henderson, who wrote that Longstreet had endeavored to defend his own record by reflecting on

⁶⁴ Unsigned review of Longstreet's *Manassas to Appomattox*, in *Nation*, LXII (February 13, 1896), 146; *New York Times*, January 19, 1896; G. F. R. Henderson, "Review of *From Manassas to Appomattox*," in *Journal, Royal United Service Institute*, reprinted in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XXXIX (April, 1915), 104.

⁶⁵ E. P. Alexander to Frederic Bancroft, October 30, 1904, in possession of John R. Peacock, High Point, N.C. The italics are in the original.

⁶⁶ J. W. Jones, "Who Commenced It?" (letter to editor), in *Richmond Dispatch*, February 16, 1896.

the conduct of Lee and others but had "failed altogether to shift the burden of responsibility for delay from his own shoulders." Henderson wrote that he did not believe that Longstreet had deliberately been disloyal to Lee at Gettysburg, but that "his irritation at the rejection of his advice was such that he forgot his duty." In Henderson's opinion, Longstreet's bitter attacks "serve only to alienate sympathy and destroy respect. . . . He has been subject to the merciless assaults of many enemies. He has been assailed with accusations which are utterly without foundation; and it may seem harsh in the extreme to criticise the veteran's defense of his military conduct. But where historic truth and great reputations are at stake it is impossible to be silent. . . ." ⁶⁷

In spite of these criticisms, the book was well received (so well that twelve years after its publication, in 1908, it was reissued in a "Second Edition—Revised"), as much perhaps from a desire to hear Longstreet's version as for any other reason. In addition, over thirty years had passed since Gettysburg, and time had mellowed or blunted many bitter memories and healed hurt feelings. When Longstreet went to Richmond to attend the annual reunion of the United Confederate Veterans in July of 1896, six months after the publication of his book, he was uncertain as to how he would be received. To his surprise and pleasure, he was welcomed with a tremendous ovation by the veterans, who saw in him only Old Pete, their hard-bitten, hard-hitting commander of days long past. As General D. H. Hill said, Longstreet "was true throughout the war." There was no criticism of his conduct during the war, but only of his post-bellum actions and opinions.

The dying embers of the long Gettysburg controversy between Longstreet on the one hand and his critics and the defenders of Lee on the other were blown into blaze by a renewal of the charges against Longstreet for his conduct at Gettysburg in General John Brown Gordon's book, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, published in the fall of 1903, a few months before Longstreet's death. Gordon's book brought forth an angry answer to his so-called "Established Facts" and to General Pendleton's "Fulminations." No attention was given to General Early's much abler "Replies" or to General Fitzhugh Lee's comments on Longstreet's conduct.⁶⁸

As the Reverend J. William Jones had written several years previous to Longstreet's death: "General Longstreet began the controversy and kept it up . . . his attacks on General Lee have been as unjust as they have been unseemly and ungrateful; and . . . the only thing 'politics' has had to do

⁶⁷ Henderson, "Review," *loc. cit.*, 113, 115, 117.

⁶⁸ Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 31-84.

with the controversy has been that ever since Longstreet became a Republican, a partisan Republican press has labored to make him the great general on the Confederate side, and to exalt him at Lee's expense. . . ." ⁶⁹

Here we may leave an unfortunate phase of Longstreet's career. It was a controversy which embittered the later years of his life and in the end left matters just about where they stood at the beginning.

⁶⁹ Jones, "Who Commenced It?" *loc. cit.*

The End of the Road

LATE IN FEBRUARY, 1897, WHILE IN FLORIDA, GENERAL LONGSTREET LEARNED that Colonel A. E. Buck, a rival Georgia Republican politician, was in Washington seeking appointment to the Mexican mission and that he was backed by Republican clubs throughout Georgia. This report so alarmed Longstreet that he took a train for Atlanta "determined to see whether there was going to be any breach of faith." The reports which Longstreet heard in Atlanta induced him to go on to Washington to press his claims as well as to be present at the inauguration of the new president, William McKinley. He was not, however, able to get any definite commitment from McKinley. Colonel Buck did not get the Mexican mission; it went to General Powell Clayton of Arkansas soon after the inauguration, and Buck was appointed minister to Japan, an appointment reported to be solely political.¹

Soon afterward, General Longstreet was invited to be a guest at the dedication of Grant's tomb on Riverside Drive in New York City. He went from Washington as a member of the party of Vice-President Adlai E. Stevenson and on arrival, put up at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, as he had done many times in the past. On the evening of his arrival he was one of the guests of General James Grant Wilson at his home on East Seventy-fourth Street in New York City. Others who sat down at the table were Generals Simon B. Buckner, William B. Franklin, C. C. Augur, and a number of former West Point schoolmates of Grant and Longstreet. On the following day a parade and a reception given by President McKinley took place, Longstreet, Buckner, Gordon, Lew Wallace, and others participating.²

Following these busy engagements, Longstreet returned to Gainesville, where, in June, he was interviewed. The reporter wrote:

I looked for a large, old-fashioned Southern place with pillars and wide halls. Instead the house was an ordinary story and a half farmhouse. . . . A board nailed to a tree offered wine for sale at a very low price. . . . [Longstreet was] in his vineyard, scissors in hand, pruning his vines. He is a big, old man, stooping a little now and slow of gait. He wears long white whiskers, cut away from his chin. His hair is white as wool, but his skin is ruddy. One of his arms is a little disabled and he is quite deaf in one ear.

¹ *New York Times*, February 20, March 19, April 6, April 7, 1897.

² *New York Herald*, April 27, 1897; *New York Times*, April 27, 28, 1897.

Longstreet told the reporter: "I live with my tenant. He is a veteran of the Northern army."³

The old soldier was preparing for another event that was to do much to soften the last years of his life. This was his remarriage, an event which took place in the governor's mansion in Atlanta at 3 P.M. on September 8, 1897. The bride was Helen Dortch of North Carolina, who was at the time employed in the Georgia state library.⁴ The couple went on a brief honeymoon trip to Porter Springs, near Atlanta; but on account of the uncertainty of Longstreet's expected government appointment, they soon left for Washington, where he at once resumed his efforts to secure Federal office. Having failed to obtain the Mexican mission, he had decided that the office of United States railway commissioner was fair prey. During preceding years, this position had been held successively by General Joseph E. Johnston and by General Wade Hampton, then incumbent, who was completing a four-year term.

It was a nip-and-tuck contest. First Hampton was deemed secure in his office; then Longstreet seemed certain to be appointed in his place. In October a correspondent of the *Baltimore Sun* wrote that the seven-month struggle between Hampton and Longstreet for the office of railway commissioner had practically ended in a victory for the incumbent. Although Longstreet was an "original McKinley man" who had done much toward sending a McKinley delegation to the St. Louis presidential nominating convention and who had a vast amount of personal political influence, Hampton had the advantage of being already in the position. Furthermore, Hampton's service in the Senate had brought him into contact with various eminent Republicans, some of whom were still senators and had appealed to the President in his behalf—"and with so much effect that Longstreet, who fondly hoped to be ensconced in his comfortable position before the end of March (last), is still on the outside. It is said he is so much discouraged that he is looking around for another place. Both of these war-worn veterans are said to be very poor and so the consideration that has been alternatively urged is a stand-off."⁵

The office was a pleasant and desirable one. A well-informed observer acidly commented:

It pays handsomely, and is an extremely pleasant position in every way; but from the time of its creation it has never been anything but a sinecure. The hardest work the incumbent has ever had is to "tote" around the railroad passes showered upon him from all parts of the country, which would easily fill a bushel basket, and to sign for his month's pay. The theory of the office was supervision of the various railroads which had been recipients of Government aid. The practice has been no supervision whatever, but traveling around having a good time without personal expense.⁶

³ *New York Tribune*, June 7, 1897.

⁴ *New York Times*, September 9, 1897.

⁵ *Baltimore Sun*, in *New York Times*, October 23, 1897.

⁶ *Ibid.*

But in spite of predictions and guesses as to the outcome of the contest, by the last week in October the fight was over, and Longstreet had won. On October 29, among other presidential appointments, McKinley sent in Longstreet's nomination to be "Commissioner of Railways." The nomination, however, faced a fight in the Senate for confirmation. Longstreet's connections with the Warmoth and Kellogg factions in Louisiana more than twenty years before were cited against him as being sufficient to condemn him; his criticisms of General Lee, both in his newspaper articles and in his book, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, were also held against him. Longstreet's supporters accused the opposition of waving the bloody shirt and contended that "disagreements which succeeded the war and the friction which resulted therefrom should be forgotten." It was stated that Longstreet was not competent for the office, but this charge was not pressed. It was not until January 22, 1898, that final favorable action was taken. The vote was 33 to 15, the term of office to be four years. It is related that General Hampton was so incensed at his failure to secure reappointment that he would not come to the office to turn it over to his successor. General Longstreet went to the office, took the oath alone, so it is said, and endeavored as best he could to acquaint himself with the duties of the position.⁷

In spite of General Longstreet's success in securing his appointment to Federal office and his desire to take a honeymoon trip, conditions in Cuba and the intransigence of the Spanish government had created a situation that seemed to make it desirable for him to remain at his post until things became more settled. On February 20, 1898, the battleship *Maine*, which was anchored in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, was destroyed by a mysterious explosion. This event so strained relations that war soon followed. Longstreet, in spite of his age, at once offered his services to the government; his age and the state of his health debarred him, however, although he had been recommended by influential men of the South. He did not offer advice, as he felt that "if the President wants the benefit of my advice he can call upon me. I am sorry that I am not a younger man." He did, however, offer the services of his son, James Longstreet, Jr., as a substitute.⁸

During the first week of June, Longstreet and his bride were at the Empire Hotel in New York City. While there the General expressed the opinion that "if a policy of starvation were adopted [in Cuba] it would mean only a matter of weeks" until the war would be over. From New York he and his wife went to his home in Gainesville for a brief rest and then on to the military training camp at Chickamauga where troops were gathering, preparatory to

⁷ *New York Times*, October 30, 1897; Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 117; *New York Tribune*, January 23, 1898.

⁸ *New York Tribune*, April 29, June 1, 1898.

being sent to Cuba. "He was received with courtesy by General and Mrs. [John R.] Brooke and was offered 'a bodyguard of aides to assist him through camp.' He refused, as he said he did not need a guide—he knew the field and had visited every part of it. . . ." ⁹

From Chickamauga, Longstreet and his bride returned to Gainesville; and in the last week in July they were in Atlanta, where Longstreet attended the United Confederate Veterans meeting as the guest of a camp of Confederate veterans of Augusta, Georgia. He was requested to wear his Confederate uniform but replied that it had been burned in the fire that had destroyed his home ten years previously; thereupon the veterans insisted that he send his measure so that a new uniform could be made. Longstreet never forgot his reception; he had to be protected so that he could eat his meals and get needed rest. "His old 'boys' surged about him for . . . hours, eager to touch his hand, to touch his garments and look into his face. . . ." Longstreet was again enthusiastically received by his former soldiers as he and Mrs. Longstreet rode in a carriage in the parade through the streets of Atlanta. General Gordon, in his capacity as president of the United Confederate Veterans, presided over the meetings as usual; and Longstreet's predecessor in Washington, General Wade Hampton, was among those who attended the reunion and rode in the parade. ¹⁰

Following these strenuous activities and a rest in Gainesville, Longstreet and his bride were off on a brief honeymoon trip to visit Mexico, where fifty years previously General Longstreet, as a young officer, had served in the war with Mexico and had sustained his first wound in the service of his country at Molino del Rey in the outskirts of the city of Mexico. Arrived in Mexico, Longstreet looked up a former acquaintance. Mrs. Longstreet has told the story: During the Mexican War while visiting "at the home of a Mexican family in the City of Mexico, [Longstreet] fell in love with the daughter of the house and told her (as all soldiers do!) that he would come back for her. . . . We called on this lady about whom trooped her children and grandchildren. General Longstreet said: 'Señora, I told you we would come back, and I have come.' She answered, 'But you were a long time about coming. And I observe that you have brought your wife with you.'" ¹¹

After a short stay in Mexico, General Longstreet and his wife returned to the United States, going to New Orleans and then to visit Longstreet's sister in Oxford, Mississippi, which also had been the home of his uncle, Judge Longstreet. While Longstreet was in Oxford, a small boy named William

⁹ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1898; *New York Times*, June 1, 1898.

¹⁰ Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 120; *New York Tribune*, July 21, 22, 23, 1898.

¹¹ Helen D. Longstreet to Ben Ames Williams, October 2, 1944, quoted by courtesy of Ben Ames Williams.

Faulkner "marched up to him and said, 'General, what happened to you at Gettysburg?' The old boy about blew his top." From Oxford General Longstreet went westward to make an inspection of railroad property in California and the northwest. In his report, he recommended "government control and operation of a first class double track railway from Kansas City, Missouri to San Diego, California, by air line route." He repeated the tour in the summer of 1899 and was received everywhere along his route of travel with consideration and cordial greeting by Confederate and Union veterans alike. While on the West Coast, he was entertained in San Diego at a dinner in the home of U. S. Grant, Jr., the son of the former president.¹²

Most of the next year was spent by General Longstreet, either attending to the duties of his office in Washington (where he lived at the Barton Hotel) or in Gainesville. In March, 1901, he was present at President McKinley's second inauguration; and six months later, he attended the inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt, who as vice-president succeeded to the office of President after McKinley's assassination in Buffalo, New York, in September, 1901. In the spring of 1902, on Memorial Day, he stood on the platform with President Roosevelt, General Sickles, and others to review the parade of old soldiers who marched by in honor of their fallen comrades. Later, in a tent near the White House, he met many old Union soldiers of the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac and in a brief speech said: "I hope to live long enough to see my surviving comrades march side by side with the Union veterans along Pennsylvania Avenue, and then I will die happy."¹³

One of the last public appearances of this distinguished soldier was his attendance at the centennial of the founding of the United States Military Academy, at West Point, his alma mater of sixty years previous. On June 9, 1902, at an alumni luncheon held in Cullum Hall, Longstreet and a classmate, John S. McCalmont, were, in terms of service, the oldest graduates present. They sat on either side of the presiding officer, General John M. Schofield. After the tables had been cleared, brief speeches were made, all in a spirit of harmony and good fellowship. General Alexander, who had been Longstreet's chief of artillery, in "a touching scene . . . alluded in complimentary terms to the Old War Horse who sat there—his fiery spirit hidden by the disguise of an ear trumpet and goggles bearing testimony to the passage of the years and saying in unmistakable language—

That this is all remains of thee?

Shrine of the mighty! can it be.

"Heartly and sincere applause greeted the mention of the old hero's name

¹² *New York Times* (book review section), November 7, 1948, p. 6; *New York Times*, November 22, 1898; Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 108, 121.

¹³ Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 21.

but it fell on closed ears, and as no one thought to bring him forward the opportunity for a dramatic and inspiring scene was lost."

But Wednesday, June 11, was the big day, the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, being the principal speaker and guest of honor. He was followed by General Horace Porter, the orator of the day, by Secretary of War Elihu Root, and by a series of toasts—to one of which, "The Volunteers," Longstreet's friend and companion General Sickles responded. The following day the guests and visitors scattered to their homes, Longstreet returning to Washington.¹⁴

Longstreet's "plan and desire" was to be present at Gettysburg in the latter part of September, 1902, at the unveiling of the equestrian statue of General Henry W. Slocum, but the state of his health prevented him from doing so. Disabled "from a severe hurt" in one of his feet, he was unable to stand for more than a minute or two at a time. In expressing to General Sickles his regret at his inability to attend the ceremonies, Longstreet wrote: ". . . to-day I can say with sincere emotion, . . . that [the Confederate failure at Gettysburg] was and is the best that could have come to us all, North and South. . . ." ¹⁵ Old and feeble, he remained through the winter in Washington; and in the spring of 1903 he went to Gainesville, where through most of the summer he fought for strength and health. He suffered from the effects of the wound which he had received in the Wilderness nearly forty years previous. In addition, a cancer in his eye had developed; and in the hope of relief and perhaps a cure, he went to Chicago for treatment, returning to Gainesville shortly before Christmas of 1903.

The end came swiftly, mercifully, and unexpectedly. At 6 P.M. on the second of January, 1904, James Longstreet died. His passing put an end to the quarrels which had stormed about him. All sought to do him honor, save only a bitter few who, even when death had removed the object of their hatred, could not forget the past.

Tributes to his memory and regrets of his passing were many and genuine; and they came from all parts of the country, particularly from the South—from former comrades and soldiers, from friends and associates of post-bellum days, and from many who knew Longstreet only by reputation. The feeling of bitterness toward General Longstreet generated by his affiliation with, and support of, the Republican party had gradually diminished as a new generation appeared on the scene. Few remained who thought of him as a traitor to the South.¹⁶

¹⁴ "The Ceremonies at West Point," in West Point Centennial Number, *Army and Navy Journal* (New York), XXXIX (June 14, 1902), 1029-32, *passim*.

¹⁵ Longstreet to Sickles, September 19, 1902, in Helen D. Longstreet, *Lee and Longstreet*, 15.

¹⁶ St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, quoted *ibid.*, 230.

The funeral, which was held in Gainesville at the county courthouse, was "the most impressive ceremonial" ever seen in that mountain town. The "crush [was] so great, that the ceremonies were delayed an hour." Special trains brought admirers and mourners from far and near. A military escort and a long procession of state, city, and county officials, Confederate veterans, and others accompanied the funeral procession as it proceeded to Alta Vista Cemetery in the suburbs of Gainesville, where the old soldier was laid to his final rest.¹⁷

¹⁷ *Atlanta Constitution*; quoted *ibid.*, 217, 222-25; *New York Times*, January 7, 1904.

Epilogue

IT IS PERHAPS PROPER IN AN ACCOUNT OF LONGSTREET'S POST-BELLUM CAREER to attempt to evaluate this period of his life and to arrive at some understanding of his reasons for casting his lot with the victorious forces of the Union rather than with his own people and section. His influence was great; he expected and hoped that by joining with the forces in control in Louisiana, he could help to shape their policies. In addition, Grant the soldier was his friend; and undoubtedly Longstreet expected that he could count on the assistance of Grant the politician in controlling the forces that might be raised against a rational plan of Reconstruction of the former members of the Southern Confederacy.

In the sequel, Grant, even as President, was used by selfish men bent on so shackling the South that it could not for a long time be a force in national politics or a commercial competitor; Longstreet, in Louisiana, likewise came to be used by selfish men who were bent on immediate personal gain regardless of consequences to others. And in Louisiana Longstreet had no Lee to guide him and to counsel with him. On his own, Longstreet was never an effective force, either in peace or in war. As a subordinate he was usually prompt and decisive; but as commander, he gave a performance which left much to be desired. These characteristics of his military career were carried over into his political activities. In Louisiana, Longstreet became a respectable façade behind which unscrupulous men frequently operated to accomplish questionable objectives; in Georgia, as United States marshal, he became the protector of designing men, including his own son, who deceived him and smeared his character and reputation by their own dishonest and unworthy acts.

In addition, Longstreet does not seem to have been a good manager of his personal affairs. During the twenty years after Appomattox he was in receipt of an income that averaged perhaps ten thousand dollars annually, and yet when he left office in 1885 he had little to show for his years of political activity. He trusted too much in others—in men of few scruples and few ethical standards of conduct.

For most of his civil career Longstreet depended on the emoluments of public office for his support. Although he appears to have thrown his lot with

the Republican party in Louisiana in the expectation that by the mere force of his example and personality he could sway the political leaders in the state and perhaps in the nation to his way of thinking and acting, he was opposed by forces of greed and avarice beyond his ability to understand or to combat. After the first months of apparent success, Longstreet realized that he could not bend his associates to the way in which he thought they should go. But he had made his decision; he had cast his lot; and apparently he did not see how he could do otherwise than run with the mob, at the same time doing what he could to control and direct it.

When he found that his best efforts went for naught, Longstreet still stayed on. But his heart was not in the fight. His associates had thrown honor, and decency in action and conduct, out of the window. But to Longstreet these associates represented the means of a livelihood. He seems to have come to have no other objective than to stay in office and take the pay and use the privileges that came with the office. He seems to have had no enthusiasm for the avowed objectives of Reconstruction; he took, rather than gave, orders. He became a convenient tool—always on hand to be used when needed and then to be returned to his place in the scheme of things, always expected to be on call for the next emergency.

Longstreet was ostracized socially not so much because of his act in joining with the unsavory forces of Reconstruction in Louisiana as because he had elected to live and act on the wrong side of the street. His own reaction to criticism did not help matters any. Officially he had to be listened to, but socially he was simply ignored. His combativeness when opposed caused him to resent such treatment and to oppose its sponsors with all his strength, meanwhile holding tenaciously to positions which he had taken. Other Southern leaders with fewer scruples but more political ability—men like Joe Brown of Georgia, Mahone of Virginia, and Chalmers of Mississippi—threw their lot with the Republicans without losing such social recognition as they demanded. A Southern writer, E. A. Pollard, who knew Longstreet, presented what seems to have been a fair appraisal of him at about the time of Appomattox. The characteristics of appearance, action, and conduct described were frequently manifested in his post-bellum career. Pollard wrote:

Gen. Longstreet had a genuine and inimitable *sang-froid* in battle. It did as much to encourage his men as many passionate displays of fervour, and was especially effective in keeping them steady in the most desperate circumstances.

The personal appearance of Gen. Longstreet was not engaging. It was decidedly sombre; his bluish-grey eye was intelligent, but cold; a very heavy brown beard was allowed to grow untrimmed; he seldom spoke unnecessarily; his weather-stained clothes, splashed boots, and heavy black felt hat gave a certain fierceness of aspect to the man. His temper was high and combative,

and he was quick to imagine slights to his importance. But his relations with Gen. Lee, who seems to have been most felicitous in accommodating the peculiarities of all his lieutenants, were not only pleasant and cordial, but affectionate to an almost brotherly degree; an example of beautiful friendship in the war that was frequently remarked by the public.¹

General Longstreet's career, both military and civil, was in many respects paradoxical. He was constantly on the defensive; and when he assumed the defensive-offensive, the results were not very helpful to him or the cause which he represented. He refused on moral grounds to accept appointment as one of the managers of the Louisiana Lottery, yet he supported the devious and unscrupulous practices of Reconstruction in Louisiana without question. He was honest in his personal affairs and transactions and yet condoned dishonesty and corruption in his political associates, both by his silence and by his fulfillment of the duties of the offices to which he had been appointed.

The latter period of his life was embittered by his controversy over the responsibility for the loss of the battle of Gettysburg. Longstreet's writings and speeches set against him many able and honest men who refused to accept his views or to endure his vehement attacks in silence. Longstreet seems to have begun his attempt to evade any blame for the outcome at Gettysburg as an answer to the charges by General Pendleton, but in doing so he stirred up a controversy that he felt compelled to keep going as his opponents marshaled ever more effective rebuttal and argument. Undoubtedly, this controversy did little to help Longstreet live down the record of his career in Louisiana and perhaps raised against him criticism and social ostracism with which he was unable to cope.

Whenever he appeared in his capacity as a Confederate veteran, he was enthusiastically welcomed by the men who had served under him, particularly those from the ranks. But when he appeared as a speaker, a writer, or a politician, his welcome was mixed or hostile. The fact that he never held elective, but always appointive, offices goes far to explain the attitude toward him of the average white Republican voter.

Longstreet lived a long life, a life filled with action. He was a man who performed most successfully when he was controlled and directed by one for whom he had both personal and professional respect. Throughout most of his Confederate career, under the considerate and watchful direction of Robert E. Lee, he gave his best. His soldiers admired him as a fighting man; Lee understood him and used him in battle as a tactical leader who was far above the average.

In his life after the war Longstreet lacked Lee's inspiring and sympathetic leadership and example; those with whom he was associated possessed few

¹ Edward Alfred Pollard, *Lee and His Lieutenants* (New York, 1867), 420.

of the qualities of character or interest that would have tempered Longstreet's actions and given them positive and constructive direction.

After Appomattox, Longstreet was uncertain as to his future course. His location in New Orleans was more or less accidental, but his support of the Republican party in Louisiana was deliberate and entered into only after careful thought and prayer. His trust, he said, was in God; his aim was to devise some honorable means of saving his people from the extremity of distress. He was certain that if his counsel was accepted all would be well. In spite of threats on his life he insisted on following the course he had chosen. That he did not succeed was through no lack of trying, but rather because the forces arrayed against him were too strong for him to overcome.

The passage of time mellowed his own feelings and those of his opponents. In the last years of his life the brilliance of his military career and the sincerity of his peacetime efforts became more apparent. At the end it was Longstreet the dogged fighter and brilliant tactician who was remembered and honored rather than Longstreet the politician, battling forces and men he could neither understand nor control.

Critical Essay on Authorities

Manuscript Collections

The development of Longstreet's post-bellum career has depended on three main general sources: manuscript materials, newspapers, and government documents. This has been necessary because no detailed account or accurate summary of this period of his career has ever been written. Longstreet himself dismissed it in his memoirs, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, with less than one thousand words.

There is no large collection of Longstreet's letters and papers, though he carried on an extensive correspondence during the last thirty years of his life. Material relating to him is scant and much scattered. This is due to a number of causes, not the least of which is, reportedly, a distribution of his private correspondence by sale or gift to a variety of scattered institutions and individuals.

Aside from routine reports, few letters written prior to the Civil War have been found, and none of those found contain anything of importance. No letters by Longstreet to his wife of any date have been located. She lived with him at his various stations, and there was, therefore, little if any need for letters. The same reason will explain the lack of letters to his wife during and after the Civil War. General and Mrs. Longstreet and their children moved from one place to another, and members of the family were never long separated from one another. Letters that probably were written at various times have not been found; they were doubtless lost or destroyed in one way or another. Longstreet wrote often and at great length to various people, particularly from 1874-75, when the Gettysburg controversy began to be important to him, until his death. His correspondence in the ten-year period after Appomattox with former associates in the Confederate army was infrequent or solely of a business nature. This was largely due to his early adherence to the carpetbag Republican party in Louisiana, which resulted in his estrangement from all or most of his former associates in the Confederate army.

General Longstreet wrote a number of letters to General R. E. Lee immediately after he moved to New Orleans, but this correspondence ended rather abruptly two years later. Even in the case of his wartime aide, Captain T. J. Goree, with whom he traveled to New Orleans after the surrender at Appomattox, there was a ten-year silence after a brief correspondence following his arrival in New Orleans. A possible explanation for Longstreet's ten-year silence is the fact that from 1867 to 1876 he was fully occupied by his political activities and responsibilities in Louisiana.

One of Longstreet's correspondents during the New Orleans period was President U. S. Grant, with whom he enjoyed a lifelong friendship. Longstreet called on Grant in Washington on several occasions, and he frequently wrote him concerning the political situation in Louisiana. Some of this correspondence is now

in the Henry C. Warmoth Papers in the Southern Historical Collection in the University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. In the Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina, is a group of letters written to and received from General D. H. Hill over a period of ten years (1879-89), as well as a number of miscellaneous items. There are small collections of Longstreet letters in the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi; in the Washington and Lee University Library, Lexington, Virginia; in the Georgia State Library, Atlanta, Georgia; in the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California; in the Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio; in the Pennsylvania Historical Society Library, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and in the New York Public Library. This last collection includes a letter of Longstreet's to Greeley in the Horace Greeley Papers and correspondence between General Longstreet and the editors of the *Century* magazine in connection with Longstreet's contributions to the Century War Series, later reprinted in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.

Likewise, there are numerous letters in the various National Archives collections, all of them relating to Longstreet's quest for office or connected with his services in the various Federal offices to which he was appointed. A group of Longstreet letters is in the collection of Colonel Thomas Spencer of Atlanta, Georgia, but much of the original material in this collection has been dispersed. Some letters of Longstreet's (particularly his correspondence with Henry B. Dawson, editor and publisher of the *Historical Magazine*) are in the New York Historical Society Library; and one useful letter to Dawson is in the United States Military Academy Library, West Point, New York. Manuscript material also was located in the Chicago Historical Society Library, in the Emory University Library, in the University of Georgia Library (in which is an unarranged and uncalendared group of papers and correspondence of Dr. William H. Felton relating to the political situation in Georgia in the early 1880's), and in the Library of Congress.

A valuable source has been the collection of Goree Papers recently transcribed and deposited in the Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, which includes a diary kept by Goree, covering most of Longstreet's trip south to New Orleans in the summer of 1865. This collection also contains a group of Longstreet's letters to Goree extending over more than thirty years, in which Longstreet discussed, and asked for information on, controversial points in connection with his military career or explained his statements and acts.

Single more or less valuable papers have been located in various depositories, but no significant group other than those mentioned has been found.

Published Correspondence

Other than the small collection of letters printed by Longstreet in his memoirs, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, no printed collection of Longstreet letters has been found. All his letters relating to the Louisiana period were located in contemporary New Orleans newspapers. Most of them were reprinted in New York newspapers and in the Washington (D.C.) *National Intelligencer*. Frequently letters of a later period than Reconstruction were printed in the local newspapers and reprinted in the New York newspapers, particularly the *New York Times*,

the New York *Tribune*, and the New York *Herald*. Several of Longstreet's letters to Jefferson Davis were printed in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist. His Letters, Papers, and Speeches*, 10 vols. (Jackson, Miss., 1923); and some were published in Henry C. Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction: Stormy Days in Louisiana* (New York, 1930).

Government Publications

The reports, correspondence, and other records of the various campaigns published in *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, cited above, have been used extensively in connection with Longstreet's service in the Civil War.

Many references to, and much testimony by, General Longstreet are in the reports of the various congressional committees appointed to investigate charges of election irregularities in Louisiana during the Reconstruction period, notably *House Executive Documents*, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 211; *House Executive Documents*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 91; *Senate Reports*, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 457; and *House Reports*, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 261. The proceedings relating to Longstreet's relief from political disabilities are in the *Congressional Globe*, 46 vols. (Washington 1834-73), 40 Cong., and in *The Statutes at Large of the United States of America* (Boston and Washington, 1845—). Longstreet's testimony and correspondence in connection with the case of General Fitz John Porter are in *Senate Executive Documents*, 46 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 37, Pt. 1, Serial No. 1871. Likewise, his testimony and correspondence in connection with the investigation of his conduct of affairs as marshal of Georgia are in the Springer Committee Report, printed in *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 48 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. XXI, Miscellaneous Document No. 38, Pt. 1, Serial No. 2233.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Newspapers have been most useful in tracing events in Longstreet's career, most of the material being obtained from New York newspapers, particularly the New York *Times*, the New York *Tribune*, and the New York *Herald*. The New Orleans *Times* and the New Orleans *Republican* were the most useful New Orleans newspapers, but neither printed as much useful material as is contained in the New York newspapers. Other papers used include the Lowell (Mass.) *Daily Courier* (1867), the Philadelphia *Times* (1879-80), the Richmond *Enquirer* and *Examiner* (1869), the Richmond *Examiner* (1896), the *National Intelligencer* (1865-69), and the Atlanta *Constitution* (1886).

Among periodicals, the most useful have been the *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Richmond, Va., 1876-1943); *Southern Magazine* (Baltimore, 1868-75); *Land We Love* (Charlotte, N.C., 1866-69); *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* (New Orleans, 1917—); *Harper's Weekly* (New York, 1857-1916); *Nation* (New York, 1865—); *McClure's Magazine* (New York, 1893-1929); *Journal of Southern History* (Baton Rouge, 1935—); *American [Appletons'] Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events*, Ser. I (1861-75), 15 vols. (New York, 1862-76); *Army and Navy Journal* (New York, 1863—); and *Century* (New York, 1870-1925), particularly Volumes XXX-XXXIII, in which Longstreet's articles appeared.

Reminiscent Works and Autobiographies

The most valuable publications in this classification are Longstreet's own *From Manassas to Appomattox*, cited above, and Helen D. Longstreet's *Lee and Longstreet at High Tide* (Gainesville, Ga., 1905). Other helpful works of this nature include U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, 2 vols. (New York, 1885-86); Rebecca Latimer Felton, *My Memoirs of Georgia Politics* (Atlanta, 1911); Henry C. Warmoth, *War, Politics and Reconstruction*; and *Annals of the War*, cited above; Hamlin Garland, *Roadside Meetings* (New York, 1930); Julia Collier Harris (ed.), *Joel Chandler Harris, Editor and Essayist: Miscellaneous Literary, Political and Social Writings* (Chapel Hill, 1931); John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, and E. P. Alexander, *The Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, cited above.

Biographies

The only biography of General Longstreet is that by H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, *James Longstreet, Lee's War Horse* (Chapel Hill, 1936), which is based almost entirely on Longstreet's own book, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, and which gives only one short chapter to the forty years of Longstreet's life after Appomattox. Biographies of many of Longstreet's military and political associates have proved very helpful; these include John William Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee, Soldier and Man* (New York and Washington, 1906); Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, cited above; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in Command*, 3 vols. (New York, 1942-44); James Grant Wilson, *General Grant* (New York, 1897); William Preston Johnston, *The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, Embracing His Services in the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States* (New York, 1878); John Donald Wade, *Augustus Baldwin Longstreet: A Study of the Development of Culture in the South* (New York, 1924); Wirt Armistead Cate, *Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Secession and Reunion* (Chapel Hill, 1935); Louise Biles Hill, *Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1939); P. G. Hamlin, *The Making of a Soldier: Letters of General R. S. Ewell* (Richmond, 1935); Elias Nason and Thomas Russell, *Life of Henry Wilson* (Boston, 1874); Susan P. Lee, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton* (Philadelphia, 1893); and Walter H. Taylor, *General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, with Personal Reminiscences* (Norfolk, 1906).

Special Articles

The most important special articles used in connection with this study of Longstreet's career after the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse have been those concerning the carpetbag leaders in Louisiana during Reconstruction which have appeared in various numbers of the *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, particularly the following: John Edmond Gonzales, "William Pitt Kellogg, Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana, 1873-1877," in *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIX (April, 1946), 394-495; Francis Byers Harris, "Henry Clay Warmoth, Reconstruction Governor of Louisiana," *ibid.*, XXX (April, 1947), 523-653; Agnes Smith Grosz, "The Political Career of Pinckney Benton Stewart Pinchback," *ibid.*,

XXVII (April, 1944), 527-612; and Fayette Copeland, "The New Orleans Press and the Reconstruction," *ibid.*, XXX (January, 1947), 149-337.

General and Special Histories

A varied use has been made of general and special historical works that provide background for, or direct reference to, Longstreet's career in Louisiana and afterwards. These include Ella Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868* (Baltimore, 1924); Alcée Fortier, *History of Louisiana*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1904); W. G. Cooper, *The Story of Georgia*, 4 vols. (New York, 1938); Lucian Lamar Knight, *A Standard History of Georgia*, 2 vols. (New York, 1917); Lucian Lamar Knight, *Land Marks, Memorials and Legends*, 2 vols. (Atlanta, 1913-14); Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (New York, 1930); Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868; the Democratic Effort to Regain Control* (New York, 1933); George F. Milton, *The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals* (New York, 1930); I. W. Avery, *The History of the State of Georgia from 1850 to 1881 . . .* (New York, 1881); Walter L. Fleming, *Louisiana State University: 1860-1896* (Baton Rouge, 1936); James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 . . .*, 8 vols. (reprint, New York, 1902-20); Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, 6 vols. (New York, 1917-36); E. Merton Coulter, *The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877*, in *A History of the South*, VIII (Baton Rouge, 1947); Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War . . .*, cited above; William Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac* (New York, 1882); and E. Merton Coulter, *William G. Brownlow, Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands* (Chapel Hill, 1937).

Index

- Alexander, E. Porter, 25, 52, 117, 178, 223, 229, 232, 270, 272-73, 305, 307, 309, 441; at Gettysburg, 181-82; withdraws from Richmond defenses, 296; criticizes Longstreet, 434
- Alexander, John D., 277
- Allan, William, 185, 420
- Allen, Henry W., 320, 323
- Alvord, Benjamin, 378-79
- Anderson, G. B., 273
- Anderson, G. T., 233
- Anderson, Richard H., 151, 177, 281, 297-99; in Maryland campaign, 93; in Wilderness campaign, 270f, 274; commands Longstreet's corps, 275
- Anderson, T. C., 362-63
- Armistead, Lewis A., 184
- Arthur, Chester A., 385, 391, 393, 395
- Augur, C. C., 437
- Averell, W. W., 260
- Badger, A. S., 370-71
- Baird, Absalom, 327-28, 337
- Ballin, Ralph, 391, 394
- Banks, Nathaniel P., 39, 78
- Barksdale, William, 111
- Barlow, F. C., 270, 273, 301
- Battine, Cecil, 187
- Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 429, 431, 433
- Bayley, G. W. R., 368
- Bean's Station, 239
- Beauregard, P. G. T., 119-20, 159, 245-47, 320, 323, 325, 330, 331, 336; commands Confederate army, 21; at First Manassas, 22-23, 32; at Fairfax Courthouse, 35; transferred to Tennessee, 36
- Benning, H. L., 272, 295
- Bingham, William, 341
- Birney, D. B., 177
- Black, J. C. C., 399
- Blackburn's Ford, 23, 25
- Blaine, J. G., 390-91, 395
- Blain's Cross Roads, 240
- Boutwell, G. S., 357
- Bovee, George E., 351, 363
- Boyd, D. F., 351-53
- Bragg, Braxton, 137, 195, 197-98, 205, 206, 245, 256, 323, 325, 410; at Chickamauga, 200-201; controversy of, with Longstreet, 209-20, 250-51; instructions to Longstreet, 222-23; at Chattanooga, 229; starts reinforcements to Longstreet, 230; defeated at Missionary Ridge, 235; relieved of command, 251
- Bramlette, T. E., 372
- Brandy Station, 157
- Brannan, J. M., 205
- Breckinridge, John C., 204, 249, 287, 289
- Brooke, John R., 371
- Brown, B. Gratz, 360
- Brown, Joseph E., 331, 341, 398, 445; appointed to U.S. Senate, 385; leader in Georgia, 387-88
- Brownlow, W. G., 346
- Bryan, Goode, 272
- Bryan, William Jennings, 409
- Bryant, John E., 383, 395; seeks to replace Longstreet as marshal, 390-91, 393-94
- Buck, A. E., 383, 390, 393, 401, 437
- Buckner, Simon B., 195, 203, 215, 221, 230, 320, 323, 325, 336, 437
- Buford, John, 83, 166, 187
- Bull Run, *see* Manassas
- Bull's Gap, 248
- Burkesville, Va., 287
- Burnside, A. E., at Sharpsburg, 98f; relieves McClellan, 106; at Fredericksburg, 106, 109, 110, 115; replaced by Hooker, 116-17; transferred to the West, 132; in Tennessee, 195, 211, 217, 219, 221, 223, 225f, 235; relieved, 237; in Virginia, 248, 258, 263, 269
- Butler, B. F., 162, 257, 261, 279, 331-32
- Butterfield, Daniel, 160
- Cabell, H. C., 259
- Campbell, Hugh J., 347, 356, 360, 382; sketch of, 347-48; Longstreet writes, 361; elected president, Louisiana state senate, 364; succeeds Longstreet, 374
- Campbell, John A., 331-32
- Cameron, Simon, 346
- Candler, A. D., 389
- Carter, G. W., 355-57

- Carter, Josiah, 429-30, 433
Casey, James F., 326, 347, 350, 352, 357-58, 360, 382
Century, The, Longstreet's articles in, 426-27, 430
Century War Series, 428-29, 431, 433-34; origin of, 428-29; payments to Longstreet for articles in, 429; Longstreet's correspondence regarding, 430
Chalmers, James R., 330, 392, 445
Chantilly, battle of, 90
Chase, Salmon P., 343, 358
Cheatham, B. F., 205, 210
Chesnut, James, Jr., 215
Chickamauga, battle of, 204-17
Clayton, Powell, 437
Cleburne, Patrick R., 201, 216, 230
Clements, J. C., 389
Cleveland, Grover, 395, 400-402
Cobb, T. R. R., 113
Colquitt, A. H., 385, 387-89, 398
Cooper, Samuel, 146
Couch, D. N., 160
Crittenden, T. L., 197, 200
Crook, George, 278, 306
Culpeper Courthouse, 156-57, 193
Cunningham, J. C., 391
Curry, J. L. M., 17
Custer, George A., 304, 309-10, 431
Custom House faction, 353-57, 360

Davis, Jefferson, 119-20, 257, 322, 407; and First Manassas, 32; and J. E. Johnston, 35-36; correspondence of, with Lee, 138; considers troop transfer to Bragg's aid, 138; confers with Longstreet, 149; supports Lee, 151; approves Lee's plan, 152-53; refuses Lee's resignation, 194; and Bragg controversy, 212-20; confers with Lee and Longstreet, 245-46; rejects plan to invade Kentucky, 249; offers Longstreet command in place of Hood, 280; and defense of Richmond, 287-88; at dedication of statue in Atlanta, 398-99; death of, 404
Davis, W. G. M., 273
Dawson, H. B., 412-13, 416, 419-20
De Feriet Returning Board, 363
Dent, John H., 344
Devens, Charles, 379
Dibble, H. C., 363
Dorch, Helen, *see* Longstreet, Mrs. James (2)
Dunn, O. J., 351-52, 354, 355
Du Ponte, Durant, 362
Durell, E. H., 363

paign, 171f; in Wilderness campaign, 267; controversy of, with Longstreet, 417-28
Elliott, W. L., 236
Elzey, Arnold, 126, 139; under Longstreet's command, 133
Emory, W. H., 356-58, 365, 371
Evans, N. G., 29, 95
Ewell, R. S., 9, 14, 23, 29, 64, 151, 156, 161, 178, 252-53, 261, 264f, 295, 297, 298-99

Fairfax, John W., 284, 342
Fairfax Courthouse, 35
Fellows, J. Q. A., 331
Felton, Dr. W. H., 385, 387, 389
Field, C. W., 242, 245, 260, 265-67, 274, 281, 283, 296, 305, 308
Fitzsimmons, O. P., 380, 387, 390-91
Five Forks, 292-94; losses at, 301
Foraker, J. B., 408
Forrest, N. B., 201, 210, 320
Fort Sanders, 230-33
Fort Steadman, 289-90
Foster, John G., 122, 125, 145, 240-41, 251; in East Tennessee, 236f; relieves Burnside, 237; writes Halleck and Grant, 239
Franklin, W. B., at Sharpsburg, 98; at Fredericksburg, 111f, 437
Frederick, Md., 93
Fredericksburg, Va., 107, 108-109, 111
Fremantle, A. J. L., rides with Longstreet, 161, 164; quoted, 165, 166, 169, 173, 174, 186, 189-90, 191
French, S. G., 133, 143, 145, 147
From Manassas to Appomattox, 408, 430-35

Garfield, James A., 205, 385, 386
Garland, Elizabeth, 9
Garland, Harriet Smith, 13, 16
Garland, Hamlin, interviews Longstreet, 409
Garland, John, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16
Garland, Louisa, *see* Longstreet, Mrs. James (1)
Gartrell, L. J., 389
Gary, M. W., 281, 283
Gem Saloon, 357
Getty, George W., 263, 268, 270
Gettysburg campaign, 156f; first clash of, 166, 174; geography of, 167; losses on first day at, 171; second day's operations, 174-75; Longstreet on failure of, 410
Gibbon, John, 295
Goggin, J. M., 234
Gordon, John B., 166, 387, 398, 405, 406; address of, 168-69; leads attack on Fort Steadman, 289-90; and withdrawal from Richmond, 296-97, 299, 303, 304, 306; attends last council of war, 305; at Appomattox, 310; resigns from U.S. Senate, 384-85; renews charges against Longstreet, 435

- Goree, T. J., 408, 410, 417-18, 426, 428, 431;
as aide to Longstreet, 19, 22, 284; Long-
street's companion during convalescence,
278; accompanies Longstreet to Lynchburg,
317; urges Longstreet to settle in Texas, 317,
321; diary of, 318-20; correspondence of,
with Longstreet, 324, 376, 406-407, 414-15;
Longstreet visits, in Texas, 405-406; state-
ments of, regarding interview with Lee in
January, 1864, pp. 414, 417, 418
- Grady, Henry W., 396, 438; speech of, 399;
assists Longstreet in his writing, 421-23;
Longstreet interviewed by, 426
- Granger, Gordon, 200-201, 242; marches to
aid of Thomas, 209
- Grant, U. S., 6, 8, 9, 15, 192, 227, 238-39, 248,
288, 338, 340, 343-44, 350-51, 392, 395,
400, 401, 437, 444; at Chattanooga, 218,
229; visits Knoxville, 240; appointed general
in chief, 245, 256-57; Longstreet's opinion
of, 256-57; plans of, 261-63; and battle of
the Wilderness, 265-78; and siege of Rich-
mond, 278-79, 282f, 284, 292f, 294; de-
mands surrender of Lee's army, 301; receives
surrender of Lee's army, 310; and Mexican
railroad, 326; Longstreet's opinion of, 344,
395; inaugurated as President, 345; nomi-
nates Longstreet for government position,
345; criticism of, 345; Longstreet seeks sup-
port of, 352-53; appealed to for aid, 364;
supports Kellogg's claims, 366, 371; Long-
street favors for President, 385; death of,
398; memorial meeting for, 408
- Greeley, Horace, visits New Orleans, 353; as
presidential candidate, 360
- Gregg, David McM., 263, 300
- Gregg, John, 272
- Griffin, Charles, 297
- Halleck, H. W., 160, 239-40
- Hampton, Wade, 55, 331, 413, 438-39
- Hancock, W. S., 48, 262, 267-70, 273-74
- Handy, M. P., 421-22
- Hardee, W. J., 220
- Harper's Ferry, movement on, 93; besieged by
Jackson, 97; surrender of, 97
- Harris, Joel Chandler, 392, 396; assists Long-
street, 429, 433
- Harris, John S., 352
- Harrison, Benjamin, 400-401
- Harrison, ——— (scout), 161, 162
- Haskell, John C., 259, 308
- Hatch, F. M., 362
- Hatton, Robert, 55
- Hawkins, John S., 362
- Hayes, Rutherford B., 377-80
- Hays, Harry T., 323
- Hebert, P. O., 368
- Heintzelman, S. P., 29
- Henderson, G. F. R., criticism of, of Long-
street's memoirs, 434-35
- Herron, A. S., removed from office, 338
- Herron, F. J., removed from Returning Board,
362-63
- Heth, Henry, 166, 171, 181, 187, 268, 271,
294-96
- High Bridge, Va., 298
- Hill, A. P., 178, 261, 289, 407; commands
division, 65; attacks at Beaver Dam, 66; at
Gaines' Mills, 67; attacks Pope at Ox Hill,
89; remains to receive surrender of Harper's
Ferry, 97; arrives at Sharpsburg, 101; pro-
moted, 151; characterization of, 151-52; in
Gettysburg campaign, 155, 156f, 161, 170,
174, 182; in Wilderness campaign, 264;
killed, 294; Longstreet's tribute to, 295; staff
of, absorbed by Longstreet's command, 295
- Hill, B. H., 389, 398-99
- Hill, D. H., 201, 204, 208, 215, 435; on Penin-
sula, 43; re-enforces Longstreet, 47-48; at
Seven Pines, 53; commanded by Longstreet,
59; at South Mountain, 93; at Sharpsburg,
98; comments of, 102; commands in North
Carolina, 120, 122, 124-25, 130, 132f, 147;
writes Longstreet, 139; quarrels with Bragg,
212; relieved, 220; editor, *Land We Love*,
335, 416; comments on Longstreet's nomi-
nation to government office, 345-46; Long-
street corresponds with, 428, 430
- Hill, Jerome, 405
- Hindman, T. C., 203, 207
- Historical Magazine*, 412, 413; ceases publica-
tion, 420
- Hoke, R. F., 266, 281, 319, 396
- Holmes, T. H., at First Manassas, 29
- Hood, John B., 110f, 122, 130, 131, 140, 143,
147, 156, 174, 176-77, 180, 193, 198-99,
323, 325, 336; at Seven Pines, 57; in Mary-
land campaign, 96; attacked by Hooker, 99;
at Fredericksburg, 112; at Chickamauga,
201-202, 207; wounded, 242; replaces John-
ston in Georgia, 279; defeated by Thomas in
Tennessee, 285; settles in New Orleans, 320;
as Longstreet's traveling companion, 321;
interviewed, 329; takes over Longstreet's
cotton brokerage business, 341; writes Long-
street regarding Gettysburg, 416
- Hooker, Joseph, at Sharpsburg, 99; at Freder-
icksburg, 112f; replaces Burnside, 116-17;
activity of, in Virginia, 127, 135, 143, 144-45;
attacks Lee at Chancellorsville, 148; builds
army, 152; opposes Lee, 153-54, 156f; re-
lieved by Meade, 162; in Tennessee, 218
- Howard, O. O., 166
- Huger, Benjamin, 53, 55
- Huger, F. K., 259

- Hughes, Robert W., 367
 Humphreys, A. A., 177, 262, 297, 300, 301, 303, 305, 308
 Humphreys, Benjamin G., 204, 272, 324-25, 326
 Hunter, D. H., 122, 125
 Imboden, John D., 157
 Ingraham, James H., 358
 Jackson, T. J. (Stonewall), at First Manassas, 28; in Shenandoah Valley, 39, 51; instructions to, from Lee, 64; summoned by Lee for conference, 65; failure of, 76; defeats Banks at Cedar Run, 78; in Second Manassas campaign, 79f; seizes Manassas Junction, 82; takes position at Groveton, 83; in battle of Groveton, 88-89; pursues Pope, 89; defeats Pope at Chantilly, 90; recrosses Potomac River, 94; in Maryland campaign, 94f; captures Harper's Ferry, 97; at Sharpsburg, 98f; forced back, 99; promoted and assigned to corps command, 105; at Fredericksburg, 112f; after Fredericksburg, 117; death of, 151
 Jenkins, Micah, 140, 164, 218, 230, 232, 274; in East Tennessee, 225f; controversy over rank of, 242; mortally wounded, 274
 Jenkins, J. C., 391
 Johnson, Andrew, 321, 327, 339; and Longstreet, 322; and Reconstruction in Louisiana, 328-30
 Johnson, Bushrod, 203, 207, 231, 292, 298-99
 Johnson, Edward, 165, 184, 267
 Johnston, Albert Sidney, reburial of, 325
 Johnston, J. E., 220, 245, 248, 258, 396, 438, 445; at Harper's Ferry, 28; at First Manassas, 29, 32; position of, at Fairfax Courthouse, 33; reorganizes army, 37; plans withdrawal of army, 37-44; relations of, with Longstreet, 44-45; faces McClellan on Peninsula, 50; at Seven Pines, 52-53, 56, 60-61; opposes Sherman in Georgia, 257; replaced by Hood, 279; Lee hopes to join, 296; Longstreet's opinion of, 426
 Jones, C. C., 416-17
 Jones, D. Floyd, 373
 Jones, D. R., 95
 Jones, John B., 124
 Jones, J. William, 418, 420, 427, 434
 Jones, Samuel, 217
 Jones, W. E., 239
 Kearny, Philip, 71
 Kellogg, W. P., 340, 360-61, 368, 369, 383-84, 413; elected to U.S. Senate, 347, 382; as governor, 364, 365, 366; calls for U.S. troops, 369; abdication of, demanded and refused, 370; appeals for aid, 371; retains office, 374
 Kelly's Ford, 194
 Kemper, James L., 184, 367
 Kershaw, J. B., 113, 204, 243, 265, 272, 274, 295
 Keyes, E. D., 88, 121
 Kilpatrick, Judson, 182, 190, 193
 King, Rufus, 83-84
 King, W. H. C., 330-31
 Knoxville, Tenn., 217, 220f; besieged, 228f; Foster's headquarters at, 239
 Lamar, L. Q. C., 334
 Latrobe, Osmun, 284
 Law, E. M., at Sharpsburg, 98f; at Gettysburg, 177; controversy of, with Micah Jenkins, 242, 254; in Wilderness campaign, 272
 Lawshe, P. F., 379
 Leadbetter, Danville, 231, 234
 Lee, Fitzhugh, 79, 107, 193, 290, 301, 303, 305-306, 405, 426; replies to Longstreet, 418, 423, 435
 Lee, G. W. C., 298
 Lee, Robert E., as adviser to Davis, 40, 41-42; commands Army of Northern Virginia, 62-63; and Peninsula campaign, 64-75; at Second Manassas, 82-83; and invasion of Maryland, 86-95; at Sharpsburg, 98-106; at Fredericksburg, 109-22; detaches Longstreet, 127f; at Chancellorsville, 138-49; and second Northern invasion, 151-63; at Gettysburg, 163-86; after Gettysburg, 190f; relations of, with Longstreet, 212-13; opposes Grant, 256-57; in Wilderness campaign, 260-76; prepares to defend Richmond, 282f; evacuates Richmond, 288-95; losses of, 299; and surrender to Grant, 302-10; after war, 322, 323, 336-37, 342-43, 410-11, 417, 426, 435-36, 446
 Lee, Stephen D., 324, 406
 Lee, W. H. F., 292
 Liberal Republican party, 359, 360
 Lincoln, Abraham, 122; proposes plan of attack at Fredericksburg, 108
 Locke, R. D., 389
 Logan, John A., 341
 Long, Armistead L., 305, 413-14; 416; writes Longstreet, 415, 417
 Longstreet, Augustus B., 6, 7; Longstreet visits, 324, 334; advice of, 334; Longstreet writes, regarding Gettysburg, 410
 Longstreet, Augustus Baldwin, 13, 14n
 Longstreet, Fitz Randolph, 14n, 348
 Longstreet, James, 6, 7
 Longstreet, James, early life of, 5, 6; as West Point cadet, 7, 8; family life of, 9, 12, 14,

36; early army career of, 13-14, 15-16; and secession, 16-17; enlists in Confederate army, 18-19; character of, 20; at Blackburn's Ford, 21-26; at First Manassas, 29-32; on Peninsula, 33-34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 45, 48-49, 55-72; at Second Manassas, 79; and first Northern invasion, 83-95; at Sharpsburg, 98-101; commands First Corps, 105; and Fredericksburg, 106-17; in Suffolk area, 120-46; and second Northern invasion, 146-54; in Gettysburg campaign, 156-94; at Chickamauga, 196-210; and quarrel with Bragg, 212-19; in East Tennessee, 220-49; and last Virginia campaign, 249-66; and Wilderness campaign, 269-73; wounded, 274, 275-76, 277-80; returns to First Corps, 281; and defense of Richmond, 282-98; and surrender, 305-17; returns to South, 317-20; and pardon, 321-22, 340, 341-42; business activities of, 323-26, 343-44; expresses opinions on public issues, 329-32, 342-44; and Louisiana Republicans, 332-36, 339-40, 345-76; correspondence of, with Lee, 336-37; in Lynchburg, 341; named surveyor of port of New Orleans, 345, 358-59; and Louisiana State University, 347-48, 351-52, 353; as adjutant general of Louisiana militia, 349, 359, 364, 366, 374; and New Orleans and Northeastern railroad, 348, 359; and Custom House controversy, 350-51, 353-54, 356-58; commissioned major general in Louisiana militia, 356; and election of 1872, pp. 358-64, 365; and Levee Commission of Engineers, 366-68, 372; salary of, 366-67; and Withers controversy, 367; and unification movement, 368-69; wounded in White League riots, 370-71, 372; and election of 1874, pp. 372-73; moves to Georgia, 375, 383; seeks new Federal appointment, 378-82; enters Catholic Church, 380; named minister to Turkey, 384, 385-86; and election of 1880, pp. 384-85; as U.S. marshal in Georgia, 386, 390-96; and Georgia politics, 386-91, 437; and Springer committee, 393-94; receives Mexican War pension, 397; reconciliation of, with Davis, 399; attends conventions, 400, 404-405, 406, 407, 408; and Harrison's cabinet, 401; financial resources of, 402-403; death of wife of, 403; and election of 1896, p. 409; as author, 410-37; controversy of, with Early, 415-20; and *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 421, 423-24, 425, 426; and *Philadelphia Times*, 421-22, 424-25; and *Annals of the War*, 424; and *Battles and Leaders*, 427, 428-29; and *Century* magazine, 427; and *Century War Series*, 428; writes *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 430-37; second marriage of, 438; as com-

missioner of railways, 438-39, 440-41; death of, 442; evaluation of, 444-47
 Longstreet, James (1), son of General Longstreet, 14n
 Longstreet, James (2), son of General Longstreet, 14n, 317, 439
 Longstreet, Mrs. James (1), 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 288, 317-18, 367, 402, 403-404
 Longstreet, Mrs. James (2), 438
 Longstreet, John Garland, 14n; born, 13; attends Virginia Military Institute, 317; accompanies father on journey south, 318; graduates from Virginia Military Institute, 348; conduct of, as deputy marshal, 394
 Longstreet, Mary Anne, 14n, 16
 Longstreet, Robert Lee, 14n, 246, 386-87
 Longstreet, William, 5
 Longstreet, William, 317, 319, 375
 Longstreet, William Dent, 14n
 Louisiana Lottery, 347, 351, 353
 Lowell, C. W., 347, 351, 352, 364
 Lynch, John, 362
 Lynch Board, *see* Returning Board

McClellan, George B., relieves McDowell, 35-36; character of, 38; and Peninsula campaign, 38-77; relieved by Pope, 77; replaces Pope, 93; learns Lee's plans, 94; at Sharpsburg, 98-101; relieved by Burnside, 106
 McClure, A. K., 422-23
 McComb, H. S., 349
 McCook, A. McD., 200, 206
 McDowell, Irvin, commands Union army, 21; at First Manassas, 28-33; relieved by McClellan, 35; commands on Rappahannock, 44, 50; sends Rickett's division to Pope's aid, 84; moves against Longstreet, 87
 McEnery, John, 360-61, 364-65, 370-71
 McGowan, Samuel, 291, 292
 Mackall, W. W., 213, 220
 Mackenzie, R. S., 293
 McKinley, William, 409, 437, 441
 McLaws, Lafayette, 193, 199, 203, 225, 232; at Seven Pines, 57; in Maryland campaign, 93-100; at Fredericksburg, 108f, 113; leads march to Culpeper Courthouse, 156; at Gettysburg, 174f; in East Tennessee, 226f; relieved from command, 242-43, 254
 Magruder, John B., 39, 40, 42-43, 53, 69, 72f, 76; in Mexico, 320, 323
 Mahone, William, 273-74, 291, 295, 299-301, 303, 305, 307, 392, 445
 Manassas, first battle of, 28-36; second battle of, 77-90
 Mansfield, J. K. F., at Sharpsburg, 99
 Markham House conference, 387

- Marshall, Charles, 158, 169, 185, 302, 310, 414, 416; retains copy of Lee's Gettysburg report, 411
- Martin, W. T., commands Longstreet's cavalry in East Tennessee, 238-39
- Marye's Hill, attack against, 113
- Maurice, Sir Frederick, 158
- Maury, D. H., 320, 323, 324
- Maury, Matthew F., 323
- Maynard, Horace, 384
- Meade, George G., 261; at Fredericksburg, 113f; replaces Hooker, 162; at Gettysburg, 189; after Gettysburg, 189, 192; opposes Lee, 257, 267, 282; pursues Lee, 297, 301
- Mechanics Institute, 357, 364
- Merritt, Wesley, 304
- Miles, Nelson A., 301
- Milroy, R. H., engages Ewell, 157, 162
- Mitchell, R. B., 200
- Moncure, J. C., 364
- Monroe, John T., 327-28, 338
- Moore, A. B., 17
- Morgan, George, 421-22
- Moses, Raphael J., 162
- "Mud march," 115-16
- Negley, J. S., 200, 205
- New Orleans, La., ex-Confederate officers in, 320, 322; Longstreet settles in, 320; riot in, 327-28; political corruption in, 350; battle of, 370-72
- New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad, 349, 359; Longstreet resigns as president of, 359
- New Orleans *Picayune*, criticizes Longstreet, 334
- New Orleans *Times*, 330; Longstreet's letters to, 330, 331; urges concerted action, 331; editorial comment of, 334
- Nichols, W. A., 15, 321
- Northern Virginia, Army of, 43; on the Peninsula, 50-66; advances northward, 77; at Gainesville, 85; at Sharpsburg, 104; retires to Virginia, 104-105; reorganized, 105, 151; situation of, 120-21; northward advance of, 156f; crosses Potomac, 161; losses of, 190; retreat of, from Gettysburg, 190-92; condition of, 195; as Grant's objective, 262; crushed by Grant, 306; surrender of, 308-309, 317
- Ogden, F. N., 341
- Ord, E. O. C., confers with Longstreet, 288; commands Army of the James, 292, 298, 300, 306, 309
- Orr, J. L., 341
- Owen Brothers, 320, 322
- Packard, S. B., 347, 351-53, 360, 382; opposes Warmoth, 355, 358; appeals to Grant, 371
- Palfrey, J. C., 104
- Paris, Comte de, 125, 420, 423, 424
- Parke, J. G., in East Tennessee, 237, 239-40, 251
- Parker, J. M. G., 340; correspondence of, with Longstreet, 332-33, 335; appointed surveyor of customs, 358
- Parsons, William Barclay, 343
- Peck, J. J., 121
- Pegram, W. J., 293
- Pemberton, J. C., 120, 137
- Pender, W. D., 166, 171, 181
- Pendleton, W. N., 281, 415-16, 418, 419, 435; address of, 168; sent by Lee to Grant, 302-303; attends last council of war, 305; "Memorial Address" of, 412
- Peninsula campaign, 50-76
- Penn, D. B., 360-61, 370-71
- Pettigrew, J. J., 55, 166, 184, 193
- Philadelphia *Times*, 419; Longstreet's articles in, 421-23, 424-26
- Phillips, S. T., 394
- Pickett, George E., 57, 122-23, 140, 147, 156, 161, 180, 183, 260, 270, 281, 290-91; in southeastern Virginia, 130-31; orders to, 181-82; charge of, at Gettysburg, 183-84; at battle of Five Forks, 292-94; Gettysburg report of, destroyed, 427
- Piedmont House, 396
- Pinchback, P. B. S., 362; elected lieutenant governor of Louisiana, 355; nominated for governor of Louisiana, 360-61; acting governor, 364; struggle of, with Warmoth, 365
- Pleasanton, Alfred, commands Hooker's cavalry, 157
- Polk, Leonidas, 201, 204, 210-11, 215; criticism of, 209; quarrels with Bragg, 212; writes Davis, 212
- Pollard, E. A., appraisal of Longstreet, 445-46
- Pope, John, 256, 260; relieves McClellan, 77; learns Lee's plans, 79; papers of, captured, 81; concentrates forces, 82; situation of, 84; defeated at Groveton, 88-89; retreats, 89-90
- Porter, Fitz John, in Seven Days battles, 66-67; at Second Manassas, 87f; moves against Longstreet, 87; Longstreet testifies for, 381
- Porter, Horace, 442
- Preston, William, 203, 207
- Price, Sterling, 323
- Ransom, Robert, 237
- Republican party, *see* Liberal Republican party
- Returning Board, 362-64, 373
- Reynolds, J. J., 205-206
- Richardson, I. B., at Blackburn's Ford, 25, 27

- Richmond, defense of, 280f; evacuation of, 287-95
- Ricketts, J. B., 83-84, 263
- Robertson, B. H., 170
- Rodes, R. E., 156, 171, 187, 267
- Rogers, W. H., 378
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 441-42
- Root, Elihu, 442
- Rosecrans, W. S., 8, 138, 195, 197, 200, 201, 205, 206, 207, 210-11, 214, 217, 218, 342, 392
- Sailor's Creek, Va., 298
- Scales, A. M., 181
- Schofield, J. M., 441
- Schurz, Carl, 328
- Scott, T. A., 346
- Seddon, James A., on Suffolk operations, 120-21, 123f, 142f; and Longstreet, 149; drawn into Bragg controversy, 212-13
- Sedgwick, John, 263, 270
- Seven Days battles, 66f
- Seven Pines, battle of, 56-58
- Seymour, Horatio, 342-43
- Sharpsburg, battle of, 97-104
- Sheridan, Philip H., 206, 262, 285, 292-93, 302, 304-305, 310, 332, 340, 346; at Dinwiddie Courthouse, 292; commands at New Orleans, 325-26; goes to Mexican border, 326; on Maximilian, 326; in New Orleans, 328-29, 337-39; visits Washington, 338; removed, 339; sent to New Orleans by Grant, 373
- Sherman, W. T., sent to East Tennessee, 236; advice of, to Grant, 257; commands in Georgia, 257; in New Orleans, 325; Longstreet writes, 379; statement of, regarding Longstreet, 400-401
- Sickles, D. E., 177, 346, 406, 434, 441-42
- Simms, R. M., 309
- Smith, E. Kirby, 35, 251, 320, 406, 411
- Smith, Gustavus W., 35, 40, 43, 53, 55, 56, 58-59
- Smith, Hoke, 396
- Smith, Jacob, 12
- Smith, M. L., 273
- Sorrel, G. M., 109, 161, 162, 178, 203, 228, 273
- Southern Historical Society *Papers*, 420-21, 423-24, 426
- Southern Magazine*, 412
- Speer, Emory, controversy of, with Longstreet, 386-87; runs for Congress, 389; investigates Longstreet, 390; criticizes Longstreet, 393
- Springer Committee, 393-95
- Stanton, Edwin M., 160
- Stephens, Alexander H., 389
- Stevenson, Adlai E., 437
- Stewart, A. P., 203, 207, 323
- Stuart, J. E. B., at First Manassas, 33; scouting of, 40, 45, 75; receives directions from Lee, 79; orders to, captured, 79; at Second Manassas, 80f; in Maryland campaign, 94f; conducts raid into Maryland, 106; in Pennsylvania campaign, 155, 156, 157, 158-59, 164
- Suffolk, Va., 119f; siege of, 140f
- Sumner, E. V., at Sharpsburg, 100; demands surrender of Fredericksburg, 109; crosses Rappahannock, 111; attacks Marye's Hill, 113
- Swinton, William, interviews Longstreet, 317, 411; writes *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, 411
- Taylor, Erasmus, 277, 416
- Taylor, Richard, 323, 325; criticizes Longstreet, 428
- Taylor, Walter H., 414, 416; opinion of, 181, 276; Longstreet writes, 426
- Tennessee, East, situation in, 217f; campaign in, 235-49
- Terry, A. H., 282-83
- Thomas, George H., 200, 207, 229; at Chickamauga, 205f, 209-10, 211; replaces Rosecrans, 218; defeats Hood in Tennessee, 285
- Thompson, M. Jeff, 323, 340, 347; supports Longstreet, 335; as engineer on Levee Commission, 368; death of, 368
- Toombs, Robert, 63; at Raccoon Ford, 80; captures Pope's despatches, 81; commands rear guard, 95; defends Burnside's bridge, 100-101; leadership of, 102
- Traverse trench, origin of, 116-17
- Trimble, I. R., 181, 184
- Turner's Gap, action at, 95
- Twigg, David E., 10
- United Confederate Veterans, New Orleans meeting of, 406; Longstreet's opinion of, 406-407; Houston, Tex., meeting of, 408; Longstreet attends Richmond meeting of, 408, 435; Augusta, Ga., meeting of, 440
- Vance, Z. B., 119
- Van Dorn, Earl, commands division, 35
- Vaughn, J. C., in East Tennessee, 236f
- Venable, C. S., 260, 272, 299, 306, 414; writes Longstreet, 415
- Wadsworth, J. S., 269-71, 273
- Walker, J. G., 93f, 99
- Walker, Leroy P., 17
- Wallace, Lew, 386, 437

- Walton, J. B., 425; at Blackburn's Ford, 24
- Warmoth, H. C., 332, 347f; opposition to, 351;
Longstreet supports, 351-53; injured, 353;
and Custom House controversy, 354-57;
Longstreet tenders resignation to, as adjutant
general, 359; elected president, Returning
Board, 362; struggle of, with Pinchback,
364-65
- Warren, G. K., 262, 267-68, 270, 292
- Weitzel, Godfrey, 282-83
- Wells, J. M., attitude of, 327; removed from
office, 328-29, 338; as president, Returning
Board, 373
- West, J. R., 352
- West Point, 7-8, 376, 381, 441-42
- Wharton, Jack, 362-63
- Wheeler, Joseph, 210, 221, 223, 235, 336
- White, Julius, 226
- White Leaguers, 369; conflict of, with Kellogg
administration, 370-71; mass protest of, 370;
met by armed force, 370-72
- Whiting, W. H. C., at First Manassas, 31; at
Seven Pines, 53; position of, 56; in south-
eastern Virginia, 141
- Whittier, C. A., 308
- Wilcox, C. M., 181, 184, 268, 271, 294-96, 320
- Wilderness, the, description of, 262; battles in,
265f
- Williamsburg, Va., battle of, 47-48; losses at,
48-49
- Wilson, Henry, 331; address of, 332
- Wilson, James Grant, 437
- Wilson, James H., 263
- Withers, Robert E., 367
- Wofford, W. T., 273
- Wood, T. J., 205-206
- Wright, G. H., 263, 294, 305
- Wright, Marcus J., 430